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Structuring social relationships: Music-making and group identity 
Rebecca Naomi Whiteman 
This thesis is about groups and their boundaries: how we bond with some people, but are separated 
from others who do not belong. It is also about social interaction - the building-blocks of this group 
identity. In particular, I investigate music’s role in our social landscape. Making music together is a 
powerful way of establishing and structuring these relationships; I argue that it can bring people 
together, but can also reinforce the divisions between them. 
First, I present a new synthesis, drawing on relevant literature about our capacity for sociality, 
analyses of social interaction, and a history of the research on social groups. I outline a helpful 
framework by which to understand different forms of social engagement, depending on the nature 
of the interaction goal; I also clarify the concepts of interdependence and categorisation as distinct 
processes in group formation. Following this, I suggest that when our interaction is primarily 
affiliative, or relational, in goal (with little or no external goal focus), then it brings people together 
via relationships of interdependence; when we aim to communicate something more precisely (i.e. 
we have an external goal), then the need to maintain our common ground might instead form the 
basis for social division via categorisation. 
Second, I report an initial empirical project which tests some of these predictions. My experiments 
show that music-making enhances affiliation, especially when there is no external goal focus. Adding 
a goal contributes to social division - affiliation on the basis of common team membership - but only 
when the interaction task was a success. When it was not successful, or caused embarrassment for 
those involved, participants instead seem to distance themselves from any associated group identity. 
This experimental work is supported by video analyses, in which I show different patterns of 
behaviour in interaction with and without an external goal.  
This thesis is an important starting point in understanding the nature both of social groups and of 
music. It highlights the potential for music-making to structure our social world through either 
affiliation or division.  
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Introduction 
Humans have always been sociable animals. Every day, we engage with others; we think, speak or act 
according to the norms of our community. We are interdependent - we learn from others, acquire 
food with them, and rely on their help in bringing up our children. We each build a sense of our own 
identity - both as individuals, with our quirks and peculiarities, and as members of society, wanting to 
feel part of something bigger. This thesis is about how we relate to others; specifically, about the 
everyday, face-to-face, small-scale interactions we have with others to enact these social 
relationships.  
We interact with others in all sorts of ways - passing people in the street, standing together in a lift, 
holding a conversation or committing to a lifelong partnership. Musical interaction is an important 
part of this social world. Playing in an orchestra, listening to a playlist, attending a concert or 
“jamming” with friends are all places where we build connections with others. This work concerns 
the role of music-making in forming social groups; specifically, how does music - as a form of social 
interaction - help us to bond with others, and also to form our sense of social identity? And also - 
how does music relate to other forms of interaction, such as speech? 
Answering these questions has been a multi-faceted process, drawing on insights from many 
different fields of study - observational, theoretical, ethnographic, and empirical. Understanding 
humans - and especially groups of humans - requires knowledge of our ontogeny (and phylogeny); 
understanding of our social cognitive capacities, from the underlying neuroscience to their 
behavioural manifestations; and insights into how our particular cultural context influences how we 
expect to engage with others, in speech and music. As such, this work does not fall easily into the 
discipline of musicology, or even social psychology - rather, it involves the convergence of these with 
anthropology, evolutionary psychology, ethnomusicology, and sometimes sociology. 
The project has two main parts: first, a literature review, synthesising research from a variety of 
fields (Chapters 1 to 4); and second, an empirical project, using novel experimental methods to offer 
initial insights into a perhaps ongoing investigation (Chapters 5 and 6). I shall use this introduction to 
present some definitions, before providing a more detailed overview of the thesis as a whole. 
Understanding musicality 
I start with the particularly thorny issue of how to define music, beginning with the commonplace 
(Western) idea of music as sound, as an artwork to listen to or even to “consume”. I argue that this is 
far too narrow a definition for our purposes - where the broader, social function of music is 
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concerned. Instead, I present a basis for thinking of music as an interactive activity - a (potentially 
universal) practice, rather than a specific product or “piece”. Once this is in place, we can consider 
the social (and even survival) consequences of music-making - including, of course, the potential 
efficacy of music in forming group identity. 
The Western music scene 
If we were to approach an unsuspecting individual and ask how they define “music”, they are likely 
to suggest that it is primarily an auditory phenomenon: perhaps “organised sound”, a backing track, 
or something they enjoy listening to in their leisure time. The first entry for the Oxford English 
Dictionary defines ‘music’ as: 
The art or science of combining vocal or instrumental sounds to produce beauty of form, 
harmony, melody, rhythm, expressive content, etc. (“music”, OED, 2003) 
Music for us is a pleasing combination of sounds - or at least something to which we might ascribe 
aesthetic or “artistic” value. On special occasions, we pay to attend concerts, to see and appreciate a 
particular performer or piece; we sit quietly and listen to how the pattern unfolds (and complain 
when the presence of other audience members spoils this experience; see, e.g. Molleson, 2013). 
Now that recorded music is easily available, especially over the internet, music can be literally all 
around us. People carry with them their own musical world, playing through noise-cancelling 
headphones as they walk, jog or commute. Music has become a commodity (see Katz, 2010; also 
Sterne, 2006) - we pay for the right to “own” or curate that world. We can build and share playlists 
which give a sense of who we are and what we enjoy (see e.g. North & Hargreaves, 1999). At the click 
of a button, we can regulate our emotional state, using music to lift our spirits or evoke a sense of 
nostalgia (e.g. Saarikallio & Erkkilä, 2007). We can use this to influence others - perhaps even against 
their better judgement (e.g. Ziv et al., 2007). Thus, music has become a sonic resource - something 
we draw on as individuals, but also of commercial value for businesses to exploit.  
Our musical tastes signify our own social identities, while musical genres more widely often align 
with socio-economic or national stereotypes (see e.g. Bryson, 1996, or Shevy, 2008). Music can have 
political import, in its association with either minority groups (like the subversive anti-government 
sentiment in popular music of 1980s Brazil) or oppressive forces in society (think of the Nazi adoption 
of Wagner’s rousing melodies in public displays of power - an association which remains in Israel 
today). 
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Locating the survival function of sound 
In these ways, music is socially and politically significant. However, attempts to understand what 
underlies this, and the potential origins of this behaviour, from a psychological, biological, even 
evolutionary perspective, all highlight a puzzle. Namely, music does not have obvious survival value, 
and so does not fit easily into traditional models of natural selection. As noted by Charles Darwin 
himself:  
As neither the enjoyment nor the capacity of producing musical notes are faculties of the least 
direct use to man in reference to his ordinary habits of life, they must be ranked amongst the 
most mysterious with which he is endowed. (Darwin, 1871) 
Perhaps, music is a by-product of other, more useful capacities. Pinker (1997) famously characterised 
it as ‘auditory cheesecake’ - our enjoyment of music is a pleasurable accident, drawing on useful 
capacities for language, emotional signalling and auditory perception, but without any value in its 
own right (also compare Roederer, 1984, and Hauser & McDermott, 2003). Others have afforded 
music slightly more significance: Miller (2000) proposed a costly signalling account, arguing that 
music could be adaptive in sexual selection - performers demonstrate their fitness through 
impressive sonic displays. However, given the lack of sexual dimorphism we see in musical 
performance, this account seems somewhat limited. More recently, Patel (2010) suggested that 
music is a ‘transformative invention’ or ‘technology’: it was a chance occurrence, a one-off, which 
then happened to have biological, social significance, and impacts on our cultural landscape - in the 
same way as e.g. fire.1 
These accounts, characterising music as a by-product, or something that emerged by accident, 
without biological significance or roots (apart from, perhaps, Miller’s account), do not sit well with 
our everyday experience of music. We report strong emotional effects (Gabrielsson, 2001), with 
neurobiological correlates in central reward-processing regions (Blood & Zatorre, 2001); we exhibit 
early proclivity for rhythm perception (Winkler et al., 2009); and close ties between music and ritual 
are apparent across most (if not all) human societies (see summary of possible musical universals 
reviewed by Trehub et al., 2015).  Music is likely older, with deeper roots than they acknowledge: the 
‘Isuritz Pipes’ exemplify sophisticated musical instruments (with precise placing of finger-holes, and 
possibly an off-centre playing position), dating back to the Aurignacian (d’Errico et al., 2003). The 
more recent discoveries of bone and ivory flutes in southwestern Germany corroborated this: by 35 
 
1 Hodgson and Verpooten (2014) also proposed a costly signalling account of music, but with its adaptive value 
limited to a cultural sphere (see Chapter 1 for an evaluation of the validity of the distinction between biology 
and culture): within models of cultural evolution, music and other ritual practices were selected due to their 
value in displaying the fitness of the society or group as a whole (see also Hodgson 2017). 
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000 years ago, our Europeans ancestors already had a well-developed musical tradition (Conard et 
al., 2009).  
The discrepancy we find between music’s social (and personal) significance, its ancient heritage, and 
the suggestion that it is no more than a by-product with no biological significance in its own right, 
might be the result of a problematic starting point: our definition of the phenomenon we seek to 
explain. If we understand music purely as sound, then it is harder to understand why this might be so 
important. However, if we have reason to expand this concept, and to think of music in broader 
terms, then we might discover more productive avenues to address questions of the social, 
psychological role of music in group bonding and identity. 
Music beyond the West: expanding our definition 
The idea of music as a commodity, or an auditory art-form, is widespread now but had very specific, 
Northern European, origins. The industry of copying manuscripts, a rising Medieval trade 
proliferating particular versions of church liturgy and providing objects of prestige for the wealthy, 
might be an early example of this thinking. Notated music here became part of the economy, even 
though what was written down was only an extract from a rich, flexible orally-transmitted tradition 
(see overview in Cross, forthcoming). It was much later that the idea of “the music itself” began to 
surface. Musical engagement (influenced by figures such as Immanuel Kant) involved ‘disinterested’ 
listening, as we contemplate the beautiful (even sublime) in the musical form (see Rohlf, 2018, for an 
overview of Kant’s philosophy). A musical work was unique, and of great cultural and artistic value; 
the master composer who created it sometimes became an almost mythical being - a “musical 
genius” whose oeuvre transcended time to become part of a virtual museum of musical artefacts 
(see Goehr, 1992). Our approach to music - in the West - is heavily influenced by this philosophy. 
When we attend a concert or download an MP3, we are buying music as if it were an artefact, an 
object with an identity of its own. 
However, this perspective does not capture the focus of most musical practice, in the West and 
elsewhere. Children sing together with no training; people dance or clap along, engaging actively 
with music more often than they try ‘disinterested listening’. Thomas Turino (2008) proposed a 
helpful distinction between our product-focussed, or presentational, musical culture and more 
participatory fields of music-making. The former encompasses the idea of music as an artefact, or 
even commodity, produced by one group of people, ‘the artists’, for a different group, ‘the 
audience’. This is what we are used to when we attend a concert, for example, or study the 
Beethoven string quartets. The latter definition of music instead prioritises ‘the doing’ (original 
emphasis), where all participants are contributing and have a role to play in the musical, social, event 
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(Turino, 2008: 26, 28).2 This is clear for the typical church congregation (where participants seldom 
perform); however, even considering a classical concert, we miss half the story if we consider only 
the musical ‘work’ which is on display. The actions of the audience, tapping their feet, recognising or 
humming along to a melody, even the decision to go to and participate in that specific musical event, 
is part of the richer activity which Christopher Small (1998) calls ‘musicking’. 
We should also consider how music is done and thought about beyond what is familiar in the 
Western world - not in stylistic terms but in the very definition of what the behaviour involves (Cross, 
2012a). A crucial dimension of this is practice: 
The vast majority of the philosophical literature has treated music as aesthetic object from the 
perspective of a listener - as sound, as score, as, at best, traces of musical behaviours. Very little 
attention has been devoted to accounting for music in action - to accounting for how a capacity 
to make music is acquired and how it is exercised, as well as what constitutes such a capacity in 
the first place. ... In any case, the majority of non-Western societies have tended to rely on 
informal, mimetic, enculturative processes of music learning...just as is the case across 
contemporary Western societies outwith the academy. (Cross & Tolbert, forthcoming) 
The freedom and uncertainty embodied in many improvised musical traditions provide a good 
demonstration of this: free collective jazz performance relies primarily on the spontaneous, mutual 
adjustment of co-performers, drawing only on the ‘implicit mental model’ which comes with 
familiarity with one’s partners at the outset, rather than any musical “work” (Canonne & 
Aucouturier, 2015, p. 545; see also Wilson & MacDonald, 2016). However, the same applies even to 
scripted performances: music is realised in the performance event, where people align their actions 
and understandings with one another in real time (Cook, 2017). Recently, approaches in music 
psychology have situated this ‘online’ processing in the context of embodied and enactive 
approaches to music cognition, more generally: the creation of musical meaning (whether scripted or 
spontaneous) is socially-situated, emergent from the collective actions of those involved (Bishop, 
2018; see also van der Schyff et al., 2018, and Moran, 2014, on the value of a process- over product-
oriented approach). 
Ethnomusicologists have acknowledged this for a long time. In the middle of the last century, Alan 
Merriam (1964) advocated awareness and discussion of the social context of musical practices, not a 
sole focus on formal features of the “music itself”. He proposed a three-stage model of music - the 
concept, behaviour, and, only then, how these are manifested in sound. This anthropology of music 
was taken up later in the work of John Blacking, who noted: 
 
2 In an essay, Turino (2009) links these fields of practice to different social habits; he argues that the 
participatory field contributes more to a sense of community, where everyone can and should take part in the 
performance. 
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Music is a synthesis of cognitive processes which are present in culture and in the human body: 
the form it takes, and the effects it has on people, are generated by the social experiences of 
human bodies in different cultural environments. Because music is humanly organized sound, it 
expresses aspects of the experience of individuals in society. (Blacking, 1973: 89) 
In his ethnography of Venda children’s songs, Blacking (1967) describes how their “musical” 
characteristics or form can be understood in the light of the children’s everyday social experiences; 
he identifies, for example, the influence from Venda language and national dance on what and how 
those children sing. A decade later, Anthony Seeger (1987) further developed this approach. He 
described how music is, in fact, more than just a manifestation of cultural context; rather it is ‘part of 
the very construction and interpretation of social and cultural relationships and processes’ (Seeger, 
1987: xiv). The musical traditions and practices of the Suyá (a hunter-gatherer tribe in the Brazilian 
Amazon) provide his case study.3 Musical performance here is not a single event, isolated or set apart 
from daily routines; rather, music-making is closely associated with social roles, identities, and 
ceremonies central to the life of the community: ‘Suyá society was an orchestra, its village was a 
concert hall, and its year a song’ (Seeger, 1987: 140). In this way, the practice of musical interaction is 
a key part of social relationships, even the functioning of society as a whole.  
In this thesis, I am considering the roots of music-making, its possible role in social group identity, 
and the psychological, biological, evolutionary mechanisms underpinning this. For these purposes, 
we need to consider human universals over cultural peculiarities, and so require a definition of music 
which is cross-culturally valid (the traditional, rather Western-centric, understanding of music as 
“organised sound” is too limited for these questions).4 Music as practice (i.e. music-making), in one 
form or another, might be a human universal. In their cross-cultural review, Trehub et al. (2015) note 
convergences in various practices and definitions of musical behaviour: it is often central to society, 
to social and ritual norms, enacting social bonds from intimate caregiving up to large-scale 
gatherings. This approach aligns with the ethnographic data, and offers a perspective relevant to 
exploring face-to-face, social relationships and identity. 
Music-making: a working definition 
Therefore, I define musical performance, or music-making, primarily as a form or mode of 
interaction, a social, performative behaviour creating a context in which we can relate to one or 
 
3 Note that ‘Suyá’ is an external label; their self-denomination is ‘Kĩsedje’ (Everett, 2012: 20). 
4 Much of the psychological literature has come up against this very problem, as many experimental results 
recruit exclusively undergraduate students at American Universities (Henrich et al., 2010). Heine and 
Norenzayan (2006) call for cross-cultural differences to be taken into account, and propose methods for 
investigating psychological universals (also Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). 
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many others. Cross (2012b) talks about how music lies within a single ‘communicative toolkit’, which 
supports spoken, sung, and all other ways of relating to and with others.  
Specifically, musical interaction can be seen as ‘embodying, entraining, and transposably 
intentionalising time in sound and action’ (Cross, 2003). It is likely to involve some degree of 
interpersonal synchrony, as people tend to entrain with one another, moving (and thus sounding) 
together in time (Clayton et al., 2005). When we isolate the sound dimension, we see that it 
generally involves discrete pitches, unequally spaced, perhaps with a preference for consonant over 
dissonant intervals (although see McDermott et al., 2016). Importantly, however, this communicates 
some sort of emotional expression - an embodied property rooted in animal signalling behaviour (see 
literature review in Juslin & Laukka, 2003). Although we can (and do) abstract this musical sound 
from its social, communicative context, even the audio signal alone maintains those ‘human-like 
properties’ which demonstrate its embodied and interactive origins (Morley, 2013: 315; see also 
Molnar-Szakacs & Overy, 2006). In these ways, the “musical” types of communicative, intentional 
behaviour can be a particularly flexible, and easy, way of engaging with others. This is the music I 
focus on; a behaviour which is intricately tied to our sociality and to the performance of our 
communities. 
Making music for survival 
With this new lens, considering music-making as an activity (rather than an artefact), we can now re-
address the question of its evolutionary origins. There are a number of possible biological or 
evolutionary accounts. For example, music could be an important signalling behaviour. While Miller’s 
sexual selection account focussed on the possible mating advantage offered by the ability to produce 
music (defined in this case as an impressive sonic display), others have developed and nuanced this 
approach. For example, Merker (2000) explored the incidence of synchronous chorusing amongst 
primates and other animals (e.g. crabs); this not only attracts females, but also indicates male co-
operation.  Hagen and Bryant (2003) suggested that music and dance might have functioned as a 
multi-modal ‘coalition signalling system’, displaying the group’s co-operation, cohesion and strength, 
and thus contributing to defence against neighbouring, competing tribes. Hagen and Hammerstein 
(2009) corroborated this with the observation that social carnivores such as primates and wolves also 
use co-ordinated vocalisations to aid territorial defence. Thus, the ability to produce co-ordinated 
musical displays offers clear selective advantages. However, these accounts by and large still focus on 
the “music itself” - a signal which conveys useful information to others. Instead, I am interested in 
the function of the musical behaviour. 
Other work has considered the capacities behind this music-making - our musical “instinct”, perhaps, 
or our “musicality”. Fitch (2015) identified four key features of ‘bio-musicality’: song and vocal 
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learning, tool use and drumming, synchronisation, and dance. Each of these might demonstrate 
continuity (homologous or analogous) with other animal behaviour, such as bird and whale song, ape 
tool use, and various chorusing behaviours; Fitch argued that we should consider the origins, 
phylogeny and ontogeny, and various ecological pressures, which lie behind each of these aspects of 
musical behaviour - rather than considering “music” as a whole. Trainor (2015) suggested that our 
ability to understand auditory signals (necessary in many musical contexts) is likely to be grounded in 
auditory scene analysis; this capacity has clear survival value - we need to be able to recognise and 
respond to potentially significant sound in our surroundings. Of course, beyond our auditory 
capacities, music-making involves moving in time, entraining with others around us. Synchrony in 
sound and movement is likely to be advantageous in forming strong social bonds within the group - 
not just signalling coalition strength to outsiders (McNeill, 1995).  
All of this work acknowledges that ‘musicality’ is a synthesis of many components, each of which is 
likely to have been of evolutionary, selective value. Indeed, it is important to remember that music-
making is not necessarily a separate category of behaviour at all. We tend to talk about music, or 
song, as distinct from spoken genres (we even describe songs as comprising music and lyrics, as 
separate components). However, this dichotomy is not always appropriate. Consider, for example, 
church liturgy, or poetry, which fall somewhere in the middle. The vocal forms of the Suyá in Brazil 
include genres which span both (what we would call) speech and music, encompassing ‘instruction’, 
‘everyday speech’, ‘everybody listens speech’, ‘invocation’ and ‘song’ (Seeger, 1987: 26). All of these 
could be said to be simultaneously spoken and sung, to different extents. Thus, we should consider 
music-making a very general class of behaviour, including all sorts of communicative practices (from 
spoken to instrumental forms, and everything in between). 
Iain Morley discusses the emergence of musical behaviour in this broad sense, considering the origins 
of contemporary hunter-gatherer musical ritual alongside those of mother-infant interaction. He 
provides a comprehensive review of the biological, cognitive capacities underpinning all sorts and 
components of interactive musicality - including emotion contagion (or the collective modulation of 
emotion and arousal), entrainment (moving and attending together in time), and an understanding 
of this shared experience (through joint intentionality or Theory of Mind). He also draws on 
archaeological evidence to show how these various abilities emerged incrementally over a long 
period of time. Vocal production, whether more musical or speech-like, is tied to our emotional 
experience and expression, and also our ability to control and co-ordinate our movements with 
others. This embodied, emotional vocal control (including a larger tonal range, capacity for sustained 
duration and articulatory control) is likely to have older evolutionary roots than any capacity for 
linguistic syntax. This more ancient and holistic, multi-facetted, musical instinct has great social 
significance, supporting our ability to relate to and bond with others - especially important in times 
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of uncertainty, such as child-rearing, inter-group meetings, perhaps rallying against threats to food or 
other resources (Morley, 2013).5 
Roederer had already provided a similar suggestion in his exploration of the emotional content of 
music (albeit defined as sound). Music: 
... can contribute to the equalization of the emotional state of a group of listeners just as a 
speech may contribute to the equalization of the intellectual state (knowledge) of the audience. 
... [it is] a means of establishing behavioural coherency in masses of people. In the distant past 
this could indeed have had an important survival value, as an increasingly complex human 
environment demanded coherent, collective actions on the part of groups of human society. 
(Roederer, 1984: 356, original emphasis) 
Ian Cross (2012b) also considers this relational quality of music-making as central to its historic and 
present societal significance. He speculates that modern musical practices might have come about 
alongside the progressive altricialisation of our species: human infants are born relatively under-
developed, thus the social context of engagement with those around them is crucial in their cognitive 
formation. These musical modes of engagement remain important into adulthood, as they continue 
to provide a flexible context to relate to others - especially in ‘situations of social uncertainty’. Music 
remains a sort of signalling behaviour - but one where the ambiguity of its meaning, or its ‘floating 
intentionality’, is a crucial part of its social function (Cross, 1999). Cross locates the survival value of 
music-making not just in biological terms, but also in the formation of our capacity for cultural 
understanding: 
... human musicality appears to provide co-ordinative and open frameworks for interaction, 
maintaining and perhaps forming, the intellectual and social flexibility that is manifested in our 
capacity for shared intentionality. Musicality does not give rise to social justice, but at an 
evolutionary timescale it is likely that it has provided space for the emergence of concepts that 
bear on how humans can, and ultimately perhaps should, interact. (Cross, 2005a:124) 
In this thesis, I continue this investigation into the social efficacy of music-making. Music, when 
defined in terms of social performance or communicative, interactive practice, is of great 
evolutionary and sociocultural significance in the development of modern human behaviour. It is 
appropriate, therefore - and indeed necessary - to explore it through the lens of experimental social 
 
5 Contrast the account provided by Gary Tomlinson (2015), who also discusses the interdependence of music 
and speech, situated in the context of the emergence of human sociality. However, he defines music as ‘the 
systematization of discrete pitch’ (Tomlinson, 2015: 265), exploring it at a more syntactic, symbolic level (rather 
than as communicative practice), aligned with linguistic forms in speech. He suggests that music is in fact the 
‘final coalescence’ of our abstract, symbolic thought (which is combined with more basic mechanisms such as 
entrainment; Tomlinson, 2015: 268). Here, instead, we consider musicality as a capacity and a performative 
context in which we form social relationships; this has clearer evolutionary roots, with more direct selective 
significance for individuals and groups (see discussion of the group selection debate in Appendix 4). 
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psychology.  I use the remainder of this introduction to present some key considerations and debates 
within this discipline, to justify and delimit the scope offered by this approach. 
Understanding sociality 
The question of how music-making supports or generates a sense of group identity could be explored 
in a myriad of ways. We require a multi-disciplinary approach, bringing together many different 
insights to inform our predictions about how musical interaction might relate to group formation. I 
shall also contribute to this scholarship with empirical - experimental and observational - data, 
collected using methods devised in line with most social psychology. In this introduction, I shall 
review some of the issues which have shaped this discipline in particular. With this in mind, I then 
provide an overview of my thesis - the main theory I explore, and how I devised a suite of 
experiments to test my hypotheses.  
Approaches to social psychology 
In the past century, two broad themes have characterised debate around the approach and scope of 
experimental social psychology. I outline first the apparent role of psychology in establishing human 
universals, contrasted with an awareness of substantial cultural variability, and note how researchers 
have attempted to balance these considerations. Second, I explore the potential of experimental 
methods - whether they are limited to clearly measurable, observable phenomena, or can tap into 
underlying factors, documenting some aspects of our “subjective” inner experience. 
Human universals or cultural specifics? 
In general, psychologists aim to elucidate human universals in our way of perceiving and 
understanding our environment. They assume the existence of at least some human-wide, 
sometimes species-specific mechanisms which shape how we act - and that these can be uncovered 
through experimental, behavioural, or neuroscientific methods, including animal models. These 
mechanisms would have evolved: they should provide (directly or otherwise) some sort of survival or 
selective advantage in the face of ecological pressures or threats, whether from other species or 
through intraspecific competition with other individuals or groups.6 
Solomon Asch (1987) wrote on the aims and methods of social psychology more specifically, 
highlighting the importance of considering universals. Psychologists are tasked, he said, with 
formulating a ‘theory of man’ - namely, ‘a comprehensive conception of human nature’ (Asch, 1987: 
5). However, this is held in tension with the fact of significant cultural divergences. 
 
6 The controversy over group selection is explored in Appendix 4. 
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If one wants to understand human beings it is not sufficient to analyse their individual capacities; 
one must study men in their setting, which is society, and observe the forces that social 
conditions exert upon them. Society...is the prime reality that provides goals and gives form to 
the character of men. Man is socially determined; to understand men we must start with society. 
(Asch, 1987: 16)  
Social psychology should tread between these universalising and specific accounts. It has to examine 
the interrelationship between the ‘psychological facts’ and the ‘social environment’ (Asch, 1987: 38).  
It has recently become evident that most participant samples, used for experiments into so-called 
universals, come from exclusively WEIRD populations (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and 
Democratic) - often undergraduates at American institutions (Henrich et al., 2010). Researchers’ lack 
of awareness of their own cultural specificity - and how this has the potential to shape their 
performance in experiments - has limited the conclusions we can draw from this work. To address 
this, and to ascertain what might be universal (and rooted in our species-wide cognitive and 
biological capacities), we need to replicate any experimental results in other cultural contexts (see 
strategies set out in Norenzayan & Heine, 2005; Heine & Norenzayan, 2006). This is especially 
important in investigations of social psychology: differences in cultural context likely have particular 
significance when it comes to our way of relating to or interacting with others.  
This task does not just involve noticing parallels across various social contexts, but actually 
understanding human cultural diversity - how the underpinning psychological tendencies are 
manifested in specific locales. This has historically been the domain of social anthropology - or, in our 
case, ethnomusicology: case studies shed light on particular social contexts, but also provide insights 
into the commonalities of human (musical) experience. In the light of this work, we can suggest 
possible universal traits - as in the aforementioned work by Morley (2013) and Trehub et al. (2015).7 
Some interesting insights on this issue have also come in the guise of evolutionary psychology - 
specifically, theories of ‘social niche construction’ (see Chapter 1). Social behaviour is not just an 
outcome of particular (biological or cultural) evolutionary mechanisms, but rather forms the 
environment, exerting its own selection pressures which shape the development of norms, practices, 
perhaps even psychological needs and capacities (see Laland et al., 2001). For all of these reasons, 
understanding an aspect of our social psychology - specifically, the role our social (musical) 
interactions play in our group identities - requires insight not only into our human biology, but also 
into the concrete contexts in which we perform these processes, day-to-day.  
 
7 Earlier, and within anthropology more generally, Brown (1991) enumerated many cross-cultural universals (or 
near-universals). There is some controversy over whether universals should be considered among concrete 
practices, as Brown does, or whether they are only on the level of underlying capacities (see e.g. Ekman, 1994, 
vs. Russell, 1994 - cited in Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). 
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Internal processes or outward signs? 
Another important debate has encompassed the field of psychology, as a whole. Looking back a little 
over a hundred years, we have seen dramatic and far-reaching shifts in the overall approach and 
scope of the discipline. At the start of the last century, scientists such as Watson, and later, Skinner, 
promoted a psychology purely based upon external behaviour. Writing in 1913, Watson argued that 
a focus on stimulus and response (and how one might predict another) is a more reliable, and useful, 
form of data - or ‘observable fact’ (Watson, 1913: 167) - than could be gained from any studies 
relying on introspection. This idea limited the scope of psychological investigations: 
The time seems to have come when psychology must discard all reference to consciousness; 
when it need no longer delude itself into thinking that it is making mental states the object of 
observation. (Watson, 1913: 163)   
Instead, he proposed: 
What we need to do is to start work upon psychology, making behavior [sic], not consciousness, 
the objective point of our attack. (Watson, 1913: 175-176, original emphasis) 
Insights could then be drawn from how behaviour changes, how habits are formed in ways 
predictable from the external environment (the presence of rewards or punishments, perhaps). No 
interpretation of this is needed - we should not propose any internal workings, mental processes or 
mechanisms. Indeed, no mention need be made of our (or another animal’s) ‘stream of 
consciousness’ (Watson, 1913: 160) at all - a subject on which scientists up until that point had only 
been unhelpfully vague (see also an overview in Graham, 2019). 
These ideas brought us an empirical method: a psychology which could be considered ‘a purely 
objective, experimental branch of natural science’, on a par with physics or chemistry (Watson, 1913: 
176). However, when this was applied to more complex behaviour, identifying just the observables 
could not provide adequate insight. Notably, Skinner’s radical behaviourist approach to language - a 
capacity, he suggested, which was acquired through simple reinforcement - attracted serious 
criticism: 
The magnitude of the failure of this attempt to account for verbal behavior [sic] serves as a kind 
of measure of the importance of the factors omitted from consideration, and an indication of 
how little is really known about this remarkably complex phenomenon. (Chomsky, 1959: 28) 
These ‘omitted’ factors were the internal workings - what we might now call cognition, memory, or 
perhaps learning: 
24 
 
One would naturally expect that prediction of the behavior of a complex organism (or machine) 
would require, in addition to information about external stimulation, knowledge of the internal 
structure of the organism, the ways in which it processes input information and organizes its own 
behavior. (Chomsky, 1959: 27) 
By this point, of course, scientists began to have at their disposal new models, or analogies, for how 
this internal structure might operate. New computing machinery was coming to the fore - initially, 
those systems devised by Alan Turing which were instrumental in the British war effort during the 
1940s. These provided a conceptual tool to theorise what lay between the stimulus input and output 
behaviour - i.e. the workings of the “mind” - triggering a so-called “cognitive revolution”. Thus, we 
could start to understand how we hold, process and respond to information as a series of 
connections, formed and stabilised by frequent co-occurrence - a process summarised in the well-
known Hebbian maxim: “Cells that fire together wire together.” The idea that we gradually acquire 
this network of associations (supported by the results of various priming studies) formed the basis 
for new models of language (e.g. Dell, 1986; see overview in Thagard, 2018). These approaches have 
been refined over the years, but remain plausible in the light of corresponding advances in 
neuroscience (e.g. Song et al., 2000).  
These two broad standpoints - a focus either on behaviour or on inner processes - remain important 
in contemporary experimental paradigms. In a critique of social psychology, Baumeister et al. (2007) 
questioned an almost exclusive focus on self-report or apparently irrelevant ‘finger-tapping’ tasks - 
measures which are assumed to relate in some way to our inner attitudes or mental processes. They 
call for researchers to remember that the ‘actual behaviour’ is what we are ultimately interested in. 
Once upon a time, perhaps, psychologists observed behavior and reported what they saw, along 
with their theories about why it happened. The emergence of competing theories, and therefore 
competing explanations, led psychologists to push each other to show what happened inside the 
person to produce the behavior. Gradually the focus shifted on these debates about inner 
processes, and journals started publishing studies that made significant contributions about 
demonstrating inner processes. Somewhere along the way, it became acceptable to publish data 
on inner processes without any real behavior included at all, which eventually became the norm.  
(Baumeister et al., 2007: 400) 
Of course, such ‘finger-tapping’ or more introspective measures might well provide insight into some 
internal mechanism; Baumeister and colleagues recommend a balanced approach - investigating 
both these processes and other, more relevant, external behaviours. 
Everyone would probably agree that the ideal paper would report both direct observation of 
behavior and measurement of inner processes that mediate and produce those behaviors. 
(Baumeister et al., 2007:401) 
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In the present project, I aim for a similar balance. This is an investigation into the relationship 
between certain behaviours - social, including musical, interaction - and an inner attitude or feeling, 
namely our sense of group identity. The latter can, however, be measured both as a behaviour - 
displaying preference towards the in-group, in some way - or as an underlying attitude - for example, 
the feeling of “connectedness” to specific others. My own empirical data include self-report and 
other measures of internal attitudes (including implicit measures), as well as video analysis of what 
my participants are actually doing as they engage with one another. 
A helpful reductionism? 
Psychological experiments offer the rigour and precision of statistical methods to test specific 
hypotheses about the effect of particular conditions or activities on an outcome. They can provide 
quantitative evidence that changing one variable causes a significant change in some other 
dimension, as indexed using certain scales or measures. However, the conditions and measurements 
must be carefully devised to ensure validity and generalisability, while maintaining a certain level of 
control. In general, therefore, all aspects of the experiment design - the research hypotheses, as well 
as the test conditions or activities, and the chosen outcome measures - must be informed and guided 
by theory. I devote a chapter to how I translate theory to practice (see Chapter 5); however, I provide 
a brief overview of this issue here.  
In another critique of the prevalent methods in social psychology, Rozin (2001) describes how a focus 
on experimental precision, at the expense of broader observations and description, can become far 
removed from the actual phenomena in question. 
Any social laboratory experiment involves making a large number of rather arbitrary choices, 
including instructions to participants, the particular human and environmental situation, the 
selection of the manipulation and control, parameters of time and sequence, and the particular 
instantiation of the issue at stake. These necessary decisions entail two risks: (a) they allow for 
the possibility that the results will not bear on real social situations and (b) they may generalize 
to only a very narrow range of apparently similar experimental situations. (Rozin, 2001: 9) 
Modelling musical interaction (or, indeed, conducting any sort of social interaction) in a laboratory is 
a task which raises these same questions of ecological validity:  how can we use data on the 
ontogeny, phylogeny of music-making and current musical practice, to develop activities which test 
the effect of these activities on our social relationships? Piloting extensively the many possible 
instruments and instructions I could use to this end helped in identifying an experimental paradigm 
which could test - easily, and realistically - the effect of music-making, broadly defined. The video 
analysis project, reported in Chapter 6, also provided insights into what this experimental task 
involved.  
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Measuring social relationships is also a difficult task. For this, there was already an extensive 
empirical literature I could draw on; however, my research required a distinction to be drawn 
between group bonding effects, i.e. a direct feeling of connectedness towards specific others, and a 
sense of group or social identity, i.e. a feeling of affiliation towards others on the basis of common 
membership. Devising adequate measures for this purpose required an awareness of how these 
types of social relationships differ - and so what dimensions for explicit self-report, or other more 
implicit tests, would be valid ways to ascertain the degree of bonding for each. 
These considerations shaped how I devised my experiments and video analysis. I present a multi-
method empirical project which aimed to provide “triangulation” of evidence, which I can situate 
within the broader interdisciplinary research context. This is only the beginning of the empirical work 
necessary to test my predictions; however, it provides some precise findings which inform 
scholarship going forward. In addition, the methodological paradigm I have thus developed might be 
of more general value in furthering research on social interaction and bonding. 
The structure of this thesis 
Now that I have outlined the scope of this enquiry - rooted in cross-disciplinary ideas, but using the 
research methods of experimental social psychology - and some definitions - notably, what I mean by 
“music” - I can describe in more detail the aims and structure of this thesis. 
Research on the social and evolutionary significance of music-making provides a basis for suggesting 
that musical interaction might well be important in establishing a sense of group identity. The 
purpose of this thesis is to investigate (a) the characteristics of musical interaction that contribute to 
its social efficacy, and (b) the nature of the group identity it might create. I shall argue that music is 
effective both at bonding people together into interdependent groups, but also instrumental in 
forming the category divides which limit the scope of affiliative interaction. 
I begin, in Chapter 1, by outlining our social capacities - why and how we interact in the first place; 
these attributes have a significant role in our development and wellbeing in the ecological and 
cultural landscape. First, I outline the evolutionary significance of human sociality. After a brief 
historical survey of the application of Darwin’s theory to human culture, and an outline of how this 
can be understood productively through the lens of social niche construction, I present evidence that 
prosociality and the formation of co-operative groups was crucial in our phylogeny; this provided the 
context for the emergence of complex cognition which, in turn, supported this environment. Second, 
I describe the mechanisms which underpin our need to belong in a social environment. Animal 
models provide insights into the neurochemistry of dyadic and group-level attachments, and 
highlight the importance of interaction in forming and maintaining these fundamental bonds.  Third, I 
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present a summary of the complex cognitive skills which are necessary for social interaction - skills 
which we acquire through those attachment relationships discussed above. These include perceptual 
skills, such as our automatic understanding of self-other equivalence; alongside cognitive flexibility, 
enabling us to infer when others differ from us in belief or emotional state. Importantly, these skills 
are interactive - our capacity for shared intentionality allows us to engage with others, from 
establishing shared attention to social learning. An overview of these capacities provides a basis, 
before we consider how social interaction unfolds in practice, and how it affects our relationships 
with others.  
In Chapter 2, I give an overview of how these capacities are enacted in the context of one-to-one 
spoken conversation. I discuss the role of common ground, how grounding takes place moment-to-
moment through verbal and non-verbal behaviour, and the distinction within speech between 
transactional and relational goals.  Sharing these goals can be thought of in terms of common 
ground: perhaps shared perspective on the physical world, shared knowledge of local conventions, or 
in the joint process of face-work. I then compare speech with musical interaction, discussing how the 
same goal orientations emerge in each. We can incorporate external conventions in musical 
interaction, just as in speech; however, music often foregrounds the phatic. These observations form 
the basis for a framework of interaction type - characterising musical (and other) forms of interaction 
as along a continuum of goal focus - from the extrinsically- to the intrinsically-oriented.8  
Then, in Chapter 3, I provide a review of the research on social groups. While, in Chapter 2, I focussed 
on dyadic interaction, I now address the study of social collectives, and how they have been thought 
about during the course of the last century. The first half of this chapter is structured broadly as a 
historical overview, considering the range of approaches there have been to groups, within the 
discipline of social psychology. I consider, in turn, concepts of cohesion, interdependence, and 
entitativity; the post-war inter-group field studies by Sherif and colleagues; through to the 
development of the Minimal Group Paradigm and its conflicting interpretations. In the second half, I 
review in greater depth the controversy between theories of group formation based on 
interdependence or on categorisation. I discuss the distinction between these processes, but argue 
that we should consider them as interlinking processes which work in tandem.  
In Chapter 4, I present the core of my thesis, bringing together material from both Chapters 2 and 3. I 
suggest that social, musical interaction contributes to group identity through both interdependence 
and categorisation. Specifically, I draw a parallel between those group formation processes - 
 
8 I use the terms intrinsically- and extrinsically-oriented to describe the nature of the interaction, as a whole. 
Intrinsically-oriented interaction privileges relational goals, whereas interaction that is extrinsically-focussed 
foregrounds the transactional. Most interaction comprises both relational and transactional goals, more or less 
simultaneously. (See Cross, forthcoming.) 
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interdependence and categorisation - and the continuum of social interaction - from more 
intrinsically- to more extrinsically-oriented engagement. Interaction which foregrounds the 
relational, phatic dimension facilitates face-to-face group bonding through interdependence; 
however, a more transactional, focus, necessitates external forms of common ground for the 
interaction to be successful (even within forms of music-making), thus limiting the scope of this 
interdependence and forming the basis for category divides. In this way, music-making can bring 
people together in forming social groups, but can also demarcate who belongs and who does not.  
In Chapter 5, I introduce my empirical project, which builds upon and tests this theory. I devise three 
experiments; these investigate (a) the role of musical versus non-musical group activities on social 
group bonding; (b) the efficacy of musical group goals on both group bonding and identification with 
a team; and (c) the efficacy of musical interaction goals in a dyad on partner bonding and an implicit 
measure of team identification. I also outline a video case study, contrasting musical interaction with 
and without a goal on patterns of gaze and interpersonal synchrony. I describe first how I developed 
this methodology, before reporting my experiments and the results of my video analysis in Chapter 
6. In brief, my experimental work provides initial evidence that more intrinsically-oriented interaction 
is indeed more efficacious for group bonding, whereas the presence of an external, transactional 
focus or goal can reinforce processes of categorisation. This work also highlights the role of 
embarrassment (perhaps a form of perceived interaction success) in influencing our group identity. 
My behavioural analysis from video data also demonstrates substantive differences between 
interaction conditions: modes of interaction which do not have an external goal generally have more 
interpersonal synchrony, involving more focus on mutual points of convergence than on any turn-
taking structure. I conclude by summarising my main findings and suggesting avenues for future 
research.  
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Chapter 1 Social capacities 
As soon as we enter the world, we are immersed in a complex and changeable landscape. We try to 
find order, perceiving patterns when things are predictable and consistent, responding to any 
unexpected events, and learning how to manipulate or change our surroundings. However, we are 
not just occupied with passive objects; in fact, we spend more time and attention on our dealings 
with other people. We are social creatures, seeking out and enjoying the company of others. These 
are more complicated, and potentially risky, encounters. Other people have minds of their own; we 
need to co-operate with them and trust that they will do the same in return.  
In this chapter, I explore our social capacities - what they are, and where they came from. I start with 
a broad vantage point, considering the place of human sociality in the evolution of our species. The 
application of theories of natural selection to human social, or cultural, experience, and to social 
groups, have been fairly controversial; I review these difficulties, and suggest that theories of social 
niche construction are helpful in coupling social (or cultural) behaviours - like music-making - with 
their biological, evolutionary context.9 After this, I focus on the biological basis for our social instinct, 
and the cognitive capacities which allow us to interact and engage with others. I bring together 
research on the neurochemistry of attachment, theories of neural resonance and action 
understanding, as well as work on our Theory of Mind, our experience of empathy, and how we can 
establish shared intentionality. 
This provides an overview of our social capacities, answering the why and the how of social 
interaction, before we discuss (in Chapter 2), what social interaction comprises; and then (in Chapter 
3) how this interaction occurs in practice, in a complex social landscape of in- and out-groups.  
The evolutionary landscape 
Music-making is an activity that has been significant for thousands, if not tens of thousands of years, 
across cultures, and for individuals’ whole life-span (see e.g. Morley, 2013). To consider the role of 
musical interaction in our experience of living in and belonging to social groups, we need to start by 
exploring the evolution of our social capacities, in general. Our tendency to interact and affiliate with 
others, to want to belong, is something peculiarly human. I shall explore why this might have been 
beneficial, or adaptive, and how it might have, itself, shaped the emergence of our modern 
behaviour. 
 
9 Culture is a difficult term to define. Here, I treat the social and the cultural as overlapping; culture is 
comprised of wider social norms and shared symbolic systems, itself formed by (and shaping) face-to-face 
social interaction. I discuss this in more depth below. Readers should note that the relationship between the 
social and the cultural in anthropology and psychology has not been straightforward (see Johnson, 1994). 
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Evolutionary paradigms 
Understanding the processes of evolution - not to mention the evolution of human capacities - has 
been a challenging topic throughout the past century and a half. The theory of natural selection 
espoused by Darwin set the agenda for subsequent work (Darwin, 1859). It has been variously 
applied, and used to explain all sorts of phenomena (see review in e.g. Jablonka & Lamb, 2007).  
In this section, I shall summarise the various forms in which Darwinism, or neo-Darwinism, have 
appeared. I shall note some controversies that still plague the field; although I do not attempt to 
solve them, an awareness of current debates helps to develop an informed approach to the 
evolutionary significance of human sociality and group identity. 
Understanding humans by their genes 
In general, we first encounter Darwin’s theory in the form generated by the ‘Modern Synthesis’ of 
the 1930s, where the idea of natural selection was combined with Mendelian genetics. Since this 
development, genes (specific regions of DNA, each coding for a particular trait or attribute) have 
been considered the primary units of selection, transmitted via reproduction. Phenotypes, or the 
expression of these traits in the appearance and behaviour of organisms, are determined in large 
part by genotypes (i.e. one’s genetic make-up). Indeed, changes in small sections of DNA can cause 
significant changes in external features, which are then inherited by offspring (from whether we are 
biologically male or female, to the colour of our eyes). When diversity appears (through random 
genetic mutations), certain traits (i.e. genes) which fit better, or offer more adaptive benefit in the 
current environment, are more likely to be selected, and passed down to offspring. There is little 
acknowledgement here of the role of the external environment in this process - genetic variation and 
selection is paramount (see historical survey by Jablonka & Lamb, 2007).  
Scientists have applied this approach to various social traits as well, seeking, for example, a genetic 
basis for antisocial behaviour (e.g. Brunner et al., 1993), or even musicality (e.g. Mariath et al., 2017). 
Additionally, more extensive efforts to apply this thinking to social or cultural phenomena have 
involved devising a different but analogous unit of selection - one that is not biological and 
transmitted via reproduction, but rather a cultural entity which is passed from generation to 
generation by social learning. Dawkins (1976) proposed that ‘memes’ might fulfil this role: these are 
replicating units which code for specific cultural traits.10 
Alongside models of genetic evolution, therefore, we have theories of cultural evolution which 
account for the development of all sorts of human behaviour - from language to basket-weaving (e.g. 
 
10 See also the notion of ‘conceptual genes’ in Caporael & Brewer (1991). 
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Jordan & Shennan, 2003); of course, musical instruments and styles of performance have also been 
approached in this way (Tëmkin & Eldredge, 2007; Le Bomin et al., 2016). 
Beyond the gene - importance of environmental factors 
However, both this “nature” and our “nurture” are important in our formation; indeed, factors in our 
external environment influence and interact with the expression of genetic attributes. Organisms 
have ‘developmental plasticity’ (West-Eberhard, 2003): they are responsive both to their genes and 
to the developmental context in which these genes are expressed. Our models of evolution needed, 
therefore, to be expanded to encompass these insights: 
... if recurrent phenotypes are as much a product of recurrent circumstances as they are of 
replicated genes, how can we accept a theory of organic evolution that deals primarily with 
genes? (West-Eberhard, 2003: 4)11 
Our understanding of these epigenetic processes has grown since then. For example, maternal 
grooming shapes rat stress responses (Weaver et al., 2004); in humans, environmental stress can 
trigger the onset of schizophrenia (a genetic condition; the effects of this stress on the individual are 
also heritable - see Roth et al., 2009).  
If genes alone cannot account for heritable, biological conditions, then it does not make sense to use 
genetic selection-based models to explain even more complex human behaviour in a deterministic 
manner.  
We cannot base an evolutionary psychology on an impoverished biology. If genetic reductionism 
is inadequate to account for integrated structure at the level of the organism, direct genetic 
explanations for complex social arrangements should be inconceivable. (Carporael & Brewer, 
1991:189) 
Similarly, it becomes difficult to characterise social, cultural behaviour as the expression of discrete, 
gene-like entities, which are subject to analogous processes of selection and transmission. Our 
investigation of one such cultural “trait” - namely music-making (see Introduction) - has shown that 
this is not a single attribute, which is passed on in discrete units, but rather a synthesis of many 
interlinking capacities, then performed in a rich social environment. If neo-Darwinian genetic theory 
does not completely explain processes of biological evolution, Dawkins’ version of this modern 
synthesis, applied to the cultural sphere, is scarcely appropriate. 
 
11 Oyama et al. (2001) had a similar idea a couple of years earlier. In their ‘developmental systems theory’, they 
proposed that evolution occurs in ‘cycles of contingency’: ‘development and evolution [are] processes of 
construction and reconstruction in which heterogeneous are contingently but more or less reassembled for 
each life cycle’ (p. 1). Thus, multiple factors shape the expression and transmission of traits - again beyond the 
genetic code.  
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Other evolutionary approaches have been developed to account for this more complex picture. 
Selection might not occur just on the level of the gene (or gene equivalent); instead, different 
individuals, kinship groups, or even populations might be units (or ‘vehicles’) of selection. In other 
words, some genes, behaviours, or even groups, might offer higher ‘fitness’ and thus outcompete 
others in that environment. This idea - namely, multi-level selection - was formulated by Wilson and 
Sober (1994) as a way to defend (or temper) the more controversial theory of group selection (see 
Appendix 4). Although evolution still acts at the level of individuals, and genes remain the unit of 
inheritance (unlike in group selection proper; only individuals can reproduce and pass on their 
genetic material to the next generation), group-level behaviours or environments are key 
contributors to this process. We can explain this further using niche construction theory: this 
acknowledges that the selection environment (the conditions or pressures which favour one 
individual over another) is not unchanging: rather, it is itself formed through organisms’ 
characteristics and behaviour. Organisms do not just respond to their environment; rather, they play 
an active role, changing the ecology and thus the acting selection pressures (see Odling-Smee et al., 
2003). For example, when a beaver constructs a dam, this does not just provide protection from 
external threats (an adaptive response to ecological pressures), but this new habitat itself becomes 
the selective environment, changing water drainage patterns, plant ecosystems, and even potential 
predation risks (see Naiman et al., 1988, for an account of how beavers change their environment; 
and Turner, 2000, for many other examples of this sort of behaviour). This is a holistic account, 
involving much more than just genes.  
If these theories can accommodate broader environmental factors, implicating even learned 
behaviours which manipulate in some way the external world, then there is more scope to consider 
the place of social or cultural phenomena - human behaviour which is difficult to explain at a genetic 
level - in the evolution of our species.  
Characterising culture 
Humans are a product of their biology just as much as are other animals. There are some aspects of 
our social lives, though, where we might hesitate to apply evolutionary theory - such as our artistic 
culture, our musical tastes, our morality or sense of spirituality. However, this traditional distinction 
between the arts and the sciences, or between our culture and biology, is not always helpful. Tim 
Ingold, working in social anthropology, discusses how our cultural practices - those activities we learn 
through socialisation or enculturation, such as a manner of walking or playing a Bach cello suite - do 
not operate in a separate sphere from our psychology, but rather emerge from the intersection of 
our sociality and biology, forming learned behaviour which is fundamentally embodied. He argues 
33 
 
that we need to ‘dissolve the boundaries’ between the social and biological disciplines, adopting a 
so-called ‘obviation approach’:  
... the human being is not a composite entity made up of separable but mutually complementary 
parts, such as body, mind and culture, but rather a singular locus of creative growth within a 
continually unfolding field of relationships. (Ingold, 1998: 23) 
To understand the place of our human sociality, or the impact of certain social activities - like musical 
interaction - then we need to situate them in context. This means understanding their deep-seated 
biological, or cognitive, roots, and their wider evolutionary functions. In what follows, I shall review a 
couple of theories which accommodate cultural phenomena within evolutionary psychology.  
First of all, there is the theory of cultural evolution developed by Richerson and Boyd (documented in 
Richerson & Boyd, 2005; and earlier, Boyd & Richerson, 1985).  In this, they retain some of the more 
simplistic, Darwinian, almost memetic approach to culture, with specific cultural traits being 
selectively transmitted (see a critical review by Fuentes, 2006). However, they defend their use of 
natural selection as a model - acknowledging that the actual mental representations involved, and 
the means of transmission by social learning, are fairly loose analogies of the genetic process 
(Henrich et al., 2008). Importantly, their theory does not involve cultural evolution in isolation, but 
rather gene-culture coevolution: both cultural practices and genetics influence the environment, 
shaping the selection pressures acting both on cultural variation (more quickly), and on genetic 
change (over a longer period). 
... genes and culture [are] obligate mutualists, like two species that synergistically combine their 
specialized capacities to do things that neither one can do alone. ... Genes, by themselves, can’t 
readily adapt to rapidly changing environments. Cultural variants, by themselves, can’t do 
anything without brains and bodies. Genes and culture are tightly coupled but subject to 
evolutionary forces that tug behaviour in different directions. (Richerson & Boyd, 2005: 194) 
One well-known example of this is the prevalence of lactose tolerance within societies with a history 
of dairy farming. The gene which codes for the enzyme necessary to break down lactose (beyond 
childhood) is relatively uncommon in humans. However, with the Neolithic advent of dairy farming in 
Europe, more individuals with this gene thrived in the new environment, being more likely than 
others to pass on their genetic make-up to the next generation. Gradually, more and more could 
process (and benefit from) the milk and cheese that were then available; there is now a 
preponderance of this gene in certain populations (but not in others; see Beja-Pereira et al., 2004). 
Second, given that humans are particularly adept at social learning - a skill which enables us to work 
together to construct or change our environment - niche construction theories are particularly 
applicable. In building shelter, managing our food supply, even developing traditions of cultural, 
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perhaps moral, norms or expectations, we alter the selection pressures which act to give some 
individuals survival (and social) advantage over others (Laland et al., 2000). Certain religious 
traditions, for example, favour those who are more inclined to co-operate over others; these social 
conditions then can also enable collective efforts to change the physical landscape, diverting the 
water supply, for instance - as necessary in the construction of complex rice terraces in Bali (see 
Lansing & Fox, 2011). Even routine foraging and farming methods affect the local ecology, 
concentrating natural resources within a relatively small area with large population density (Rowley-
Consy & Layton, 2011). These sorts of activities can have significant (and relatively rapid) impact on 
our surroundings, on the acting selection pressures - potentially prompting us to adapt the way we 
generally function and behave (see Laland et al., 2001).  
To emphasise, this not only implicates our physical surroundings, but also the social or cultural 
environment. Our suitability to our habitat involves all of our being - not just our biology, or how able 
we are to fight disease or predators, but also our sociability, our ability to understand, relate to 
others and co-operate with them. We can find examples of this even in the contemporary world. 
Broadly speaking, our Western culture focusses on individuals, encouraging self-reliance or 
autonomy. Having an independent self-construal might be more adaptive in this individualist setting. 
However, elsewhere, in collectivist societies, having a sense of oneself as interdependent with others 
in community is more congruent, or a better fit, with the environment. This selection process, 
especially the interaction between individuals and their own selective environment, exemplifies 
social niche construction (Yamagishi & Hashimoto, 2016).12 
In these ways, all of our behaviour - from our biology to our sense of what is “right” - is subject to, 
and forms an active part of, the selection pressures and other evolutionary forces which have shaped 
the development of our species as a whole. We are not just concerned with changes or pressures 
from the external environment, but also the corresponding neural adaptations, and developments in 
our cognition (which in turn influence the social or physical ecology, comprising a positive feedback 
loop; see Iriki & Taoka, 2012, for an example of this in tool use and the evolution of symbolic 
cognition). This is a context in which to understand the significance of our human sociality - including 
our abilities to interact with others, and to develop a sense of group belonging or identity. These 
capacities were adaptive within a group context, and also maintained this new social environment.  
Therefore, we can (and should) attempt to understand human social and cultural behaviour in the 
light of its evolutionary roots. Theories of natural selection are not restricted to genetic processes, 
 
12 This is also a good example of gene-culture coevolution: these cultural systems or self-construals seem to be 
associated with a polymorphism for a serotonin transporter protein. The short allele, also linked to affective 
disorders such as anxiety, is more prevalent in collectivist cultures; however, this social niche acts as a buffer, 
actually reducing the level of anxiety in the population (see  Chiao & Blizinsky, 2009; although, compare 
comment by Eisenberg & Hayes, 2011).  
35 
 
but in fact offer insights into the role of sociality both in response to, and in creating, our “natural” 
habitat. Specifically, our musical traditions and other community practices are not divorced from our 
biology; rather, they form a potentially integral part of the evolution of our species.  In the next 
section, I consider the basis for this claim, discussing the emergence and the effect of our social, 
group behaviour, before turning to its constituent parts in the second half of this chapter. 
The emergence of group behaviour 
Now that we have made the case for exploring social behaviour through an evolutionary lens, we 
consider the biological, phylogenetic roots of our social capacities - capacities which lie behind our 
sense of group identity, and our enjoyment of making music together. In this short section, I shall 
present our current understanding of the role of our social instinct in the evolution of modern human 
behaviour and cognition - both its adaptive benefits in response to environmental pressures or 
threats, and how it created a protective social niche, providing the context which allowed an ever-
expanding cultural complexity.  
The evolution of prosociality 
Engaging with others always relies upon the fundamental motivation to co-operate with them. 
Interacting, sharing information with others, helping them, or just giving up some time and energy to 
be with them, is primarily prosocial - we are motivated to do it, and not just because it offers us 
some direct advantage.  
Researchers studying the evolution of human co-operation in general have approached it from a 
number of perspectives. Working from a traditional understanding of natural selection, 
investigations have identified certain “selfish” motivations or explanations for co-operation, such as 
kin selection, direct or indirect reciprocity. Individuals who behave prosocially are more likely to be 
reproductively successful, as either their kin will survive to continue the family line (as in models of 
inclusive fitness or kin selection), or others will see their good works and help them in return (see 
summary by Nowak, 2006, and early models by Trivers, 1971; and Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). Given 
that we regularly help those to whom we are not related, kin selection accounts have been expanded 
to describe how we might use similarity, perhaps our common possession of a hard-to-fake ‘tag’, to 
direct (and limit) our altruism towards those within our wider social circle (Cohen & Haun, 2013). 
In fact, co-operating with others might be beneficial for individuals because it temporarily serves the 
collective. Co-operating or collaborating with another is actually a rewarding experience in its own 
right - not just because of the future benefits we might get as a result (Rilling et al., 2002). Groups 
with more altruists are likely to be more successful, whether in defending territory or hunting, than 
others. We might say that social groups with norms of co-operation are likely to function more 
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successfully than other groups, leading to the proliferation of more co-operative tendencies in 
subsequent generations: this is a group-level selection account of prosociality (see original theory of 
group selection proper presented by Wynne-Edwards, 1962, and its adaptation as part of multi-level 
selection theory by Wilson & Sober, 1994).There has been ongoing controversy surrounding group 
selection; however, the idea that group-level processes support individual fitness has been 
supported by subsequent work - notably, the suggestion that emergent, group-level processes are 
important traits which affect individuals’ chances of survival (Smaldino, 2014), and that groups form 
the selective environment - as in the niche construction theories we considered above (see Appendix 
4).  
An environment in which mutual collaboration is expected would favour those individuals with more 
prosocial motives who act in line with these norms. Systems of rewards and sanctions, and a general 
bias for conformity, might reinforce these processes - selecting those who are motivated to co-
operate, and who possess the capacities for social understanding (see Boyd & Richerson, 2009, 2010, 
on cultural group selection; and Molleman et al., 2013, for a model of how the group selection of co-
operation might interact with processes of social learning; a similar process is explained by Gintis, 
2011). Thus, prosociality, the motivation and the ability to interact with others, is prevalent, and 
indeed necessary, for social living - whether it is the genetic predisposition, an individual personality 
trait, a social behaviour or activity, or a whole group, which is selected.  
Benefits of group living 
To consider where this social world might originate, we turn to the ecological pressures which might 
have triggered the construction of this co-operative, protective niche. The nature of the food supply, 
for example, has been linked to the development of egalitarian (or other) social systems (Woodburn, 
1982), and to costly behaviour to defend the group’s territory (see Brown, 1964, on his theory of 
economic defendability). Marean (2016) explores the possibility that abundant and predictable food 
resources located in marine coastline regions off northern and southern Africa (probably around 110 
000 years ago) prompted intergroup territoriality and conflict, as well as ‘hyperprosociality’ within 
the group to co-ordinate this sort of behaviour. 
Moreover, Collard et al. (2016) argue that environmental factors such as these drove increasing 
cultural complexity. They argue against the ‘demographic turn’ hypothesis (or the idea that an 
abundance of cultural forms came merely as a result of population size or density), instead 
suggesting that environmental risk, such as competition or other potential threats to available 
resources, led societies to develop more and more complicated technologies and social systems to 
manage, and potentially tackle, these problems. In these ways, the co-ordination of group efforts 
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was necessary in generating a material, and a social, niche which moderated any threats, and 
increased the chance of those individuals surviving in their (potentially hostile) environment. 
The start of a species?  
It is probably the case that there was no sudden shift, no big cultural explosion that coincided with 
the onset of Homo sapiens in the world. Rather the origin of our species should be understood more 
in terms of a series of small transitions, in an environment where many hominids were living and 
developing relatively successfully (Foley et al., 2016). However, the development of prosociality and 
norms of co-operation, in response to these selection pressures, then prompted further shifts in the 
social cognitive capacities of Homo sapiens, in particular. 
According to the Vygotskian Intelligence Hypothesis, our abilities to engage with others are based, at 
root, on these co-operative intentions. Whereas non-human primates can point, this is generally only 
for instrumental purposes, i.e. “I want that”, in response to potential competition from others. On 
the other hand, human infants, already within their first couple of years, show willingness to co-
operate - pointing in order to share information with others (see e.g. Franco, 2005, and discussion 
below). This is the motivation they need to share joint goals with others, to achieve and maintain 
together a state of shared intentionality. For this, however, we need much more complex cognitive 
representations: we need to understand that another has a different perspective to us, try to 
imagine what that might be, and then act with this in mind. The impulse to want to help or to affiliate 
with others is therefore the basic context which supports the development of our more extensive 
social cognition: the understanding and awareness of other people which then enables us to learn 
from and to collaborate with them (see Moll & Tomasello, 2007).  
Modern humans are distinguished not only by this shared intentionality, but also the “scaling up” of 
this to a whole-group level, forming collective intentionality. While the ability to co-ordinate with 
specific others, in shared intentionality, provided interdependence in defence, foraging and hunting, 
the emergence of group norms which guided these activities required a sense of collective identity 
and intentionality - a sense that the whole group can act as a unit (Tomasello et al., 2012; see a 
similar two-stage model in Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). 
These capacities - whether being able to represent another’s perspective or the idea of group norms 
- rely on a symbolic type of understanding (rather than something that is iconic or indexical). In other 
words, we need to be able to have mental images which do not link to anything concrete in the 
external world, but rather comprise an abstract idea or concept. This symbolic cognition probably 
emerged from our actions in the world: making and using tools to manipulate the environment 
extends our natural body schema and relies on (and develops) skills such as recursion - paving the 
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way for the reasoning central to use of language and syntax (Stout & Chaminade, 2012). At the same 
time, the pair bond - the co-operative niche in which infants learn how to engage with the world and 
with others in this way - favoured the selection of individuals with a more developed prefrontal 
cortex (Deacon, 1997). Thus, our social skills developed in a self-reinforcing cycle - with new actions, 
neural developments, then underpinning corresponding cognitive  capacities, in a process of ‘triadic 
niche construction’ (Iriki & Taoka, 2012). 
Alongside a more complex symbolic cognition, we developed other skills within this niche which 
enabled us to learn. High-fidelity imitation, especially of the whole action process (rather than just 
achieving a particular outcome), enables quick and effective learning, from generation to generation, 
as well as amongst the current social community. Instead of discovering everything each time anew, 
we could develop the group’s resources in a so-called ‘ratchet effect’. This, alongside our bias for 
conformity (and the presence of potential sanctions if we act otherwise), resulted in a ‘cumulative 
culture’ (Tennie et al., 2009; also Sterelny, 2011; and see model in Lewis & Laland, 2012). The 
willingness to co-operate with one or many others, therefore, provided the seed from which we 
developed a social landscape, with many material, technological, and symbolic innovations. This 
protective niche became more and more complex and diverse, shielding us from any external 
environmental pressures, and providing considerable selective advantage over our competitors.  
The core capacities (that arose from and were reinforced in this environment) are summarised 
clearly in Marean’s ‘three pillars of human uniqueness’. 
No other living animal has this combination of hyperprosociality, heightened social learning, and 
advanced cognition. They are the unique descriptors in our species abstract and, in my opinion, 
are what archaeologists were chasing with their fuzzy concept of modern human behavior. 
(Marean, 2015: 541) 
Our tendency towards prosociality, co-operation, and the corresponding abilities in social learning 
and symbolic cognition, all seem to play a large part in the emergence and development of our 
modern human behaviour. Next, we explore the basis for social interaction, and group identity, more 
specifically - mindful of the broader significance of these capacities within the evolutionary 
landscape. If this section addressed the question “why”, the next shall explore the “how” of our 
social capacities: I shall discuss the nature of the biological, and cognitive, mechanisms which support 
our ability to interact with those around us, forming social groups through activities like music. I 
explore first what might drive our predisposition for sociality, including the role of low-level reward 
circuits; and second the perceptual skills we need to understand others’ minds. Most research we 
draw on here focusses on the skills required as we observe the actions of others. In Chapter 2, 
however, we expand our scope beyond those ‘spectator’ theories to address how these individual 
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capacities are played out in an interactive context (see Schilbach et al., 2013, for a discussion of this 
distinction, and Hari et al., 2015, for suggestions about how experimental work should account for 
this). 
Our social instinct 
In the light of this evolutionary picture, it is clear that our enjoyment of social interaction, even a 
need to be in the company of others, is deep-seated. We also know this through everyday 
experience. From our earliest years, we seek out and are deeply affected by the positive interactions 
we have with people around us.13 We maintain relationships with kin, as well as developing wider 
friendship groups outside of our family circle. We might talk to strangers on the street, but we are 
also likely to dance with people we don’t know well in a night-club, or sing with them in church. This 
is such an integral part of our lives that we feel negative emotions, a sense of loneliness, when we 
lack social interaction or miss the company of others. This is acknowledged in the psychological 
literature in the concept of our ‘need to belong’:  
... human beings have a pervasive drive to form and maintain at least a minimum quantity of 
lasting, positive, and significant interpersonal relationships. (Baumeister & Leary, 1995: 497) 
Others have referred to this as a ‘concern with connectedness’ (Pickett et al., 2004: 1095).14 It is not 
enough to interact now and again; we must know that our relationships endure, with regular, 
positive contact with certain others, reinforcing the knowledge that we care for one another’s 
wellbeing. Baumeister and Leary argue that this motivation could account for a vast range of 
behaviour, perhaps even underlying our need for power, validation, as well as intimacy: 
... the belongingness hypothesis would suggest that human culture is at least partly adapted to 
enable people to satisfy the psychological need to live together (Baumeister & Leary, 1995: 498) 
We can now measure this need in a single-item self-report scale (Nichols & Webster, 2013); prior to 
this, researchers showed that a higher ‘need to belong’ correlated with accuracy in understanding 
facial emotion (Pickett et al., 2004); an experience of rejection led to better memory for social events 
(Gardner et al., 2000).  
Above, we explored the emergence of this ‘hyper-sociality’, and its role in the development of 
modern humans (beyond the capacities of other hominids, or what we see in present-day non-
human primates). Here, I shall outline the mechanisms and capacities which underpin our motivation 
as a peculiarly sociable species; in fact, social interaction might be our ‘default mode’ of functioning - 
 
13 An inability, or even just a disinclination, to do this, we view even as pathological. 
14 This construct of connectedness is used in the present empirical project - see Chapter 5, and results in 
Chapter 6. 
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it does not emerge from these mechanisms, but forms the context for their development (Hari et al., 
2015). In turn, I discuss research on relationships (a) where individuals become attached to another 
in a pair bonding process, and (b) where they are bonded in a close-knit social group. In reviewing a 
wide range of literature in this chapter, I show how interpersonal interaction has great emotional 
salience, and deep evolutionary roots. 
Music-making is one mode in which we relate to many different others, and is an activity which can 
be central to maintaining stable relationships within our community. Understanding the broader 
mechanisms behind why and how we approach, bond, and interact with others more generally will 
help us to understand, in turn, why we make music, the capacities which are involved, and - 
ultimately - the effects this might have on us.  
Pair bonding 
Our most salient bonding experiences are generally with one other person. We become attached first 
to our caregiver, who looks after us, providing our “way in” to the community at large (Bowlby 1984). 
They make sure our physical needs are met, providing us with food and protection. Just as important, 
interacting with our caregiver helps us to practise and develop the social skills we need to function 
effectively in the social world. Even as we go on to engage with lots of other people, in adulthood we 
again seek dyadic attachments, whether in the form of romantic relationships or with close friends. 
Monogamous pair bonds also occur in non-human animals, such as some species of voles. Combining 
evidence from our human experience with animal models of the underlying neuroanatomy helps to 
build a convergent account of how this might work.  
Neurochemistry of attachment: oxytocin and the reward network 
We have subcortical brain structures which respond to beneficial environmental stimuli - like food, 
drink, or sexual contact - with a reward response, reinforcing certain behaviours or encouraging us to 
seek out that stimulus in the future.15  Negative responses to certain environmental events are also 
adaptive: we feel fear when there is a potential threat, something we would rather avoid. Even in our 
fairly comfortable Western society, where we do not need to worry about seeking food or escaping 
predators, this primitive approach-avoidance system is still at work. Emotional reinforcements of 
these kinds are implicated in all sorts of learning (the process of modifying or creating new synaptic 
pathways - see Schultz, 2000), even guiding our supposedly “rational” decision-making (Damasio, 
2006). Forming attachments with others relies on this network; it motivates us to approach others, 
and then to continue to seek out their company after this, if it was a positive experience for us (Insel 
& Young, 2001; Lim & Young, 2006). 
 
15 Note that the ‘liking’ of a certain stimulus is distinct from the ‘wanting’ - these are supported by dissociable 
neural reward pathways (see e.g. Berridge, 1996).  
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The neuropeptide hormone oxytocin is implicated in this process, alongside the dopamine pathways 
stimulating the experience of reward - a process that Ruth Feldman terms ‘crosstalk’ (Feldman, 
2017). Oxytocin modulates these reward responses, depending on the social context; it shapes our 
response depending on what (or who) we see, underpinning the social recognition memory 
necessary for attachment to specific others (Groppe et al., 2013). While it enhances our reward 
response when we see our loved ones (Scheele et al., 2013), it also inhibits this response, or even 
stimulates a fear response, if we see others with whom we do not want to engage (see Maroun & 
Wagner, 2016, on how oxytocin acts in different parts of the amygdala to balance these approach or 
avoidance tendencies). 
A neurochemistry triggered by interaction 
We find interaction, even with strangers, a rewarding experience. We have a reward response 
following all sorts of social stimuli, whether just making eye contact (Kampe et al., 2001), initiating 
shared attention (Schilbach et al., 2010), or mutual co-operation in an economic game (e.g. Rilling et 
al., 2002; McCabe et al., 2001). The rewarding nature of our interactions is manifested in our 
tendency for play - something also exhibited by other animals. Trezza et al., (2010) reviews the 
neurobiological correlates of play behaviour in rats, implicating dopamine and opioid networks (see 
below on the role of endorphins).  
Interaction with our loved ones, often infants (and romantic partners), has some distinctive features - 
exaggerated, musical vocalisations, expressions of positive affect, direct gaze and touch. The 
individuals are closely co-ordinated, interacting with and responding to each other, displaying a high 
degree of ‘biobehavioural synchrony’ (Feldman, 2017).16 This is rewarding behaviour, and again is 
shaped by the release of oxytocin (Feldman, 2012).17 Even very small-scale, perhaps hardly 
noticeable, behaviour is relevant here: synchronised pupil dilation leads to mutual trust of 
interaction partners - another effect which is modulated by oxytocin (Kret & De Dreu, 2017). 
Oxytocin improves the fluency of our interactions, whether tapping synchronisation (in a leader-
 
16 There are various definitions of synchrony which are used in the literature; Feldman, in her general 
approach, defines synchrony in terms of temporal concordance in behavioural patterns and physiology; this has 
potentially broad applications: ‘Synchrony...describes a critical component of close relationships that builds on 
familiarity with the partner’s style, manner, non-verbal patterns, personal rhythms, behavioural preferences, 
and pace of intimacy.’ (Feldman, 2012: 382) 
17 In Feldman’s model of attachment, these bottom-up effects, stemming from the interaction itself, are also 
modulated by more complex, higher-order representations, such as ideas of commitment. If our mode of social 
engagement creates the immediate conditions in which we might bond with others, then these conditions can 
be shaped from the top-down, with other more symbolic or normative, perhaps even moral, concepts or 
imperatives. These might encourage us to stay within an attachment relationship that is actually maladaptive, 
or help to re-wire our avoidance responses to heal from previous negative experiences (Feldman, 2017). The 
types of group formation which I explore later in this thesis - the way our interaction mode facilitates 
immediate bonding, and then how our ideas of group identity moderate this bonding process - parallel this 
distinction. 
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follower paradigm - Gebauer et al., 2016) or even inter-brain synchronisation (measured using EEG - 
Mu et al., 2016).  
The same neurochemical response characterises maternal ‘licking-and-grooming’ caregiving in rats. 
This behaviour has long-lasting, even cross-generational significance: the amount of caregiving 
received influences later stress responses, and even the amount of caregiving they give to their own 
offspring (see Champagne, 2008, for a review). Thus, the experience of interaction within pair bonds 
is mediated by these neurochemical mechanisms, enacting and establishing attachment within the 
dyad.  
Attachment and our view of the world around us 
Our attachment relationships, although performed within an exclusive, one-to-one context, are 
relevant to our experience in the wider world. Human attachment behaviour corresponds to social 
interactions and stress response later in life. Sroufe (2005) noted longitudinal effects of infant 
attachment style (trait-like characterisations, developed from work by Ainsworth) on later self-
reliance, emotional regulation and social competence; more specifically, Feldman (2007) reported 
that the degree of synchrony in mother-infant face-to-face interaction predicted capacity for 
empathy even in adolescence.18  
Attachment in adulthood also shapes how we respond to events or stressors in the environment. 
James Coan’s ‘social baseline theory’ (2008) posits that proximity to our significant others helps to 
regulate stress through load sharing or risk distribution. Relationships of trust and interdependence 
reduce the risk from outside threats - we can afford to worry less, as we know others around us can 
respond and protect us, as we could do for them. We even exhibit a smaller neural response to 
threat when we are with someone we feel close to (Coan et al., 2006). 
Belonging to a social group is also a context in which we develop relationships of trust and expected 
interdependence with others around us. There is a strong, biological basis for pair bonding, enacted 
through the experience of interacting and co-ordinating with another. The feeling of group belonging 
might come about in a very similar way. 
 
18 See also Carter (2005) on the role of oxytocin in mediating the effects of neglect. 
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Group belongingness 
Although attachment relationships are most often considered only in the context of pair bonds, we 
can have a similar experience towards a social group (see Smith et al., 1999 for an application of 
attachment theory to group membership).19  
The purpose of this thesis is to address the question of how our group bonds, our sense of belonging 
to, or identifying with, a group, comes about through the way we interact with others. Now that we 
have outlined the basic mechanisms behind attachments in general, we can consider how the same 
biological processes might support either our bonding to other group members, or an identification 
with the group as a whole.  
Oxytocin in group attachment 
In her work on attachment, Feldman (2017) includes the role of ‘biobehavioural synchrony’ in dyadic 
up to group-level interactions. Importantly, the same biological correlates are involved. For example, 
the regulatory effects of oxytocin, shaping our attention towards, and salience of, certain social cues 
are just as important in the context of a group. We are motivated to act prosocially, experience 
empathy, and have a decreased stress response when we are amongst members of our own group - 
again, this offers protection, moderating potential risks from environmental threats. This is a 
selective response, just as with specific attachment figures (Shamay-Tsoory & Abu-Akel, 2016).  
In this case, the social cues need not be people with whom we have interacted. Rather, we can feel 
attachment towards the group identity, moderating our response to others on the basis of cues for 
in-group or out-group membership. Oxytocin is responsive to these types of social cues, motivating 
selective prosociality, conformance to specific group norms, as well as aggression towards the out-
group (De Dreu & Kret, 2016). 
Furthermore, there is a large literature comparing the effect of intranasal exposure to oxytocin, 
versus a placebo condition, on co-operative behaviour in economic games. MacDonald and 
MacDonald (2010) review a number of these studies, highlighting the overall effect of oxytocin on 
biasing individuals towards prosocial behaviour (see Kosfeld et al., 2005, and Zak et al., 2005, and 
Barraza et al., 2011, for specific investigations of this; although, compare meta-analysis by Nave et 
al., 2015, who suggest that these findings might be somewhat exaggerated). Baumgartner et al. 
(2008) showed that oxytocin reduced the response to a breach of trust - participants in this condition 
continued to act prosocially, even when their partner had not (corresponding to decreased activation 
of the amygdala).  
 
19 The ‘Inclusion of the Other in the Self’ scale is applied to both individual and group-level contexts (see Aron & 
McLaughlin-Volpe, 2001). 
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Grooming at a distance 
Robin Dunbar also considers how our social network is maintained through interaction - with 
important psychopharmacological and cognitive correlates (Dunbar, 2018). He argues that primate 
attachment, so-called ‘social grooming’, behaviour can again be extended to incorporate much 
larger-scale human communities. This implies a similar continuity between one’s close attachments 
and the wider membership of our social network. 
Primate group sizes are correlated with neocortex volume (Dunbar, 1992) - perhaps a proxy for our 
social cognitive capacities. According to the Social Brain hypothesis (see overview in Dunbar, 2007), 
the number of relationships we can maintain at once depends upon our capacity to keep track of 
those links, an information-processing capacity whereby we can keep in mind not only third-party 
relationships, but also how others behave towards us. Social relationships are ‘implicit social 
contracts’, an understanding of reciprocal support as and when it is needed (Dunbar, 2018). In other 
words, our social relationships are built on trust. This depends upon our ability to understand others 
(capacities we shall explore further in the next section of this chapter), and, crucially, has important 
behavioural manifestations. 
In particular, primate group size is correlated with time spent grooming (Dunbar, 1993).20 This is a 
social behaviour which requires single-minded attention devoted to a partner. It is a significant time 
investment (up to 20% of their day), requiring mutual trust; ‘a statement of commitment’ (Dunbar, 
1996: 44). Vervet monkeys are more likely to go to another’s aid if they are a recent grooming 
partner (see work by Seyfarth & Cheney, reported in Dunbar, 1996); grooming can even act as a form 
of reconciliation following a conflict or breach of trust (see Dunbar, 1996: 26). The action of physical 
grooming creates ‘the psychological environment’ for this social reciprocity (Dunbar, 2010): it lowers 
the heart rate, reduces stress, and triggers the release of endorphins (e.g. Keverne et al., 1989; also 
Machin & Dunbar, 2011). In primates, this sort of close relationship supports small coalitions, 
‘buffering’ individuals from external threats (see overview in Dunbar, 1996; also, compare this idea 
to Coan’s Social Baseline Model of attachment). 
The time demands of this activity impose a limit on group or coalition size (Dunbar et al., 2009). Thus, 
the larger networks we see amongst humans necessitate forms of interaction which have the same 
effects as this dyadic social grooming, but are more efficient - extending to more individuals at once. 
Dunbar hypothesised that language evolved to meet this need: 
 
20 Although, compare Grueter et al., 2013; with a reply from Dunbar & Lehmann, 2013. 
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... language evolved as a "cheap" form of social grooming, thereby enabling the ancestral humans 
to maintain the cohesion of the unusually large groups demanded by the particular conditions 
they faced at the time. (Dunbar, 1993: 689) 
Through speech, we can engage with multiple individuals simultaneously (to be exact, three times as 
many - in proportion with the size of human as compared to other primate groups - see Dunbar et 
al., 1995), while doing other things; speech also enables us to learn about others and their 
relationships without direct observation, i.e. in gossip (see overviews in Dunbar, 1993, and 1996). 
However, language alone was unlikely to ‘bridge the bonding gap’, as Dunbar puts it. Just exchanging 
words with another, or building up our knowledge of whether or not to trust certain others in our 
society, do not give the same endorphin ‘kick’ as does the action of physical grooming (Dunbar, 
2004). Other types of interaction might enact more effective ‘grooming-at-a-distance’. For example, 
laughter releases endorphins (as measured by proxy in pain threshold, by Dunbar et al., 2011), is 
particularly salient (even contagious) in a social context (Devereux & Ginsburg, 2001), and remains an 
important part of our social encounters - promoting affiliation and cohesion, ‘smoothing’ our 
interactions with others (see Gervais & Wilson, 2005). Moreover, behavioural synchrony increases 
liking and trust for others, mediated by ratings of self-other overlap and opioid release (with pain 
threshold as a proxy - see Lang et al., 2017); synchronised rowing also causes an endorphin surge 
(Cohen et al., 2010). Dunbar and his colleagues have found that singing, drumming and dancing 
together also result in endorphin release (again, measured using pain threshold); the crucial part of 
this is the activity, rather than more passive engagement with the so-called “music itself” (Dunbar et 
al., 2012). In particular, moving in synchrony with others seems to contribute in large part to this 
bonding effect, making participants more likely to help or reward their partners (whether after 
rowing or dancing together - see Cohen et al., 2010; Tarr et al., 2015, 2016; although compare Davis 
et al., 2015).21  
Thus, the endorphin system might play a more important role than oxytocin, being implicated in 
dyadic grooming behaviour as well as in relationships beyond the exclusive infant-caregiver or 
romantic partner contexts. In summary, though, whether it is oxytocin or the endorphin system 
which plays a primary role, group belongingness seems to be underpinned by the same emotional 
mechanisms as our experience of attachment to a significant other - and interaction is important 
across the board. Our experience of bonding or attachment towards other individuals seems to 
operate with similar mechanisms, whether we are in a dyad or a group, or whether we know the 
 
21 The use of fire is also likely to have created extra time for these activities to be built into the community 
routine. While it was an adaptive technology for cooking, protection and making tools, it also lengthened the 
waking day, creating time which could not easily be spent hunting or foraging for food, but rather could be 
dedicated to social bonding activities (such as dancing, chatting, story-telling) with everyone brought together 
around the campfire (Dunbar & Gowlett, 2014). 
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other person intimately or not at all. These are significant experiences, implicating deep-seated (and 
evolutionarily-ancient) emotional resources. Now I have explained our basic motivation to interact 
with others, I shall next outline in more detail the skills and awareness we need to engage with them 
successfully.  
Social cognition 
We are motivated to interact with other people. We seek out others, especially those select few to 
whom we feel attached, or those who with whom we share the same group association or 
membership, and desire to feel close to others, or that we belong. However, the skills and 
understanding we need to engage with others are more involved than this. These capacities are 
generally encapsulated in our ‘social cognition’; this is an umbrella term which includes a whole 
range of perceptual abilities. In their review, Happé and colleagues define it as: 
... the processing of stimuli relevant to understanding agents and their interactions (Happé et al., 
2017: 244) 
They include more general skills as part of this processing ability - including memory and attention - 
as well as our general social motivation (see above). More specific abilities include imitation, emotion 
recognition, empathy, social learning, and Theory of Mind (Happé et al., 2017).22 Frith and Frith 
(2007) have a similarly broad definition:  
Social cognition is the sum of those processes that allow individuals of the same species...to 
interact with one another. ... Essentially it depends upon the exchange of signals. (Frith & Frith, 
2007: R724) 
In this section, I shall outline some of what is involved in recognising and exchanging these signals; 
this ranges from quick, automatic responses, to more deliberate, top-down processing. These same 
capacities are involved regardless of how we engage with others - whether it is avoiding someone on 
the street, holding an argument, or playing a piano duet. I offer here a very general review, 
addressing, in turn, how we perceive and simulate others’ experience, how we understand another’s 
different perspective, and then how we interact or work with them in the light of this.  
Understanding others: self-other equivalence  
Work in social neuroscience provides insights into a low-level, neural basis for social cognition. This 
is, at root, the understanding that others are ‘like me’ (in the words of Meltzoff, 2007) - a starting 
point by which we can relate to others, on the basis of our own experience.  
 
22 Happé et al. (2017) also describe how cognition denotes a level of explanation which lies between neural 
processes and behaviour, but crucially depends on and relates to each of these. 
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The discovery of mirror neurons 
In the 1990s, a research group investigating the neural correlates of actions performed by monkeys 
noticed - by chance - that the very same neurons were stimulated when the experimenter moved the 
relevant objects into place in setting up the experiment. A subsequent investigation of this 
phenomenon revealed that there are neurons in the F5 region of the premotor cortex which fire both 
when the monkey performs specific goal-directed hand movements and when it just observes those 
same actions (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992).  
This was a highly significant finding, and one which has had relevance in research on the mechanisms 
underpinning action understanding, Theory of Mind, empathy, as well as our ability for joint action 
(thus interaction) with others. It has been described as: 
... a neurophysiological account of the experiential dimension of both action and emotion 
understanding. (Gallese et al., 2004: 396) 
Importantly, in a review of recent findings, Keysers (2009) notes that mirroring systems seem to be at 
work in various parts of the human brain, but so far there is only animal evidence for the presence of 
actual mirror neurons. Therefore, Keysers recommends that we speak of ‘a putative mirror neuron 
system.’ With this reservation in mind, it seems likely that the capacity for neural simulation, drawing 
on the neural resources we have in common with our interaction partner, is likely important in our 
ability to understand and co-ordinate with them. I shall now review some of the evidence for this 
claim. 
Simulating actions and emotions  
If we have a mechanism by which we simulate others’ actions when we observe them, it means that 
we can draw on our own experience of performing those actions to infer their goal, predicting what 
the other might be intending to do or to achieve. In a way, we experience the same actions - even 
though we do not actually carry them out. 
With this mechanism we do not just “see” or “hear” an action or an emotion. Side by side with 
the sensory description of the observed social stimuli, internal representations of the state 
associated with these actions or emotions are evoked in the observer, “as if” they were 
performing a similar action or experiencing a similar emotion. (Gallese et al., 2004: 400) 
Even just hearing the outcome of an action activates the equivalent motor regions of the brain (e.g. 
Keysers et al., 2003). This mechanism is most effective for actions we are already familiar with (see a 
comparison of novel and familiar actions in an fMRI study by Brass et al., 2007). 
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Moreover, we do not just simulate another’s movement, but also actually mimic them. Often, we do 
this without realising it; it occurs frequently when we are conversing with others. 
One may notice using the idiosyncratic verbal expressions or speech inflections of a friend. Or 
one may notice crossing one’s arms while talking with someone else who has his or her arms 
crossed. Common to all such cases is that one typically does not notice doing these things - if at 
all - until after the fact. (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999: 893) 
We do this to aid the fluency of our interactions, to understand or predict what the other is doing, 
and to make the other person like us more (but only when they do not notice us doing it). People 
who score higher in tests of “perspective-taking” mimic others more (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). We 
also use mimicry to enhance affiliation with our partner, especially when we feel we need to 
compensate for an otherwise unsuccessful encounter (see e.g. Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). 
Motor simulation mechanisms are also important in our recognition, and experience, of others’ 
emotional states. The same mirroring, ‘experiential insight’ (Gallese et al., 2004: 401), lies behind 
emotional mimicry (for example, mimicking another’s facial expressions), and even emotional 
contagion (where we actually feel the same emotions as others around us). For example, we 
recognise that another feels either disgust or fear, just based on whether they have widened or 
narrowed their eyes (Lee & Anderson, 2017); we even feel others’ pain, with the same neural 
correlates - activation of our insula - as we would expect from first-hand experience (Lamm et al., 
2011; although modulated by experience and context, e.g. Cheng et al., 2007). Again, this helps us to 
affiliate - we bond with interaction partners, even in a group context, through a shared emotional 
experience (see Hess & Fischer, 2013; Barsade, 2002).  
A neural basis for language? 
This mirroring, or perception-action coupling, forms an automatic link between us and others. I have 
given examples of how this is important in signalling - whether showing affiliation, in recognising 
another’s intentions or how they are feeling.  
Some have argued that this same mechanism can support more complex signalling, such as the skills 
of perception (and prediction) involved in the back and forth of a conversation. This implicates higher 
orders of intentionality; in other words, we do not just signal and recognise others’ signals, but we 
also signal in the knowledge that others are recognising us, and we recognise others’ signals knowing 
that they know we are doing this etc. - in a recursive system (see Dunbar, 2007, for an illustration). 
Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) were among the first to suggest that our ability to simulate and recognise 
others’ actions, alongside some mimicry of those actions - enabling the other to recognise that we 
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are simulating them in this way - is the start of a bridge between the two communicators which can 
then support dialogue. 
Since then, Arbib (2005) has traced a possible evolutionary development, from action recognition, to 
imitation, and then forms of proto-language. Gallese (2008) formalised this in his neural exploitation 
hypothesis: our mirror neuron system comprises the root of our language abilities, which are thus 
fundamentally ‘embodied’.  Understanding others’ movements requires us to simulate and represent 
the structure and hierarchy of their action, and infer its goal; this same mechanism, only in more 
abstracted form, lies behind our perception and performance of the hierarchies and structures of 
language:  
... the “words” of the premotor vocabulary...are not only assembled and chained to form 
intentional “action sequences”...; they can also be assembled and chained to structure language 
sentences and thoughts. (Gallese, 2008: 328) 
A similar line of thought is used to link our early tool use to the symbolic cognition recruited in 
language (see e.g. Arbib, 2011, and Vaesen, 2012). Others, however, are much more sceptical of the 
link between a mirror neuron system and more complex forms of social cognition (see e.g. Cook et 
al., 2014, and Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005).  
In general, though, our basis for relating to others is that they are “like us”. On top of this, we shape 
our perception of others according to more complex social factors or considerations - whether we 
are aware that they have a different perspective, for example. I turn next to address these 
moderating influences.  
Understanding others: beliefs and emotions 
When we interact with other people, it is important to understand that our partner is not always just 
like us - but is distinct, with a different perspective, and thoughts and beliefs which might decidedly 
differ from our own. If our basis for engaging with and understanding others is an awareness of self-
other equivalence, then we need to complement this with self-other distinction or control, taking 
into account other, external factors which might influence them (even if they do not influence us). 
This balance of self-other equivalence and control is important in (a) our understanding of Theory of 
Mind, and (b) our ability to empathise.  
From mirroring to mentalizing 
Our ability to mentalize is a sort of mind-reading ability - being able to understand, or ‘infer’ 
another’s mental state or emotions (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006). A couple of fMRI studies have 
implicated ‘mirror neuron areas’ of the brain when participants observe social actions. For example, 
Becchio et al. (2012, in a study of the same name) found that observation of competitive or co-
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operative actions (i.e. two people reaching for the same object, or working to build a tower together) 
correlated with greater activation of mirror neuron areas (e.g. the inferior frontal gyrus), and 
mentalizing brain regions (including the prefrontal cortex), than observation of individual actions, 
moving objects irrespective of the other person. Moreover, Iacoboni and colleagues (2005) found 
that some of the same mirror areas (again, the inferior frontal gyrus) were activated in observing an 
action that was socially ‘embedded’ i.e. for cleaning, or drinking, in comparison to the same action 
observed with no context. In all of these social contexts, when we observe someone else, we are 
trying to discern what their intentions might be, so we can predict what they might do and respond 
appropriately. Our mirror neuron system - i.e. the understanding of self-other equivalence - is 
implicated in this process: ‘the mirror and the mentalizing systems work in concert as to code for 
others’ social intentions’ (Becchio et al., 2012: 247). 
However, self-other mirroring is not enough. Others might hold beliefs that are different to ours, and 
perhaps even different to what we know to be true about the world: it is important to recognise 
another’s perspective and how it might be shaped by external conditions or access. Theory of Mind 
tasks, including the famous ‘false belief paradigm’, are used to assess our understanding of others’ 
different minds. In the 1980s, Wimmer and Perner developed a task in which children observed an 
object being placed somewhere, and had to predict where a second observer thought the object 
might be. The twist was that the second observer left for a time, and, in that period, the object was 
moved - without their knowing. Children at around age 3 did not acknowledge this fact in their 
answers, not seeming to recognise that the other person had a false belief about where the object 
was; however, by age 4, half of the participants began to recognise that their beliefs were different; 
most of the 6-9 year-old participants could answer correctly. This provides evidence that this ability 
to mentalize comes with some social experience,23 emerging consistently around the age of 4 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983; see meta-analysis of studies by Wellman et al., 2001).24 
Moreover, in interacting with another, it is not always helpful to mimic them, but rather to take 
complementary roles. Hasson and Frith (2016) argue that we should understand interaction in terms 
of ‘coupled dynamics’ more than simple mirroring: consider the joint action of passing and catching a 
ball, or playing piano duets where one of us is to provide the off-beat. Whether predicting another’s 
false belief, or acting in a different but complementary way, we in fact need to inhibit our tendency 
to mimic or mirror others. Brass et al. (2005) found just this - in a task where we need to not imitate 
 
23 This also implicates the extended altricial, or juvenile period, in human lives, within the context of the infant-
caregiver bond - a context in which the infant learns these important social skills (see Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 
2006, for details). 
24 Some argue that task demands mean that this ability is only expressed explicitly at this age, but the 
understanding might be present earlier, by just 13 months. Clements and Perner (1994), and Onishi and 
Baillargeon (2005) introduce implicit measures which might demonstrate an earlier ability to mentalize, but this 
is difficult to interpret (see Heyes, 2014).  
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others, in other words, where we inhibit our automatic mirroring system, we activate the same 
neural areas recruited in Theory of Mind tasks. In this way, we seem to have two layers, perhaps 
systems, in our social cognition - (1) an automatic, self-other equivalence, stemming from neural 
mirroring mechanisms, and (2) a more cognitively-demanding and flexible ability to perceive social 
states according to context (see Apperly & Butterfill, 2009, and Evans, 2003).   
Empathy 
Empathy is a multi-faceted construct which recruits both of these layers in its different 
components.25 Preston and de Waal define empathy as: 
... any process where the attended perception of the object’s state generates a state in the 
subject that is more applicable to the object’s state or situation than to the subject’s own prior 
state or situation. (Preston & de Waal, 2002: 4) 
Or, more concisely: 
... the ability to share the feelings of others (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012: 1) 
This of course includes a degree of self-other equivalence: just observing another’s emotional state 
or affliction primes our own representations as if we were in their position - recruiting the same 
perception-action links discussed above (see, for example, the parallel brain networks activated in 
observation of disgust, in von dem Hagen et al., 2009). As we saw above, these lie behind emotional 
contagion (e.g. Barsade, 2002 - see above), real feelings for the other person which motivate 
prosocial behaviour to alleviate that state (see contrasting accounts of this by Batson, 1987 vs. 
Cialdini et al., 1987; also, de Waal, 2008). 
Alongside this ‘emotional empathy’ component, there is also ‘cognitive empathy’. It is not always 
helpful just to feel and act according to our own sympathetic distress; rather, we should sometimes 
inhibit these feelings to then be able to act appropriately (Preston & de Waal, 2002). This is not 
always a positive thing, though - inhibiting our emotional empathy might be due to motivations for 
revenge, envy, or even because the other person belongs to an out-group (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010; 
see also reviews by Bernhardt & Singer, 2012, and Singer & Lamm, 2009).26  
In summary, our complex forms of social cognition - our response to social signals or stimuli - comes 
from low-level self-other merging mechanisms, relating to others as if we are like them, alongside 
 
25 This skill is also associated with early parental interactions - see Gonzalez-Liencres et al. (2013) for one 
possible account of this.  
26 A high score on traits in the so-called ‘dark triad’ of personality, e.g. psychopathy, is linked to selective 
deficits in emotional (or affective) empathy, but without any impairment in cognitive empathy (Wai & 
Tiliopoulos, 2012). 
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cognitive flexibility, taking account of context, even being inclined to dissociate from others in some 
circumstances. Before the close of this chapter, I shall apply these skills to an interactive setting: 
beyond just understanding others, or predicting what they are thinking, we need to consider how we 
work to align our intentions and beliefs with them in situ.  
Working with others: sharing their intentions  
Michael Tomasello and his colleagues have suggested that what makes human social cognition 
different from that of our nearest primate relatives is the capacity for shared intentionality: 
... a suite of social-cognitive and social-motivational skills...[which] refers to collaborative 
interactions in which participants share psychological states with one another (Tomasello & 
Carpenter, 2007:121) 
It is important not just to investigate our ability to perceive and interpret others’ social signals, but 
also to address how we work together in interaction, actively responding to and influencing the other 
in real time. Gallotti and Frith call this the ‘we-mode’:  
... interacting agents share their minds by representing their contributions to the joint action as 
contributions to something that they are going to pursue together, as a “we”. (Gallotti & Frith, 
2013: 163) 
This builds upon our skills of perception, the bridge we form with others when we realise we are like 
them, and the cognitive flexibility we have in recognising that they might differ from us in meaningful 
ways. It also acknowledges how we each act to manipulate the other and their mental states, in a 
mutual exchange.  
Shared attention 
The simplest form of this ‘we-mode’ is our tendency to share focus, to look at something together. 
We intuitively follow another’s gaze, using this signal to understand what they are attending (apes 
can also do this, but rely more on head movement: Tomasello et al., 2007). Beyond this, though, we 
work together, directing each other’s gaze in order to achieve this state of joint (or shared) attention: 
... joint attention is not just two people experiencing the same thing at the same time, but rather 
it is two people experiencing the same thing at the same time and knowing together that they 
are doing this (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007: 121, original emphasis) 
The aim is not just to look at something together, but to know that we have this mutual focus: 
... both individuals are aware of each other’s object of attention and each of them will use the 
other’s gaze direction to check that both attend to the same target (Itier & Batty, 2009: 848) 
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Siposova and Carpenter (2019) have recently offered more clarity about the nature of this shared 
state, and the type of common knowledge (or common ground) it involves. They prefer the term 
‘social attention’, and unpack it into a number of levels, all of which ‘depict some form of triadic 
relation between self, other, and an object of their attention’ but vary in the degree of ‘jointness’. 
Monitoring attention is an individual experience, tracking and manipulating the attention of another; 
common attention involves the mutual knowledge of a shared focus, but again still on the level of the 
individual. In contrast, mutual attention involves more explicit shared focus: ‘both of them directly 
experience each other attending both to that thing and to their own attention to the thing and each 
other’; and, finally, shared attention requires the intentional communication about that state 
(Siposova & Carpenter, 2019: 261-262). 
These begin to emerge from infancy: we use pointing gestures to try and orient another’s attention 
in a particular direction, and then check back to their partner to make sure this has been successful 
(see Franco, 2005). The associations we learn through doing this are important in language 
acquisition (see e.g. Brooks & Meltzoff, 2005). In this way, we co-operate with one another (see 
above on Vygotsky Intelligence Hypothesis) to build our common ground about the world around us. 
We take into account what we know about the other (based on our own experience, but also from an 
awareness of their own, perhaps differing, perspective), working to ensure that we are on the same 
page. We shall see later (in Chapter 2) that achieving and maintaining this common ground is still 
crucial in ever more complex forms of social interaction.  
Social learning 
We use all of these skills - from an understanding of action intentions, Theory of Mind, and the 
inclination to want to share attentional focus - to learn from one another, building up our own 
knowledge and understanding of the world (and how we can act upon it - with tools, for example). 
Our self-other equivalence is crucial here. Sommerville and Hammond (2007) set up a task whereby 
an adult showed a child how to build toys. After working collaboratively (taking turns), the child 
displayed a memory bias, reporting more often “I did it” for the experimenter’s actions, presumably 
having represented them cognitively as their own. 
However, this ability to mimic is again recruited flexibly. Wang and Hamilton (2012) present a 
framework to understand the top-down modulation of imitation (again implicating the prefrontal 
cortex - see mentalising section above), which depends on the social context. We are much more 
likely to imitate (and thus learn from) higher-ranking individuals (who are presumably more expert or 
reliable; see theory of prestige presented by Henrich & Gil-White, 2001, or evidence from Rakoczy et 
al., 2010). Again, we use imitation deliberately to build affiliation - we even over-imitate, 
demonstrating our adherence to certain norms, even if they do not add any instrumental value to 
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the action (Over & Carpenter, 2013). Most children do not just imitate, but can also switch roles, 
demonstrating that they have understood what is required (e.g. Carpenter et al., 2005); they readily 
adapt to teaching their peers the skills they have just acquired (as in e.g. Whiten & Flynn, 2010) and 
they even recognise when others are adhering to their learnt norms (and object if they are not - 
Rakoczy et al., 2008). 
Whiten (2017) offers a comprehensive comparison of children’s abilities with those of chimpanzees. 
There are some similarities, and continuities, but the high fidelity with which children copy the form 
of other’s actions (rather than just emulating the result), the ability to build upon and develop those 
learnt techniques, and the over-imitation of certain norms all lie behind a striking disparity in the 
diversity and complexity of culture displayed by humans, compared to our primate relatives - and 
perhaps how a cumulative culture might have developed (see discussion above, and also e.g. Kendal, 
2011, and Lewis & Laland, 2012). 
Summary: our interaction engine 
I shall summarise by drawing on the image of an ‘engine’ - a holistic and multi-dimensional concept, 
coined by Levinson (2006). The multiplicity of social, perceptual capacities, which all together 
comprise our social cognition, lies behind our ability to understand and engage with others. These 
capacities integrate more primitive reward-based representations with our more complex symbolic 
abilities, implicating neural pathways between older, subcortical regions and the more recently-
developed prefrontal cortex (see Damasio’s somatic-marker hypothesis - Damasio, 2006; and work 
outlining a ‘social brain’ by Adolphs, 2009, and Insel & Fernald, 2004).27  
At root, our social cognition relies upon a willingness to co-operate, to approach others, a desire to 
engage with them in the first place - underpinned by the neurochemistry of attachment, our social 
instinct that we reviewed above. However, interacting with others is then a more complex task: we 
rely on subtle cues to infer a great deal about what another is thinking or feeling, try to influence 
their attentional focus, and in turn generate signals for their benefit. Levinson and Holler (2014) 
discuss the many layers of this ‘stratified’ system. Just holding a conversation with one other 
implicates deep gestural, embodied capacities, which are then co-opted into our symbolic systems of 
thought and language. We do not just talk - rather, we observe and understand others through their 
actions and align ourselves with them, generating a sense of ‘shared intentionality’ in order then to 
establish and build upon our common ground.  
 
27 The importance of these neural interactions is revealed in certain social deficits (and other traits) 
characteristic of autism (Gaigg, 2012). 
55 
 
With the repertoire of capacities which make this intricate performance possible, our species has a 
greatly expanded potential for learning, dissemination of techniques or technologies within and 
between generations. As a result, we have much more complex and diverse social systems, cultural 
differences in the way we are expected to interact - a multitude of sociocultural niches (see above). 
Importantly, social interaction - and the particular way in which it is manifested in our community - is 
an art that we have to practise. We learn these skills, developing our empathy and Theory of Mind, 
acquiring our local language of interaction, through experience with others around us. Humans have 
a long period of ‘altriciality’: in other words, we are born relatively underdeveloped, so our neural 
and cognitive development occurs as we engage with others, situated within a particular locale, from 
our earliest years (see Joffe, 1997).  
It is the performance of these interactive skills which we are interested in here. This chapter was 
devoted to understanding our individual, social capacities, and their place in the evolution of our 
species. However, our conversations, and our music-making, are all enacted in a rich social context - 
they recruit these individual capacities, but in ways which are tailored to the specific cultural world in 
which they are performed. In order to understand how social - specifically, musical - interaction 
pertains to our relationships with others, we need to address how our social cognition is played out, 
in real time. In my next chapter, I turn to address this - shifting focus from research on our biological, 
cognitive capacities, to draw on observations of our everyday social encounters. 
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Chapter 2 Social interaction 
If Dora had been alone she would have called out at once to Toby, so little was she embarrassed 
and so much amused and pleased by what she saw. But the proximity of Michael, which she had 
for a moment forgotten, made her pause, and turning to him she had a sense of embarrassment, 
not so much because of his presence as on his behalf, since he would perhaps imagine some 
embarrassment in her. (The Bell, Iris Murdoch, p. 75) 
Humans are social animals, with the motivation and capacity to engage with others. We grow up in 
this peculiar niche, developing these skills from our infancy. Holding a conversation is not a simple 
task. It involves multiple systems operating in parallel, with precisely-timed movements and actions, 
and a high level of interpersonal and symbolic understanding. We start to be able to do this, with 
apparent ease, before we can walk.  
In the previous chapter, I gave an overview of some of the mechanisms which underpin this 
extraordinary ability - the neurobiological architecture, and the basic cognitive skills involved in our 
‘shared intentionality’. Importantly, these are enactive mechanisms - we develop and demonstrate 
these skills in a social context, through interacting with others (see Schilbach et al., 2013); this is our 
‘default mode’ of engaging with the environment (Hari et al., 2015). Now, I shift focus to explore the 
behaviour involved in this activity - a rich (and somewhat messy) picture. Most research in this area 
investigates dyadic, spontaneous conversation between two adults, who often have no previous 
acquaintance. I draw out key observations and themes from this work, and present one lens through 
which we might understand the possible goals of this behaviour. This (albeit simplified) picture is 
helpful in building my theoretical (and, ultimately, empirical) paradigm; but, the categories we 
establish here are, in reality, much more flexible and constantly overlapping. 
First, I present an overview of the intricate behaviour involved. Since the first micro-analyses, 
conducted during the 1960s, there has been a growing body of work deepening our understanding of 
what goes on, moment-by-moment, as a conversation unfolds. We act in synchrony with our partner, 
co-ordinating when and where we look, each taking our turn to speak while the other assures us that 
they are listening. Second, I identify what might be the main goals of our interaction. The aim to 
maintain and build common ground with our partner is an overriding concern; however, the 
encounter might be focussed more or less towards either transactional or more relational goals. My 
third section explores one relational focus. As we interact with another, we consider the impression 
we are giving, being sure to maintain the other’s positive view of us. Where our relationship is 
affiliative, we also show a degree of tact to protect the other’s reputation, or face.28 I provide an 
 
28 Where we are motivated by certain power dynamics, however, things can be a bit different. 
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overview of this goal, as well as the function of embarrassment - a social emotion we experience 
when these things go wrong. All of these components of conversation serve the process of grounding 
- maintaining our shared focus, with a common goal to communicate and to affiliate with our 
partner. We hope that we both hold positive impressions of each other; when we both realise 
something has gone awry, one (or probably both) of us feel ashamed or embarrassed. 
Although all of this work so far focusses on spoken conversation, it is relevant for our understanding 
of music-making. In the second half of this chapter, I present the case for thinking about music and 
language as part of the same communicative system, but - again - with possible differences in their 
primary focus or goal orientation. The same framework of goal type - contrasting extrinsically- with 
intrinsically-oriented interaction - is useful in distinguishing music and speech as tending towards 
opposite poles on a single continuum; while speech highlights the transactional, music foregrounds 
the relational goals of engagement. I summarise these ideas, and suggest how they might also 
characterise different types of musical interaction. In turn, these musical goals might structure our 
social relationships - perhaps contributing to our sense of group identity (see Chapter 3 for an 
overview of approaches to social groups, and then Chapter 4 for a synthesis of these ideas and the 
resulting experimental hypotheses).  
Everyday interaction: conversation 
When we think about speech, we often immediately think of our use of language - the common code 
we use to communicate certain information to others, a vocabulary we acquire early on, and then 
continue to expand throughout our adulthood. However, speech is more than just syntax and 
semantics. Not only do we act through words, but we also gesture with our hands, nod our heads 
and shift our posture - communicating a lot through our body language. With a combination of these 
channels, we might aim to communicate something about the world, or we might just be modulating 
our relationship with the other, starting a conversation, changing topic, or trying (as delicately as we 
can) to extract ourselves from a conversation that has gone on far too long. By way of introduction, I 
shall introduce three key aspects of conversation which frame how I shall think about it for the rest 
of the chapter: as a shared activity, a multi-modal activity, and as an activity with both transactional 
and relational goals.  
Whenever we enter a place with at least one other person in it, we are aware of them, and shape our 
behaviour accordingly (think of the sometimes stressful experience of entering an elevator with 
someone we do not know well). We might aim to engage with them, or to avoid such an encounter. 
But, as soon as we begin an interaction (or they approach us), we have to attend to and co-ordinate 
with them, going through the motions to fulfil our obligations as a conversation partner. Here, I talk 
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primarily about those ‘focussed encounters’; in the words of sociologist Irving Goffman, these 
involve:  
... the reciprocal influence of individuals upon one another's actions when in one another's 
immediate physical presence (Goffman, 1959:27) 
Conversation is a shared activity, something we do together in the same way as passing a ball in 
football, or working together to lift a table (see Sebanz et al., 2006). For this reason, Garrod and 
Pickering describe speech as ‘a particularly well-integrated form of joint action’, involving alignment 
of actions, and symbolic or cognitive understanding (Garrod & Pickering, 2009: 293). 
This joint activity involves holistic patterns and perceptions of behaviour. When we speak on the 
telephone, we only have the auditory information to go on (and the world of email and instant 
messaging is even more restrictive) - but it is always easier to communicate clearly in person, face-to-
face.29 In this context, we have access to facial expressions, information about what someone is 
looking at, as well as the way in which they are moving their hands and shifting their posture. Often, 
our observations are key in understanding what they are talking about or how they are really 
feeling.30 Thus, we should approach conversation as a multi-modal activity. Levinson and Holler 
describe the role here of a whole ‘ensemble of linked systems’: ‘language is the tip of an iceberg 
riding on a deep infrastructure of communicational abilities’ (Levinson & Holler, 2014: 1-2). This claim 
is supported by investigations of the phylogenetic development of our ‘interaction engine’, especially 
the ‘gesture-first’ hypotheses of the evolution of language (see Levinson & Holler, 2014, for an 
overview, and also a presentation of this thesis by Tomasello, 2008). 
When we view speech as an interactive, collaborative, and multi-modal form of engagement, it is 
then clearer that the meaning we construct together can be both transactional - sharing information 
about something in the world - and relational - modulating how we relate to each other in the 
process. In just the same way as we can use all our both our linguistic and our visual gestures to 
portray meaning which might be iconic, indexical or symbolic,31 the way in which we act through all 
of these channels comments upon or changes the nature of our social engagement.  These are, in 
Goffman’s words, ‘a special set of acts and gestures comprising communication about 
communicating’, which frame the whole encounter according to a ‘working consensus’ (Goffman, 
 
29 Researchers have only recently started investigating the differences we experience between co-present face-
to-face interaction and conversation mediated by video over the internet (as on platforms such as Skype - see 
e.g. van der Kleij et al., 2009). 
30 See, for example, the ‘integrated message model’ of Bavelas and Chovil (2000): they discuss how a variety of 
auditory and visual signals can together comprise synchronised ‘acts of meaning’; Clark (1996) alludes to a 
similar phenomenon in his idea of a ‘composite signal’ (see Clark, 1996: 156). 
31 According to Peircian Semiotics, icons derive their meaning through similarity, indexical signals through a 
physical link or co-occurrence (such as pointing), and symbols on an arbitrary convention (see Atkin, 2013).  
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1966: 96, 99).32 Thus, we enact both transactional (or instrumental) and affiliative goals, to differing 
degrees (from e.g. greeting, then passing on a message, to ending the conversation, we highlight the 
relational, transactional, and then the relational dimension again). These stages, we might say, have 
different goal orientations - two types of communicative intention which might become more or less 
important at different stages in our conversation.  
In what follows, I shall explore each of these facets in more depth. In turn, I address how this joint 
action is performed (e.g. in the timing of our words, or where we look); I discuss how this work 
supports a process of grounding, helping us to align our understanding and intentions; and then I 
unpack the parts of conversation primarily oriented towards either the more transactional or 
relational goals. Our motivation to ‘save face’ is one example of how we manage an important 
relational dimension of the encounter.  
Performing conversation: evidence from micro-analysis 
Conversation is an ‘organised, skilled performance’ (Argyle & Kendon, 1967). It is co-ordinated and 
precisely-timed - a bit like (or perhaps very like) a musical ensemble. I shall give an overview of the 
types of behaviour which are involved in conversation, especially the roles of synchrony and mutual 
gaze.33 
Turn-taking - a universal conversation format 
It is a fairly basic feature of conversation that participants take alternating turns and, in general, 
avoid overlapping talk (see Schlegloff, 2000). It is normal (and indeed expected) that we give the 
other chance to voice their thoughts, and that we actively (and obviously) listen to them while they 
do this. Interrupting (even coming in with our turn slightly too soon) and talking non-stop are 
generally inadvisable and sometimes frowned upon. 
 A general model of turn-taking was formulated from audio recordings by Sacks et al. (1974).  This 
characterised the system as (1) ‘locally managed’ (at each point in the dialogue, the participants 
individually track potential transition points), and (2) ‘interactionally controlled’ (each participant 
shows an awareness that the other is tracking possible transition points, and takes account of this in 
the way they talk), being (3) ‘sensitive to recipient design’ (participants construct their turn according 
 
32 Abiding or not to these norms might make the encounter a positive or a distinctly negative experience; this 
implicates an understanding of etiquette, and even a moral dimension, to our conduct in interaction (see 
Goffman, 1966). 
33 Modern observational techniques now allow us to track the joint action involved - from the eye movements 
of multiple conversation partners, up to the synchronisation of whole-body movements. Before this precision 
was available, however, some of the seminal studies which set the stage for conversation analysis were 
conducted with a single video camera, careful placing of mirrors, and markings on the film itself to denote 
synchronised or other movement of interest. This methodical work was crucial in the development of this field, 
and is of relevance here. 
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to the orientation, knowledge - or common ground - of their partner). These features comprise a 
format which is ‘a basic form of organization for conversation’: 
... “basic”, in that it would be invariant to parties, such that whatever variations the parties 
brought to bear in the conversation would be accommodated without change in the system, and 
such that it could be selectively and locally affected by social aspects of context. (Sacks et al., 
1974: 700) 
In other words - it has ‘the important twin features of being context-free and capable of 
extraordinary context-sensitivity’, or both ‘general abstractness and local particularization potential’ 
(Sacks et al., 1974: 700). Moreover, an analysis of conversations in ten different languages (by Stivers 
et al., 2009) suggests that this format is a universal - all examples displayed avoidance of overlapping 
talk, and minimal silence between turns (relative to the length that seemed “normal”) - with cultural 
variants only in overall ‘tempo differences’. They conclude: 
Our empirical evidence suggests robust human universals in this domain, where local variations 
are quantitative only, pointing to a single shared infrastructure for language use with likely 
ethological foundations. (Stivers et al., 2009: 10587) 
Levinson (2016) expands on this infrastructure. He points out that turn-taking involves complex 
multitasking: in order to take our turn “on time”, we have to start formulating our response, and 
launching language production while still listening to and comprehending the speaker, predicting 
what they will say next and when they will finish. Thus, it does not make speech easier; instead, we 
adapt our way of speaking to aid this process - for example, using particular intonations to signal the 
type of utterance as soon as we start. Despite this complexity, turn-taking is present from proto-
conversation in infancy, and in sign languages - where it is not strictly necessary in the same way as it 
might be in speech; it also resembles the ‘duetting’ of primates such as monkeys and marmosets. 
Turn-taking is therefore not just an easy way to organise our speech; instead, it is likely to be an 
‘older’ or more basic structure which provided a frame for the evolution of language itself.  
Co-ordinating turns: interactional synchrony 
Within this structure of turn-taking, it is important to take our turn at precisely the right moment. If 
we are too quick, we might cut the other off, interrupting them and seeming rude. If, on the 
contrary, we wait for too long, it might seem that we are not interested, or even give the impression 
that we disagree with what they have just said. If the timing of our talk can communicate all sorts of 
meaning, we must be able to - by default - take our turn at the right moment, to avoid possible 
misunderstandings. From experience, we know that this feels automatic, or “natural”. 
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Duncan (1972) identified some signals we use to do this. We show that we are passing on the floor to 
the other, or ‘turn-yielding’, with a change in pitch intonation, alongside some sort of stereotyped 
expression (e.g. “you know”), slowing our speech and finishing our gestures; if we want to keep our 
turn, stopping the other person from coming in, we generally keep our gestures going (even if our 
speech momentarily stops). The listener supports our turn through ‘back-channel’ responses such as 
“mm”, maybe completing our sentences for us. 
However, as we have mentioned, there is more to taking a turn than just responding to the speaker 
(by which time it might well be too late). As well as the predictive mechanisms suggested by Levinson 
(see above), our timing is guided by a regular “beat”, aligning the speaker and listener through a 
mechanism of entrainment (see Clayton et al., 2005, on how this occurs in all sorts of 
communicative, musical, and other behaviour). Condon and Ogston were the first to notice such 
‘interactional synchrony’ (Condon & Ogston, 1967: 230).34 In an analysis of conversation around the 
dinner table, between three family members, they note that one person would be moving their fork 
in time with the syllables of another’s speech. They remark: 
... the three interactants looked like puppets being moved by the same set of strings. (Condon & 
Ogston, 1967: 229) 
Later work provided insights into potential mechanisms lying behind this. Wilson and Wilson (2005) 
suggest that entrainment happens on a neural level. ‘Endogenous oscillators’ (i.e. neurons with 
regular, periodic activity) in the brains of both participants entrain to the speaker’s syllable rate. This 
effectively forms a beat (here called an ‘entrained cyclic pattern’), which guides the timing of turn-
taking: listeners will come in “on time” with this beat; their ‘readiness’ is supposedly ‘counterphased’ 
with that of the speaker to avoid simultaneous starts.35 If they miss their entrance (or give a back-
channel response in its place), the baton is handed back to the speaker. On the other hand, the 
listener can indicate that they want to speak, starting to gesture and form words at regular intervals. 
(If they are cut off by the speaker again and again, this can become a frustrating experience.) In this 
way, turn-taking is a mutual, carefully timed performance, involving the co-ordination of both 
participants to ensure it runs smoothly.  
Kendon makes the parallel with music-making, suggesting that listeners know when to take their 
turn:  
... much as a musician may begin to move conspicuously with the music, as he readies himself to 
enter with his part at the right moment. (Kendon, 1970: 114) 
 
34 Synchrony and entrainment are often used interchangeably in the literature. I use the term “entrainment” to 
denote a coupling mechanism, from which “synchrony” is often the outcome.  
35 Sometimes, two people can be unhelpfully “in phase”: both start speaking at the same time, stop and then 
start again at precisely the same moment.  
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He built upon the earlier work of Condon and Ogston, providing more examples in his observations of 
movement among conversation groups in a hotel lounge. Importantly, Kendon notes that the 
mirroring of gestures, and synchronisation of the listener’s body movements with the flow of speech, 
mark out a dyad from the rest of the group: 
By mirroring the movement of the speaker, the person directly addressed thus at once 
differentiates himself from the others present, and at the same time he heightens the bond that 
is being established between him and the speaker. (Kendon, 1970: 113) 
Schober and Clark (1989) note a similar distinction between the addressee and any overhearers. The 
direct engagement between the conversation partners enacts a process of grounding - alignment of 
action corresponds to cognitive or symbolic alignment, and thus mutual understanding. In this way, 
the “musical” co-ordination and patterning of movement in time is a crucial part of speech, 
supporting our mutual understanding or common ground within the dyad (see footnote 37, p. 65).36 
Joint action - back-channelling  
The speaker and listener, swapping roles, are always both involved in maintaining this “beat” 
structure. Even if only one individual is talking at once, they depend upon the feedback of the 
listener, through the latter’s ‘back-channel’ responses. A conversation depends upon this reciprocal, 
collaborative process: the listener reassures the speaker that they understand and want them to 
continue. 
This is the case even in a very one-sided conversation. Bavelas et al. (2000) instructed one participant 
in a dyad to tell a ‘close-call story’, while the other was just to listen (and, in some cases, to do a 
counting task at the same time). The listeners who gave their undivided attention (i.e. who did not 
have a simultaneous counting task) contributed frequently with responses that were closely related 
to the story’s content, smiling and showing excitement at the relevant points, even gesturing to 
depict the scene being described to them. On the other hand, when listeners were distracted by the 
counting task, not only did the frequency of these responses drop, but the speakers told their stories 
significantly less well (according to external raters). Listeners, therefore, are actually involved in the 
telling of the story: 
Even in highly asymmetrical dialogues, speaker and listener roles are not fixed and separate. 
Rather, their relationship is reciprocal and collaborative, in that the narrator elicits responses 
 
36 Also important is the interpersonal ‘bond’ that Kendon mentions. Synchrony in conversation enhances 
partner affiliation or degree of ‘rapport’ (Bernieri, 1988). This is crucial in infant-caregiver relations, with 
correlates in attachment style (secure attachments were associated with well-timed interactions, whereas 
more insecure relationships were characterised by less smooth exchanges - see e.g. Isabella & Belsky, 1991) 
and the development of empathy (Feldman, 2007). This will be discussed in greater depth in relation to musical 
interaction more specifically, and how this effects prosociality, especially in the context of a group. 
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from the listener and the listener's responses affect the narrator. In spontaneous storytelling, the 
interlocutors interact together to produce the narrative. (Bavelas et al., 2000: 951) 
 The researchers also investigated the role of gaze behaviour in a similar, asymmetrical dyadic 
context (Bavelas et al., 2002). They find that the speaker ‘seeks a response’ by looking at the listener. 
The listener (who is likely to be looking already), meets the eyes of the speaker, and produces their 
supportive response at this point, then the speaker looks away and continues with their story. They 
argue that these ‘gaze windows’ are important check-points in the grounding process: if the listener 
does not respond confidently at these points, the speaker then repeats themselves or elaborates 
until the listener shows something more convincing (an example of repair - see below). This 
‘microcollaboration’ guides how the speaker’s narrative will proceed. 
Gaze behaviour 
This study shows just one instance of the role of gaze; the eye movements of both the speaker and 
the listener play a disproportionate role in the structure and experience of dialogue. Meeting the 
eyes of someone else (whether just in passing, or within a conversation) is something we do not like 
to do for too long, but is a particularly useful way of understanding their intentions or mental state. 
Humans have unusually-shaped eyes in comparison to all other primates. They are more oval-
shaped, with an extremely prominent white sclera. Whereas most primates camouflage where they 
are looking (as an adaptation against predators), humans display this clearly (Kobayashi & Kohshima, 
1997). The opportunities this affords for signalling, and thus effective social communication, was 
important in our adaptation to group living (where the risk of predation is reduced by virtue of 
creating a protective social niche; see Emery, 2000, and also Chapter 1).  
We focus on the eye region when we try to recognise another person (or just below the eyes - 
Peterson & Eckstein, 2012), or discern what emotions they might be experiencing (e.g. Lee & 
Anderson, 2017). This is important when coupled with information about someone’s gaze direction, 
helping us to learn about the environment - the affective significance of objects around us. Infants 
can detect the difference between direct and averted gaze, later being able to orient their attention 
to what another is looking at (and vice versa - see section on shared attention in Chapter 1). This aids 
language acquisition, and is important in the development of Theory of Mind (with noticeable 
differences among individuals with e.g. autism spectrum disorders; see review by Itier & Batty, 2009). 
Direct gaze (also called mutual gaze, or eye contact) is more salient in our interpersonal interactions. 
From birth, infants are sensitive to, and prefer, faces which are looking directly at them (e.g. Farroni 
et al., 2002); we also find it easier to remember those faces and read their emotions, and even rate 
them as more attractive (see Itier & Batty, 2009). Meeting someone’s gaze activates a different 
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cognitive and neural system compared to when we see them look elsewhere. While averted gaze 
activates the superior temporal sulcus (important in our perception of context and motion, i.e. the 
orienting of our attention in the environment), eye contact implicates the amygdala and the fusiform 
gyrus (important in emotion and facial memory processes; George & Conty, 2008). 
Direct gaze can signal affiliation or attraction, or otherwise communicates dominance or threat, 
depending on the context (see e.g. Ellsworth & Carlsmith, 1968; Exline, 1963). We tend to regulate 
the amount of eye contact we have with another in order to maintain an appropriate level of 
intimacy in our conversation (adjusted in relation to other factors such as physical proximity - see 
Argyle & Dean, 1965 - and amount of smiling - as in Kendon, 1967). We might use it for social control, 
perhaps persuasion or seeking friendship, or fostering a spirit of co-operation (see review of all of 
these functions in Kleinke, 1986). 
Kendon (1967) showed that mutual gaze was particularly important in regulating the flow of a 
conversation. He analysed video film of conversations between two unacquainted individuals, who 
had been instructed to “get to know one another”, and found that it functioned: 
... both as an act of perception by which one interactant can monitor the behaviour of the other, 
and as an expressive sign and regulatory signal by which he may influence the behaviour of the 
other. (Kendon, 1967: 24) 
One can tell that the other is about to speak when they look away; after that, the speaker then 
monitors the listener, looks for a response to signal understanding (see discussion of gaze windows, 
above), and indicates when they are coming to the end of their turn by looking again to the listener. 
Mutual gaze thus indicates and effects a turn transition; it is also a means for grounding - ensuring 
continued mutual understanding throughout the exchange. 
This grounding process is shown in more detail by Goodwin (1980), who reveals an interesting 
pattern between a speaker’s words and the listener’s gaze behaviour. When one starts speaking, 
their utterance is rather jumbled and fragmentary - until they see that they have the other’s 
attention (i.e. they achieve mutual gaze), at which point they restart and give the complete sentence. 
The speaker thus only takes their turn when they know the other is exhibiting ‘proper hearship’, 
signalling to the speaker that their words will be recognised and understood.  
This tracking signal is important not only to validate the speaker in an exchange, but also for the 
listener to demonstrate that they want to be involved. In a more complex eye-tracking study of 
three-person conversations, Holler and Kendrick (2015) find that the ‘unaddressed’ participant looks 
to the current speaker, shifting to the other just before their turn ends, perhaps to ensure that they 
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are kept up-to-date with the conversation, and also ‘to display recipiency’ to those who are presently 
more involved.  
In this way, the reciprocal patterning of actions - even just eye movements - in time creates and 
maintains an affiliative context in which we share both our experience of being in that relationship, 
and also the information or ideas that we want each other to know. Now that I have detailed the 
format of this performance, we can examine in greater depth the goals of the encounter - primarily, 
the goal to maintain common ground. 
Achieving alignment: maintaining our common ground  
We talk about “being on the same wavelength” with someone, or whether someone else “gets” what 
we are talking about. When we talk, we share knowledge with another, perhaps aiming to impart 
some of our wisdom (as in instruction), or to persuade someone who thinks differently (as in an 
argument or debate of some kind). Whether or not we eventually agree, our goal is, at least, to 
understand how another is thinking, so that we could think like them if we wanted to. In other 
words: 
... dialog is a form of joint action in which interlocutors have the goal of aligning their 
understanding of the situation (whether they agree about every detail or not) (Garrod & 
Pickering, 2009: 295) 
Aligning our understanding is not just about ideas and concepts. It is likely that, in fact, our fast, 
automatic mirroring mechanisms are a core part of this process (see Chapter 1). Our comprehension 
system and that involved in the production of our own spoken responses are interlinked via what 
Garrod and Pickering (2004) call the ‘perception-behaviour expressway’. Basic motor resonance 
mechanisms might underpin even higher-level, shared cognitive representations (lexical, syntactic or 
semantic alignment) - perhaps with the different levels of representation reinforcing each other.37 All 
of this creates our ‘common ground’ (Clark, 1996: 12).  
Starting a conversation: discerning our common ground 
Holding any conversation depends on sharing some form of communicative code or language.38 
Other cultural, or group-specific, knowledge is also often assumed, and this guides how we talk and 
what words we use (e.g. a mathematician will talk about their work very differently if they think their 
 
37 See the ‘mechanistic account of dialogue’ in Pickering & Garrod (2004). Garrod & Pickering (2009) suggest 
that the lower-level, automatic processes of imitation and entrainment are key to this process, underpinning 
more abstract cognitive representations (others go further and argue that the higher-order processes are not 
necessary at all - see e.g. dynamical systems theories of Shockley et al., 2009) 
38 We can communicate well in the absence of this, however. For example, while on holiday in a country where 
we do not speak the native language, it is possible to use a variety of gestures to ask someone to take our 
photograph in front of a specific landmark. 
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partner does or does not have a degree in the subject). On a more localised level, we take into 
account what another can or cannot see from where they are standing (although not always reliably - 
see Keysar et al., 2003).  Overall, for two people, their common ground is ‘the sum of their mutual, 
common, or joint knowledge, beliefs and suppositions’ (Clark, 1996: 93).  Importantly, this concerns 
our beliefs about our common ground, or what we think we share, based on some sort of evidence 
(e.g. what we remember from our previous encounters with them). 
This is a recursive process: not only do we know what they know, but we also know that they know 
what we know, etc. Clark argues that it is impossible to hold in mind the infinite iterations of this, 
proposing that our level of knowledge is limited to the following levels: 
... p is common ground for members of community C if and only if: (1) every member of C has 
information that basis b holds; (2) b indicates to every member of C that every member of C has 
information that b holds; (3) b indicates to members of C that p. (Clark, 1996: 94) 
Relevance 
The awareness of what we do (and what we don’t) share with our partner at the outset, is then 
crucial in how we then interact. We form utterances on the basis of what we think they know, or 
what perspective they have - according to the principle of ‘recipient design’ (see above on turn-
taking). More generally, Sperber and Wilson (2012) suggest that we hold expectations of relevance; 
these are not rules, but form a part of ‘the very act of communicating’; they pertain to the 
knowledge, awareness (or common ground) held by each partner as a basis by which new 
information might be processed:  
An input is relevant to an individual when it connects with available contextual assumptions to 
yield positive cognitive effects: for example, true contextual implications, or warranted 
strengthenings or revisions of existing assumptions. (Sperber & Wilson, 2012: 6) 
Their theory comprises two main principles: the cognitive principle of relevance - that ‘human 
cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance’ - and the communicative principle - 
‘every act of overt communication conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.’ (Sperber & 
Wilson, 2012: 6). This forms a heuristic that makes communication much more efficient: we can 
assume that the speaker formed an utterance on the basis of what is most relevant, or salient, to 
them - as well as their knowledge of what is relevant to us, the recipient - and pick the interpretation 
which is thus likely to be the most obvious to us both. In this way, 
... relevance-oriented inferential processes are efficient enough to allow for a much greater slack 
between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning, with sentence meaning typically being quite 
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fragmentary and incomplete, and speaker’s explicit meaning going well beyond the minimal 
proposition arrived at by disambiguation and reference assignment. (Sperber & Wilson, 2012: 5) 
Moreover, we can arrive at this richer meaning without too much effort: 
According to the relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic, [a hearer] should follow a path of 
least effort, and stop at the first overall interpretation that satisfies his expectations of relevance. 
(Sperber & Wilson, 2012: 7) 
Grounding and repair 
On the basis of what we think we share, including a common understanding of the types of actions 
which are relevant for our discourse, we proceed to exchange and share information of one sort or 
another. In the process of speaking, we build up our common ground in a mutual, interdependent 
process of ‘grounding’ (Clark, 1996: 221). This happens incrementally. We do not just send 
information to another, but we communicate it in parts, checking at every stage for signals from 
them that they have understood (see above on back-channelling). These processes do not always 
work, however. If they look at us blankly, request clarification, or say something nonsensical, we 
know that we then need to go through a process of ‘repair’ - and one which minimises the disruption 
to our exchange. In general, this is initiated in some way by the recipient - namely, ‘other-initiated 
repair’:  
... a recipient of a linguistic message signals that there is a problem understanding or hearing 
what was said, and the sender then “fixes” it. (Dingemanse et al., 2015: 2) 
Schober and Clark (1989) demonstrated the role of these processes empirically by comparing 
differences in the understanding held by ‘addressees’ (those who are directly involved and can 
respond in conversation with another participant) and ‘overhearers’ (others who are not involved in 
the conversation). Participants were given a simple task to arrange shapes into a particular 
configuration. Because the addressees could signal their understanding (or request clarification), and 
thus could collaborate with the speakers in building up a shared vocabulary to describe the obscure 
shapes at their disposal, it was much easier for them to construct the right picture, in comparison to 
the overhearers (who still had access to all of the same information exchanged between the 
conversation partners). In this way, holding a conversation involves a reciprocal process of 
grounding, building up shared understanding between the interactants, which in turn guides their 
ensuing talk.  
This grounding does not just happen in language use. Clark presents a ‘ladder of joint actions’, from 
the movement or articulation itself, up to its symbolic import (Clark, 1996: 221), and argues that 
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alignment must occur on all of these levels for the grounding to be ultimately successful (and the 
message to be jointly understood).  
To see how grounding works, we must look beyond language use. There are general principles 
about how people discharge intentions in performing any action, both autonomous and joint 
actions. If so, they should also apply to signaling [sic] and recognizing, presenting and identifying, 
executing behaviours and attending to them. (Clark, 1996: 222) 
Our ‘interactive alignment’ (Garrod & Pickering, 2004) occurs through a mutual recognition of all 
sorts of gestures and actions, with language remaining just the tip of the iceberg (Levinson & Holler, 
2014). The multi-modal performance of precisely-timed movements and gestures are oriented 
towards this goal - to share understanding or experience. However, the nature of this goal varies 
widely with context - as we shall see next. 
Communicative goals 
Conversation is best described as a form of joint action, a participatory activity involving many levels 
of action - from the mirroring of movements and gestures, up to alignment of our cognitive 
representations, as shown in our use of symbolic and abstract language. Beyond the mode (or multi-
modality) of this activity, however, we need to consider the goal of this joint action. Some 
experimental work uses ‘joint action paradigms’ to investigate the dynamics of collaborative 
interdependence, or interaction. The tasks might involve individual (but simultaneous) responses to 
particular stimuli which appear on a screen (e.g. Sebanz et al., 2003), playing a piano duet in time 
with one another (or with a recording - see e.g. Novembre et al., 2014), or jointly tracking a moving 
object on a screen with a cursor (Knoblich & Jordan 2003). In these, participants work together 
towards some pre-determined, and external, goal (or are mutually aware of each other’s separate 
tasks). Speech is a form of joint action - albeit, a more complicated, and intricately detailed, one; 
indeed, the goal of our everyday interaction tasks (whether spoken or musical) is much harder to pin 
down.  
Transactional and relational goals 
Most of our discussion of common ground so far has concerned our mutual understanding about 
something in the world. We take into account our partner’s knowledge, what they can see, and our 
previous history of interaction in how we talk; we check regularly to see if they affirm what we are 
saying, that they know what we are talking about. In this way, we work together, using gestures or 
words, to co-create and share meaning, referencing things outside the interaction according to 
iconic, indexical or symbolic relations (see footnote 31, p. 58). Grice (1969) argued that this meaning 
can be understood in terms just of the speaker’s intentions, which are uncovered by the listener 
through inference:  
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“U meant something by uttering x” is true iff, for some audience A, U uttered x intending (1) A to 
produce a particular response r; (2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1); (3) A to fulfill (1) on 
the basis of his fulfillment of (2). (Grice, 1969: 151) 
Sperber and Wilson expanded this to include the listener’s actions, in their discussion of how 
meanings and intentions are understood collaboratively in terms of overall relevance (see above). 
Both perspectives, though, highlight the instrumental goal, a transactional dimension of our 
interaction - a little like the goals devised in those joint action paradigms. However, our aim in 
conversation is not solely to communicate something. We greet our partner, ask them how they are, 
and, while we talk, we nod, smile or move our hands in ways that do not actually add anything 
substantial to the information we exchange.39 Thus, our conversation comprises different, but often 
simultaneous levels - multiple interaction goals at any one moment. 
A helpful distinction is often made between the syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics of language. 
While syntax refers to the way in which information is transmitted in particular codes or sounds, and 
semantics the conventions by which certain signs have agreed significance, pragmatics refers to the 
relationship between the participants, i.e. a focus which is:  
... less on the sender-sign or receiver-sign relations and more on the sender-receiver relation, as 
mediated by communication. (Watzlawick et al., 1967: 4, original emphasis) 
Watzlawick et al. elaborate on this particular comparison, also presenting it as between the content 
and the relationship. Along the lines of Bateson’s earlier work, they use a physiological analogy: 
... let A, B, and C be a linear chain of neurons. Then the firing of neuron B is both a “report” that 
neuron A has fired and a “command” for neuron C to fire. The report aspect of a message 
conveys information and is, therefore, synonymous in human communication with the content of 
the message. It may be about anything that is communicable regardless of whether the particular 
information is true or false, valid, invalid, or undecidable. The command aspect, on the other 
hand, refers to what sort of a message it is to be taken as, and, therefore, ultimately to the 
relationship between the communicants.  All such relationship statements are about one or 
several of the following assertions: “This is how I see myself...this is how I see you...this is how I 
see you seeing me...” and so forth in theoretically infinite regress. (Watzlawick et al., 1967: 32-33, 
original emphasis) 
While we have the ‘content’ on one level, on another we have the ‘metacommunication’, the 
‘information about this information’ (Watzlawick et al., 1967: 34-35, original emphasis), or, as 
Goffman put it, the ‘special set of acts and gestures comprising communication about 
communicating’ (Goffman, 1966: 99). This is always important: a relational frame or lens via which 
 
39 Sometimes, we even nod and agree when we have no idea what the other person is talking about. 
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the information is shared. Sometimes, though, relational goals, or the phatic dimension, have greater 
prominence in our exchange.  
The phatic 
The term ‘phatic communion’ was first used by Malinowski (1923) to describe: 
... a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words (Malinowski, 
1923: 478) 
He elsewhere describes his idea of ‘pure social intercourse’, which is: 
... when the object of talk is not to achieve some aim but the exchange of words almost as an end 
in itself (Malinowski, 1923: 475) 
Although his main object of study is the ‘primitive’ language of ‘savage tribes’ (Malinowski, 1923: 
451) he acknowledged that this apparently “basic” form of communication applies extensively 
elsewhere too: 
A mere phrase of politeness, in use as much among savage tribes as in a European drawing room, 
fulfils a function to which the meaning of its words is almost completely irrelevant. Enquiries 
about health, comments on weather, affirmations of some supremely obvious state of things - all 
such are exchanged, not in order to inform, not in this case to connect people in action, certainly 
not in order to express any thought. (Malinowski, 1923: 476) 
The goal of these types of communicative exchanges is for bonding and affiliation - serving what 
Malinowski calls ‘the fundamental tendency which makes the mere presence of others a necessity 
for man’ (Malinowski, 1923: 477; compare Baumeister and Leary’s ‘need to belong’ - Chapter 1).40 
Jakobson (1960) also employed the concept of the phatic, writing on the distinction between 
linguistics and poetry. He presented a triadic model of the function of language, carrying referential, 
emotive and conative functions - all of which concern ‘the information it carries’ from the addresser 
to the addressee (Jakobson, 1960: 354). Beyond this, he describes the contact or the phatic function 
as: 
... messages primarily serving to establish, to prolong, or to discontinue communication, to check 
whether the channel works (“Hello, do you hear me?”), to attract the attention of the 
interlocutor or to confirm his continued attention (“Are you listening?” or in Shakespearean 
 
40 Importantly, the inability to communicate in this way can be very unhelpful: ‘Now speech is the intimate 
correlate of this tendency, for, to a natural man, another man’s silence is not a reassuring factor, but, on the 
contrary, something alarming and dangerous. The stranger who cannot speak the language is to all savage 
tribesmen a natural enemy.’ (Malinowski, 1923: 477) I shall go into more detail on how the potential (or 
inability) to interact forms an important basis for category divides in Chapter 4.  
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diction, “Lend me your ears” - and on the other end of the wire “Um-hum!”).’ (Jakobson, 1960: 
355) 
This has a similar, relational purpose.41 Later, in a review of how the concept of ‘phatic communion’ 
had developed since this earlier work, Coupland et al. (1992) expanded it beyond just affiliation to 
encompass other ‘relational goals’. In general, these are: 
Goals of talk that relate to building, modifying, or dissolving personal relationships, and, on the 
other hand, those that have to do with the definition and redefinition of own and others' 
identities as interacting beings (Coupland et al., 1992: 211) 
Particular ways of communicating, including nonverbal behavioural cues such as gaze or posture, do 
not communicate “information” but rather act to define relational frames, which then continue to 
shape the whole encounter. These frames can be categorised along mutually exclusive dimensions of 
affiliation and dominance, alongside a degree of involvement (see Dillard et al., 1996; 1999), or 
according to Burgoon and Hale’s (1984) more extensive list of twelve relational messages (including 
task orientation, involvement and affection. The goal of these communicative acts is therefore to 
define the relationship, which in turn shapes how we interpret the words spoken, the content of the 
speech, within this frame.42  
In this way, we have some communicative acts which convey information about the world, while 
other signals indicate and shape the relational context - they have, respectively, transactional or 
relational goals. Importantly, however, this is not a sharp divide; the same types of behaviour might 
be used in both categories, according to context. For example, nodding one’s head is often just a 
signal that you are listening, that you are following (or to give the impression that you are engaging), 
i.e. it serves a relational goal. However, this immediately changes when you are asked a question - 
nodding then has a transactional purpose, showing that you do agree, or that you will do something. 
These different goals surface at different points in the exchange; we might say that the interaction 
moves from being more intrinsically- to more extrinsically-oriented (see Cross, forthcoming: 11). At 
the start of an encounter, or at the end, our actions enact a relational goal, whereas, at other points, 
this behaviour remains in those back-channel responses, acting as a “channel” for the information, 
but the transactional is emphasised - the interaction becomes extrinsically-oriented.  
Coupland et al. (1992) used the example of “how are you?” questions. The distinction between 
treating this question either as relational (perhaps rhetorical), or as an occasion where the speaker 
really wants to know the truth of the matter (i.e. where a transactional goal is more salient), is 
 
41 Albeit, as part of Jakobson’s more traditional approach - describing our use of specific ‘messages’ conveyed 
from speaker to listener. 
42 See Burgoon et al. (1984) for examples of particular clusters of nonverbal cues; and the discussion of this 
‘meta-communicative’ dimension above. 
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particularly prominent in the context of health interviews - the data that Coupland et al. analysed. 
They found that the different goals behind this particular question are negotiated over the course of 
the conversation, as both participants work together to decide what the current, salient goal of the 
exchange should be: they ‘feel their way toward or away from the phaticity of their conversational 
exchanges’ (Coupland et al., 1992: 219).  
These two interaction goal orientations both still rely on (and themselves comprise) forms of 
common ground: the participants decide jointly whether certain actions are relevant in a relational, 
or in a transactional dimension. In just the same way as transactional goals necessitate grounding 
about the external world, achieving alignment on some idea, establishing a relational frame also 
becomes common knowledge for both participants, who understand more about how they relate to 
each other. Even the awareness of whether some behaviour or utterance itself is intended in a 
relational or a transactional sense should be something which is shared. (Think of the possibility that 
someone might ask “how are you?” to be met with an unwanted account of various financial or 
health-related difficulties.)  Thus, I suggest that common ground is necessary, both in relational and 
transactional dimensions of the interaction. 
Next, I shall explore the experience of embarrassment. The motivation to avoid this, and to ‘save 
face’ (Goffman, 1967: 5), is, I argue, a particularly important relational goal which shapes the way we 
interact and associate (or not) with other people; embarrassment could be construed as a shared 
understanding (a common ground) of the failure to achieve this end.43 This interesting case will 
become more important in the light of research into social identity and group formation (to be 
discussed in the next chapter); I shall explore how this moderates the effect of interaction on group 
formation in my experimental work (Chapter 6).  
Creating good impressions 
When we interact with other people, we are not just concerned with communicating something well, 
but also with keeping a good image of ourselves in their eyes, and in the eyes of others who might be 
listening (or who they might talk to later). This motivation is important for our own self-esteem; even 
this is a highly social phenomenon - it is tied to how we think others perceive us, based on our 
experience of interacting with them. This is an important motivation in unfocused interactions - we 
feel embarrassed if we trip up clumsily in front of others, for example, and hope that no-one we 
know was there to see us. Here, however, I focus on the need to save face, to protect our self-
 
43 Of course, the cause of our embarrassment might be something external. For example, I might inadvertently 
steal your shopping trolley, or spill wine over your carpet. This shared external focus, however, has 
consequences for what you think of me - and thus for our relational goals. In this way, however, 
embarrassment spans both of these categories, testing the limits of our present framework.   
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esteem, within more focussed interactions - the conversational exchanges that have been our 
primary focus so far. 
Face-work 
Irving Goffman describes how, in general, we aim to project acceptable ‘selves’, or positive images of 
ourselves (Goffman, 1956: 268). This is an important concern in our everyday interactions - not just 
in what we tell others (the transactional domain), but in how we interact with them, respecting ritual 
etiquette in order to preserve an affiliative relationship. Penelope Brown and colleagues (1987) 
discuss this in terms of ‘politeness’: we take great care over the way we say things. Instead of getting 
straight to the point, we might introduce any request we have, for example, with:  
“Look, I’m terribly sorry to bother you, would it be awfully inconvenient if...” (Brown et al., 1987: 
57) 
This is a ‘strategic’ use of language to ensure we gain (and maintain) our partner’s approval (Brown 
et al., 1987: 56). We are not concerned only with saving our own ‘face’ (to use Goffman’s term once 
again), but also fulfil our obligations to our partner to protect their image, perhaps tactfully avoiding 
certain topics or trying to continue a normal conversation despite another’s errors of social 
judgement.  
The elements of a social encounter, then, consist of effectively projected claims to an acceptable 
self and the confirmation of like claims on the part of the others. (Goffman, 1956: 268) 
Sometimes, though, this careful performance starts to unravel. An error of judgement - a joke that 
falls flat, or, worse, one that is taken as an insult - threatens this state of affairs. We first try to gloss 
over the event, maybe hiding the fact that we noticed their faux pas. Laughter, teasing or other 
forms of ‘banter’ are techniques we use to diffuse the potential tension, trying to ‘reduce the 
seriousness of conflict by denying reality to the situation’ (Goffman, 1956: 271). Edelmann (1987) 
also describes how the embarrassed individual and their ‘audience’ together use laughter as a coping 
mechanism ‘in order to change the meaning and focus of the situation’, transforming it from 
something embarrassing to something merely funny (Edelmann, 1987: 86). In other words, we try to 
maintain focus on our previous common ground - the ideas we had previously about each other and 
our relationship. 
However, sometimes this does not work. Goffman describes the experience of ‘breaking frame’ 
within a conversational group, perhaps with ‘paroxysms of laughter’: 
The little social system they created in interaction collapses; they draw apart or hurriedly try to 
assume a new set of roles. (Goffman, 1956: 267) 
74 
 
Embarrassment 
The experience of embarrassment is a key part of this process. It is an emotion which is generally 
shared, in response to the failure of one interactant or the other to save face, to protect their 
perceived self-esteem (or that of the other). Individuals are motivated to hide their embarrassment, 
in an attempt to maintain the previous state of play. They might avoid another’s gaze, while 
regaining composure. However, once the event has come into the open, and individuals are 
appropriately embarrassed, the participants have together acquired new common ground, the ‘new 
set of roles’ and relational understandings which they then have to deal with in some way.  
Specifically, embarrassment:  
... occurs whenever an individual is felt to have projected incompatible definitions of himself 
before those present (Goffman, 1956: 264) 
Importantly, this discrepancy, or the new understanding of a person, is new information which is 
then shared (or thought to be; this is information which we had previously tried to hide). For 
Modigliani (1971), embarrassment is understood as: 
... a feeling of inadequacy precipitated by the belief that one's presented self appears deficient to 
others (Modigliani, 1971: 15) 
It comprises a loss of self-esteem in a particular situation, crucially related to the perceived 
observation and negative evaluation from others. Modigliani provides evidence for this definition 
from an experimental study in which subjects experience either success or failure, which is either 
mitigated or unmitigated, and either in public or private. Embarrassment following failure is generally 
stronger in the public condition (although a mild form might occur in private, perhaps due to the 
anticipated presence of others); when it is stronger, it was followed by more attempts to explain 
away, excuse, or even deny the failure in some way. 
Felt embarrassment, a wish to retreat from the situation, or an experience of shame,44 is often 
complemented by an external, visual signal, predominantly in the form of blushing. Given our 
motivation to hide our embarrassment, this would seem to be a maladaptive response. However, 
this might in fact function to restore one’s image in the eyes of others (perhaps in the same way as 
our attempts to regain some esteem through excusing our actions). The blush might act as a signal of 
our acknowledgement of failure, or of our misconduct, thereby showing others that we do in fact 
share those values or norms that we have transgressed. It is an honest signal of important moral 
common ground. 
 
44 Although, embarrassment and shame are arguably dissociable to some extent - see discussion in 
Castelfranchi & Poggi (1990). 
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Blushing lets others know that some value against which we are, or are believed to be, 
inadequate is nonetheless a value to us, a value we sincerely share. Thereby they can distinguish 
us, sincere maintainers of the group's values, from other potentially dangerous individuals who 
only pretend to share such values, but in fact do not, and therefore do not have the right to 
belong the group. (Castelfranchi & Poggi, 1990: 241) 
In summary, the motivation to avoid or hide our embarrassment (as part of the general performance 
of ‘face-work’ - Goffman, 1967), and the display of embarrassment when it is mutually recognised, 
serve to maintain or manage certain aspects of our relational common ground. This is a mutual 
process, as it concerns not only our perceived self-esteem, but also our ideas about what the other 
can perceive about us, as a result of our interaction. We control these perceptions together, 
deploying coping strategies or distracting our attention - always jointly.  
This is just another case of how our spoken, dyadic conversations are intricate, reciprocal 
performances, responding to the actions of others in real time, in order to work towards a range of 
possible goals, simultaneously, which might be more or less transactional or relational. Maintaining a 
positive relationship is one relational goal, achieved through ‘face-work’ and part of a multi-modal 
process of grounding. In the event of social mishaps, this positive common ground might be 
threatened, perhaps resulting in the uncomfortable feeling of shame or embarrassment (often 
shared by all present). While this has possible restorative functions (in the display of blushing), this 
subjective experience is likely to lead one to distance themselves from or leave the situation, and 
hope “never to see them again”. In the next chapter, I move on to talk about those social 
relationships which do ensue, following social interaction. Self-esteem (or lack of it) is an important 
motivating factor shaping who we do (or do not) want to associate with.  
Now, however, I shall broaden the scope, encompassing forms of interaction which foreground these 
transactional or relational dimensions - encounters which are more extrinsically- or intrinsically-
oriented in their overall goal. We now bring in music-making, explore its place on this spectrum and 
how it is related to speech.  
Types of interaction 
So far, I have focussed on spontaneous, spoken conversation, held between two (or sometimes 
three) unacquainted individuals. The question of this thesis, however, is the efficacy of musical 
interaction in social bonding and group formation processes. In this section, I show that we can think 
about music-making in the same vein as spoken interaction, as part of the same ‘communicative 
toolkit’ (Cross, 2012b: 26). Music and speech have different emphases though, making them more or 
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less suitable for different occasions - and possibly, as I shall argue later (see Chapter 4), differentially 
effective for different types of group formation.45  
Our communicative toolkit: music and speech 
As I noted in my overall Introduction, music is generally relegated to a different category of 
behaviour altogether. Most often, this comprises rehearsed, scripted performances by specialist 
musicians, which are then enjoyed and evaluated by a listening audience. However, here, I study 
music in a participatory field - focussing on the co-ordinated action involved in the process of 
performing, rather than on the “music itself”. We shall look at ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins 
and cross-cultural examples of this activity, revealing deep-seated links to speech and language. 
These provide convergent evidence for a common ‘communicative toolkit’ which supports both 
music and speech; both of these are manifestations of a capacity for social, interactive engagement, 
in which we share some form of common ground. 
Music and speech in ontogeny 
In our infancy, we become attached to our primary caregiver; this is important not only to protect us 
and provide the resources we need, but also as the context in which we learn how to relate to all the 
others around us. The neurobiological architecture supporting this pair bonding process was 
explored in Chapter 1; here I address in more detail the form of this behaviour. It involves a type of 
interaction which has been described as proto-language, and also proto-music - it spans both 
categories, undermines a possible dichotomy between them, and shows how music and speech are 
linked from early in development. 
When we speak to infants, we automatically adopt a much more exaggerated way of talking. We 
speak more slowly, with more obvious rhythmic emphasis, larger contours and sing-song melodic 
lines. We smile at them, and might rock them at the same pace. We adjust how we do this depending 
on their mood - if we need to wake them or attract their attention, we use steeper contours and a 
higher overall pitch; the opposite is the case if we are trying to soothe them or put them to sleep.46 
These are features which hold cross-culturally - see Mechthild Papoušek’s (1996b) summary of 
findings from a number of studies, recruiting German, American and Chinese parent-infant dyads 
(also see Trehub et al., 2015, on cross-cultural parallels) - and which make infant-directed speech 
sound more “musical”. Indeed, Papoušek argues that this is our ‘earliest form of music education’, 
 
45 I define speech here as the synthesis of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Language is a prominent part of 
this (along with its correlates in gesture, gaze and other non-verbal behaviour), and can be used for 
transactional and/or relational goals.  
46 Falk (2004) talks about the ‘putting the baby down’ hypothesis as a potential factor important in the adaptive 
phylogeny of this behaviour: it is a form of interaction which can maintain the infant’s attention at a distance. 
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which is just as - if not more - important as the structured schooling in music we might receive later 
(Papoušek, 1996b: 90).47  
This is a multimodal interactive context, involving verbal, tactile and vestibular stimulation - 
complementing the infants’ ‘transmodal’ perception (Papoušek, 1996b: 90, provides a description; 
see e.g. Phillips-Silver & Trainor, 2005, for an empirical demonstration). Specifically, the patterns of 
sound display an inbuilt or honest emotional salience, which has the effect of modulating the mood 
and arousal of the infant in an apparently natural way. Hanuš Papoušek (1996a) discusses the basis 
for this in mammalian signalling, such as separation calls, drawing upon the work of Trevarthen, who 
describes how recognisable patterns in motion are linked to affect and expressed in sound via the 
‘Intrinsic Motive Pulse’, i.e. ‘the body-moving rhythmic and emotionally modulated system’ (see 
Trevarthen, 1999: 160). Trainor et al. (2000) provides empirical support for this, showing the acoustic 
parallels between expression of specific emotions, exhibited in both adult speech and the infant-
directed register.  
Importantly, this is not just one-way expression; rather, it is part of a reciprocal exchange - 
developing our ability to engage in turn-taking patterns of spoken behaviour crucial in conversation 
(see above). The caregiver synchronises their own actions, for example, rocking the baby at the same 
rate as their own speech; they also are synchronised with the pre-verbal utterances and movements 
of the infant.48 The caregiver is also responsive to the contribution of the infant to this proto-
conversation, encouraging vocal matching and developing simple interactive games where the 
caregiver’s response is predictably contingent upon the infant’s input (see description in Papoušek, 
1996b).  
Particular phrases come to mean something categorical, such as approval or disapproval, requests or 
invitations, to which the infant learns an appropriate response, and also copies. The caregiver models 
these pre-linguistic phrases, clearly segmenting units using exaggerated prosody and rhythmic 
patterns to highlight phonological divisions. Mimicking this, the infant gradually learns how to 
segment the melodic stream using consonants, thus acquiring speech and an understanding of 
language (see e.g. Saffran et al., 1996, on statistical learning as a potential mechanism supporting 
this), developing their vocabulary through associations with the external environment (recruiting 
shared attention - see Franco, 2005). In this way, infants can begin to acquire complex 
 
47 Many studies have shown how newborn infants are good at discriminating auditory features such as melodic 
contours and rhythmic patterns - often with a sensitivity higher than that of adults (see e.g. Hannon & Trehub, 
2005, and Winkler et al., 2009; overall review in Trehub & Hannon, 2006). They also recognise sounds that are 
familiar e.g. their native language, and their mother’s voice - based on their intra-uterine acoustic experience 
(see e.g. Ockleford et al., 1988) 
48 As I mentioned above (see footnote 36, p. 62), this interactional synchrony is associated with the 
development of secure attachment bonds and the infant’s acquisition of empathy. 
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communicative abilities before they can walk. Eventually, linguistic speech diverges from 
spontaneous singing, engagement directly with music or dance (see Brandt et al., 2012, for an 
overview of how mature, culture-specific forms of musical engagement and language diverge from a 
common precursor).49  The roots of this, however, are in behaviour which undermines the distinction 
between music and speech. The deeper history of these interactive behaviours also point to 
something similar (Morley, 2013). 
Music and speech in phylogeny 
Our earliest vocalisations were probably extensions of broader emotional signalling mechanisms, 
exhibited by a whole range of species. Modern humans developed voluntary control of the 
articulatory and breathing systems which support this, but our vocalisations are still very much linked 
to our emotional experience and expressions (perhaps localised in the right hemisphere - see Morley, 
2013). Vocalisation is also bound together with body movement - Iain Morley refers to all such 
behaviour as ‘gesture’, just either ‘vocal’ or ‘corporeal’. He proposes that these are linked by a motor 
co-ordinator (which would explain why we gesture at the same time as our words). Due to 
perception-action links (i.e. our mirror neuron system), the emotions we express in these multimodal 
channels are also experienced by others through contagion. Our experience of both music and 
speech (alongside dance, the infant-directed register, among other things) is rooted in this 
interlinked system of emotion, rhythm, gesture and vocalisation. This system is a core part of all 
social intercourse. In particular: 
Musical experience relies upon systematic use of a gestural system, including vocal tonal gesture 
relying on rhythmic cyclical muscular control, which exists to allow the expression of emotional 
state and the understanding of emotional state in others. (Morley, 2013: 254) 
Fitch (2012) suggests a slightly different account: the root ‘proto-language’ was a communication 
system which recruited our capacities for entrainment and hierarchical pattern perception; from this 
we acquired the ability to then abstract an understanding of musical and linguistic syntax. Morley 
(2012), in response to this, locates the common thread not in syntax (or other features of the musical 
or linguistic surface), but in the performance of vocal and corporeal gesture and emotional 
expression. Thus, just as holding a conversation is, at root, an interactive, joint activity that we share 
with others (and then use this basis to scaffold some perhaps more abstract form of common 
 
49 Cross (2012b) actually suggests that music-making specifically might have emerged in its own right in the 
context of our extended altriciality (i.e. our particularly extended period of development from birth until 
adulthood). The more “distinct” forms of music, resembling almost a different category of behaviour, might 
exist in order to continue into adulthood those same ‘juvenile exploratory patterns of thought and behaviour’ 
as exhibited in the infant-directed register, the music-language combination, that we use in infancy (Cross, 
2012b: 25). 
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ground), engaging in music (or dance, for that matter) is the same sort of shared performance, with 
an emotional salience underneath the common cultural meaning. 
Cross (2012b) comments, that, for these reasons, music probably did not either precede or follow 
language in an evolutionary timeframe, but rather:  
... music and language are best conceived of as having co-evolved as components of a generalized 
human communicative toolkit. (Cross, 2012b: 26) 
A more firm distinction between them, something we have in the separate categories given for 
“music” and “speech” or “language” is likely, he argues, to be culture-specific, and not due to any 
real biological distinction. A broader category of communicative interaction, encompassing a greater 
variety of possible practices, is more helpful. I turn next to some particular examples (from the 
“West” and elsewhere in the world) which demonstrate the validity of this more flexible approach. 
Music and speech in practice 
Improvised musical traditions like jazz are often thought of as conversational, with “jamming” 
sessions comprising informal environments in which musical ideas are shared and developed, in a 
relaxed social setting. Sawyer (2005) advocates an approach which focusses on the pragmatics of 
such interaction, rather than ‘formal features’ such as syntax. 
Musicians in an ensemble communicate with each other, and these interactional patterns 
replicate the essential interactional processes found in all human communication. As we listen to 
a performance, we are exposed to the distilled essence of human sociality. (Sawyer, 2005: 47) 
He explicitly compares jamming to company brainstorming sessions, or even a family resolving a 
financial crisis. The pragmatic components common to all these contexts include interactional 
synchrony (and the process of entrainment), as well as a more general ‘emergent’ property of the 
interaction, which comes about through interpersonal collaboration (i.e. the idea that ‘the whole is 
greater than the sum of the parts’ - Sawyer, 2005: 47-49).  
Others have started to investigate processes like gaze in the context of music-making. 
Vandemoortele et al. (2018) seem to be among the first to employ mobile eye-tracking in 
investigating gaze behaviour during the rehearsal and performance of a trio. There are no consistent 
patterns that emerge, however (perhaps because it is a scripted performance, rather than something 
improvised in the moment - the latter might have been more like a spontaneous conversation).  
Healey et al. (2005) incorporate the concept of the ‘F-formation’ in their analysis of a small musical 
ensemble. This was coined by Kendon (building on the work of Goffman) to describe the spatial 
arrangements of people in conversation, a ‘shared interaction space’ in which they can see and 
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respond to each other movement’s and gestures (see Kendon, 1990; and Healey et al., 2005: 2). In 
Healey and colleagues’ study, they argue that something similar is going on in free improvisation 
among seven instrumentalists. The musicians’ movements mirror in some way the passing of ideas 
around the group, e.g. by focussing the group’s attention more or less on certain individuals’ 
performance.  
Participants jointly determine when and where changes in the musical trajectory will occur. They 
also form a collective filter through which ideas are either elaborated or abandoned. (Healey et 
al., 2005: 9) 
Maya Gratier (2008) expanded the parallel between music and language to include shared 
understandings between interactants. She talks about processes of ‘grounding’ common to speech 
and music - again in the context of jazz improvisation. Examples of common ground include the 
necessary cultural shared understandings (a language of sorts) that come from an awareness of 
certain melodic ideas, the repertory of a certain jazz tradition or school, as well as a specific personal 
history of musical interactions with one’s co-performer. Grounding occurs in the course of 
performance when one participant introduces a certain familiar ‘lick’ or ‘riff’, the other signals their 
recognition (perhaps through joining in to complete it), and they develop it together. She also 
suggests that the process of entrainment, here forming the framework of the ‘groove’, forms 
another sort of common ground that they work from and develop. Even the drummer can contribute 
in this conversation: perhaps, by interjecting motifs within the regular rhythmic structure, they are 
doing something ‘akin to the acknowledging head-nod and “uh-huh” performed by listeners in 
conversational contexts’ (Gratier, 2008: 99). In this way, musical improvisation might be just like a 
spoken conversation, not just in its use of gaze and interactional synchrony, but also in common 
ground, even external references, presenting meaningful phrases which are recognised and then 
commented upon in the course of the dialogue.  
Work in ethnomusicology has also provided a number of examples which show the interchangeability 
of musical versus spoken forms of interaction, supporting the argument that they can (and indeed 
should) be thought of as the same overall type of behaviour, with a common architecture. For 
example, the vocal genres of the Suyá, in Brazil (as documented by Seeger),  include a whole range of 
styles - from different types of speech (‘everyday’, ‘bad’, ‘angry’), each of which involves a particular 
manner, and occur in different contexts; to ceremonial ‘recitatives’ and ‘invocations’, narratives or 
anecdotes known as ‘what the old people tell’; and more fixed-form, structured songs (see Seeger, 
1987: 26).  
In other contexts, the lament genre provides an interesting case study. In fieldwork conducted 
amongst Karelian refugees in Finland during the mid-1980s, Elizabeth Tolbert (1994) documented the 
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Finnish-Karelian itkuvirsi, a ‘riveting performance of grief’ which mixes together song with weeping 
and a ritualised language. This is an improvised form, a so-called ‘work of sorrow’ (Tolbert, 1994: 
181) drawing upon a collective, historic Karelian identity while commenting upon their present 
plight. It comprises a form of communication traditionally understood to transcend this world, 
whereby the lamenter can reach out to the souls of their deceased kin in Tuonela, and by extension, 
demonstrate a longing for their own memories of their homeland (Tolbert, 2001). Tolbert provides a 
description of the lament: 
Alina begins her lament with the traditional muffled sobbing ... Shielding her eyes with her hands, 
she sways gently in a circle and starts to lament, employing the icons of crying, the special lament 
words, and the sigh-like melody to contact her mother in Tuonela. (Tolbert, 1994: 184) 
In this way, the individual voice does not just enact the grief, but also refers to itself through sigh-like 
melodies and performed sobs. Thus: 
... the lines between emotion and reference, language and music, and form and content, are 
blurred. The lament both references grief and performs it, interleaving reference to emotion and 
its performative expression. A strict opposition between emotional music and referential 
language is further undermined by the heightened and intermediary forms of crying, singing, and 
speaking. (Tolbert, 2001: 86) 
Similarly, the ‘sung-texted weeping tradition’ of the Kaluli society from the rainforest region of Papua 
New Guinea, reported by Steven Feld (1990), breaks down the traditional boundaries of music, song, 
and speech. There are five different patterns of weeping, each with a distinct societal function; they 
range from more controlled performances of sorrow, mimicking birdsong in e.g. descending melodic 
phrases, to more “naturalistic” expressions of shock or distress, with ragged breathing, tears, and 
high or falsetto vocalisations (see Feld, 1982). Feld describes the variety of forms: ‘some more 
recited, some more sung, some more cried, some more improvised, some more composed’ (Feld, 
1990: 252). The sa-yalab is one particularly interesting example: it involves conversational, 
spontaneous speech, as the performers collaborate in presenting distinct but interrelating layers of 
language (in the “lift-up-over sounding” aesthetic), alongside the descending melodic line associated 
with a birdcall, and sobs, tears, and a wobbling vibrato voice (see Feld, 1990). 
These examples all undermine a traditional dichotomy of music and speech, exhibiting practices in 
which these are combined and performed together. Interestingly, music and speech tie together not 
only in their interactive potential and embodied processes involved in their performance, but also in 
their communication of culturally-shared meaning. This picture of communicative interaction spans 
the relational and transactional, incorporating shared understandings, ritual meanings or semantics, 
even perhaps a correct syntax.  
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Interaction goals: differentiating music and speech  
We have good reason to think of both music and speech as part of the same communicative toolkit - 
a capacity for interaction that manifests itself in a variety of ways through ontogeny and across 
cultures, modes of interaction which have common phylogenetic roots. However, there are some 
differences between more musical and more linguistic forms of interaction. In this section, I shall 
present a framework by which they can be distinguished, along a continuum, rather than in separate 
categories. For this, I first think of the different ways in which music and language mean things, and 
then present the implications of this in terms of the different goal orientations of music and speech - 
i.e. emphasising the relational or the transactional. 
Locating musical meaning 
Signs can mean through iconic, indexical or symbolic relationships to their object (see footnote 31, p. 
58, on Peirce’s semiotic system). Language is primarily symbolic, with signs that are generally 
arbitrary in form, but meaningful through convention, or a collectively-agreed system of 
correspondence. Our vocabulary is built upon indexical foundations, however, as we learn it through 
association. In infancy, we point to things, aiming to share attention with others towards objects of 
interest. We gradually assign labels to things, splitting up the world around us into our culture’s 
categories. Symbols then emerge as we develop the ability to evoke those categories at a distance, 
without those external referents actually present (see discussion in Tolbert, 2001).  
Knight and Lewis (2017) go further and describe how the symbolic, and often metaphorical, use of 
language is in fact a form of deceptive signalling, dependent upon mutual trust within the community 
lest this reversal of costly signalling is misinterpreted. They use the example of play - a context in 
which: “the aggressive actions that follow are not to be mistaken for real” (Knight & Lewis, 2017: 
443). This is significant for the evolution of language: 
While the vocal signals of young primates tend to be stimulus bound, inflexible, nonsymbolic, and 
limbically controlled, their playful bodily antics are strikingly imaginative, unpredictable, 
incipiently symbolic, and cognitively controlled - all suggesting a point of departure for the 
evolutionary emergence of language (Knight & Lewis, 2017: 443). 
Thus, language has the capacity to mean - from direct reference to these ‘fake’ metaphors - being 
the unique exemplar of a symbolic cognition that is possessed only by human primates. For this 
reason, we can use speech for both relational and transactional purposes, as discussed above - both 
commenting on external objects, and modulating the internal, affiliative (or otherwise) frame of our 
conversation. However, music has slightly different capacities to mean, and, for this reason, tends 
towards a different goal orientation.  
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There are a few scholarly approaches which provide some helpful approaches to how music might 
have or acquire certain types of meaning. First, Trevarthen (1999) describes how musicality 
encapsulates and denotes aspects of our universal lived experience through being a direct expression 
of our ‘Intrinsic Motive Pulse’, which includes the ways that we move and feel emotion. Musical 
contours are expressive of movement, they are ‘audible gestures’, as he describes vividly: 
It seems we have to go to the source of experience in acting, the generative images of moving, to 
find a convincing account, to balance the reasoned explanation and give it authenticity; and we 
have to give a central role in our explanation to the sense of time in moving - the time it takes to 
step, jump, glide, hit, grasp, lift, throw, caress, or to think and talk - the measures and tensions of 
time that originate in the mind inwardly and become an output. The dynamic repetitive impulse 
that is cultivated and remembered in music is present in the way we have to move in our bodies 
no matter what we are doing, and this same impulse is both anticipated and reflected in all the 
senses, synchronously, as they seek, pick up and assimilate overlapping and transforming images 
of the effects of moving. (Trevarthen, 1999: 157-158) 
Second, Tolbert (2001) built on this same line of thought in her account of musical meaning as a form 
of mimesis. She focusses on the musical (especially the lamenting) voice as an honest, non-arbitrary 
signal of emotional expression, which is rooted (as Morley’s work also shows) in corporeal 
movements and gestures. Combined with voluntary control and access to memory, vocal musical 
expression is a medium by which iconic and indexical gestures can be displaced from their context 
and thus evoked “at a distance”. This creates the infrastructure for symbolic thought: signals, forms 
of meaning or representation, could be arbitrary, while retaining the ‘indissoluble bond between 
vocal emotion and vocal reference’ which makes the voice more trustworthy.  
The musical voice is above all a meta-commentary on the conditions of symbolic thought and the 
possibility of culture, and a meta-commentary on the possibility of language; it reminds us that 
so-called arbitrary signs are anchored to intercorporeal representations of emotionally 
guaranteed, cultural truth. (Tolbert, 2001: 91-92) 
Third, Cross and Woodruff (2009) present a framework which includes a greater variety of ways in 
which music might mean. Beyond this mimetic, ‘motivational-intentional’ dimension, music is ‘socio-
intentional’, resembling speech in the ways in which it directs our attention, providing a framework 
of entrainment and joint action ‘to impart a sense of communicative intent’ (Cross & Woodruff, 
2009: 87). It can also be ‘culturally-enactive’ in the shared, semantic meanings that music evokes 
(with a degree of arbitrariness) in a particular sociocultural context. Importantly, however, those low-
level biological significances of the motivational-intentional, or mimetic dimension, ‘hold the 
experience of meaning in music on a leash’ (Cross & Woodruff, 2009: 84). In this way, under the right 
conditions, music is capable of some of the same sorts of meaning as is language (with possible 
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semantic significance, and syntactical conventions).50 However, language has a much greater 
preponderance of symbolic meaning, and a much greater capacity for specific reference.  
Whereas in language it is usually possible to specify the subject of an utterance with some 
precision, this is almost never the case for music. Music appears to be a strangely malleable and 
flexible phenomenon. The meaning or significance of a musical behaviour or of a piece of music 
can rarely be pinned down unambiguously; music appears to be inherently ambiguous (Cross, 
2005b: 30). 
This is a continuum, where they do meet in the middle (and even overlap): music can occasionally 
refer to something specific, and language can be ambiguous, such as the ‘significatively-freighted 
elusiveness of poetry’ (Cross & Woodruff, 2009: 89). However, it is always possible for two different 
people to interpret the meaning of music in slightly (or very) different ways. In the words of Cross, it 
has a ‘floating intentionality’: 
In effect, one and the same piece of music can bear quite different meanings for performer and 
listener, or for two different listeners; it might even bear multiple disparate meanings for a single 
listener or participant at a particular time. Music has a sort of “floating intentionality” (the word 
“intentionality” here simply means “aboutness”); it can be thought of as gathering meaning from 
the contexts within which it happens and in turn contributing meaning to those contexts. (Cross, 
2005b: 30) 
This means that, in general, music and language each tend ‘towards opposite poles’ of the 
communication spectrum: 
... language and music should properly be distinguished as tending towards opposite poles on a 
continuum of capacity for specificity of meaning (Cross & Woodruff, 2009: 89) 
And, therefore, they each might prioritise different communicative goals.  
Locating musical goals 
We have so far have been comparing music to our use of language. However, when we think about 
the different components of speech as a whole, we might recall that the specific meaning (which is 
possible with words and certain e.g. pointing, or “hurry up”, gestures) is not always salient for the 
overall purpose of the exchange. For example, when we ask “how are you?”, but only for the purpose 
of beginning our conversation, the actual symbolic meaning of the words is redundant - the phrase is 
 
50 Examples of arbitrary semantic significance of music include the association between the sound of the 
opening phrase of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony and the idea of ‘Fate knocking at the door’; or the Bolivian 
“tara” being used to “call the rain” (see Stobart, 1996, 1994); moreover, the syntactical correctness of 
particular harmonic conventions has been linked to language using neuro-imaging evidence collected by 
Koelsch et al. (2002).  
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no more than a ritual expression. The relational becomes more important - the phrase begins our 
encounter in just the same way as a wave, an approach or a hug. On the other hand, a hug is not 
sufficient if we really want to know the details of the health or happiness of the other. For this 
transactional, or instrumental, purpose, we need more precise meaning - encoded within the 
semantics and syntax of words (and supported by the pragmatics, too). Because of the lack of specific 
symbolic meaning which can be encoded and so shared through music-making, this activity thus 
tends towards different goals in comparison to speech; specifically, prioritising the former, relational, 
intentions over the latter, transactional, goals. 
Cross (2013) notes that speech can be inexplicit in ‘phatic communion’, for the purpose of 
establishing affiliation; however, there is always the potential for conflict:  
... this function can always be undermined by the potential for our utterances to be interpreted 
not as tokens of recognition of each other’s communicative presence, but as definite statements 
about the world that are capable of being contested. (Cross, 2013: 419) 
On the other hand, in music, ‘the phatic or relational dimension is foregrounded’: 
In music, we cannot formulate or convey semantically decomposable propositions. But music has 
the advantage over language in the relational domain in that music sets up and maintains its 
affiliative, relational, frame, without its affiliative qualities having to be continually re-negotiated, 
and the individual significances that participants may attribute to the ongoing musical interaction 
are not required to be made mutually manifest in order for the interaction to be sustained and to 
succeed. (Cross, 2013: 419) 
Music generally has a goal of affiliation, structuring social relationships - it has an intrinsic 
orientation:  
... music as participation has a function that is intrinsic to it - simple continuation of the joint 
activity - with no extrinsic goal in view. (Cross, forthcoming: 11) 
On the other hand, while the relational is important in facilitating the phatic channel of interaction in 
speech, this is generally coupled with a goal to communicate something, to share attention and 
understanding about something external, i.e. speech is more extrinsically-oriented in goal.  
... conversational interactions can express a function that can be thought of as proper to speech 
and that is extrinsic to the interaction: the organisation of joint action for a mutually explicit 
purpose. (Cross, forthcoming: 11) 
We discussed above, in relation to these relational and transactional goals in speech, that both 
necessitate sharing common ground, but perhaps common ground of different sorts. In 
communicating information about the world, we go through a process of grounding the interaction, 
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ensuring that this common ground is maintained as we build upon it, incrementally, with each 
exchange. In a similar way, through the process of ‘face-work’, we aim to maintain a particular sort of 
relational common ground - protecting our own positive image in the eyes of the other, and 
protecting theirs at the same time. Thus, there might be a continuum of common ground types, 
depending on goal orientation of the current interaction context. Music is a flexible medium, which 
can exhibit a range of goal types.  
Musical common ground 
In some types of musical interaction, there are more specific, external meanings or conventions, 
which need to be shared for the interaction to be successful.51 This requires some background 
common ground, in just the same way as shared cultural knowledge, or the ability to speak a 
language. This has been shown in how people perceive certain musical tonal patterns, just by 
listening. For example, in Castellano et al. (1984), the Indian listeners understood the music 
presented as according to the system of tonal hierarchies acquired through familiarity with that style. 
The Western listeners, on the other hand, did not have this pre-requisite common ground, and 
understood it at face value, rating tone hierarchies according to their frequency of occurrence. 
This common ground is important in performance, where musicians share common expectations 
with the others involved. In Maya Gratier’s (2008) analysis of jazz improvisation, the “content” of the 
contributions of each performer is situated within the ‘community of practice’, using certain melodic 
gestures or riffs that are known from previous performances, or knowledge of the style in general. In 
a completely different context, the Kaluli ritual weeping involves emulating the sound of the muni 
bird, a call that has significance not only from the external landscape, but from the cultural 
worldview and mythologies about the soul’s transition to the afterlife (see Feld, 1982). As Tolbert 
puts it, commenting on the voice of the Karelian lamenter: 
Her voice...creates a bridge between the world of the living and the world of the dead, the past 
and the present, weaving individual lives into collective remembrances. (Tolbert, 1994: 194) 
However, in other contexts, we might say that there is a lower threshold of external common ground 
which is required for a successful performance. The music is more oriented towards maintaining a 
certain type of relationship (or “internal” common ground), not necessitating such group-specific 
knowledge. This lies more within Cross’ category of the socio-intentional, rather than the culturally-
enactive dimension of musical meaning (see Cross & Woodruff, 2009). Music is often just about that 
‘communicative intent’, comprising: 
 
51 Here, I am combining the meaning that music might convey to a particular group, and the particular rules or 
conventions by which it might be performed. These often inform each other, and rely upon collective, shared 
understanding about the “music itself”, or the actions involved in producing it.  
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... performative actions and sound structures that could be interpreted as affording cues about 
shared intentionality that direct attention in interaction. (Cross & Woodruff, 2009: 86) 
This is an important part of language as well - in elements such as interactional synchrony and 
prosody, for example; however, this phatic dimension is more salient in music. In Gratier’s analysis, 
much of the common ground she talks about in jazz pertains to this level of shared understanding. 
She suggests: 
... displays of mutual understanding between musicians are rooted in a collaboratively negotiated 
embodied phrasing through which repetition, mirroring and matching, punctuation, and 
completion and synchronisation might constitute the musical basis for grounding. (Gratier, 2008: 
71) 
The timing of performer’s phrasing, the co-ordination of particular moments of synchronisation or 
mimicry moment-to-moment, all involve shared awareness and continual grounding, but about the 
performance frame or relational context which is being enacted. 
In summary, music prioritises more relational goals, particularly those which are affiliative, above any 
sort of goal which requires participants to share more specific external common ground for the 
interaction to succeed. For this reason, music has particular efficacy in managing ‘situations of social 
uncertainty’. These include the infant-caregiver relationship,52 and also intra- as well as inter-group 
contact (see Cross & Woodruff, 2009). In the remainder of this thesis, I explore intra- and inter-group 
processes in more detail (Chapter 3), and then consider how different types of music-making - i.e. 
those which vary along this continuum of extrinsic- to intrinsic-oriented goals - might have different 
functions in this context (see Chapter 4).  
An analysis of the processes involved in conversation is useful to understand all sorts of interactive 
communication, encompassing forms of both music-making and speech. Both are part of the same 
communicative toolkit, and necessitate grounding - both in the relational or transactional dimension 
(what we might call internal or external common ground). Speech, in its use of language and gesture 
with more specific referential meaning, prioritises the transactional goals; whereas, music-making, 
with its essential ambiguity and ‘floating intentionality’ makes relational goals more salient. 
Importantly, these are not distinct categories, but different goal orientations, along a continuum 
from the most extrinsically- to more intrinsically-oriented encounters. Therefore, different sorts of 
interaction (even different sorts which seem “musical” to us) might be more or less efficacious in 
 
52 In this contact, the indefiniteness of music’s interpretation might also aid the development of domain-
general intellectual flexibility, or the ability to apply the same thing to multiple situations, a ‘metaphorizing 
capacity’. This property is exemplified by the flexibility by which music might mean different things in different 
situations (see Cross, 2005b: 37). 
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mediating social relationships, depending on what prior knowledge the participants share about the 
interaction, and what they deem necessary to make music in that context.  
In the next chapter, I shall shift focus, and provide a review of the current research on social groups. 
After laying out this background, I can present my thesis about how these areas overlap: how 
different types of interaction create different types of social bonds or groups.  
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Chapter 3 Social groups  
Simon felt a perilous necessity to speak; but to speak in assembly was a terrible thing to him. 
"Maybe," he said hesitantly, "maybe there is a beast." 
The assembly cried out savagely and Ralph stood up in amazement.  
"You, Simon? You believe in this?" 
"I don't know," said Simon. His heartbeats were choking him. "But..." 
... 
"What I mean is ... maybe it's only us." (Lord of the Flies, William Golding, p. 82) 
In our modern society, we have seen the great power and influence of social groups - with 
devastating effects in the first half of the twentieth century, and wars continuing up until the present 
day (think of Israel and Palestine, and Syria and Turkey). However, bloodshed caused by the co-
ordinated efforts of one group pitted against the other is nothing new - it has been a feature of 
human existence, throughout history (and probably prehistory).53 On the other side of the coin, 
practitioners and researchers have identified the benefits of group activity, from sports to singing in 
choirs, seeking to publicise these effects in the face of funding cuts. Engaging in these communities, 
in co-ordinated team activity, can have important effects on wellbeing and therapeutic potential. 
In Chapter 2, I explored the components of social interaction, showing how we can characterise types 
of engagement on a continuum between, on one hand, an extrinsic orientation towards more 
transactional goals, or, on the other, a foregrounding of relational goals - or an intrinsic orientation. 
All sorts of encounters - whether spoken, sung, or somewhere in the middle - fall along this 
spectrum. In general, musical interaction has an intrinsic focus, whereas, introducing language in 
speech makes the transactional dimension salient - speech has a more extrinsic goal focus. This is a 
helpful framework through which we can investigate how different types of music-making (in all of 
its various manifestations, varying along this axis) might form a sense of group identity. 
In this chapter, I address the notion of the group. I start with a historical review of approaches to this 
topic - mainly within social psychology, but acknowledging the significant influence of sociology. 
There have been various standpoints - some emphasising the inter-individual nature of the group, 
and others the idea of group identity as an internal, psychological property. I trace the move from a 
focus on interdependence between individuals, to later ideas about social identity and self-
categorisation. 
 
53 The prevalence of intergroup discrimination can be much closer to home - even in our own attitudes. The 
institutional manifestations of this are only recently being addressed, with new training programmes designed 
to overcome implicit biases that we might hold without knowing it. 
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The respective importance of interdependence versus categorisation processes is an ongoing debate. 
In the second half of this chapter, I shall outline a few ways in which researchers have attempted to 
evaluate the contribution of each process, or to synthesise them - whether as mechanisms operating 
in parallel, resulting in different types of group, or as ways in which the same group might become 
more inclusive (or restrictive) to outsiders. I then build upon the last suggestion, proposing that these 
balancing forces of inclusion (via interdependence) and exclusion (through categorisation) might 
involve interaction which is more intrinsically or extrinsically oriented (see above). In this chapter, I 
present just the outline of this idea; I flesh it out, with more examples, in Chapter 4. This then forms 
the basis for my experimental work (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
A brief history of social groups 
Living and working in social groups has been a context which has transformed our species - changing 
the selection pressures, and enabling us to build up a whole wealth of cultural norms. The ability we 
have to relate to other people, and communicate with them in various gestures and symbols, relies 
on our unique cognitive capacities which developed within this context, and which continue to make 
it possible (see Chapter 1).  
A preference for those who are part of the same tribe, group, or family, is adaptive for the individual; 
distrust or even outright aggression towards those who are in neighbouring (perhaps competing) 
groups may also emerge.54 We enact our social bonds with certain individuals (and withdraw such 
affiliative links with others) through our interaction with them, perhaps in making conversation or in 
collaborative music-making. Now that I have explored how to characterise these forms of interaction, 
I can present various approaches to the group as a social unit. This is a more or less separate domain 
of research. However, I outline this with a view to synthesising these topics, thinking about how 
different modes of interaction might shape the group formation process.  
Research on social groups has a very long history, formed through the intersection of sociology 
(especially the work of Simmel, Durkheim and others) with psychology. The ideas which emerged 
have since formed the subject of a plethora of empirical, often laboratory-based social psychological 
studies, all operationalising “group-ish” feeling or in-group bias with a whole range of measures.55 I 
begin this chapter by providing some necessary background, giving a rather whistle-stop tour of the 
main theories, as they were developed, in more or less chronological order.  
 
54 Although see Manson & Wrangham (1991) and replies, for discussion on this topic. 
55 These have included explicit preference ratings, attribution of certain stereotypic traits, or actual behaviour 
towards others, alongside more implicit measurements of the same judgments, using response times (as in the 
Implicit Association Test - see Greenwald et al., 1998), memory biases or the use of abstract language (see a 
review of how in-group favouritism and out-group derogation are measured, and compared, in Hewstone et al., 
2002). 
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Individual and social: do groups exist? 
An emerging field of social psychology, as it began to tackle the question of social groups, 
encountered key questions fairly quickly. Primarily: how should we think about psychology - 
something generally restricted to the domain of the individual - in relation to the social - phenomena 
which necessarily transcend the realm of individuals? 
This tension is explored in a critique by Pepitone (1981) (where the same debates were apparently 
surfacing, even into the 1980s). On one hand, there was a general feeling amongst psychologists that 
‘the individual was the only reality’ (Pepitone, 1981: 974). In a telling and oft-quoted remark from the 
1920s, Allport claimed: “There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a 
psychology of the individual” (quoted in Pepitone, 1981: 976). On the other hand, other ideas were 
surfacing: ‘global, yet unseen, nonpalpable notions like the group mind’, a collective consciousness, 
and other social phenomena (Pepitone, 1981: 974). These phenomena have a reality of their own - a 
“castle in the air” (Simmel & Hughes, 1949: 260) - drawn from, but irreducible to, the individuals that 
comprise them. In Durkheim’s words, we have two ‘states of consciousness’, between our being as 
an individual and our part of society, which form an often conflicting ‘double existence’ (Durkheim, 
2005: 43-44).56 The relationship between the social and the merely individual was the sociologists’ 
turf; however, an exploration of social psychology needed to engage with these ideas.57  
However, psychological perspectives retained an ‘individuocentric bias’: a focus on individual (inter-
individual, at most) processes (see Steiner’s lecture, given in 1974 - ‘Whatever Happened to the 
Group in Social Psychology’). The influence of behaviourism (from earlier in the twentieth century) 
meant that viable theories only concerned the observables, namely, our responses to any 
environmental stimuli (whether this is a reward, a threat, or another human). Psychologists emulated 
the methods of the “harder” empirical sciences: these “objective” natural sciences were felt to be 
somehow more reliable, or valuable; the methods successful there were automatically deemed 
appropriate here, too. However, Pepitone argued that this approach was ‘inadequate to explain 
social behavior’ [sic] (p. 972): 
... it would appear that a major lesson from history is that inasmuch as social psychology is 
conceived as part of a natural-science oriented, general psychology of the individual, its theories 
cannot adequately deal with the influences on personality and social behavior that originate in 
the objective environment, including especially the social structures and normative systems in 
which individuals are embedded and psychologically subscribed. (Pepitone, 1981: 983) 
 
56 The idea that these two ‘states’ exist within and guide the actions of individuals has a few parallels with the 
social identity and self-categorisation approaches (these are explored later in this chapter). 
57 This became especially pertinent after the experience of war and economic depression in the 1930s and 40s 
raised many questions about our social behaviour and psychology: people started to think about how social 
organisations function, and how charismatic leaders could influence large crowds of thinking individuals. 
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Given that these social systems have real effects both on our subjective experience of the world and 
on the way we actually behave, it was important to develop social psychological theories which could 
take account of these phenomena in a more helpful way. Sociologists were more fruitful, working in 
the other direction. They acknowledged that:  
... society cannot constitute itself unless it penetrates individual consciousnesses and fashions 
them “in its image and likeness”; so, ...it can be said with confidence that a number of our mental 
states, including some of the most essential, have a social origin. Here it is the whole that, to a 
large extent, constitutes the part; hence it is impossible to try to explain the whole without 
explaining the part, if only as an after-effect. (Durkheim, 2005: 35) 
In this section, I shall review a number of attempts made by psychologists to develop a theory of the 
individual that resonated with the knowledge of some sort of social consciousness.  
Group cohesion 
One early approach to social groups was to understand how individuals calculate the potential costs 
and benefits of group membership. Group cohesion is a metric for this, signalling ‘the degree to 
which the members of the group desire to remain in the group’ (Cartwright, 1968: 91). The 
attractiveness of one’s group is affected by properties of the other members, how similar they are to 
each other, the overall group goals as well as the effectiveness of the group in attaining these. A 
group might be more attractive if has a greater degree of ‘co-operative interdependence’, especially 
in the face of some (maybe shared) external threat. This group is compared to attractiveness of 
alternative groups, keeping in mind potential costs of leaving (or of moving from one group to 
another). The resulting group-level cohesion is thus associated with how concerned individuals are 
for their membership of that group, their motivation to participate with the others, and to contribute 
to the group’s activities (see Cartwright, 1968).  
Group interdependence 
Calculations of group cohesion were fairly individualistic in scope. ‘Functionalistic theories’ (Thibaut 
& Kelley, 1959: 5) considered more the relationships between individuals; these drew on game 
theory to model how individuals might work together to achieve shared aims. Thibaut and Kelley’s 
social interdependence hypothesis, a ‘theory of interpersonal relations and group functioning’ 
(Thibaut & Kelley, 1959: 1), is one example of such an approach. This still highlighted the benefits 
offered to the individual by the group: 
Because the existence of the group is based solely upon the participation and satisfaction of the 
individuals comprising it, the group functionalism becomes an individual functionalism. The 
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ultimate analysis then is in terms of the vicissitudes of individuals as they try out various 
adaptations to the problems confronting them. (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959: 5) 
These ‘various adaptations’, however, involve joint behaviour of interdependent group members - 
behaviour which can be modelled using co-ordination games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Participants work towards shared goals, outcomes which comprise the ‘operating consensus about a 
desirable state of a given task’ (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959: 257). They adapt their choices to their 
expectations of other participants, mutually shaping the outcomes of the group as a whole. Working 
together often results in greater rewards than might be possible on one’s own; but this depends 
upon mutual co-operation and trust. General, shared norms can also develop: a common framework 
about how members of the group “should” act across a variety of situations.  
This resembles the definition of a social system, or ‘collectivity’, provided by sociologists Parsons and 
Shils (1951). This is, namely, a:  
... social system having the three properties of collective goals, shared goals, and of being a single 
system of interaction with boundaries defined by incumbency in the roles constituting the 
system. (Parsons & Shils, 1951: 192) 
In other words, individuals have their own, complementary roles, enabling them to work together in 
‘concerted action’ (Parsons & Shils, 1951: 55). This theory goes beyond simple interdependence, 
however: individuals display solidarity in their common (even ‘harmonious’) values and expectations 
(Parsons & Shils, 1951: 193-4). In this way, there seems to be a group function or identity which is 
emergent from (or goes beyond) the individuals involved. It does not depend on the identity of the 
members, as long as the relationships and outcomes are maintained. In other words: 
... if the group's resources enable it to withstand the loss of several members, without very 
dramatic changes in its structure or functioning or in the outcomes achieved by the remaining 
persons, we might decide to consider this collectivity as maintaining its identity even though 
there are minor fluctuations in the size and composition of the group. (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959: 
192) 
Group entitativity 
In some way, then, through joint interaction towards a shared goal, a collection of individuals 
becomes a group, an entity, or some sort of “thing” in itself. Shaw (1976) provided a review of these 
various definitions of the group, synthesising them into two assumptions:  
If a group exists, ... members (1)  are motivated to join the group (and hence expect that it will 
satisfy some of their needs), and (2) are aware of its existence, i.e., their perceptions are 
veridical. (Shaw, 1976: 11) 
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Shaw here traced a middle path between the individualism of contemporary psychology and the 
more holistic idea of the group as a real, collective consciousness. He argued that groups can be a 
real phenomenon, but which come about through interaction between individuals. This ‘realness’, or 
‘entitativity’, is quantifiable; objects in the environment are the most “real”, and groups vary in their 
‘entitativity’ below this. This comes from Gestalt principles of perception - namely, the idea that the 
whole is emergent from, or more than the sum of, its parts (Shaw drew on Campbell’s work in his 
discussion of this).58 In particular, the common fate of the group’s component features (i.e. 
individuals), and also their similarity and proximity to one another, were found to be reliable cues for 
the perceived ‘entitativity’ of a group. Shaw concluded: 
Since the only basis we have for attributing reality to any object derives from our perception of it, 
we must conclude (with Campbell) that a group is real to the extent that it is perceived as an 
entity. (Shaw, 1976: 14) 
These psychological theories begin to resemble more the sociology of earlier decades. Simmel and 
Hughes (1949) had also emphasised the association, or ‘togetherness’ between individuals - a 
different level of reality, or thing (or even ‘art’), which is distinct from the lives of those separate, 
interacting personalities. They even discard the notion of shared goals: the crucial part is ‘the pure 
essence of association’; sociability is ‘a legitimate end in itself’ (Simmel & Hughes, 1949: 255, 259).59 
Moreover, a group’s internal structure, or the component relationships which contribute to its 
‘entitativity’ in a Gestalt fashion, had been modelled (albeit rather abstractly) in various ways - 
notably Granovetter’s theory of weak and strong ties (see Freeman et al., 1992). 
Intergroup relations 
A convincing case for the argument that the group is a real entity in its own right - and not just a 
collection of individuals - came with Carolyn and Muzafer Sherifs’ field studies investigating 
intergroup relations. In providing a context for boys to take part in fun activities, with or against their 
peers, the researchers constructed a whole new social reality which provoked individuals to act in 
ways that were extraordinary - wildly different from their normal behaviour (and not in a way which 
could be justified as a response to just a new environmental stimulus). This behaviour stemmed from 
awareness not only of the boys’ own group membership, but also of a different group of which they 
were not a part: the reality of group phenomena emerged in the relationship between groups. 
 
58 The higher-order system emerging from a collection of individual components, via Gestalt processes of 
perception, is exemplified by how a melody still sounds more or less the same regardless of whether it is the 
key of C or G (even though the notes used would be very different in each case). (This is the example given in a 
historical review of these developments by Turner et al., 1987: 12-13) 
59 This resembles Cross’ definition of intrinsic-oriented interaction (see Chapter 2). As Simmel and Hughes put 
it, the motivation for interaction is: ‘a feeling of the worth of association as such, a drive which presses toward 
this form of existence and often only later calls forth that objective content which carries the particular 
association along’ (Simmel & Hughes, 1949: 255) 
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Sherif (1967) reported three experiments (the second had to be terminated due to excessive 
hostility), which were run in naturalistic settings - three outdoor sports camps - and recruited groups 
of 11-12-year-old boys who had no previous acquaintance. All the boys were from fairly affluent, 
middle class backgrounds, and were generally healthy and happy - there were no known underlying 
individual factors which might have affected their behaviour. First of all, the experimenters found 
that friendships formed spontaneously (due to common interests or similarity, when the boys were 
left to their own devices) were effectively nullified when the experimenters intervened only to divide 
the boys into two different groups. Second, after group members took part together in activities such 
as camping, cooking, or transporting canoes, the groups quickly developed their own internal 
structures, with clear leaders and norms such as in-jokes, preferred places, and even sanctions for 
those who did not fit in. These group activities were formulated in terms of interdependence: 
... conditions that embody goals with common appeal value to the individuals that require 
interdependent activities for their attainment (Sherif, 1967: 80). 
They observed that, as a result, the boys developed a sense of “we”, as opposed to the “they” - the 
latter only on the basis of a mere awareness that another group existed. 
Third, they brought the two groups together in a tournament of games. The groups competed in 
tasks such as a tug of war, baseball, and a treasure hunt. Despite being fairly normal games, these 
conditions alone created solidarity within the groups and a strong feeling of hostility between them: 
members of one group branded the others as “cheats”; the experimenters reported that one group 
set alight a banner belonging to the other; and the groups refused to spend time together even in 
pleasant, easy activities such as dinner or watching a film. 
If an outside observer had entered the situation at this point, with no information about 
preceding events, he could only have concluded on the basis of their behavior [sic] that these 
boys (who were the “cream of the crop” in their communities) were wicked, disturbed, and 
vicious bunches of youngsters. (Sherif, 1967: 85) 
It was just the conditions of the intergroup tasks - an interesting reversal of the conditions of 
interdependence - which seemed to promote such a strong shift in the boys’ attitudes and 
behaviour. 
The sufficient condition for the rise of hostile and aggressive deeds (including raids on each 
other's cabins with destruction of property) and for the standardization of social distance 
justified by derogatory images of the out-group was the existence of two groups competing for 
goals that only one group could attain, to the dismay and frustration of the other group. (Sherif, 
1967: 85) 
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Finally, the researchers investigated what conditions might possibly reduce this hostility. Mere 
contact was not enough (eating together, for instance, turned into “garbage wars”). Rather, the 
conflict only eased through re-constructing conditions of positive interdependence, tasks with goals 
which were rewarding for both groups, and which they could only achieve through working together. 
These ‘superordinate goals’ were created through tasks such as finding the source of a leak in a pipe; 
together tugging a broken-down truck (which carried a delivery of their food); and all contributing 
towards the cost of a film.  
Joint efforts in situations such as these did not immediately dispel hostility. But gradually, the 
series of activities requiring interdependent action reduced conflict and hostility between the 
groups. (Sherif, 1967: 89) 
This was effective only cumulatively; eventually, they did begin to form friendships with members of 
the other group, and could all sit together (they chose to take the same bus home).  
In this case, the experience of being in a group seemed to come about through functional 
relationships, whether of co-operation or competition. Such conditions resulted in within-group 
preference and clear out-group derogation - as manifested in differential attitudes, stereotypes and 
behaviour, as well as a sense of loyalty to the in-group. Group-motivated behaviour such as hostility 
to the out-group did not stem from particularly aggressive individuals, but rather came from whole-
group interests which were then owned and embodied by the individual members (who acted 
perhaps out of character). These intergroup dynamics were emergent; they exhibited a group-level 
reality that surpassed individual relations. We turn next to consider the subsequent phase of social 
group scholarship. This explored how such external, group relations could indeed have an individual, 
psychological impact.  
Groups in the lab: social  categorisation and identity  
These demonstrations of group-level phenomena are corroborated by our own experience: the 
relationship between groups of fans of two rival football teams following a match, or the potential 
for conflict between neighbouring countries which are competing for the same natural resource. 
What was still unclear was how the subjective experience of group membership - on an individual 
level - could arise, following a concern for the group as a whole. Turner and colleagues called this 
‘the psychological reality of the group’ (Turner et al., 1987: 24). 
All of the work so far prioritised face-to-face contact as the way in which individuals both generated 
and enacted these group divisions. However, during the 1970s, when researchers studied the 
minimal conditions under which inter-group behaviour might emerge, they discovered that this 
might not be necessary.  
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The Minimal Group Paradigm (MGP) 
Tajfel, Turner and colleagues set out to identify the minimal conditions of group formation which 
prompted individuals to display in-group bias. Although they expected some conditions of 
interdependence to be necessary, they actually found that participants showed a clear preference for 
other in-group members in their control condition. That is to say, individuals who were assigned a 
team identity (according to trivial criteria: classed as an ‘under-estimator’ or ‘over-estimator’, or a 
preference for paintings by Klee or Kandinsky) and then given the chance to reward other individuals 
who either belonged to their group or to the other group (designated only according to code 
numbers on their questionnaire, and with the awareness that this did not at all affect the rewards 
they would receive), then assigned more points to the in-group. Participants actually preferred to 
reward relatively more to the in-group than the out-group, even if this meant they awarded fewer 
points overall - the relative gain of the in-group above the out-group, rather than an absolute point 
total, was more important to them (see original experiment in Tajfel et al., 1971). 
Interpreting the MGP: Social Identity Theory 
These findings were interpreted as evidence that the subjective experience of belonging to a group, 
and the resulting in-group bias, arises from a process of mere categorisation. In the experiment, 
participants never met or interacted with any others, neither in- nor out-group members, so face-to-
face interdependence could not have been a necessary part of the process. This did not deny the 
importance of interpersonal relationships or of intergroup contact (as we saw earlier). Rather, the 
findings of the MGP suggested that the group concept, the psychological state of group membership, 
comes about initially through categorisation: individuals identify themselves and others with a 
particular group or category. This formed the basis for Social Identity Theory (first presented in Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979). 
A summary of the theory, presented by Hogg & Abrams (1988), emphasised the changes that occur 
within the individual, as a result of them being assigned to a particular group. They state: 
... belonging to a group (of whatever size and distribution) is largely a psychological state which is 
quite distinct from that of being a unique and separate individual, and...it confers social identity, 
or a shared/collective representation of who one is and how one should behave. (Hogg & 
Abrams, 1988: 3, original emphasis) 
We categorise people into groups as part of a general need to find order in our environment: 
perceiving regularities in this way is a process of uncertainty reduction, making the world a bit more 
predictable. We notice commonalities among people, helping us to form stereotypes about how we 
expect certain sorts of people to behave. This process has much broader implications - with real 
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consequences for how we think about ourselves and others. When we categorise ourselves as part of 
a particular group, we internalise this new identity as part of our self-concept (Brewer, 1991); we 
emphasise our own traits that align with the properties we have in common with other members 
(forming group stereotypes - see Haslam et al., 1999).  
Our self-concept is comprised of several identities - some on a personal level and others social 
identities (see Brewer & Gardner, 1996). All of these contribute to how we think about ourselves, our 
self-evaluation, and thus impact our well-being, sense of self-worth, or (as is more common in the 
literature) our self-esteem. Our need for positive self-esteem in relation to our social identity - that 
associated with membership of a social group - motivates us to show our group’s ‘positive 
distinctiveness’ (Hogg & Abrams, 1988: 23).60 This becomes especially relevant in relation to other 
groups (as we saw in the Sherifs’ work, above). Historically, there are many examples of large-scale 
social groups, categorisations based on nationality or religion, who are pitted against each other just 
on the basis of those differences, fighting for power or status over the other (Hogg and Abrams use 
the example of Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland). The sense of in-group preference, or 
inclination towards out-group derogation, therefore comes about through internalisation of this 
social identity as part of one’s individual sense of self, combined with one’s own need for “coming 
out on top”.61 
There has been some confusion over the role of self-esteem in this process, with rather mixed 
empirical findings. Hogg and Abrams (1990) identified three different hypotheses or ‘corollaries’, 
clarifying potential aspects of this process: inter-group discrimination results in higher self-esteem; 
self-esteem promotes inter-group discrimination; or mere category salience leads to higher self-
esteem. They reviewed various studies, finding most support for the first of these corollaries (as did 
the more recent literature review by Rubin & Hewstone, 1998): most evidence indicated that 
successful in-group discrimination enhances self-esteem (but not vice versa).62  
Interestingly, Crocker and Luhtanen (1990) distinguished the role of personal and more collective 
self-esteem in predicting these ‘enhancement’ motives, or in-group preference. Those with an 
 
60 Other motivations which might contribute include a need for coherence in our self-identity, a sense of 
meaning (which can come from upholding our social norms or stereotypes), self-efficacy or a motivation for 
power and control over others. These are self-evaluative motivations, rather than a drive for self-
enhancement, and are likely to be more important day-to-day - although the latter might arise under 
conditions of threat (Hogg & Abrams, 1990). See also Amiot and Aubin (2013) for insights from self-
determination theory: the effect of whether our identities are freely chosen or imposed upon us. 
61 Other strategies to attain positive group distinctiveness and self-esteem might instead include social mobility 
(changing group), if possible, or other sorts of social change (see Hogg & Abrams, 1988). 
62 These uncertainties about the precise role of self-esteem might be due to how it is measured. Often, 
empirical studies measure or manipulate global self-esteem. In contrast, Social Identity Theory implicates a 
more specific self-concept about a social identity which comes to the fore only in certain contexts (and so is 
much harder to measure; see Hogg & Abrams, 1990). 
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already high sense of collective self-esteem were more likely to discriminate in favour of their in-
group, upholding this self-evaluation through preference for their own group identity. On the other 
hand, those with lower collective self-esteem do not feel the need to increase their self-evaluation; 
rather, they act consistently, and display less in-group bias. This provides some support for the 
second corollary: individual differences in self-esteem motivate in-group bias.63  
Broadly, the social identity we acquire through being assigned to (or choosing) a social group 
becomes an important part of how we think about ourselves in relation to others. Although there are 
mixed findings, in general a sense of group identity, and a preference for those who belong to our 
group, stems from our personal wellbeing and our need to uphold a positive sense of self. 
Self-Categorization Theory 
Following the development of Social Identity Theory, Turner and colleagues investigated more the 
general ‘social-cognitive basis’ which underpins this sense of group membership. Their theory of Self-
Categorisation (presented in Turner et al., 1987) formulated with more precision the way in which 
we align ourselves with certain types and combinations of social identities.64 
The fundamental idea is that group behaviour is the behaviour of individuals acting on the basis 
of a categorization of self and others at a social, more “inclusive” or “higher order” level of 
abstraction than that involved in the categorization of people as distinct, individual persons. 
(Turner et al., 1987: 2) 
Turner et al. describe three levels on which we classify others: on a species level, as human; on the 
level of social groups, based on certain similarities and differences (e.g. male or female, working or 
middle class); and then as individuals, noticing the ways that we all are different, even within our 
own social categories (Turner et al., 1987: 45). Each of these layers of definition is a different facet of 
one’s self-concept; they function independently, and can become more or less salient depending on 
the context (see also Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Our social identities operate on this medium level of 
abstraction: we do not always engage with others just as individuals in their own right, but rather as 
members of a category (Turner et al., 1987: 42).65  
 
63 Aberson et al. (2000) endorse most of these findings in their meta-analysis; however, they also reveal that 
individuals with low collective self-esteem do show some in-group preference, but only in indirect rather than 
explicit measures (in keeping with their need for self-consistency). 
64 Confusingly, they refer to Social Identity Theory as the ‘social identity theory of intergroup behaviour’ 
(Turner et al., 1987: 42), referring to the motivational basis for positive differentiation of one’s own group 
above others) and their new Self-Categorisation Theory as ‘the social identity theory of the group’ (Turner et 
al., 1987: ix). Importantly, the realm covered by Social Identity Theory is within their broader model of Self-
Categorisation.  
65 If one level of categorisation is activated, this inhibits any other categorisation based on other similarities or 
differences (due to a ‘functional antagonism’ between levels of categorisation - Turner et al., 1987: 49). 
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Working up from the bottom of this framework is often thought of as a process of 
‘depersonalization’. Although this term has negative connotations, it refers here to a purely 
perceptual phenomenon in the way we view all other people, and ourselves. Turner et al. draw on 
the work of Rosch and Bruner, who investigated how we develop hierarchical classifications for 
everything in our environment - from chairs, to trees, and now to people. Dividing people into social 
groups does not necessarily imply judgements of value; rather, these divisions merely come from 
trying to maximise intra-class similarities and inter-class differences to make the most sense out of 
the present surroundings (the meta-contrast principle - Turner et al., 1987: 46-47).  
Of course, what seem to be purely perceptual processes do end up, as we know, having real (often 
negative) effects in the way we think about and treat others. When we are primed to think on a 
group level, we do not think of others as individuals, but just as members of a category - with all the 
associated attributes or stereotypes.66 Importantly, this shapes our interaction with them, 
responding to them on the basis of these heuristics - the accounts of racial bias displayed by police in 
the United States, is a good (albeit often brutal) example of this.67 
Category divides and bounded affiliation 
We generally mimic people who we like, but not others who we have more negative feelings about 
(Likowski et al., 2008). Relatedly, we mimic people more during conversation when they belong to 
our in-group (e.g. on the basis of religious belief) than those in the out-group (Yabar et al., 2006). We 
are also more likely to laugh at jokes when we hear fellow university members laughing than when 
we think the laughter comes from members of an unpopular political party (Platow et al., 2005); and 
we only spontaneously mimic the emotional expressions of politicians when our views are aligned 
with theirs (Fino et al., 2019). Even when we are divided by only minimal criteria (like certain art 
preferences), we are more co-ordinated in performing a simple movement with an in-group than an 
out-group member (Miles et al., 2011). In general, then, phatic forms of interaction, simple and easy 
ways of affiliating with others, are already marked by the existence of category divides, or an 
awareness of having different social identities.68 Kavanagh and Winkielman (2016) suggest that this 
intergroup mimicry effect is the result of social learning biases whereby we emulate only those who 
are reliable models, i.e. those from within the group. 
 
66 In Cambridge during the summer season, the streets are often full of tourist groups coming from overseas, 
especially China. On the basis of this experience, I have observed my own tendency to group individuals 
according to race, which involves a stereotyping of Chinese as tourists and white British as students or 
academics. This categorisation is a simplification of the demographic of the university town, and is unsuitable 
to be applied more generally in other University contexts (i.e. generally, Chinese people working in the library 
are not there as tourists).  
67 See, for example, the news report of a politician who was stopped by police for trivial reasons - and assumed 
it was because of the colour of his skin (see Revesz, writing in the Independent in July 2016). 
68 See Blocker & McIntosh (2017) for a comparison of how mimicry is shaped by different types of group 
boundaries - whether minimal, interdependent, socially consequential etc. 
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This, of course, has consequences for how we think about others, and how much we like or affiliate 
with them. Hess and Fischer note that: 
... mimicry serves to foster affiliation but also crucially depends on an initial affiliative stance, that 
is, an initial openness to engage with the other (Hess & Fischer, 2013) 
This is even shown on a neural level. When viewing photographs of certain ‘extreme outgroups’, we 
do not even activate the prefrontal cortex (central in our social cognition), instead processing the 
images of those people in the same way as we would objects; the insula and amygdala are activated - 
areas associated with our experience of disgust (Harris & Fiske, 2006). Even following just a minimal 
basis for categorisation (a dot estimation task), we show a larger neural response to in-group than 
out-group faces (Ratner & Amodio, 2013). Any mimicry of outgroups might emerge in fact through a 
motive of appeasement - in response to someone who is perceived as a threat (see fMRI study of this 
effect by Rauchbauer et al., 2015).  
These group boundaries are also characterised by a limit of our capacity to empathise (see Fuchs, 
2019). The motor resonance which lies behind this - enabling our understanding of others’ pain, or 
other mental states - is least responsive when we observe people who we think belong to e.g. racial 
outgroups (among Canadians, these are the South Asian and Black individuals; Gutsell & Inzlicht, 
2010). We are less likely to “feel their pain” (Avenanti et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2009), or experience 
sadness along with them (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012). 
As a result of these actual processing differences, people feel less close or connected to those who 
are different from them (according to some criteria). It follows that we are more likely to help or 
trust those who are within our group, or who look the same as us in some way. In other words, we 
reinforce this group boundary by the way we interact and affiliate (or don’t).  
In summary, after a century of research into social groups, we can account for a broad range of 
phenomena - including our membership and sense of belonging to a larger-scale category, regardless 
of whether we have had personal experience of interacting with all of the other members, or none of 
them (or just a tiny fraction). The Social Identity and Self-Categorisation theories made this possible 
by highlighting the role of categorisation above a sense of interpersonal interdependence. 
Furthermore, they offered a way to re-consider our question of reconciling the domain of the social 
with that of the individual: here, we situate ‘the social self-concept...in the mind of the individual’ 
(Turner et al., 1987: 67). Social groups are not “out there” in society, but are represented on a 
psychological level, and mediate our individual choices and behaviour.  
... society is in the individual as much as individuals are in society. (Turner & Oakes, 1986: 239-
240) 
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However, this was not the end of the story. The respective roles of face-to-face interdependence and 
social categorisation (in the mind of the individual) in forming social groups (and the ensuing 
definition of what a social group is) are still the subject of debate. In the next section, I focus on more 
recent approaches to this question, how researchers have synthesised and combined these 
processes in various ways, before presenting my own ideas about how we might distinguish them - 
by thinking more about the types of social interaction which might be involved. 
Interdependence and categorisation 
These Social Categorisation and Identity theories did not replace older work into the role of 
interpersonal contact and functional group relationships. Rather, they provided new insights into 
possible psychological processes at work. However, there were competing claims about which 
process is primary, which is more important, or occurs first, in establishing group identity. In this 
section, I shall explore this dialogue. I start by outlining competing interpretations of the MGP; then I 
suggest how these different mechanisms might actually work in tandem and be complementary 
insights - they are two sides of the coin to consider when approaching questions of group formation 
and identity. 
Interdependence and categorisation in minimal groups  
Initially, the main criticism of the Social Identity interpretation of the MGP came from Rabbie, 
Horwitz and colleagues. They argued that participants still had a sense of interdependence, even in 
those minimal conditions: their task was to allocate rewards to others, thus they were aware that 
others would be doing the same, with them in mind.69 They acknowledged that processes of 
categorisation do occur as we align ourselves with others who have some common attribute; 
however, they suggest that these categories only become meaningful units, or groups, with 
relationships of interdependence: 
A social group can be considered as a ‘dynamic whole’ or social system, characterized by the 
perceived interdependence among its members, whereas a social category can be defined as a 
collection of individuals who share at least one attribute in common. (Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988: 
117) 
We might categorise ourselves with those who are blonde, who share the same toothpaste, or who 
also play the cello. However, they argue, until there are some conditions which encourage us to act 
together, we will not be a meaningful unit. If, one day, others start to derogate the intelligence of 
 
69 The MGP actually involves both members of both groups having the opportunity to reward all other 
participants, regardless of group membership; however, other experimental variants have reversed these 
effects with clearer conditions of interdependence (favouring the in-group or the out-group accordingly - see 
Rabbie et al., 1987 (discussed in Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988). 
103 
 
blondes, we might perceive the need to defend ourselves, or demonstrate in some other way - acting 
together (even if not face-to-face) - the value of this social group. Identification is therefore with the 
outcome of the group goal, via perceived interdependence. The process of categorisation, by itself, is 
unlikely to evoke a sense of real belongingness or in-group preference: 
There is no evidence to date that the experimenter’s ad hoc classifications of subjects into Blues 
and Greens or Kandinskis and Klees were internalized by them into their self-concepts. If so, their 
self-concepts must be extraordinarily malleable. (Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988: 120) 
Turner and Bourhis (1996) responded to these criticisms by arguing that categorisation involves more 
than just noticing similarities. The act of categorisation means that we represent ourselves and 
others as belonging to this group or another; this is psychologically significant, and ‘a relevant basis 
for [our] behaviour’. This collective awareness of group membership does go along with displays of 
interdependence; in fact, interdependence might be either a cause or an effect of such 
categorisation. But, he argues, the crucial process in group formation is an internal process of 
categorisation and social identification with that category.  
Therefore, we have two possible accounts of the mechanism behind group formation - either as 
something emerging from real, instrumental, interdependence; or as the result of a process of 
categorisation and identification. The latter might come from such external interrelationships, but 
these are translated into something individually meaningful via representations (and motivations) 
occurring primarily on a cognitive level. More recently, other researchers have attempted to tease 
apart (or synthesise) these processes; I shall review this empirical work next.  
A container for reciprocity 
Like Rabbie and Horwitz, Yamagishi and colleagues argue that there is a ‘residue’ of interdependence 
in the MGP. The knowledge that we share group membership (or categorisation) with others is 
perhaps linked to an understanding that my actions will affect other group members, and that I have 
an obligation to them (as they do to me). This is not just in-group liking or preference, but an 
expectation or norm of reciprocity (stemming from a sense of outcome interdependence - see earlier 
discussion of Thibaut and Kelley). This is not inconsistent with a Social Identity approach; however, 
any categorisation process is inseparable from a root perception of interdependence - and this is a 
key part of group belonging. 
The defining feature that makes a group distinct from a simple aggregation is the existence of 
actual or imaginary interactions. No sociologist would dare to attach the term group to an 
aggregate of people who simply share some characteristics or category unless they believe at 
least that they are connected somehow with others and have the potential to influence each 
other. (Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000: 116) 
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Yamagishi and Kiyonari provided evidence for this by manipulating the conditions in which 
participants played Prisoner’s Dilemma games - specifically, their knowledge of each other’s group 
membership, i.e. whether or not they both knew they were in the same group. This is an important 
precursor for the influence of co-operative norms, which rely on a categorisation which is known to 
be shared: 
... the mere fact that the player and the partner belonged to the same group was not sufficient to 
produce in-group favoritism [sic]: unless the player was aware that the partner knew they shared 
group membership, the partner's group membership had no effect on the level of his or her 
cooperation. (Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000: 119) 
They also investigated these expectations more directly by comparing choices made in simultaneous 
versus sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma games. In the former, participants were led to believe that 
them and their partner allocate rewards simultaneously; whereas, in the latter set-up, they thought 
they were the first player to allocate a reward (which the second player would see before deciding 
how much to reciprocate).70 Choices in simultaneous games rely on a generic norm of co-operation, 
while those in sequential games on more direct reciprocity. They find that an in-group preference 
arises only in simultaneous games; this effect vanished when direct reciprocity became more 
relevant. Therefore, being categorised as part of a group comes along with general expectations of 
in-group reciprocity; as they put it,  
... the social category is the container of the expectations of in-group reciprocity. (Yamagishi & 
Kiyonari, 2000: 127) 
They go further, claiming that these are closely intertwined: 
... the empty container itself can play no role in producing in-group favoritism in the minimal 
group situation unless it is filled with expectations of in-group reciprocity. (Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 
2000: 127) 
Our experience of being in a group (or our ‘group heuristic’ - see Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008: 7) 
necessarily incorporates an expectation of mutuality. This makes sense when we consider the 
beneficial effects of group living in our evolutionary history - we co-ordinate in hunting, gathering 
(and fighting for) other resources, and rely on others to protect us (as we do the same for them).71  
Since these findings, others have also tried to discern whether categorisation or interdependence is 
more important in group formation. For example, Balliet et al. (2014) directly compared the 
predictive power of Social Identity (and Categorisation) theories with the hypotheses from this 
 
70 Actually, the participant was playing alone (with only a virtual “partner”). 
71 See Cosmides & Tooby (1992) on domain-specific cognitive adaptation to these expectations of social 
exchange. 
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theory of ‘bounded generalised reciprocity’. They conducted a meta-analysis of in-group preference 
observed in various economic games. In this case, their basis for distinguishing which mechanism is 
at play was whether the presence of out-group members has an effect, as compared to ‘unclassified 
strangers’. The meta-contrast principle of Social Identity Theories implies the importance of a 
distinctive out-group for in-group preference to emerge (see also Hartstone & Augoustinos, 1995); 
whereas, the idea of the in-group as a context for reciprocity does not require this obvious 
comparison. They also compared the role of indirect versus direct reciprocity on in-group preference. 
Overall, they provide more support for the reciprocity account: the presence of a distinctive out-
group does not seem important, and, again, the presence of a means for direct reciprocity 
undermines any effect of group membership. 
Interdependence and categorisation in tandem  
It seems likely, therefore, that there is a place for interdependence, probably alongside processes of 
categorisation. Stroebe et al. (2005) conducted a study where they manipulated participants’ 
strength of identification (through the belief that they are either typical or not typical of their 
assigned group) and the relationships of outcome dependence (i.e. interdependence) they have with 
other participants (either working with other in-group, out-group members, with both - as in the 
original MGP, or none - in a control, no-dependence condition). As expected, according to the 
categorisation account, they showed a main effect of identification on in-group allocations in the 
control, no-dependence condition: the strong identification condition led to more within-group 
altruism. Simultaneously, they found support for an ‘unbounded reciprocity’ account: when 
participants are interdependent with out-group members (compared to interdependence with all 
participants and to the no-dependence condition), they displayed higher expectations for out-group 
reciprocity, and allocated bigger rewards across the group divide. However, the effects on in-group 
preference were stronger when the interdependence relationships were with other in-group 
members; this shows an integration of categorisation with a sense of bounded reciprocity within the 
group, both influencing participants’ choices. In the light of this, they conclude: 
... it can be fruitful to study ways of integrating social identity and reciprocity-based approaches 
to intergroup discrimination in the MGP, rather than testing the two approaches separately. 
(Stroebe et al., 2005: 844) 
Other researchers echoed this call. Platow et al. (2012) showed that categorisation produces 
interdependence, and vice versa; they also criticised a ‘propensity toward dichotomy’, arguing that 
both interdependence and categorisation are likely to be important in group formation (and should 
not be considered separate “schools of thought”). In a similar vein, Durrheim et al. (2016) traced the 
changing roles of interdependence and categorisation, each emerging as important contributors to 
in-group preference according to current conditions.  
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Therefore, it seems important not to dichotomize interdependence and categorisation. Rather, we 
should explore which of the two processes might be more or less salient, and the different effects 
they each might have in structuring the social environment. The studies we move to next depart 
from the exclusive focus on economic games, and show how these mechanisms might work in 
tandem in slightly more natural settings.  
Types of entitativity 
Another recent body of work harks back to the notion of the group as a type of ‘entity’. This is the 
idea that the cohesion, or “group-ish-ness”, of social groups is measurable on a scale of ‘entitativity’ 
(a term that is drawn from Campbell’s work - see above).72 Research has suggested that we use 
certain cues in perceiving how far a collection of individuals can be considered ‘a meaningful group, 
as one entity’; these are the Gestalt properties which underlie our perception of any objects’ 
interrelationship (or combination into a whole) in terms of e.g. common fate, proximity or similarity 
(Rutchick et al., 2008). If we reconsider individuals’ perceived interdependence, or their common 
categorisation, not as opposing mechanisms but rather as different cues for how individuals relate to 
one another, then different types of entities, or groups with different types of ‘entitativity’, might 
result.  
Ip et al. (2006) ran a series of experiments, varying which cues corresponded to group membership 
(among cartoon creatures) and asking observers to rate the groups’ ‘entitativity’. They found higher 
ratings, both for groups that move together (with apparent interdependence), and for groups that all 
had the same body colour (perhaps indicating common category membership). Rutchick et al. (2008) 
investigated the possibility that these cues actually signalled a different way of thinking about or 
‘construing’ groups. They primed participants with images of either dynamic interdependence 
(thinking about a hive of bees), or categorical similarities and differences (thinking of bee species), 
and then gave them a description of a social group. Under the first condition, participants were more 
likely to remember features of the members’ interaction, whereas under the second, they 
remembered how the members were similar. Thus, these cues for entitativity both predict perceived 
group formation; however, they operate under (and contribute to) different ways of thinking about 
groups. They even claim that: ‘any given group can (in principle) be construed categorically or 
dynamically’, the crucial difference being only ‘the mindset of the perceiver’ (Rutchick et al., 2008: 
905, 908).   
Others have identified an analogous division in self-report data: we consider the everyday societies 
or social units we encounter (or are part of) to be either dynamic (interdependent) or categorical 
groups. Prentice et al. (1994) conducted a couple of questionnaire studies, each recruiting individuals 
 
72 Here, cohesion is used in a different sense to Cartwright’s concept of group cohesion I discuss above. 
107 
 
involved in various university societies. They found two distinct characterisations of groups - some 
being ‘common-bond groups’ (based on interpersonal attraction) and others ‘common-identity 
groups’ (based on some common trait). As above, these are distinguished by the ways in which the 
individuals are related; in this case, either attachment among group members, or attachment to the 
external identity of the group.73 They describe how these group types have different ways of 
operating, perhaps with different degrees of loyalty, longevity, and ways of responding to conflict.74  
Therefore, categorisation and interdependence are not opposing mechanisms, but instead comprise 
different ways of representing groups (that we could potentially switch between),75 as well as 
different bases (or cues) for interrelationships among individuals in order for them, as a collective, to 
be considered an ‘entity’ of one sort or another. Next, I shall look at research which continues our 
focus on categorisation and interdependence as two potential processes or cues underlying the 
formation or delineation of groups; instead, however, it considers how they act simultaneously, 
perhaps as opposing forces in our perception of where the group boundaries lie.  
Shifting groups: de- and re-categorisation processes 
A great deal of research has considered how personalising interaction (a form of interdependence, as 
we saw in Chapter 2) might reverse the ‘depersonalization’ processes involved in social 
categorisation. While, as we saw above, category divides limit our social relationships, affiliative 
interaction can also undermine those boundaries. When people are instructed to mimic others who 
belong to a different racial category, or a racial out-group, they then show less implicit prejudice than 
people who just watched without mimicking (Inzlicht et al., 2012). When we synchronise with others 
in an out-group, or in another team, we are also more likely to want to affiliate, or even just to be 
near them, than we were before (e.g. Reddish et al., 2016; Tunçgenç & Cohen, 2016); co-operation 
following synchronous movement reaches the same level as shown normally amongst in-group 
members (Cross et al., 2019) and seems to restructure our cognitive representations of those 
category divides (Good et al., 2017).76 In this way, the psychological effects of social categorisation 
(forming distinct groups by a top-down process, resulting in intergroup discrimination in the way we 
behave towards others) might be moderated by conditions of interdependence, perhaps even re-
categorising people into more inclusive groups.  
 
73 Hogg and Turner (1985) manipulate categorisation and group liking in a similar but much earlier study. 
74 Lickel et al. (2000) also classify a range of groups according to similar criteria, this time noting more specific 
differences between intimacy groups, task groups, social categories, and loose associations. 
75 Compare how, previously, only categorisation was the basis for the ‘psychological group’. 
76 Even just listening to music can generate a similar ‘empathic resonance’. Individuals (with high dispositional 
empathy to begin with) identified with, and therefore showed reduced levels of implicit prejudice for, racial 
outgroups - specifically Indian or West African people - after they had listened intently to Indian or West 
African popular music, i.e. when they had “allow[ed themselves] to be immersed in the music” (Clarke et al., 
2015). 
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In order for these encounters to reduce intergroup bias, it is important for the new interdependent 
relationships to influence (from the bottom up) broader processes of categorisation - concerning the 
whole group, not just those select individuals. Within the research on so-called ‘contact theories’, 
there have been a number of approaches to this problem. For example, in their ‘common in-group 
identity model’, Gaertner and colleagues explore the possibility that individuals can change the 
cognitive representation of their in-group, expanding it to others via experiences of interaction with 
out-group members (see e.g. Gaertner et al., 1993). In this way, the out-group becomes assimilated 
within a broader in-group identity. Of course, possible problems with this, played out in the real 
world, include the dangers of assimilating minority ethnic groups within a more powerful group, and 
the threat to valued social identity that this might entail (see review in Hewstone et al., 2002). 
Conversely, models of crossed categorisation suggest that increasing the number of potential 
category divisions might reduce overall bias usually occurring across just one dimension; Mullen et al. 
(2001) provide evidence for the efficacy of this in certain conditions, but conclude that it is more just 
a ‘redirection of bias’.  
Thomas Pettigrew (1998) provides a more multi-faceted approach which includes a number of these 
separate models, but within a longitudinal framework. Initial contact must have the following 
conditions: equal group status, common goals, interdependence rather than competition, and the 
support of the authorities and wider society (rules originally presented in Allport’s contact 
hypothesis) as well as ‘friendship potential’ (repeated contact in a variety of settings - Pettigrew, 
1998: 80). This initial contact promotes decategorisation, more specific liking and reduced anxiety 
towards members of the out-group. Following this, the category divide needs to become salient 
again to promote generalisation towards other out-group members; recategorisation might occur, 
creating a unified group identity which is satisfactory for both groups concerned. A meta-analysis 
showed the effectiveness of this sort of contact situation across a range of out-group targets, 
successfully generalising to the group as a whole (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).  
In this thesis, I expand upon this idea, bringing in insights about the nature of social interaction 
(explored in Chapter 2). Now that we have seen how processes of categorisation and 
interdependence might operate in tandem, each shaping our perception of where group boundaries 
lie, I shall turn to discuss how various forms of interaction might enact each of these processes - 
forming group boundaries through categorisation, but also re-structuring those relationships through 
affiliative interdependence. My proposal, which I set out in brief below (and expand upon in the next 
chapter), is that different components of interaction might realise both processes of 
interdependence and of categorisation, depending on the goal orientation of that interaction 
context. While Gaertner et al. (1990), Good et al. (2017) and others have investigated the process of 
forming and re-forming group boundaries through affiliative interaction, I go beyond the question of 
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just overcoming category divides, seeking how interaction contributes to group bonding and to group 
identification processes. I draw on the distinction between intrinsic- and extrinsic-oriented 
interaction goals as a helpful way of characterising different forms of social (including musical) 
engagement. These different emphases, shaping the way we interact with others, have implications 
for the interpersonal relations which result - either dividing us into categories, or instead bringing us 
together in conditions of interdependence. 
The role of interaction - a proposal 
When we make music, especially when our involvement is simple (like clapping along, or joining in 
with a well-known song), it is easy to engage with others who we do not know, and with whom we 
might not have anything else in common. The fewer background references we need to “get”, or 
conventions we need to understand, the more likely it is that we will be able to join in. Music is an 
affiliative form of interaction; when we make music with others, we are more likely to like them, 
perhaps even overcoming any previous prejudices or reservations.77  
When we hold a conversation, however, the threshold of external common ground we each need to 
access is much higher. In talking, we generate and maintain an affiliative context, a channel through 
which we can converse; however, for our interaction to be at all successful, and for this channel to 
remain open, we must at least share some common, cultural knowledge, especially a common 
language - and often, as well, the life experience which enables us to understand certain concepts or 
vocabulary. 
We speak of “language barriers”. It is this common ground - distinguishing who can take part from 
those who cannot - which forms the basis of important social categorisations. These requirements 
form the necessary “containers”, inside of which reciprocity and affiliation is then possible (to use 
the terms of Yamagishi and colleagues). In a very similar way, musical practices which rely on 
extensive training, access to a score, or cultural knowledge of the correct way to interact, restrict 
who can take part to a certain, often quite select, few.  
These forms of interaction vary along a continuum. Speech (and some forms of music-making) 
requires more external common ground; it is more extrinsic-focussed in goal. Simple music-making, 
however, often requires less of this external common ground; music foregrounds the phatic, 
becoming more intrinsically-oriented, e.g. its focus being primarily to co-ordinate with one’s 
partner(s). I propose that, in moving along this continuum, making our interactions more 
extrinsically-focussed, raising the threshold of the external common ground or knowledge we need, 
 
77 See a slightly different framing of this idea in terms of ‘The Biosociology of Solidarity’ - i.e. how ‘sustaining 
the established rhythm’ contributes to a sense of solidarity, or belonging (Kalkhoff et al., 2011: 937). 
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we diminish the potential for interdependence, simultaneously providing a basis for social 
categorisation. Moving in the opposite direction, our interaction becomes more relational, more 
intrinsically-focussed in goal, with much less external common ground required to take part. These 
are conditions of interdependence which are much more inclusive, expanding the potential for 
affiliative group formation. Features of the interaction which were oriented towards transactional 
goals, or external common ground, cease to form category divides; instead, we have a new, wider 
basis for group identity, involving all who want to take part (rather than just those who share the 
same language of interaction). 
In this way, the different components and goal orientations of social interaction contribute either to 
processes of categorisation, restricting relations of interdependence to those who are included 
within the in-group, or to conditions of affiliative interdependence. Our respective mechanisms of 
categorisation and interdependence thereby become more or less salient depending on the current 
interaction context. In my next chapter, I draw on a range of literature - from empirical studies on 
synchrony, prosody and empathy, examples from work in ethnomusicology, to discussions of group 
norms and conventions - to provide a comprehensive outline of this theory. This then forms the basis 
for my empirical work, in which I provide some initial, more direct evidence for these ideas.   
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Chapter 4 Musical groups 
So the LORD scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth: and they left off to 
build the city. Therefore is the name of it called Babel; because the LORD did there confound the 
language of all the earth: and from thence did the LORD scatter them abroad upon the face of all 
the earth. (Genesis 11: 8-9, Authorized King James Version) 
We exist in community - we have a social brain (Chapter 1) and interact with those around us in a 
variety of ways, with ease (Chapter 2). This leads to a sense of group identity: we affiliate selectively 
with known others or others with whom we share some common attribute (Chapter 3). The way we 
interact with others, and our feeling of belonging to a group, are tied together; this relationship is the 
subject of the present chapter. In his writing on sociolinguistic variation, Daniel Nettle (1999) shows 
that dialect is important in our perception of group boundaries, distinguishing those who we can 
trust from any outsiders, or possible free-riders.  I build upon this work, suggesting that the way we 
interact is not just a social cue, but also performs those social relationships, maintaining groups and 
their boundaries. 
So far, we have addressed the nature of our social interaction - the intricate performance of 
relational and transactional goals, and how these are each manifested (to a greater or lesser extent) 
in the way we talk to, or make music with, others. We have also considered the definition of a social 
group - viewed either as an interdependent collection of people, or as a broader social category. 
Here, I shall synthesise these areas of research to help us understand how our social interaction 
might relate to our group identity. My basic premise is as follows: on one hand, interdependent, 
relational interactions bring people together; while, on the other hand, the external common ground 
necessary for more extrinsically-focussed encounters forms the basis for categorisation, creating 
boundaries between who is included and who is not. In this chapter, I shall present this thesis in full. 
Music-making is an activity that can bring many people together. The recent film Bohemian 
Rhapsody, a dramatic biopic tracing the life of Freddie Mercury, includes a scene recreating the 
performance of ‘We Will Rock You’, in a huge venue, for Live Aid. This depicted the emotional 
potency of a whole sea of people performing together the basic hand-clap rhythm and repeated 
lyrics which form the backbone of the song. This is social interaction on a large scale.78 Everyone is 
focussing merely on the need to stay in time, in synchrony with the rest of the crowd. Nobody is 
communicating any information to others around them, beyond the act of moving and clapping 
together. We might say that this is interaction with an intrinsic-oriented goal - foregrounding the 
 
78 The huge scale of group interaction portrayed here (and as occurs often in mass sporting events) is 
somewhat unusual in our evolutionary history - it is only relatively recently that humans have gathered in such 
numbers. 
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phatic dimension of communication, with no need to understand or keep track of anything beyond 
the mere act of engaging and acting jointly with others. This is rewarding, and everybody feels like 
they belong - at least temporarily - in that social group. 
We see this phenomenon often - among football supporters, or other massed choirs. But these 
occasions are not always so inclusive. We have all had the experience of being (it seems) the only one 
who does not know the words; while others around us are singing, we try to hum along and smile, 
but actually just feel slightly out-of-place and embarrassed. Only the best singers can arrive at a 
Hallelujah chorus ‘sing-along’ event without at least having a copy of the score. In these, and many 
other, contexts, we need to possess (or have access to) a higher threshold of external common 
ground or knowledge in order to take part, and thus feel we belong. The type of music is more 
extrinsic-oriented in its focus: we are not just moving together, but we are singing something 
together. The necessary common ground thus becomes the basis for social categorisation, forming a 
boundary around those involved in that interacting, bonded group. We need to meet certain 
prerequisites before we can feel we belong. 
Here, I shall draw on various examples of these phenomena to provide some convergent evidence 
for this framework. In the first half, I explore the ways we interact and so include: how the phatic 
aspects of social interaction, and so the modes of interaction which prioritise these (being more 
intrinsic-focussed in goal), serve to bind people together into interdependent groups, increasing their 
liking and trust for one another. In the second part of this chapter, I look at the converse - how the 
way we interact excludes others. I discuss how those more transactional aspects of interaction 
necessitate external common ground (being more extrinsic in focus); it is these demands which form 
boundaries between social groups, and can become the basis for our in-group and out-group 
categorisations. Music-making can span the whole range, varying in goal focus, and thus in power to 
include and exclude. I give examples of both of these forces in action and highlight how my 
experimental work (reported in Chapter 6) shall provide some initial empirical evidence for these 
ideas. 
Social bonding: intrinsic-oriented interaction  
I start by considering the components of interaction through which we bond. In Chapter 2, I explored 
phatic communion: encounters which maintain the “channel” of our interaction more than 
communicating something concrete about the world. As we shall see, it is this dimension which plays 
an important part in social bonding - of dyads up to the largest groups.  
A helpful starting point is to consider again the possible precursors of language - behaviours which lie 
behind (and maybe before) our ability to build up a complex symbolic code - and the role they played 
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in forming co-operative social groups, an important niche in the evolution of our species (see Chapter 
1). In particular, we recall at this point Dunbar’s notion of ‘grooming-at-a-distance’: in forming non-
human and human primate social groups, interaction such as laughter, moving in time, and singing 
together are likely to be particularly effective - more so than just using language. He suggests that 
music-making (or an ancient practice perhaps resembling what we think of as music-making) is a 
ritual which provides the same emotional resonance as grooming, but on a larger scale: 
Imagine trying to co-ordinate the lives of 150 people a quarter of a million years ago out in the 
woodlands of Africa. Words alone are not enough. No one pays attention to carefully reasoned 
arguments. It is rousing speeches that get us going, that work us up to the fever pitch where we 
will take on the world at the drop of a hat, oblivious of the personal costs. Here, song and dance 
play an important part: they rouse the emotions and stimulate like nothing else the production of 
opiates to bring about states of elation and euphoria. (Dunbar, 1996: 146) 
Here, we shall examine in more depth these forms of affiliative interaction. Even within a medium 
such as speech, the mere words we use do not comprise the whole interaction - rather, the way we 
speak, engage, and entrain with others forms the relational dimension of our interaction (including, 
of course, a degree of synchrony, and sometimes a great deal of laughing together). These are more 
intrinsically-oriented in goal, foregrounding the phatic, relational components rather than more 
transactional goals; they are the aspects of social interaction which are more simply and directly 
rewarding, reinforcing the relationship we have with our partner(s), and which can build inclusive, 
affiliative groups amongst any individuals who want to take part. As McNeill describes: 
Words and ideals matter and are always invoked; but keeping together in time arouses warm 
emotions of collective solidarity and erases personal frustrations as words, by themselves, cannot 
do. Large and complex human societies, in all probability, cannot long maintain themselves 
without such kinesthetic undergirding. Ideas and ideals are not enough. Feelings matter too, and 
feelings are inseparable from their gestural and muscular expression. (McNeill, 1995: 152) 
In the following sections, I shall outline evidence which supports this hypothesis, addressing 
specifically those shared ‘gestural and muscular expressions’ of collective solidarity and experience. I 
turn first to work investigating synchrony, and then to the role of affect and prosody in generating a 
sense of shared experience, of intersubjectivity, amongst the participants.79 These are important 
components of music-making; but - as we shall see in the second half of this chapter - they are not 
the whole story. 
 
79 The relationship between song style (e.g. vocal ‘cohesion’) and aspects of social structure (such as solidarity) 
had been explored a couple of decades earlier, in Lomax and colleagues’ Cantometrics project (see Savage, 
2018, for an overview). 
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Moving in time: synchrony and social bonding  
Here, I shall explore findings about the effects of keeping in time, or moving in synchrony, with 
another person (or other people). The ease of engaging with one another, falling automatically into 
step, highlights how social interaction is our ‘default mode’ - not an unusual activity or special 
occasion (Hari et al., 2015). In Chapter 1, I considered the possible mechanisms behind this, and, in 
Chapter 2, how it appears in dialogue; here, I focus on another contemporary experience. William 
McNeill, a historian, has provided a range of examples of how synchrony is and has been central to 
group behaviour, from politics to religion. He starts with an account of his experience in the 
American military, specifically, the peculiar feeling of enjoyment in marching together - a strenuous 
exercise with no apparent purpose:  
Marching aimlessly about on the drill field, swaggering in conformity with prescribed military 
postures, conscious only of keeping in step so as to make the next move correctly and in time[,] 
somehow felt good. (McNeill, 1995: 2) 
He describes how this so-called “muscular bonding” gave him a ‘sense of pervasive well-being’, ‘a 
strange sense of personal enlargement’, and even: 
... a state of generalized emotional exaltation whose warmth was indubitable, without, however, 
having any definite external meaning or attachment. (McNeill, 1995: 2) 
There is a whole myriad of empirical work which explores this phenomenon, unpicking its role in our 
social relationships, and our sense of group membership.  
Being entrained 
The experience of synchrony, moving or sounding together in time, is underpinned by the 
mechanism of entrainment, ‘the interaction and consequent synchronisation of two or more 
rhythmic processes or oscillators’, or the process by which two independent, self-sustaining 
components become coupled and “lock in” to a common periodicity (Clayton et al., 2005). 
Sometimes, this is ‘asymmetric’, as when a person is tapping their foot along to a recorded track; at 
other times, people move together, mutually adjusting their rate of movements to each other in real 
time (see Konvalinka et al., 2010; Clayton, 2012).  
We seem to entrain unintentionally and automatically (Richardson et al., 2007). This is a key part of 
our ability to co-ordinate, whether in martial arts, hand-clapping, or joke-telling (Schmidt et al., 
2011), or in ordinary conversation (see Chapter 2). Vesper et al. (2010) term it a ‘coordination 
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smoother’, as it makes our actions more predictable for the other (see also Vesper et al., 2011).80 
Similarly, Valdesolo et al. (2010) demonstrate that pairs who have rocked together perform better on 
a subsequent joint action ‘labyrinth’ task; they also feel closer or more connected to their partner. All 
of these effects lie within the category of the phatic or relational - they shape the way in which we 
relate to the other, maintaining the interaction channel, rather than involving or shaping our 
perception to anything outside the interaction itself. 
Feeling close 
Moving or drumming together with another person is a rewarding experience. It activates reward-
processing regions of the brain and leads to prosocial or helping behaviour (e.g. picking up pencils 
dropped by accident; Kokal et al., 2011). It changes how we perceive the interaction, and our 
partner. Infants are more likely to look at characters that are moving in synchrony (than asynchrony; 
Fawcett & Tunçgenç, 2017). When we dance in time with someone, we look at them for longer 
(Woolhouse & Lai, 2014) and remember more about their appearance (Woolhouse et al., 2016). Even 
when we move in-phase (compared to anti-phase), we are more likely to remember both what we 
and our partner have said (rather than displaying our usual self-memory bias; Miles et al., 2010; see 
also Macrae et al., 2008). 
We also like our partner more (see meta-analysis by Mogan et al., 2017). Just tapping in time with 
the experimenter (as compared to asynchronous tapping, or tapping alone) makes us more likely to 
rate them higher on explicit ratings of liking (Hove & Risen, 2009; this is even the case with virtual 
partners - Launay et al., 2014). Others who are just looking on notice a greater degree of rapport 
when we wave or walk in synchrony (Lakens & Stel, 2011). We are also more likely to trust others, 
contributing more in an economic game (Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009), and to help them (and more 
quickly - see Rabinowitch & Meltzoff, 2017; and meta-analysis by Rennung & Göritz, 2016). This 
effect arises from as early as 14 months (Cirelli et al., 2014a); these infants show directed prosociality 
to those who bounced in synchrony with them (and not to any other person; Cirelli et al., 2014b), but 
this helpfulness can transfer to others if we see that our partner is affiliated with someone else as 
well (Cirelli et al., 2016). The same effects of synchrony on liking can be seen in larger groups - but 
perhaps through ‘distributed coordination’, via a network of synchronised dyads, rather than the 
complete synchronisation of the whole group at once (see von Zimmermann et al., 2018). 
Not only is synchrony a cue for our affiliation with others, but it also affects how we think about 
ourselves in relation to them. In particular, we feel like we are somehow more similar, or that our 
 
80 Mari Reiss Jones (2016) uses this predictive, anticipatory dimension of entrainment in her multi-levelled 
model of ‘dynamic attending’ to music - we predict where the next beat (and the next strong beat) will fall, and 
thus modulate our attention and expectations accordingly.  
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identities have got closer to (or even merged with) them. In a classic study, Botvinick and Cohen 
(1998) demonstrated that after brushing subjects’ fingers in synchrony with the brushing of a rubber 
hand placed in front of them, they are then more likely to distort their perception of where their 
hand is, acting as if the rubber hand is actually their own.  This effect does not emerge when the 
brushing is asynchronous. This sort of self-other merging seems to be experienced not only with 
rubber hands, but with other people with whom we have moved in synchrony. McNeill quotes A. R. 
Radcliffe-Brown, who describes a ritual conducted by Adaman islanders: 
“As the dancer loses himself in the dance, as he becomes absorbed in the unified community, he 
reaches a state of elation in which he feels himself filled with energy or force immediately 
beyond his ordinary state, and so finds himself able to perform prodigies of exertion.” (Radcliffe-
Brown, 1922; in McNeill, 1995: 8) 
He links this with Judith Hanna’s idea of “boundary loss”, and provides his own description of this 
phenomenon as: 
... a blurring of self-awareness and the heightening of fellow-feeling with all who share in the 
dance. (McNeill, 1995: 8) 
In experimental settings, tapping in synchrony results in higher ratings of closeness, or felt similarity 
to one’s partner (in dyads of 8-year-olds; Rabinowitch & Knafo-Noam, 2015); dancing in synchrony 
results in a more interdependent self-construal (Reddish et al., 2013); and this perceived similarity is 
likely to be the mediator of greater helping (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2011).81 In fact, moving in 
synchrony can inhibit our own affective self-regulation, as we become absorbed in this group 
experience (Galbusera et al., 2019).82 
Showing group membership 
In this project, I am investigating not only interpersonal liking, but the formation of social groups 
(although these do, of course, often go hand in hand). Good et al. (2017) manipulated the degree of 
synchrony or asynchrony according to ‘minimal’ group boundaries (being assigned to either the red 
or blue team). Synchrony within these groups or across these team divides changed subjects’ 
cognitive representation of the group accordingly - as either individual teams or a more inclusive 
group membership, respectively - with the corresponding in-group prosocial behaviour exhibited 
afterwards (in a public goods game). Therefore, synchrony with others affects perceived group 
 
81 These studies often use the ‘Inclusion of the Other in the Self’ scale, where subjects indicate their experience 
of self-other merging according to felt similarity with one picture from a series of more or less overlapping 
circles (Aron et al., 1992).  
82 This effect seems to come at the cost of self-monitoring and agency; the most successful joint action might 
actually recruit a mixture of self-other merging and distinction processes (see e.g. Huberth et al., 2019, and 
Fairhurst et al., preprint). 
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boundaries; this might even result in you feeling the protection afforded by this group membership 
(Fessler & Holbrook, 2014). 
This matches our experience outside of the lab: religious rituals often involve moving in synchrony, 
with resulting feelings of in-group trust and prosociality (as shown in an economic game, where 
participants could contribute to a ‘public investment’; Fischer et al., 2013). In what seems to be a 
real-life version of the study by Good et al., Lucas and colleagues (2011) document how separate 
groups of musicians, who together participate in the Afro-Brazilian Congado ritual, display their 
differential community identities not just through banners and uniforms but also in ‘rhythmic 
difference’ (original emphasis). That is, they try to resist entraining with other groups (which 
becomes a harder task the closer they get), avoiding eye contact and maintaining their own sense of 
beat as far as they can.  
In these ways, synchrony bonds us together with all who are moving and playing in time. However, 
our experience of music is often richer than this; there are other components which also contribute 
to our mutual affiliation. 
Shared emotional experience: prosody and social bonding  
Forms of emotional signalling are displayed across the animal kingdom; predator alarm calls, for 
example, can convey more information than we might realise on first hearing, through subtle 
acoustic variations (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2003).83 In our way of interacting with infants, we also 
modulate how high or fast we sing, or the shape of our melodic line, according to their emotional 
state (and whether or not we want them to sleep); here, we are not just conveying a signal, but are 
in fact trying to change their own state of mind, or to share a feeling with them. In this section, I shall 
discuss how we share our emotional experiences through forms of resonance and mimicry, and how 
those mechanisms are in play when we listen to music (in a presentational field), and in promoting 
feelings of empathy after we have interacted  musically (in a participatory sense).  
In his account of how music forms community, William Benzon (2002) includes anecdotes of feeling 
moved by the emotional experience of another (even a stranger), conveyed through song (e.g. see 
his example of watching the tearful performance of Bette Midler on The Tonight Show - Benzon, 
2002: 2-3). He describes how a process of coupling and resonance might underpin this, due to 
common experiences and expressions of musical emotion: 
... for individuals sharing a common musical culture, there is a strong and systematic similarity 
between the tonal flow of music and its neurophysiological substrates that allows a tight coupling 
 
83 These contact calls are another manifestation of Dunbar’s ‘grooming-at-a-distance’ (Dunbar, 1996). 
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between the brains of those individuals. While participating in the music those individuals 
constitute a community of sympathy. (Benzon, 2002: 44) 
Freeman (2000) gives a similar account of music and social bonding: when we imitate one another, in 
making music together, we undergo a shared experience - bridging ‘the solipsistic gulf’ (Freeman, 
2000: 420) in order to create a basis for joint understanding and trust. Of course, as we have seen, 
moving in synchrony is a potent form of shared experience; sharing an emotional experience can also 
be powerful in bonding people together.  
Intersubjectivity 
We have our own subjective experience of emotion within our private worlds, drawing on prior 
experience and expectations which only we have. However, these experiences can merge in what 
Rabinowitch et al. (2012a) describe as ‘a complex entanglement between individual players entailing 
a fluid sharing of intentions, emotions and cognitive processes’ (Rabinowitch et al., 2012a: 111), or 
intersubjectivity. At a neural level, this likely comes about through the activation of mirror neurons in 
our motor cortex (see Chapter 1), causing us to simulate others’ actions and thus expressions of 
emotion (which are always tied to certain bodily manifestations).  
We mimic others’ movements automatically (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999); being mimicked causes us to 
focus more upon the other (i.e. developing a more interpersonal self-construal; Ashton-James et al., 
2007); and also enhances our rapport with others (e.g. Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; van Baaren et al., 
2004; Lakin et al., 2003). We also experience emotional contagion, whereby the emotional state of 
just one individual can “spread” to others in their vicinity (Spoor & Kelly, 2004; see Barsade, 2002, for 
demonstration of this process in the context of a group discussion). Some scholars have argued that 
the same processes are in play even when we just listen, passively, to music. Emotional contagion is 
one component of Patrick Juslin’s model of musical emotion:  
... an emotion is induced by a piece of music because the listener perceives the emotional 
expression of the music, and then ‘mimics’ this expression internally. (Juslin, 2013: 241) 
There appears to be a ‘common code’ by which emotional expression is conveyed through speech 
and musical stimuli (Juslin & Laukka, 2003). This is not a purely acoustic phenomenon. Overy and 
Molnar-Szakacs (2009), in their model of Shared Affective Motion Experience, describe how musical 
perception is rooted in an embodied experience, whereby we simulate the actions which underlie 
the production of those sounds and emotional signals. Musical emotion is thus communicated via 
the same mirroring mechanisms which lie behind our capacity for emotional contagion, and, 
ultimately, for our Theory of Mind and empathy. As listeners, we have ‘a shared affective motion 
experience’ with the performer; even in just listening in isolation, the music gives ‘a sense of the 
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presence of another person, their actions and their affective state’ (Overy & Molnar-Szakacs, 2009: 
494; see also Molnar-Szakacs & Overy, 2006): 
... the model suggests that when we hear music, we hear the presence (or agency) of another 
person, whose actions we can interpret, imitate, and predict. (Overy & Molnar-Szakacs, 2009: 
495) 
This again emphasises the experience of interacting directly with others as a more basic form of 
musical engagement - one which helps us to engage with real people, face-to-face.84   
Music and empathy 
To investigate how participatory music-making might result in a sense of shared emotional 
experience, Tal-Chen Rabinowitch (2012b) developed a number of musical games for groups of 
primary school-age children. This was a programme that was run over the course of a school year, 
and involved group interaction: children were given tasks - trying to be as rhythmically co-ordinated 
as possible, to improvise together, imitate each other’s ideas, compose a piece with others according 
to a common theme, or to convey a particular emotion through music for others to guess. Children 
who took part in these games had higher scores in emotional empathy (tested using self-report 
measures, as well as non-verbal ‘matched faces’ and memory tasks) than those who took part in a 
control programme (of equivalent but non-musical games), or those who had no extra activities. 
Empathy involves both an understanding and experience of another’s emotional state; it depends 
upon the same mechanisms of emotional resonance and mimicry, but with additional cognitive 
appraisal and self-other distinction (see Chapter 1, and also distinction between emotional and 
cognitive empathy - Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). The capacity for this depends upon individual 
differences; some people are higher in dispositional empathy, whereas others struggle to understand 
or feel what others might be feeling. Musical interaction is likely to enhance this capacity through 
certain ‘empathy-promoting’ components such as motor resonance, imitation, and flexibility to act 
with others and, of course, to entrain and synchronise with them. The way that music conveys a 
sense of musical emotion in a simultaneously ‘honest’ and ambiguous way enables people to share 
(or just think that they are sharing) a common experience (see below on floating intentionality). This 
is all enacted within a context which is ‘disinterested’, i.e. involving predominantly a focus on the 
interaction rather than being occupied with any functional, external outcome - something similar to 
the idea that the interaction is intrinsically-oriented in goal (Rabinowitch et al., 2012b). These 
components of music-making rest on the capacity for shared intentionality (see work by Tomasello 
 
84 See also Trevarthen’s account of musical intersubjectivity, discussed in Chapter 2 above. 
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discussed in Chapter 1), and contribute to this sense of intersubjectivity, and even merged 
subjectivity:  
... where one subject may regard another participating subject almost as himself, to the point 
that one may experience another's sensations as one's own (Rabinowitch et al., 2012a, p. 111).  
This experience lies behind our capacity for empathic understanding. We have already encountered 
this phenomenon in relation to synchrony - we feel self-other merging after moving or tapping 
together in time. However, Rabinowitch and colleagues (2012a) argue that this also comes about in 
combining ours and others’ contributions to the musical texture - we merge these into a single unit:  
... it is likely that when playing music together, as one gets absorbed in the music, it becomes 
harder and harder to discern the sources of the different sounds, to the point that one can no 
longer clearly tell whether the sounds being played were one's own or another's. (Rabinowitch et 
al., 2012a: 117) 
In these ways, therefore, participants in music-making bond to (and perhaps merge agencies with) 
each other through a common experience, both in the very act of making music together and also in 
the emotional bond generated from the evocative context of collective musical prosody.  
Summary: music and social group formation  
By moving together in time and affect, with a shared aim to maintain a smooth, co-ordinated 
interaction, people signal to themselves and to others that they belong to that group, they identify 
with one another, and thus will come to each other’s aid at a time of need. Music-making provides a 
context in which these phatic components come to the forefront (Cross, 2013); therefore, interacting 
musically is an efficacious means of bonding.  
Group singing encouraged more co-operation in a prisoner’s dilemma game and led to higher ratings 
of trust for other participants, compared to just listening to music, reading poetry or watching a film 
together (Anshel & Kipper, 1988); similarly, group singing resulted in higher co-operation than 
following art or competitive games (Good & Russo, 2016). Pearce et al. (2015) showed that 
participating in a choir led to faster increases in self-other closeness (as indexed by the Inclusion of 
the Other in the Self, or IOS, scale, see Chapter 5) and positive affect than other creative group 
activities, terming this the ‘ice-breaker effect’. Moreover, social bonding can even occur in a much 
larger group context than possible with other activities - up to a choir of hundreds (Weinstein et al., 
2016). These effects might implicate the same neurobiological mechanisms of social bonding, i.e. 
leading to higher levels of oxytocin compared to chatting together (Kreutz, 2014; see Chapter 1). 
Kirschner and Tomasello (2010) tested these effects of music-making with pairs of children; those 
who took part in a musical game, moving together with a pulse and singing a repetitive melody as led 
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by an experimenter, then helped their partner to pick up dropped marbles and worked together in a 
game more often than did those who took part in the spoken version of the group activity. 
In these contexts, participants engage with one another, focussing more on the relational dimension 
of interaction than what the interaction might mean or achieve externally. In its emotional 
resonance, music appears to be an honest signal (with a biological basis in costly signalling present 
elsewhere in the animal kingdom); in the action of making music together, we engage our deep-
seated capacity for shared intentionality, sharing our attention and intentions, ‘to impart a sense of 
communicative intent’ (Cross & Woodruff, 2009: 87). Aside from other more specific cultural 
associations (the implications of which we shall come to), music embodies no precise meaning: it is 
ambiguous, polysemic, with a ‘semantic open-ness’ which means that it can be interpreted 
simultaneously in many different ways. 
Engagement with music thus affords access to multiple and simultaneously available layers of 
meaning, allowing participants in a musical behaviour to interpret the significance of the music 
individually and independently while collectively affording to participants a sense that the music 
embodies an honest signal. (Cross & Woodruff, 2009: 87) 
We encountered this ‘floating intentionality’ in the discussion in Chapter 2, where we saw how it 
afforded music-making more of an intrinsic focus in its overall goal. In other words, the main thing 
we achieve when we make music is the action of doing music together. This means that it is a lot 
easier to engage musically with any number of other people because there is no need to share 
external common ground or understanding through the course of the interaction. We might say it 
has a lower threshold for necessary common ground (or even that the common ground it does 
require is more internally-focussed). As a result, it minimises the potential for conflict, and instead 
develops our capacity for social flexibility (and even a ‘metaphorizing’ capacity to apply our 
knowledge across intellectual domains; see footnote 52, p. 87). This is very helpful in bonding people 
together in social groups, and perhaps especially so for those ‘situations of social uncertainty’ in 
various life transition rituals, between the mother-infant dyad, maintaining within-group cohesion, or 
managing positive inter-group relationships (Cross & Woodruff, 2009). In fact, this gives it potential 
evolutionary importance: 
We can suggest that “something like music” is likely to have played a role in enabling our 
ancestors to get on with each other: to form, maintain and re-form stable yet flexible groups or 
cultures. (Cross, 2012b: 25) 
Therefore, music has great potential in forming social groups by interdependence (see Chapter 3). It 
is likely to be more effective than other media, such as speech, because it is intrinsically-oriented - 
foregrounding the relational goals. Thus, anyone can easily participate.  
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In my first experiment (see Chapter 6), I test this hypothesis by manipulating whether or not certain 
external goals are present and shared in the interaction group - all within a broadly musical context. I 
compare these music conditions with simple, non-musical group tasks. I hypothesise an effect of 
goals only within the non-musical context; group music-making enhances group bonding regardless 
of goal condition. This would indicate that group bonding comes about through the privileging of the 
phatic components of interaction (the synchrony and the shared emotional resonance of making 
music together), rather than a shared, external group objective.  
However, music-making does not always result in group bonding. In their experimental work on 
music and empathy (see above), Rabinowitch et al. (2012a) note that personal conflict, 
competitiveness, unbalanced musical skills, or a general unwillingness to co-operate can all 
undermine the benefits of the musical games. In order to create the right conditions of musical 
engagement, the children need ‘proper guidance and attention’ (Rabinowitch et al., 2012a: 115). In 
fact, attributes of music more generally (even just as something to listen to) can evoke real social 
divisions, whether on a political scale or just between fans of different musical styles (Lonsdale & 
North, 2009).  
In the second half of this chapter, I continue my focus on music-making as a form of interaction, but 
consider the conditions in which it might emphasise group divisions. To do this, I move from 
considering its more relational goals to those which might make it more extrinsic in focus; and 
simultaneously from considering group formation through interdependence to that resulting from 
categorisation. 
Group boundaries: extrinsic-oriented interaction  
Making music does not always bring people together. Pearce et al. (2016a) show that more 
‘competitive’ singing, between university subgroups, resulted in higher in-group closeness; shifting to 
a more ‘co-operative’ context (singing together in a circle), reduced this discrepancy, and led to the 
students feeling closer to all who were involved. On village dancing, McNeill describes an analogous 
process: 
... dance could and did become a way in which all sorts of new groups could define themselves, 
both by differentiation from within existing communities and by allowing marginalized persons or 
complete outsiders to coalesce into new, more or less coherent groups. All that was needed to 
achieve this was to exclude some persons while admitting others to the dance. (McNeill, 1995: 
52) 
Here, I shall explore how music-making demarcates category boundaries: how does our way of 
interacting musically form the basis for group divides, including some but excluding others? I propose 
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that a key element is the external common ground necessary for more extrinsically-oriented 
interaction. 
Speech comprises a mixture of the relational and the transactional: while some gestures are used for 
the purpose of starting or continuing the interaction itself, others convey and share a new 
understanding or attitude about something else in the world. The latter (predominantly language, 
but also other referential media) is a large part of speech - thus we say speech is more extrinsic in 
focus. Because of this, we need to share more in common before we even start to speak - we need to 
share knowledge of that language, sometimes even of a specialised vocabulary; as we talk, we 
continue to make sure we share understanding. There is a higher threshold of common ground, 
excluding people who do not keep up, or who do not possess certain pre-requisites.  
Music is slightly harder to pin down. A large part of it, as we discussed, is for the purpose of 
maintaining the interaction; it is more intrinsic in focus. The concept of floating intentionality alludes 
to the lack of external common ground which needs to be shared; music thus has a lower threshold, 
including more people in the activity. However, not everyone can always be involved in music-
making. Sometimes, external components limit the scope of the interaction - participants might need 
access to a song-sheet, a score, or have knowledge of the performance conventions - and exclude 
those who do not share the necessary external common ground (in perhaps the same way as in 
speech).  
Here, we shall focus on the basis of these divisions, and how they shape the formation and 
boundaries of social groups. Our focus moves beyond just face-to-face interdependence in bonding 
together co-acting individuals, to include our tendency for categorisation: assigning individuals to 
separate groups according to certain criteria. My argument is that the components of interaction 
which make it more extrinsically-oriented are the basis for such category divides. In other words, 
while some conditions of interaction include, and bring people together, other conditions exclude 
and enact the boundaries that come between certain groups (maybe splitting one group into 
subgroups, or separate factions). Music is multi-faceted, and occurs in as many ways as there are 
cultures in the world. I suggest that changing the musical goals - making music more or less intrinsic 
in focus - can act as a force for inclusion, or exclusion.  
I begin by looking at how interaction more generally can form the basis for categorisation. We 
address how this occurs in language groups, and consider the role of common ground in 
distinguishing who is involved. This is relevant not just in our everyday speech, but more generally in 
our shared norms and expectations for how we relate; these considerations of course play a role in 
our musical practices. I outline a few case studies which illustrate this, before concluding this chapter 
with a preview of the experiments I have devised to test these hypotheses.  
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Constructing boundaries: languages and conventions 
The work on Social Identity and Self-Categorisation (see Chapter 3), describes how people form 
categories (and categorise themselves in this social landscape), leading to intergroup differentiation, 
perhaps motivated by a need for positive self-esteem (in comparison with an out-group). Whereas 
theories of group interdependence focus on the interpersonal bonds between group members, social 
identity and categorisation approaches seem to privilege a discussion of how group boundaries are 
perceived and shape our behaviour. Here, I shall discuss how these boundaries have been thought 
about, criticised, and defined in relation to shared social systems, such as language or other 
conventions.85 
Defining group boundaries: insights from anthropology 
The idea of group boundaries has had a rather troubled history in the discipline of anthropology, 
given the potential for scholarship to validate the claims of one social group at the expense of 
another, perhaps supporting nationalist or other divisive forces. Moreover, we now live at a time 
where traditional societies or groups are being dispersed into multi-cultural cities, while millions of 
refugees are forced to move even across continents in search of a new homes and communities. 
However, as Bashkow (2004) argues, it is not an adequate response to simply dispense with the idea 
of group boundaries altogether: arguably, group and category divides become meaningful as they are 
crossed. Even so-called ‘imaginary communities’ exist only due to the presence of a boundary 
between those who belong and those who do not (Anderson, 2006). Bashkow draws on the earlier 
work of Boas (and his students) to devise a definition of boundaries which is still relevant (perhaps 
essential) in the contemporary world. These boundaries are (a) permeable, (b) pluralized, and (c) 
different depending on whether they are drawn by analysts or the people under investigation. 
Boundaries are plural: individuals can draw boundaries on the basis of ecology, social relationships, 
type of livelihood, or shared history or artistic styles, i.e. there are all manner of ways to categorise 
people. While we generally consider what is ‘foreign’ to lie outside of our cultural remit, an outside 
observer would be justified including this ‘zone of the foreign’ as part of our social group - even its 
perceived foreign-ness is part of a single way of viewing the world. Overall, Bashkow argues: 
... we need to move beyond the notion that cultural boundaries are motivated by sharedness, 
whether it is conceived of in objective terms (shared language, ancestry, territory, social habits, 
or other traits) or in subjective terms (shared feelings of belonging). What we need to appreciate 
 
85 When we explore literature on the evolution of sociality, kinship emerges as an important factor. Theories of 
inclusive fitness (the idea that you co-operate with your relations because they also play a role in the 
continuation of your genetic family line) were among the first accounts of group prosociality. Animals rely on 
tags, or ‘greenbeards’ to recognise kin from non-kin for this purpose.  In our human communities, family 
groups are often important subunits (see e.g. Roberts & Dunbar, 2011); here, however, I am focussing on group 
formation amongst both kin and non-kin, which can emerge through interdependence or categorisation 
according to number of possible dimensions. 
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is that boundaries can be productively defined in terms of a relationship of mutual 
comprehension. (Bashkow, 2004: 452) 
This common understanding of the world, what is considered meaningful to us, is a helpful and 
productive basis for understanding the boundaries between groups of people. We can find a similar 
focus in Dunbar’s work on friendship. He suggests that there are seven key dimensions which are 
likely to be shared amongst our affiliates: dialect, place of origin, education, interests, sense of 
humour and worldview.  
Taken together, they constitute the set of beliefs and rituals that remind us who we are, where 
we come from and why we form a single community with a common set of values and 
convictions. (Dunbar, 2018: 45) 
He links this explicitly to the feeling of ‘Us-versus-Them’ which arises with inter-category divides; 
sharing this common ground in how we view the world also helps us relate to certain others, and 
makes us more confident that they will understand us if we try to engage and interact with them: 
... being a member of your community means that you know how they will see the world, how 
trustworthy they are likely to be, whether they will appreciate the same jokes as you do, and 
even how elliptical (and hence efficient) you can be in conversation. They will understand your 
metaphors, for example, without you having to laboriously explain them. There is also the 
implicit knowledge that someone in the extended network will be wagging their finger at them if 
they default on their obligations to you. (Dunbar, 2018: 45) 
Children expect that individuals with a common group membership share common knowledge, 
specifically of cultural phenomena such as songs. However, they do not share more generic factual 
knowledge, nor do they necessarily like the same songs, by virtue of this group membership (Soley, 
2019). In this way, we can make helpful distinctions between different social categories on the basis 
of shared knowledge or understanding, a shared system of meaning - in short, some sort of common 
ground in how we relate to each other, and to the world. This still allows for a ‘release from 
proximity’ (Gamble, 1998) - social groups do not depend on face-to-face interdependence, but rather 
can exist foremost in the minds and expectations of individuals as they approach and engage with 
even unfamiliar others.86  
 
 
 
 
86 Groups are thus not limited to e.g. geographic region; this also allows for the existence of Anderson’s (2006) 
‘imagined communities’. 
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Defining group boundaries: social norms 
One way in which we share meaning within our social group is in a common understanding of norms 
or conventions in the ways we are expected to act. Bicchieri (2006) call norms ‘the grammar of 
society’: 
... like a collection of linguistic rules that are implicit in a language and define it, social norms are 
implicit in the operations of a society and make it what it is. Like a grammar, a system of norms 
specifies what is acceptable and what is not in a social group. (Bicchieri, 2006: ix) 
From a young age, children have a sense of the right or wrong way of doing an (otherwise arbitrary) 
action in a game, and correct people (or characters) who do not conform (e.g. Rakoczy et al., 2008). 
These ‘regularities in attitudes and behavior’ are often an explicit part of what distinguishes one 
social group from another (Hogg & Reid, 2006: 7). Hogg and Reid draw on the Social Identity 
approach to describe how particular normative expectations (what they call ‘shared cognitive 
representations’) are the basis for our out-group and in-group stereotypes: the prototypical 
members of each are required to embody and communicate these norms to the greatest extent 
(Hogg & Reid, 2006: 10). This does not just include conventions in the way we dress or the types of 
food we eat (although these are salient in our everyday experience). But, they are also bound up in 
our way of interacting with one another:  
Norms are shared patterns of thought, feeling, and behavior, and in groups, what people do and 
say communicates information about norms and is itself configured by norms and by normative 
concerns (Hogg & Reid, 2006: 8, original emphasis) 
The language we use, and the other gestures we deploy in speech, are all defined by these shared 
conventions. Lewis (1969) describes language in terms of general co-ordination problems; in these 
games, two participants share a goal, but, in order to achieve it, they need to make a move which is 
co-ordinated or aligned with the other’s action. In order for participants to be successful, they rely on 
their own expectations about what the other will do, or what they think they know. In the same way, 
we use language in a way which is dependent upon our shared expectations and common knowledge 
(see also Lewis, 1975).  
Defining group boundaries: language groups 
Nettle and Dunbar suggest that language is a basis for group identification, in a way analogous to 
kinship. According to models of inclusive fitness (see footnote 85 above, p. 124), individuals are more 
likely to co-operate with others who exhibit ‘tags’ that demonstrate their genetic relatedness: our 
relatives do not just continue our family line, but are also more likely to reciprocate our help in the 
future. As groups expanded in population size and density, a need to co-operate with non-kin, 
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beyond those who we know or have encountered before, necessitated linguistic markers or tags. 
Dialect is a particularly hard-to-fake tag, a marker of group membership, by which we know that 
someone belongs to our community and we can trust them to reciprocate our help - it is, as Nettle 
puts it, ‘an unfalsifiable indicator of group membership’ (Nettle, 1999: 214). It is harder for potential 
free-riders to move from group to group: our way of speaking to one another develops over a long 
period of time engaging with and living in that community. In fact: 
Someone who speaks in the same way as you do, using similar words with the same accent, 
almost certainly grew up near you, and at least in the context of pre-industrial societies, is likely 
to be a relative. (Dunbar, 1996: 168) 
Even if we cannot distinguish outsiders from insiders on the basis of appearance, just the sound of 
their voice is an honest signal. Nettle summarises this as the following strategy: 
... sound like those you wish to cooperate with, and cooperate with those that sound like you 
(Nettle, 1999: 222) 
In this way, language, dialect, or even just accent is a basis for categorisation through homophily: it is 
a way in which another looks and seems similar, so we treat them as part of our in-group (see also 
Cohen & Haun, 2013).87 We show this in the way we use our speech: when Welsh speakers have a 
difficult interaction with an English person, they broaden their accent (or even speak in Welsh; see 
Bourhis & Giles, 1977); nationalist movements are often linked to linguistic purism; and we change 
the way we speak depending on who we are talking to, or trying to affiliate with.  
It is easy to see how accommodation to group members and discommodation from non-
members, if sustained and not balanced by positive intergroup contact, would ultimately lead to 
the existence of separate languages. (Nettle & Dunbar, 1997: 94) 
And, in fact: 
... it seems that access to cooperation can depend on the use of the right linguistic markers. 
(Nettle & Dunbar, 1997: 95) 
Nettle and Dunbar (1997) provide evidence for this using a computer simulation, demonstrating that 
the presence of social markers or tags, distinguishing group members from free-riders, aids the 
evolution of co-operation.  
 
87 This is likely to refer to the outer layers of our social network - those people who we are not personally 
familiar with, but who are similar enough to us that we consider them likely to have come from the same tribe 
or community (or, in more specific types of similarity, the same club or team - e.g. Dunbar’s ‘one-dimensional 
clubs’: Dunbar, 2018: 45) 
128 
 
However, sharing a language has broader implications than just perceived similarity. As discussed 
above, an adequate basis for group boundaries (thus for processes of categorisation) goes beyond 
just seeming similar, or sharing certain attributes. Rather, it denotes shared meaning, the ability or 
potential to engage with others, who are “on the same page”. In combining Social Identity Theory 
with a study of ethnolinguistics, Giles and Johnson (1981) discuss why shared language is an 
important part of ethnic identity. They allude to a similar source of common ground or meaning in 
their collective identity: 
The use of an ethnic speech style is...a reminder of a shared past, of a shared solidarity in the 
presence of a shared destiny in the future (Giles & Johnson, 1981: 205) 
It still seems, though, that the language itself is still just an association: it acts as a cue for 
membership, a signal of one’s identity, and an attribute that is valued, in a process of 
‘psycholinguistic distinctiveness’ (Giles & Johnson, 1981: 217). However, one potential role for 
language that they mention is as ‘the ideal medium for facilitating intragroup cohesion’ (Giles & 
Johnson, 1981: 241). They also note that speech should be considered: 
... as a dependent variable reflecting the interethnic situation and changes in it, and 
simultaneously as an independent variable defining, redefining and maintaining interethnic 
relations (Giles & Johnson, 1981: 243) 
It is the role of interaction itself, the potential to engage with others and share a common experience 
with them, in showing but also enacting group boundaries which interests us here.  
For Dunbar, the potential to interact using a common language means that we have a way to find out 
about others in the outer layers of our network, about their relationships, and also manage our own 
reputation in the eyes of others (compare Goffman’s work on face) - ‘language evolved to allow us to 
gossip’ (Dunbar, 1996: 79). Aside from reputational concerns, having the potential to engage with 
others is also the potential to affiliate at all. We saw earlier how affiliation is bounded within the in-
group: not sharing a common language is a potent basis for categorisation as “other”. If we cannot 
talk to someone, we often cannot engage at all - at least in a context where speech is conventional, 
or needed. Malinowski puts this in stronger terms: 
The stranger who cannot speak the language is to all savage tribesmen a natural enemy. 
(Malinowski, 1923: 477) 
However, when we compare different interaction media - namely, more musical or more linguistic 
ways of relating - we see that this potential for interaction varies, according to (a) our continuum 
from a more intrinsic to an extrinsic interaction focus, respectively, and, as a result, (b) a different 
threshold of necessary (external) common ground. This has implications for group formation. While 
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language has a higher threshold of necessary common ground (both before and during our 
interaction), a likely basis for categorisation, music, by virtue of its floating intentionality, has a much 
lower threshold of common ground, and so is an easier way of bring people together in relations of 
interdependence. Next, I shall explore in more depth the role of common ground in this process, 
forming the basis for group boundaries. 
Constructing boundaries: common ground 
While affiliative interaction can form interdependent groups, our interaction might depend on 
common ground (whether possession of necessary prerequisite knowledge or access to the 
grounding process). This distinguishes participants from outsiders and creates a boundary around the 
interacting group, thus forming the basis for categorisation. Here, I shall give some examples of this 
process. I consider conversation groups, in particular, which illustrate helpfully the role of common 
ground on a smaller scale. After this, I can apply the same principles but in a slightly different 
context, thinking about how forms of musical common ground might form and re-form group 
boundaries. 
Conversation groups 
Holding a conversation requires common ground at the outset, and then continuous checking, 
ensuring that all participants are up-to-date, before everyone can proceed together. We signal that 
we have understood by nodding, repeating phrases back to our partner(s), or asking for clarification 
if something does not make sense. If we are not able to contribute in this way, we do not share in the 
encounter, feel much less involved, and then understand less of what the others are talking about 
(Schober & Clark, 1989).  
In speech, we allude to complex, external references and subtle meanings, through both language 
and gesture. In order to follow all of this, we need direct engagement and perhaps face-to-face 
contact with our partner(s). Kendon described how this occurs within ‘F-formations’, a type of 
focussed encounter or ‘joint transactional space’ (Kendon, 1990: 211); or, in other words: 
... whenever two or more people sustain a spatial and orientational relationship in which the 
space between them is one to which they have equal, direct, and exclusive access (Kendon, 1990: 
209) 
Participants need to be able to see and hear each other well, continually shifting their posture to 
adapt to each other, and to signal changes in frame e.g. moving from a greeting to the main part of 
the conversation, changing topic, or ending the conversation (see Kendon, 1990). These spaces are 
generally closed to outsiders, who cannot take part without some ritualised initiation into the 
conversation (otherwise, they would be rudely interrupting). As a result of these requirements, only 
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four or five people can take part in a single conversation group, before it generally breaks apart with 
some individuals starting their own strand (Dunbar et al., 1995). Where there are more than five 
people present, conversations generally only occur between ‘collaborative pairs’, or with individual 
dominant speakers addressing the whole group (Fay et al., 2000). These sorts of boundaries are 
shown more explicitly in the context of games, where participants are more sharply divided from the 
rest of the world by specific rules of play (and by the expectation of ‘fun’ - Goffman, 1972: 17). 
... games place a “frame” around a spate of immediate events, determining the type of “sense” 
that will be accorded everything within the frame. (Goffman, 1972: 20, quoting Bateson) 
Goffman writes about ‘rules of irrelevance’: certain actions are given particular significance, but 
others are ignored as irrelevant.88 Participants playing a game of Snap need only focus on the top 
card as it is turned, their task to notice a match, and then to react more quickly than their partner 
when the time comes; however, when we play Cheat, we attend closely to many more behavioural 
cues, in an effort to discern whether our competitors are deceiving us. These expectations provide a 
frame within which particular actions are interpreted: ‘an engaging activity acts as a boundary 
around the participants, sealing them off from many potential worlds of meaning and action’, and 
thus becomes a ‘world-building activity’ (Goffman, 1972: 24-25). All participants need to know this in 
order to be a part of the interacting, interdependent group: all others are excluded on the basis of 
this knowledge (which is thus a real basis for categorisation of who is in and who is not).  
Groupthink 
A perhaps stronger manifestation of this need for common ground (a requirement to be part of the 
group) is in people’s preference for consensus or conformity. This was originally shown in Asch’s 
(1956) line paradigm: participants feel the need to conform, to agree with others’ judgements, even 
when this means making decisions which they would consider clearly incorrect in any other context. 
In the context of group discussions, this same pressure gives rise to the phenomenon of ‘groupthink’: 
... a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-
group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically 
appraise alternative courses of action. (Janis, 1982: 9) 
Irving Janis (1982) considers this a distinctly negative influence, and associates it with a number of 
‘historic fiascoes’ such as the Bay of Pigs invasion and the escalation of the Vietnam War (Janis, 1982: 
174). In these cases, group decision-making was characterised by an overestimation of the morality 
and invulnerability of the group, a collective ignorance and censorship of any different opinions, 
warnings or counter-evidence, and pressure on all members to conform to the official, apparent 
 
88 Compare the principles of relevance, discussed in Chapter 2. 
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majority view.  Stasser and Titus (1985) found something similar, using their ‘biased sampling model’: 
members of a decision-making group are more likely to discuss information they all share, and do not 
bring up or pool information which specific individuals hold but others do not. This biases their 
eventual judgement according to the consensus; they come to a decision which is by no means the 
most balanced or informed.  
These phenomena are contingent to some extent on the cultural context, or norms of the group. 
Postmes and colleagues (2001) found that such consensus-focussed norms could be counteracted by 
a group-level preference for deviance and critical thinking. Moreover, in a meta-analysis, Bond and 
Smith (1996) find that the degree of conformity shown by participants in Asch’s classic line paradigm 
varied according to external cultural context. Higher levels of conformity might be expected during 
the 1950s (the era of “McCarthyism” in America), whereas they have since dropped; also, levels are 
higher in collectivist than in individualist cultures. In general, though, a need to conform to certain 
requirements, whether in explicit judgement or even in a more general norm of behaviour (as 
discussed earlier), is often a feature of social groups. Especially in the context of these discussion or 
decision-making groups, acting or speaking in such a way that thwarts others’ expectations is more 
likely to lead to conflict. We should recall that the floating intentionality inherent in music-making is 
particularly useful in avoiding conflict (especially in contexts involving some social uncertainty).  
Breaking frame 
The interaction breakdown that occurs when participants lose their common ground is another 
helpful indication of the role of this shared framework in defining the boundaries of successful, 
interacting groups. When we are talking to one or two others and have a momentary 
misunderstanding, we can go through processes of clarification and repair which can set things right 
before we can carry on as normal (see Chapter 2). In his discussion of games, however, Goffman 
(1972) talks about what happens when our different understandings of reality (within and outside 
the game-play) start to conflict with one another; even if we are obliged to continue our game, it 
might be difficult to maintain the barrier between the internal common ground and rules, and our 
external norms and understandings. He describes how ‘flooding out’ can occur (Goffman, 1972: 50). 
Individuals cannot help but act against the current rules or expectations for the game (perhaps 
laughing uncontrollably). This creates a new, distracting focus for any others, who might all have to 
work to reconfigure the identity of the group, ceasing the game for the time being (Goffman, 1972: 
53). 
While these examples generally refer to the role of external common ground (i.e. in shared 
understanding of our current context), more relational goals can comprise frames - which might, in 
certain circumstances, be broken. We act to save face, protect our image and that of our partner: a 
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form of relational or internal common ground (see Chapter 2). Losing this, or breaking this sort of 
frame, also has implications again in the boundaries we draw between ourselves and others. We feel 
ashamed or embarrassment; our smooth interaction is threatened by individual ‘flustering’, and 
broken in ‘paroxysms of laughter’. As noted earlier, our ‘little social system’ then ‘collapses’, and we 
‘hurriedly try to assume a new set of roles’ (Goffman, 1956: 267). 
This, therefore, also involves the unexpected process of attaining a new common ground. We might 
try to distance ourselves from the previous encounter altogether and engage with others, or perhaps 
attempt to retain our self-esteem in some way. Of course, our motivation for self-esteem and the 
social groups or categories which we identify with are explicitly linked in Social Identity Theory 
(Chapter 3). We shall see the impact of interaction success and embarrassment on our group identity 
(or lack thereof) in the experimental work I report in Chapter 6. 
Overall, then, sharing some sort of common ground is a criterion for belonging to the group; it is a 
basis for the boundaries between positive, interacting groups, and a basis for categorisation. How are 
these boundaries formed in music-making? In line with our need for conformity, a matching of our 
expectations, Maher et al. (2013) found that listening to music which sounds unconventional or 
deviates from what we expect cause participants to evaluate an out-group (supporters of another 
sports team) negatively, or opt to help them less (in this case, deciding how much money to give to 
help the traveller community). Here we shall focus on how our shared norms, or languages, our 
common ground in how we perform, affect the way we interact and affiliate with others, and thus 
draw group boundaries in practice.  
Constructing boundaries: musical identities 
As I outlined earlier, music-making foregrounds the phatic dimension of interaction, and thus is 
efficacious for affiliative, non-conflictual interaction, bonding individuals into groups by forming 
relationships of interdependence. We know from everyday experience, however, that musical 
performance (both in its presentational and participatory guises) adopts culturally-defined, often 
very specific forms, with its own traditions, conventions or norms and extra-musical meanings. 
According to Fritz (2013), any given musical system would ‘dock in’ to a pool of universal attributes, 
but in specific combinations according to the unique cultural style or musical language.89  
These conventions generally necessitate access to (and understanding of) certain notation, 
awareness of the external religious significance, certain permitted or unpermitted actions, and 
understanding of who can play what, when, and in what way.90 The notion of what is or is not 
 
89 Although Fritz generally limits his discussion to features of the musical sound in his model, these 
observations are still useful when considering modes of music-making within particular cultural contexts. 
90 See Turino’s discussion of various core or elaboration roles within participatory music - Turino, 2008. 
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“correct” within a particular context of music-making adds certain requirements to just a willingness 
to take part: all performers need to hold to some sort of shared framework. Benzon calls this a 
‘community of sympathy’; across these divisions, he claims, individuals are ‘incapable of mediating 
secure coupling’ (Benzon, 2002: 44). 
Moreover, there is a continuum in how far musical systems can exclude in this way: while some are 
more extrinsically-oriented in goal focus, conforming to an almost linguistic grammar (as in the 
specified forms, subjects and counter-subjects in fugue-writing, or in the expectations we hold for 
the harmonic progressions in a Bach chorale - see work by Koelsch et al., 2002) - with a primary aim 
often to perform something correctly - other forms of music-making are much more intrinsically-
focussed, where the main goal of the activity is to move and clap together. While the latter binds 
people together through shared affect and entrainment, the former provides more bases for 
exclusion.91  
Overall, I argue here that these conventions - specifically, the common ground thus required to take 
part in music-making - form the basis for categorisation, creating boundaries around those groups of 
interacting individuals, and excluding others. In this section, I shall provide several specific examples 
of how these processes occur in this way, using a range of musical examples. Music-making does not 
just form affiliative groups (through interdependence), but also creates the awareness of boundaries, 
of separate social identities (by categorisation).  
Songs around the campfire 
My first example of these two process in play is provided by a case study of egalitarian hunter-
gatherers, the Ju/'hoansi (!Kung Bushman) society of Southern Africa. In her exploration of the 
potential social (and subsistence) roles of fire, Wiessner (2014) compares the content of 
conversations during the day with those held in the evening (which is extended using firelight). While 
‘day talk’ focusses on economic and social concerns (including social regulation, i.e. gossip), 
interaction during the long evenings (i.e. ‘night talk’) is more likely to include ‘bursts of song’, 
dancing, ritual ceremonies and ‘enthralling stories’. These are forms of interaction which veer 
towards the intrinsic-oriented end of the spectrum, and are thus more primarily affiliative than the 
daytime exchanges: 
Stories told by firelight put listeners on the same emotional wavelength, elicited understanding, 
trust, and sympathy. (Wiessner, 2014: 14033) 
 
91 Knight and Lewis (2017) use similar ideas in their hypothesis concerning the emergence of language: ‘words 
and grammar are means of navigating within a shared virtual world. Singing, dancing, and other forms of 
communal ritual are necessary to join people together in such ideal or imagined worlds.’ They argue: ‘language 
will not even begin to evolve unless ritual action has already begun to establish intensified levels of 
community-wide trust in association with a shared virtual domain.’  
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Wiessner even describes how, in their song, they included all who belonged to the community - from 
long-gone ancestors to those who had just travelled away: these evening activities ‘expanded the 
virtual social universe’: 
... people went to sleep with absent kin filling their thoughts; not infrequently they left for visits 
shortly after. (Wiessner, 2014: 14030) 
At the same time, these stories and rituals enacted and reinforced their cultural identity through 
telling of shared history. So, although there is less scope for conflict, with more inclusive interaction 
in a time of bonding and shared experience, taking part is still more or less restricted to those who 
belong to that wider community, those who recognise the legendary narratives and who live 
according to the same broad system of meaning and significance.  
The performance of society 
My next couple of examples also come from egalitarian hunter-gatherer communities. First is 
Seeger’s (1987) account of music-making amongst the Suyá, an indigenous community in Brazil. Song 
is central in enacting their social relationships.  While their ritual music-making can be highly 
participatory, a ‘euphoria of community participation’ taking place in the public plaza, there are 
specific conventions about who can participate in each ceremony, according to relationships of 
kinship and gender roles. Thus: 
... performances established and re-established important relationships between groups and 
among individuals in very concrete ways (Seeger, 1987: 78) 
Seeger describes how sometimes sung rituals even revealed or clarified otherwise ambiguous or 
secret relationships. He used the term ‘structuration’ to describe this performative function of music; 
it thus bonds people together, but in culturally-prescribed ways (Seeger, 1987: 139-140). This 
function is exemplified clearly in my next example: the hocketed polyphonic style of song, exhibited 
amongst the BaYaka and Mbendjele Pygmy people in Northern Congo. This performance involves 
close co-ordination; there is no hierarchy, rather everyone can be accommodated equally - but 
within certain conventions. 
To contribute appropriately one must not drown out one’s neighbours, or sing the same melody 
as they do. Listening is as important as singing. If too many sing in unison, participants 
immediately and instinctively diverge by choosing alternative melodic modules to maintain the 
polyphony. (Lewis, 2014: 87-88) 
This ‘grammar’ of interaction is something learnt implicitly: 
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Each participant’s life-long musical apprenticeship has ensured that this musical deep structure is 
so effectively inculcated that each singer knows how variations can be executed and when to 
integrate them into the song. (Lewis, 2013: 60) 
This does not just apply to specifically ‘musical’ behaviour, but structures all sorts of interactions 
amongst community members; the skills that they acquire in learning to perform together in this way 
are applicable (and indeed essential) to their everyday dealings and activities: 
... the instinctive way that singers avoid unison has economic implications. In an egalitarian 
society, daily hunting and gathering activities are intuitively co-ordinated without the need for 
anyone to tell others what to do. If too many do the same thing, there may be nothing to eat, so 
being musically primed to do something different but complementary to others improves the 
chances that the camp will eat well. Similarly, knowing a sufficient range of melodic modules and 
when to insert them into the song structurally resembles the way environmental knowledge is 
employed to identify and extract resources from the forest efficiently. Musical participation in 
spirit plays is the main avenue through which BaYaka learn these unspoken grammars of daily 
interaction (Lewis, 2014: 88) 
Again, this specific musical language is recognisable beyond that immediate community. While it 
restricts access to those who have grown up, immersed in that system, it creates at the same time a 
wider group membership, amongst other Pygmy people who share that specific ‘socio-aesthetic’. 
Lewis recounts a comment made by one member of the BaYaka people on hearing the musical 
language of the Mbuti, who lived some distance away: 
“They must be BaYaka since they sing just like us!” (Lewis, 2013: 53) 
Interestingly, the spirit plays are often musical contexts in which these same processes of inclusion 
and exclusion operate at a small scale, even within a single community. Single-gender performances, 
often female displays of ‘reverse dominance’, emphasise their unity within that group, while 
asserting their difference - often hostility - to those men who cannot be involved. On one hand, 
during Ngoku, ‘the united body of the singing women dances arm-in-arm up and down the central 
area of the camp’. Lewis describes how ‘they speak as “Woman” to the men’ and work to assert 
themselves, and embarrass their husbands in the process. On other occasions, such as Sho or Ejengi, 
men form a strong, united (and male-only) voice in return (Lewis, 2013: 58).  
Team spirit 
Football supporters provide another case of these processes in action. Fans sing their well-known 
team songs when they are all together for a sporting event; this also links them to a wider network of 
fans through the common knowledge of their team’s chants - providing just the potential for 
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affiliative interaction with other supporters (now facilitated via the internet, for instance, in the 
exchange of comments in response to videos and recordings on Youtube). An interesting case study 
of this is the ‘Carsi’, a particularly avid fan network supporting the Beşiktaş Gymnastics Club in 
Turkey. The supporters are united not just through football, but also have a collective, class-based 
identity and a motivation to confront authority. In his exploration of this group, Kytö (2011) 
documents the strong solidarity, the ‘feelings of togetherness’ which come from the singing of well-
known, simple songs, as loudly as possible (Kytö, 2011: 82). Often, a large number of people take 
part, creating an ‘impenetrable wall of sound’. The sense of community, more than support for the 
team, might be an important motivation to belong to a group like this - especially for economic 
immigrants moving from rural towns into the larger cities: 
Supporting a team was a way to belong to a community and ease the feelings of loneliness and 
being a stranger. (Kytö, 2011: 81) 
However, this sense of community depends not just on those interpersonal, affiliative relationships 
generated and reinforced through song, but also on a common awareness of the repertory, which is 
essential before anyone can participate and show that they belong. Again, through this shared 
language, they can show their support even from afar; by chanting the songs in a pub, it is as if they 
are part of the activity in the stadium. Music’s ‘floating intentionality’ (as discussed above) makes it 
particularly suitable for this context - given the uncertainties involved in staking one’s identity on a 
team that might or might not be victorious in the match. Supporters can even sing together in order 
to help their team, somehow: 
In such a world of latent ambiguity, singing and chanting are perfect tools to argue that influence 
can be created; for their veracity can never be objectively tested. (Armstrong & Young, 1999: 
180) 
Of course, football support is as much about excluding (even attacking) others who do not belong, as 
creating a sense of inclusive community within the group. Armstrong and Young characterise it 
almost as a form of ritualised warfare (something which has been clearly demonstrated in the stand-
off between the England and New Zealand rugby teams, where the latter performed their famous 
‘haka’):92 
Football is thus about social differentiation. It is about us against them, and their defeat. It denies 
egalitarian ideals, and revels in our superiority, which it sings and dances on its way to success. It 
denies the Christian ethic that would turn the other cheek, and rather reemphasizes danger, 
 
92 See article published on the BBC website - https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/rugby-union/50229807 - accessed 
06/12/2019. This harks back to the ‘coalition signalling’ function of music, suggested twenty years ago by 
Hagen & Bryant (see Introduction to this thesis). 
137 
 
victory and domination in battles against some clearly identified “other”. (Armstrong & Young, 
1999: 179) 
The musical standards and practices of rival football teams in Sydney form a case in point. On one 
hand, the Western Sydney ultras, the Red and Black Bloc (or RBB), perform their ‘call to arms’ as 
follows:  
After chanting the words of the last verse “stand together and fight as one”, fans embrace each 
other, making long lines as if they were a single organism, and jump to the left and to the right, 
screaming “tererererere” (Knijnik, 2018: 951) 
While, as a team, they emphasise their inclusion of all different ages and nationalities, this is still a 
bounded group. Their distinct identity rests upon both the prevalence of a working class, ‘Westie 
accent’, and the enhanced quality of their musical contributions. They contrast themselves with ‘The 
Cove’, the supporter group of the rival Sydney Football Club, who do not have ‘the authenticity of 
real fans’. One RBB fan recounted:   
“Mate, when I used to go to SFC games, 50 guys with acne on their face would turn up in the 
cove. The only drum they would bring was a wheelie bin that they would smash” (quoted in 
Knijnik, 2018: 952) 
On the other hand, ‘The Cove’ has their corresponding traditions, with an emphasis on singing 
together, and crucially singing the right, or authorised, songs - what Collinson documents as the ‘sing 
or f*** off’ ideology (Collinson, 2009: 18).  Although often the repertoire is comprised of easy, well-
known melodies, many fans would argue that: 
... an authentic fan would take the time to learn the songs, difficult or otherwise...simple songs 
were an unnecessary and unwanted concession to less committed supporters. (Collinson, 2009: 
19) 
In all of these examples, music-making is a powerful bonding medium, foregrounding those phatic 
components, creating a context of interaction which is more emotionally salient than referentially 
specific. However, this resource is used within bounds specified by the society, whether norms on 
who is bonded (and against who), or the conventions as to how exactly people interact within this 
space; this restricts participation to those who know these rules (even if only implicitly). These rules - 
the common socio-aesthetic or types of societal meanings - can be abstracted beyond the immediate 
interaction space to incorporate others who share this history, i.e. it is a means of categorisation, 
sometimes without any face-to-face contact at all. 
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Summary: inclusion and exclusion 
Some components of music-making bind people together: anybody who moves together in time, and 
attends to each other’s expressive gestures, is going to affiliate to one another (just as non-human 
primates do in grooming one another). However, other components of music-making impose some 
restrictions: in order to be involved, participants must share a common knowledge of the 
conventions, and they must understand the significance of certain gestures. This common ground 
divides those who can take part from others who are excluded: it forms the basis for categorisation.  
Therefore, we can align our forms of interaction alongside our mechanisms of group formation. 
Forms of music-making which are easier to take part in, due to being more intrinsic-oriented in goal, 
are particularly efficacious in group formation by interdependence. However, music-making which 
requires more specific knowledge, both a priori and in interpreting events as they unfold (as in the 
continuous grounding required in speech), occurs only in bounded, interacting groups (or even 
dyads, in the case of some more intense conversations) - forming separate social groups by 
categorisation. 
Victor Turner’s (1969) distinction between ‘communitas’ and ‘structure’ is a similar conceptualisation 
of these different social relationships. While the latter forms cognitive classifications which provide a 
sense of order in the social environment, ‘communitas’ emerges where those boundaries are broken, 
in ‘reclassifications’, especially in those times or rituals of ‘liminality’: 
... communitas emerges where social structure is not. (Turner, 1969: 371) 
These ritual, liminal occasions often include members of out-groups, excluded or marginalised 
members of the community; they are a time when the common humanity of the group is 
emphasised, and those who are usually dominant are temporarily belittled. Of course, one needs 
those boundaries in order to break them - these two processes work together in tandem: 
... each individual's life experience contains alternating exposure to structure and communitas, 
and to states and transitions. (Turner, 1969: 361) 
While there is already some evidence of the role of music-making in social bonding (especially in its 
prominent role in rituals, or other times of ‘social uncertainty’), there is much less on which 
components of music-making might form the basis for boundaries, or category divides. My 
experimental work includes two experiments which explicitly test the role of external musical goals 
(i.e. elements which create an extrinsic goal focus) on identification with a specific team 
membership, an attribute which divides people into separate groups or categories. I also run video 
analysis on the difference between music-making with and without this external goal. In the next 
chapter, I expand on how I have operationalised this overall theoretical framework into specific 
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experimental conditions to test my predictions. I then report on the results of this empirical work in 
Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 5 Methodology 
Here, we reach the centre of this project. The purpose of this chapter is to build a bridge between 
the theoretical framework (outlined in Chapters 1 to 4) and my empirical research paradigm 
(reported in Chapter 6). First, I shall outline the main predictions arising from my theory, and, 
second, the methodology I developed to test these.  
Overall, I propose a role of musical interaction in establishing group identity - both in bringing people 
together into inclusive, affiliative, interdependent groups; and in dividing people into distinct 
categories, according to features of or expectations about the musical context. These ideas are 
rooted in the literature on social psychology - namely, understandings of group formation as 
emerging from interdependence and theories of Social Identity and Categorisation. I also seek to 
characterise musical interaction. Previous literature highlights the value of holistic, behavioural 
analysis; I also draw on the conceptual distinction between more relational and transactional goals to 
communicate something within the encounter. In this chapter, I shall demonstrate how we can bring 
music into the laboratory - varying to what extent our musical interactions are more intrinsically- or 
extrinsically-oriented in goal, and comparing music with similar but non-musical activities - in order 
to test the antecedents of group formation, through both face-to-face social bonding and a sense of 
shared team identity. 
I begin by outlining the rationale for my empirical work, explaining the aims of each of my 
experiments, and of my video analysis project. Then, I shall justify the various interaction conditions I 
use to manipulate certain variables within these experiments. I finish with explanations of the main 
outcome variables I used to measure the resulting social relationships, distinguishing the degree of 
interdependent group formation from a sense of team identification. This provides a research 
paradigm by which to convert some predictions emerging from my theory into clearly testable 
hypotheses.  
Testing the theory: an empirical project 
I devised a series of experiments to investigate the following research questions: 
(1) Is musical interaction more effective than a non-musical mode of interaction at bonding 
participants together into an interdependent group? 
(2) What is the effect of having, and sharing a goal within the group on this bonding process? 
Does sharing or not sharing the goal have a greater effect in the non-musical than the music 
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interaction condition, where differing goals and intentions can co-exist in a context of 
floating intentionality? 
(3) What is the effect of external interaction goals on participants’ sense of team identity? Does 
a team-related goal lead to preference for one’s team members, and identification with that 
team more generally? 
(4) Are there dissociable mechanisms leading to group bonding and team identification? Does 
bonding relate more to the intrinsically-oriented mode of interaction, and identification from 
success in distinctive, external team goals? 
In the section below, I shall outline in more depth how each of my experiments operationalised and 
tested the relevant hypotheses. I stress that this is just the beginning of a much larger project: I aim 
to provide initial insights which support and further inform my theory, rather than conclusive 
answers at this stage. In general, this project will shed light on the role and efficacy of music in group 
identity, and the mechanisms which might lie behind this. This work also presents a new, music-
oriented research paradigm: I think of this as an empirical resource - a way to manipulate social 
interaction in order to explore further research questions in group formation and social engagement.  
Testing group formation - experiment 1 
My first experiment investigated the antecedents to group formation or group bonding - establishing 
relationships of interdependence amongst individuals, through forms of face-to-face interaction. I 
varied two parameters of the interaction. The first I call the interaction mode - whether the group 
activity is musical or non-musical in its character and attributes. The second is the presence of an 
external goal, shared or non-shared within the group - which I introduced in both the musical and the 
non-musical activities. I then used a variety of outcome measures to test the extent to which the 
interacting individuals have become (or feel that they are) a “group”. 
Interaction mode 
I noted before how music ‘foregrounds the phatic’; it is intrinsically-oriented, emphasising more 
relational than transactional interaction goals. As discussed in Chapter 4, various forms of affiliative 
interaction (perhaps singing or moving in synchrony) generate higher levels of liking, co-operation, 
and the sense of belonging to the same group. I therefore expected that a more musical mode of 
interaction would promote more group bonding and cohesion, facilitating affiliative relationships 
among a number of individuals, than would a non-musical interaction task. I tested this hypothesis by 
comparing very simple musical and non-musical activities. The musical task emphasised direct 
interpersonal response and joint action; the non-musical interaction comprised a visual collage task, 
where participants worked together to move shapes into a picture. Aside from this, I aimed to make 
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these group activities as similar as possible - testing just the effect of the musical mode of 
engagement, as far as possible. 
Interaction goals 
The original literature on social groups emphasises interdependence towards a shared goal (Chapter 
3). However, it is not always the case that interacting individuals share (or indeed have) an external 
goal. In foregrounding the phatic, music can accommodate many simultaneous, separate 
understandings or goals in a context of ‘floating intentionality’; it does not even need an external 
goal - music-making can be sustained merely as participants share the intention to keep the 
interaction going; they do not need any mutual understanding greater than this.  
Some of the interactive activities in this experiment included an external focus (they were more 
extrinsically-oriented): participants were given a goal to depict something through their interaction 
(either visually, or through music). The visual conditions always included a goal - it was difficult to 
operationalise a non-musical, no-goal task. However, some participants in the musical interaction 
condition had no additional goal (while others did have a goal introduced): music is an interaction 
medium which could be purely relational. I tested whether adding a goal affected the resulting social 
relationships.  
Additionally, I did not just compare goal with no-goal activities, but also investigated the effect of 
whether or not those goals were shared within the interacting group (where, importantly, all 
participants expected to be working together). This is somewhat similar to the task used in Curioni et 
al. (2019), where participants had to synchronise in drawing different shapes. I hypothesise 
elsewhere (see experiments 2 and 3) that sharing an external focus, such as an interaction goal, 
might enact processes of categorisation more than interdependent group bonding. Here, it is 
important to explore whether sharing an interaction goal (or not) affects the process by which 
individuals build relationships, face-to-face, forming a sense of group identity from the bottom up. I 
also test whether the effect of goal-sharing occurs alongside, is itself affected by, or is just dwarfed 
by the effect of interaction mode. It makes sense, for example, that musical interactions are generally 
more affiliative, by virtue of their overriding characteristics - so sharing or not sharing some external 
goal might not have an effect (music has ‘floating intentionality’). Not sharing a goal in a visual task is 
likely to be more disruptive, and more difficult for participants to work alongside each other (even 
perhaps resulting in a degree of frustration at others’ seemingly inexplicable actions). 
Summary: conditions and hypotheses 
In Table 1, I summarise the main (broadly 2x2) design, the five different conditions, and the predicted 
degree of group formation. I expected music to be more effective than the non-musical task, perhaps 
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even more so when there is no external goal (i.e. when music is the most intrinsically-oriented; this is 
exploratory, however - even musical interaction might benefit from at least some shared focus). I 
then expected the goal conditions to have an effect on the level of bonding achieved through the 
visual task. 
 
 Shared goal Non-shared goal No goal 
Musical task High Highest? 
Non-musical task Medium Low  
 
Creating team divisions - experiment 2 
Although musical interaction affords some degree of ‘floating intentionality’, some forms of music-
making incorporate some reference, meaning, or convention which can be (and sometimes need to 
be) shared as part of the interaction. For example, one might require general knowledge of the 
structure of a performance, awareness of particular stylistic conventions, or access to a score in 
reading through a string quartet. These meanings or goals, although intimately linked to the process 
of interaction itself, are external: they give the interaction a focus outside the immediate 
relationship; they make it more extrinsically-oriented. Similarly, we categorise others on the basis of 
common, external attributes, perhaps signalling team identity, ethnic background, kinship or 
language group - this shapes who we interact with. Perhaps, musical interaction contributes to the 
formation of these categories: common ground, or interaction goals, might highlight shared traits, 
maybe even restricting the interaction to those who hold the requisite knowledge, awareness or 
understanding. 
In my second experiment, I introduced the idea that participants belong to two different, supposedly 
competing teams - comprising a broad membership from across their cohort. I distinguished the 
teams from the interaction groups - these face-to-face gatherings involved individuals across both 
teams, requiring them to interact both with those who shared their team identity and with others 
who belonged to the opposing team. Again, I varied attributes of this group interaction: whether 
participants had an external interaction goal or not (a goal directly corresponding to their team 
identity). I then measured both how bonded they felt to their group and, whether they felt more 
connected to individuals who shared their team membership (more than to others who did not; both 
within and outside the experimental context). This provided a way of testing whether adding an 
interaction goal, a shared focus specifically among the team members, reinforces bonding on the 
basis of their team membership (i.e. bonding only to each other, not extended to other-team 
members, even when they participated within the same interaction group). 
Table 1  Experiment 1 design and hypothesised degree of group formation  
 
Note: there was no non-musical, no-goal task in this experiment (the shaded box). 
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Goals and teams 
In this experiment, all participants interact with each other in a musical mode, varied according to 
the presence or absence of a team-related goal. In one condition, participants had no extra goal for 
their group interaction; in the other, participants were instructed to work together to depict 
something through their musical interaction.  
At the outset of the experiment, all were randomly assigned to either the “elephant” or the “bird” 
team. Where they were given an interaction goal, this was to depict a herd of elephants (if in the 
elephant team), or a flock of birds (for the “birds”). Because the groups in which they interacted 
comprised a mixture of team members, the goals were correspondingly not shared within the 
groups, but only shared amongst those in the group who also belonged to the same team. 
I tested the effect of interaction goals both on general group bonding, and on specific team-related 
affiliation. These goals formed external properties of the interaction, a type of common ground 
which is shared amongst members of the same team. Possessing a goal might emphasise the division 
between these two teams - a division which thus becomes more apparent as they interact. We see 
something similar (albeit on a much more complex, larger scale) in cases where inter-group 
boundaries are marked by difference in language use (Giles & Johnson, 1981), in music listening 
preferences (Lonsdale & North, 2009), and in different conventions of music-making (see above on 
the BaYaka musical ‘grammar’). I aimed to model this process, using musical depiction goals as a very 
simple means of varying the musical common ground or conventions, according to team identity.  
Goals and groups 
This experiment also provided another opportunity to investigate the effect of musical goals (an 
external focus, thus a more extrinsically-oriented interaction) on more general group bonding. I 
tested whether having no additional goal (i.e. interaction which privileged the phatic) enhanced 
mixed-team group bonding compared to interaction tasks with an added outside focus.  
In this case, however, adding a goal did not just change the mode of interaction; the goals aligned 
with team identity, and so possibly drew attention to differences in team membership within the 
interacting groups. Therefore, goals would not just change the mode of interaction (reducing the 
more relational focus) and thus diminish group bonding (as expected in experiment 1), but they 
might also emphasise the differences in team identity, making whole-group bonding even less likely. 
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Summary: conditions and hypotheses 
I present my hypotheses for this experiment - relating both to group formation, and to team 
identification - in Table 2. There are just two conditions - both involving musical interaction between 
individuals who belong to two different teams.  
 
Conditions > No-goal activity Non-shared goals (according to team membership) 
v Outcome  
Group bonding (across 
teams)  
High Low 
Team-related 
affiliation 
Low High 
 
Social relations and team identities - experiment 3 
The purpose of my third experiment was to make a clearer distinction between interpersonal 
bonding and a sense of team identity. In experiment 2, I measured affiliation to others on the basis of 
team membership; mostly, these others were also involved in the interaction - this made it harder to 
discern whether preference for one’s own team occurred as a result of personal identification, or 
through face-to-face interdependence. In experiment 3, I aimed to distinguish as far as possible the 
affiliation between interaction pairs (through interdependence), and the sense of team membership 
that goes beyond the immediate interaction context (through self-categorisation). 
I used the same interaction conditions as in experiment 2, with the same goal/no-goal manipulation. 
This time, participants interacted in pairs; both partners shared the same team identity. Then, I 
measured direct interpersonal affiliation towards one’s interaction partner; and their sense of team 
identification, implicitly, using a memory test. 
Interaction goals and interpersonal relations 
By comparing the same depiction goal tasks (some elephant-, some bird-related) to the no-goal 
musical interaction, I could test again whether interaction mode shapes the degree of interpersonal 
affiliation between the interaction partners. As above, if music is efficacious at group bonding 
because it has a more intrinsic goal focus, privileging the phatic over external goals, then I predicted 
that a no-goal interaction task would lead to higher affiliation between interaction partners.  
Interaction goals and team identity 
With these same conditions, I could test whether having an external goal reinforces a sense of team 
identity - and one that generalises beyond the interaction context. This time, interaction pairs shared 
Table 2  Experiment 2 design and hypotheses 
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either a bird- or elephant-related goal, corresponding to their team membership. I investigated 
whether adding this external focus emphasised team identification, in comparison to a no-goal 
interaction task. Moreover, following a pilot, and the results of experiment 2 (see Chapter 6), I 
predicted that the elephant-related goal would be more difficult to achieve (than the bird goal); I 
expected that a less successful goal would be less effective at reinforcing the related team identity 
(given that our social identities are tied to our self-esteem - see Chapter 3).  
Summary: conditions and hypotheses 
This experiment again measured the antecedents to interpersonal bonding (through 
interdependence), and the impact of an external focus on team (or category) identification. This was 
largely exploratory, but some initial hypotheses are presented in Table 3 below.  
 
Conditions > Interaction goal 
No-goal musical task 
v Outcome Bird goal Elephant goal 
Interpersonal bonding Low High 
Team identity High Low Low 
 
Characterising musical interaction - video analysis 
If the goal focus of social interaction (i.e. whether it is more intrinsic - as in no-goal conditions - or 
more extrinsic in orientation - with goals added) is a crucial factor shaping both the degree of 
affiliation between interacting individuals, and a resulting sense of team identity, then it is important 
to investigate the behavioural properties of these interaction conditions. This was the purpose of this 
final part of the present empirical project. I filmed case studies, where pairs engaged in one 
interaction task for five minutes. Three of these pairs were selected - one for each of the no-goal, 
bird- or elephant-related goal conditions. These conditions varied only in their goal focus - my 
interaction tasks were exactly the same, but for the presence or absence of an external depiction 
task.  These were analysed in detail, focussing on inter-individual synchrony and eye gaze patterns. 
Synchrony has been linked to co-ordination, affiliation and merged subjectivity. Additionally, 
conversation partners look at one another to ensure successful grounding, making sure things have 
been understood at regular points in the exchange.  If our interaction conditions exhibit different 
patterns of such checking behaviour, or a different relationship between the interaction “content” 
and participants’ gaze behaviour, then this might signal differences in the main focus of the 
interaction - perhaps a different type of common ground between our conditions. 
Table 3  Experiment 3 design and hypotheses 
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Overall, a close analysis of these controlled forms of musical interaction offers insights into the 
nature of social interaction - specifically between forms which are more focussed on external goals 
and others which privilege the relational, phatic dimensions. If this distinction forms the basis for a 
continuum between music and speech, then the first behavioural analysis of this sort (found in 
Chapter 6) has quite extensive significance.  
I shall now move on to discuss my experimental set-up. Specifically, I describe the activities I devised 
- the conditions under which my participants interacted with one another, and thus the way in which 
I turned my theoretical understanding of music-making into an operational reality. 
Lab-based musicking 
I have used Christopher Small’s term, as it emphasises how “music” should always be a verb - it is 
something which is performed, in many different contexts, guided by the various conventions and 
expectations of a particular social group or community. In a laboratory context, we face a trade-off 
between trying to model this complex reality - in other words, maximising ecological validity - and 
maintaining experimental control (as we try to manipulate only certain parameters of the encounter; 
see D’Ausilio et al., 2015, for an overview of this issue).  
Many similar studies, investigating the effects of music on social bonding, have taken place in an 
everyday musical setting, often a choir rehearsal; researchers measure certain indicators of social 
bonding, whether in self-reported ‘closeness’, level of oxytocin, or pain threshold, before and after a 
given amount of rehearsal time. In Kreutz (2014), this involved warm-up activities, time of song, and 
rehearsal points (and is compared with time spent ‘chatting’ with a few individuals about positive life 
events); Weinstein et al. (2016) also made use of an existing scheme where small local choirs gather 
once a year to form a ‘megachoir’ in order to investigate the effectiveness of music-making in 
bonding smaller or much larger groups. Others have created their own activity groups, recruiting 
professional singing coaches (alongside craft and/or creative writing teachers) to form a choir 
especially for research purposes (e.g. Schellenberg et al., 2015; Pearce et al., 2015; Pearce et al., 
2016b). Even here, though, the activities are still very broadly defined. Pearce et al. (2016a) 
constructed a semi-naturalistic study in the lab, creating contexts of co-operative and competitive 
singing (which already occurred in the activities of the university ‘cliques’ or fraternities who were 
recruited), to measure how music might enhance or undermine these pre-existing boundaries. These 
participants were already part of friendship groups before the study, which perhaps helped facilitate 
the activity. Other studies involved laboratory singing (such as Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009; or Anshel 
& Kippur, 1988), but one can imagine that adults are likely to feel uncomfortable, especially if they 
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have not had musical training. Children are usually less inhibited - as shown in Kirschner and 
Tomasello’s work (2010).  
Here, I needed an accessible musical task for adults, one which ideally models the enjoyment of 
simple music-making, while doing justice to the richness of music as it occurs “in the wild” - even 
within a somewhat artificial setting, where participants are asked to interact with strangers. I devised 
a musical activity involving aspects of music-making which occur across cultures, recruiting perhaps 
“natural”, even universal, capacities; the task did not need any specialist training, or even a great 
deal of self-confidence, to participate. At the same time, my experiments required some control, 
manipulating the task to investigate exactly which components contribute to specific social 
relationships. In particular, I devised a way to manipulate the intrinsic or extrinsic goal orientation of 
the interaction - adding or taking away an external goal to an otherwise highly flexible task, 
foregrounding the phatic as far as possible. In other words, I tried to develop musical activities which 
were more or less musical, or speech-like - varying just their position along our continuum of 
interaction goals (Chapter 2). In addition, I developed a task which could be considered a non-musical 
version of the same activity. For this, I needed to decide which components comprise more “musical” 
aspects, and selectively remove them from the task. In this section, I shall detail exactly how I 
created these conditions.  
A basic musical interaction 
Music-making is a culturally-situated activity, rooted in universal capacities to relate and tune to 
others, but shaped by specific learned customs or conventions - whether ritual expectations, a 
harmonic language, or even a social worldview enacted through musical performance. If the 
universal attributes make it an accessible way to bond with others, it is then the need for knowledge 
of the particular language which divides or categorises those who know it and so belong, from those 
who do not. In order to test this theory empirically, I needed a simple baseline musical condition, 
modelling and recruiting those universal components. Then, I could investigate the effect of adding 
external goals - making the interaction more extrinsic in focus, with a form of common ground that is 
shared amongst only some participants - on limiting or structuring those social relationships. Here, I 
shall enumerate the characteristics of our most basic musical task - the baseline condition.  
A social encounter: participatory and improvised 
In this project, I focus on social interaction and relationships - thus on ‘participatory’ rather than 
‘presentational’ forms of music (Turino, 2008; see Introduction). The main aim of the musical task 
was relational - participants were to interact, not focussing just on their individual contributions, or 
on the musical instrument they used. I instructed participants to work together (rather than 
following any leader), as a group (or a pair), and to co-ordinate with each other in making music. As is 
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often the case with forms of participatory music, there was no start or end of a “piece”, no specific 
item to recreate, but instead just the opportunity to interact and to improvise together, responding 
to one another moment-by-moment. There were no other guidelines, rules or scripts to follow 
(compare the external goal conditions below).93 They were not even encouraged to synchronise, or 
keep time; I expected that this interactive, affiliative context would provide a space where this would 
emerge spontaneously (as it does in everyday spoken conversation). 
Basic, accessible musicking: a universal capacity 
The musical activity was one in which all participants could engage equally well, regardless of their 
musical background. It was a novel task where no-one would have any expertise; participants all 
approached it from the same level, despite potential differences in exposure, musical tradition, 
training or preferences.  
Participants were given a simple musical instrument to interact with (a kazoo); this acted as a 
“mediator” of some kind (as we shall explore below), but it only required the player to vocalise, or 
hum, into one end for it to sound (no specialised hand movements, or “technique” was required). 
Thus, it was simple and easy to use, not offering any particular interest which would distract 
participants away from their primary task to interact and engage with their partner.  
This instrument changes the sound quality, but otherwise mirrors the pitch and contour of the 
participants’ vocal or sung input. Our ability to sing is a deep-seated ability, perhaps our most basic 
(and most ancient) musical instrument (other than body percussion). Ian Morley suggests that our 
vocal tract is our ‘principal tonal sound-producing apparatus’ - it is a: 
... biological instrument, possessed by all of us, which constitutes the principal tonal sound-
producer in many musical traditions. (Morley, 2013: 131) 
There is evidence that a lower larynx position (creating more resonance space, greater control of 
tongue movement and lower formant frequencies), and the increase in innervation necessary for 
more control of pitch and intensity, were already emerging from the time of Homo ergaster (at 
roughly the same time as our shift to upright bipedal posture).  The capacities for extended utterance 
duration came after this, probably around 600 000 years ago, in Homo heidelbergensis.  We know 
too, of course, that prosody and contour is important from very early in ontogeny, in the 
communicative and affective potential of infant-directed speech (see synthesis of all of these strands 
 
93 This is in keeping with the work exploring jazz (and other) improvisation (see, for example, MacDonald et al., 
2012, and Wilson & MacDonald, 2016). My experimental conditions perhaps explore further the roots of these 
tasks: I have devised an activity which is likely to differ from anything my participants have encountered before 
(compare Canonne & Aucouturier, 2015, who show the effect of familiarity on implicit models which form a 
basis for collective, free improvisation). 
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of evidence in Morley, 2013). Our ability to sing seems to be the root of our music-making capacities; 
I recruited this as a primary part of my experimental music-making task.  
Instrumental affordances: extension and distance 
If vocalising is the root of human musical capacity, to which instruments ‘constitute an accessory’ 
(Morley, 2013: 131), why use a musical instrument at all? First, it is important to note that extending 
musical capacities using tools is still a very natural thing to do. The goal-directed actions involved in 
manual tool-making, and our ability to learn these actions through imitation, have a large functional 
(and probably neural, or structural) overlap with our capacity for language acquisition and intentional 
spoken communication (Stout & Chaminade, 2012). Even more so in music-making: this does not just 
involve sung gestures or melodies, but a holistic, embodied experience in which we entrain in 
movement, and align our affective experience with our interaction partners. All sorts of gestures are 
used for various purposes in music-making (see overview in Jensenius et al., 2010); some have 
advocated an embodied understanding of music in general (even when music is defined in 
presentational, often purely sonic terms). Musical tools then act as ‘extensions of the human body’ in 
the production (or even search and retrieval) of these musical works (see Leman, 2008: 137). 
Considering the participatory field of music-making, if our vocal mode is so strongly tied to motor, 
gestural affordances (perhaps even with a common time-keeping mechanism; see Morley, 2013), 
then it makes sense that we can interact, musically, through our gestures, even via instruments or 
tools - without this mediation substantially changing the nature of the musical activity. 
Second, the use of musical instruments offers practical advantages in the context of an experimental 
set-up. Participants were restricted to interaction via this channel, precluding the use of speech and 
emphasising the relational dimensions of prosody and synchrony, rather than any external 
references or goals - the primary orientation of this basic musical task (see above). This instrument 
could be played hands-free: although participants were instructed to interact through or using the 
instrument, they could move their hands freely (as is normal during speech). Perhaps most 
importantly, the use of an instrument as a mediator provided some distance between the individual 
and their contribution - this facilitated participation by reducing the amount of embarrassment they 
might feel at having to interact or perform with a stranger, in a new setting (and sometimes with a 
video camera pointing at them). Burrows (1987) describes how musical instruments can act as a 
mask - ‘depersonalizing’ the actor through ‘timbral standardization’ across performers: 
... an instrument replaces the performer's own sonic face, the voice, with a proved impersonal 
sound used only for making music. (Burrows, 1987: 122) 
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Through this ‘cloaking’ effect (Turino, 2009: 100), my participants could be less self-conscious, as 
their voices became more uniform (or, you might say, as silly as each other).94 Again, this focussed 
the task on the relational, the task to interact with one another - as it is these dimensions which 
make our task predominantly musical (in a participatory sense), rather than anything else. 
Changing the music: manipulating interaction goals  
If the defining feature of music is a form of interaction which foregrounds the phatic, establishing 
and maintaining a context which is primarily for relational purposes, then we have described above a 
quintessential, musical condition. We have stripped away any cultural specificities, conventions, or 
references, only requiring the ability to vocalise - a universal capacity which likely forms the root of 
our human musical expression. However, the key interaction manipulation within this project was 
the goal orientation of the task - whether it was primarily intrinsic, or more extrinsic in focus. Here, I 
shall outline how I introduced an external goal focus, “changing the music” condition so that it 
became slightly less relational in focus, instead directing some attention towards an external 
interaction goal.  
A depiction goal 
In speech, we aim to share some sort of common ground, knowledge or awareness about something 
in the world. This often characterises musical behaviours too, although generally to a lesser extent: 
certain melodies might be iconic, or even symbolic; musical structures can be pre-defined according 
to convention, maybe a ritual purpose; musicians often need access to and understanding of some 
sort of score to guide their interaction or performance. In other words, we all need to read off the 
same song-sheet, as the saying goes. To model this external common ground in a controlled, 
systematic and fairly simple way, within the same musical interaction task described above, I decided 
to introduce the goal to depict something. 
Participants were instructed either to depict a flock of birds or a herd of elephants - they were told to 
make music which was inspired by this image (a picture was also shown on the instruction card). This 
required them to hold in mind this external reference, and anticipate that their partner(s) also shared 
this aim (probably with a shared selection of sounds or behaviours commonly attributed to these 
animals, drawing on their common knowledge or experience of them in the world). This becomes an 
interaction goal, and a form of common ground - something external they share and aim for - on top 
of just the goal to interact.  
 
 
94 This ‘cloaking’ function emerges in Turino’s participatory ‘field’ of music-making, which is characterised by a 
‘wall of sound’ - in contrast to the expectation of ‘clarity’ in a presentational context (I assumed the latter 
would be the default understanding of music-making amongst my participants; see discussion in Turino, 2009). 
152 
 
Goals and groups 
The purpose of this project is to ascertain how this change in interaction focus or common ground 
might enact or structure our social relationships differently. As I outlined above, the purpose of my 
first experiment was to test whether having - and sharing - these interaction goals affected the 
degree of group bonding individuals experienced following the activity. Participants always expected 
that others in their group would have the same goal;95 however, sometimes the goals were not in 
fact shared within the group - would they notice this, and might it affect group formation? Moreover, 
both experiments 1 and 3 provided the opportunity to test whether just having a shared goal or not 
affects the degree of affiliation - does this goal manipulation change the interaction mode 
substantially enough to have a real effect on how much they relate to, or like, each other as a result? 
There is also some reason to think that having different goals or common ground might create group 
boundaries by emphasising a process of categorisation. While team identity is usually signified in 
experiments by some perceptual attribute (such as team colour etc.), having a depiction goal that 
corresponds to, or is semantically related to, one’s team identity (either the elephant or the bird 
team) aligns with our real-life social experience. Language is one signifier of social identity: it is not 
just a perceptual difference, but one which actually shapes or limits our potential for interaction with 
others - we have to share common ground to associate with them.  
The role of music-making practices in these processes of group formation (and division) has been 
demonstrated in some case studies (see Giles et al., 2009, for overview and examples). Musical 
listening preferences (or personal playlists) provide an identifying “badge” for young people, aligning 
themselves with certain social categories in the eyes of their peers (North & Hargreaves, 1999). 
Again, making music provides even more potent examples of this - signalling national identity, 
membership of some ethnic class or group - especially so in the experience of migration or diaspora 
(e.g. Baily, 2005; Baily & Collyer, 2006). Crucially, people show that they belong through being able to 
participate in the music; necessarily, those who do not share this common ground are excluded 
(knowledge of and participation in a team’s football chants is a clear example of this - see e.g. 
Collinson, 2009). In this much-simplified empirical model, introducing an external form of common 
ground - here a musical depiction goal - might provide a way of emphasising one’s social identity, or 
one’s sense of belonging to a particular team. 
A non-musical task: creating a matched control condition  
Although the difference in common ground or goal orientation of musical interaction forms the main 
part of this project, it was necessary to investigate interaction mode, more broadly speaking. In my 
 
95 They were led to believe that the task was investigating “group memory” (see method in Chapter 6). 
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first experiment, I compared a musical with a non-musical task, measuring how far music is more 
efficacious for processes of interdependence. In this section, I discuss how I designed this task; in 
other words, how I defined what made a simple, interaction task more or less “musical”.  
The interaction engine 
The fundamentals behind all sorts of interaction - regardless of mode, goal focus, or anything else - 
are encapsulated in Levinson’s idea of our ‘interaction engine’: 
... a set of cognitive abilities and behavioral dispositions that synergistically work together to 
endow human face-to-face interaction with certain special qualities. (Levinson, 2006: 44) 
The idea is that human social interaction has a number of universal attributes - with just superficial 
differences across cultures (or, here, across modes of interaction). These attributes include some 
awareness of common ground, communicative intentions (or Theory of Mind); a general structure of 
turn-taking or reciprocity (although the importance of this in musical communication is an open 
question); close co-ordination in timing; in short, a participatory, multi-modal joint activity. These are 
all (with the possible exception of turn-taking) present in my musical task. I needed a non-musical 
task which involved matched levels of co-ordination, potential for entrainment and synchrony of 
movement, some sort of intention-reading - but just differing in “musicality”. 
Musical and non-musical manifestations 
My definition of the musical is somewhat broad, encompassing many forms of multimodal, 
communicative activity, but especially those on the intrinsic end of our spectrum: it foregrounds the 
relational goals, or the phatic dimension. I have already described how I can make this slightly more 
“speech-like” by introducing an external depiction goal. However, I needed to change the modality 
more significantly in testing, in the first instance, the efficacy of more musical forms of interaction for 
group bonding more generally. In order to do this, I drew on descriptions of the ‘statistical universals’ 
of music-making, ensuring that a musical task included these to some extent, while the non-musical 
task did not. I shall outline these features in brief here. 
These musical ‘design features’ might include: a discrete set of pitches, some sort of scale system 
that can be used to create all sorts of different melodic or harmonic combinations, an isochronic 
pulse, focus on contour and the transposability of melodies, all within a performative or ritual 
context (see complete list in Fitch, 2006). Similarly, Trehub et al. (2015) identifies the presence of 
specific melodic units or phrases, the predominance of unequal intervals, especially pentatonic 
scales, as well as a periodic pulse and the social occasion of music-making, as statistical universals 
(see a similar list in Stevens & Byron, 2016).  While Bispham (2009) also highlights the role of pulse 
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and pitch contour, he situates these within a broader social context or framework: this provides the 
overriding motivation which defines musical activities - namely, ‘an intrinsic motivation to share 
convergent intersubjective endstates’ (Bispham, 2009: 41). My musical condition comprised only this 
broad social framework (of course, using an instrument that emphasises melodic contour). However, 
within this interactive, improvised and free context, participants did in fact then incorporate the 
more superficial features - playing in synchrony, repeating certain notes, even sometimes using what 
sounded like a pentatonic scale. 
My non-musical task also provided a social context for free interaction that was not scripted in any 
way. Participants had to work together, co-ordinating with the others in their group. Again, no 
speech was allowed. In contrast, though, they had no instrument by which they could include any 
sort of melodic contour or prosody to engage with their partner(s). Without this dimension, 
facilitated by the musical instrument, we needed some other task to scaffold participants’ 
interaction, a context in which they had to work together to some end. From very early in our lives, 
we engage with others around us by sharing visual attention, pointing to objects and directing others 
to attend to something alongside us. Therefore, a visual task seemed to be a simple context in which 
participants could interact and affiliate, in a non-musical way.  
Participants in this non-musical condition were to arrange shapes in a collage, forming one picture as 
a group. This was just as engaging as the musical task (both were run in pilot sessions); it was very 
easy to take part in, involved participation and contribution from all group members, who had to 
work together, simultaneously, in just the same way as in the music task. They had to work with a 
great variety of shapes, with the potential to arrange them in many different ways (matching as far 
as possible the generativity and freedom of the musical activity).96 Just as tool-use is a normal and 
natural feature of music-making, moving objects is a core part of all sorts of everyday interaction (see 
Streeck et al., 2011). Any non-musical task had to include some sort of external goal: while music is 
characterised by an unusually relational goal focus, other forms of interaction are generally more 
extrinsically-oriented, i.e. achieving common ground on something external is a crucial part of the 
encounter. Thus, the visual shape task always involved the depiction goal - depicting elephants or 
birds (as pictured on the instructions), a task which was either shared or not shared within the group.  
Summary: experimental conditions 
To complete the first half of this chapter, I present again the place of these interaction conditions in 
my experimental designs. Tables 4-7 below provide a summary of each. 
 
 
96 See Merker et al. (2015) on generativity. 
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Variables tested Testing the effect of interaction goals on group formation 
Testing the 
effect of 
interaction mode 
on group 
formation 
Musical group 
interaction, with 
depiction goal shared 
within group 
Musical group 
interaction, but depiction 
goal not shared within 
group 
Musical group 
interaction with no 
additional goal 
Visual group collage, 
with depiction goal 
shared within group 
Visual group collage, but 
depiction goal not shared 
within group 
 
 
 
 
Interaction 
conditions 
Musical group interaction with goals 
corresponding to team identity 
(mixed teams, mixed goals within 
group) 
Musical group interaction with no 
additional goals (mixed teams within 
group) 
Interaction outcomes 
Group bonding across teams Affiliation to individuals on basis of team 
membership; team identification in general 
 
 
 
Interaction 
conditions 
Musical dyadic interaction with 
shared goal corresponding to team 
identity (same-team pair)  
Musical dyadic interaction with no 
additional goals (same-team pair) 
Interaction outcomes 
Affiliation towards interaction partner Team identification in general 
 
 
 
Interaction 
conditions 
Musical dyadic interaction with 
shared goal corresponding to team 
identity (same-team pair)  
Musical dyadic interaction with no 
additional goals (same-team pair) 
Behavioural 
observations 
Degree of vocal synchrony 
Incidence of mutual gaze 
Relationship between gaze and vocal behaviour 
 
Table 7  Summary of conditions and behavioural measures in video analysis project 
Table 4  Summary of conditions in Experiment 1  
Table 5  Summary of conditions and outcomes in Experiment 2  
Table 6  Summary of conditions and outcomes in Experiment 3  
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Groups and teams in the lab 
Now that I have presented my experimental conditions, I turn to my dependent, or outcome, 
variables. I have drawn from the literature (and, in some instances, devised myself) indices which tap 
into a sense of group or collective belonging, within the social landscape I constructed in the confines 
of the lab. Important here is the distinction I make between a feeling of bonding, or belonging, to the 
face-to-face group formed in the immediate interaction context through the experience of 
interdependence; and the feeling of belonging or identification to a much wider team membership, a 
more individual process of self- and other-categorisation which might be reinforced by certain 
features or attributes of that interaction context. To investigate these processes separately, I needed 
different outcome measures; in this section, I shall discuss each measure in turn - in particular, why I 
expected it to tap into one process more than the other. I start with those I used to test 
interpersonal, interdependent group formation. 
The evidence for group formation 
In experiment 1, and also to some extent in experiments 2 and 3, I tested how far participants felt 
that a group had formed as a result of the time they spent interacting together (musically or 
otherwise). This process of group formation is often equated with that of ‘social bonding’, defined as: 
... the psychological experience of increased social closeness, reflected in prosocial behaviors 
(Tarr et al., 2014: 1) 
However, it is also important to distinguish between bonding towards individuals in the same group, 
and the sense that all of the individuals involved have been bonded into one ‘entity’ (prosocial 
behaviour might stem both from individual relationships, and from being in a group context, e.g. 
Kirschner & Tomasello, 2010).97 Pearce et al. (2016b) investigate something like this distinction by 
measuring specific individual relationships which have been formed (e.g. by writing down names of 
others), as well as a sense of collective identity (the latter has some overlap with my construct of 
team identification - explored later). Here, I consider both of these dimensions - the personal 
relationships, and the general collective bonding - as important facets of group formation. I include 
both types of measure, but ensure they are clearly distinguished. Instead of measuring prosociality, I 
probe participants’ feelings about the social relationships they have formed; I assume that this 
experience of closeness or connection is a precursor to (or at least underlies) any behavioural 
manifestation of in-group preference. I shall now go through each measure in turn, providing 
evidence which supports its validity for this purpose.  
 
 
97 The question of the relative importance or sequence of these bonding processes is a subject for future 
investigation (furthering the work of Pearce et al., 2016b). 
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Trust - the definition of a group 
In his work on social networks, Robin Dunbar considers that what defines the core group size of 150 
is the perception and expectation of trustworthiness for all other individuals in that group. He says: 
What defines this group of people seems to be recognition of a mutual, reciprocal relationship of 
trust and obligation, combined with a willingness to act prosocially. (Dunbar, 2018: 34) 
This acts on the same two levels - trust for specific individuals, and a general feeling about the 
trustworthiness of the group as a whole. Dunbar characterises individual friendships as ‘implicit 
social contracts’ (Dunbar, 2018: 37, 41); time spent interacting with a specific other results in greater 
emotional connection and more trust in them (a commitment that does not rely so much on 
immediate reciprocity - see Sutcliffe et al., 2012). There are important neurochemical correlates of 
these bonded relationships too - feelings of trust are linked to the release of oxytocin, the 
neuropeptide which plays a large part in selective attachment relationships (Kosfeld et al., 2005).98 I 
incorporated a measure of trust towards specific others in a questionnaire following the group 
interaction: participants were shown photos of others (who either belonged to the group, or who did 
not), and had to make forced-choice decisions between them as to who they would trust more for 
certain scenarios (adapted from Johnson-George & Swap’s 1982 Specific Interpersonal Trust scale). 
These judgements are thus personal evaluations of how much they trust a specific other (or who they 
trust more). 
However, trust is important within the much broader group context - we need to trust those who we 
do not know so well; and this is perhaps the criterion for who belongs to our wider social group, and 
who does not. Rotter (1971) highlights this in his conceptualisation of trust - it is something more 
general: 
Interpersonal trust is defined here as an expectancy held by an individual or a group that the 
word, promise, verbal, or written statement of another individual or group can be relied on. 
(Rotter, 1971: 444) 
Importantly, this is a ‘generalised expectancy’ - derived from individual experience, but applied 
across the board, even generating trust in our society as a whole.  
The entire fabric of our day-to-day living, of our social order, rests on trust - buying gasoline, 
paying taxes, going to the dentist, flying to a convention - almost all of our decisions involve 
 
98 Interestingly, oxytocin levels also increase following group singing (Kreutz, 2014). 
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trusting someone else. The more complex the society, the greater the dependence on others. If 
trust weakens, the social order collapses. (Rotter, 1971: 443)99 
Therefore, we need to include another layer of trust - not just towards specific individuals, but to 
‘classes of significant others’ (Rotter, 1971: 446), in other words, to the experimental group as a 
whole. I included this very simply with self-report Likert scales where participants had to rate how far 
they would ‘rely on’ the others, how far they have ‘confidence’ in the group, and how far they think 
they are ‘generally trustworthy’. 
Importantly, this feeling of trust, or expectation of goodwill on the part of others, should be 
distinguished from a sense of commitment - a different emotion, but one which also emerges within 
a group context (and which exacerbates the boundary between the in-group and any outsiders). 
Here, we deal with trust, as it is the ‘booster rocket’ - enabling relationships with others who we 
might not know so well (as in the case of our experiments; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994: 138). 
However, we need trust less when other conditions or loyalties oblige us to co-operate with specific 
others via our commitment to them: perhaps due to the threat of punishment, or loss of reputation, 
preventing us from seeking new relationships with others outside this closed network (Yamagishi & 
Yamagishi, 1994). 
Feeling close: self-other overlap 
Tarr et al.’s (2014) definition of bonding includes the experience of ‘closeness’; in their review, they 
highlight the role of self-other overlap in generating this feeling. This is elsewhere described as the 
sensation that the boundaries between us and another have been blurred, probably due to our 
mirroring mechanisms - the strong connections between perception and action in our neural 
responses to observing others’ actions. When we move with another, watching them and doing the 
same thing ourselves, it starts to become difficult to work out who has done what (for example, 
which of us played the wrong note in our piano duet).  
This sense of overlap, or closeness, has been measured using a pictorial scale called the ‘Inclusion of 
the Other in the Self scale’ (the IOS scale). This is a single-item Likert scale, originally devised by Aron 
et al. (1992), where the participant and their target (usually another person, with whom they have 
interacted in some way) are depicted as two circles which are more or less overlapping. Participants 
have to decide which picture best represents or describes their relationship. Aron et al. state that 
this was ‘intended to tap directly people’s sense of interpersonal interconnectedness’ (Aron et al., 
 
99 Yamagishi and Yamagishi have since added more nuance to this definition - suggesting that ‘confidence’ is an 
index of social competence, whereas we trust in another’s goodwill in their dealings with us (Yamagishi & 
Yamagishi, 1994: 131). 
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1992: 597); it corresponds to feelings that attributes of the other have become one’s own, 
incorporated into the self (and vice versa) (see validation of this scale by Gächter et al., 2015).  
Again, in my case, I needed to apply this sense of ‘overlapping selves’ and ‘closeness’ on a group 
scale (not just towards individuals). A few others have modified the IOS scale such that the target is a 
group as a whole. One such attempt is by Swann et al. (2009), who use it as a measure of ‘identity 
fusion’ - the idea that one’s personal identity has been fused with their sense of belonging and 
contributing to a group: 
... the self-other barrier is blurred and the group comes to be regarded as functionally equivalent 
with the personal self. (Swann et al., 2009: 995) 
Although they consider predominantly how people act on behalf of their groups following a process 
of self-categorisation (something we shall explore more below), often with extreme behaviour, they 
also state that the concept of identity fusion, and the IOS scale used to test it, can be applied in 
investigating how far an individual bonds with their ‘relational groups’ (presumably similar to the 
face-to-face group bonding we are concerned with here; Swann et al., 2009: 995).  
They highlight again how this pictorial scale is useful in tapping into just a feeling of closeness, not 
even one which is easily accessible or understood; this IOS scale is  
... a straightforward index of degree of alignment with the group that can draw on conscious as 
well as nonconscious material. (Swann et al., 2009: 997) 
Thus, although it is a self-report scale, it perhaps draws on more implicit feelings of closeness or a 
general sense of overlap - feelings which correspond to a sense of group formation.100 
Connectedness 
Other self-report items I presented to my participants perhaps show the results, or manifestations, of 
such feelings of trust or closeness. The first of these is a rating of interpersonal ‘connectedness’: a 7-
point Likert scale in response to the question ‘How connected did you feel with the other 
participants in your group during the activity?’ This is a fairly common measurement of group 
bonding or group formation. Wiltermuth and Heath (2009) found that their participants feel more 
‘connected’ following synchronous than asynchronous walking. Participants in singing classes form 
more individual relationships or ‘social ties’ - specific people to whom they feel ‘connected’ (in a 
yes/no question) - more quickly than those who took part in craft or creative writing (this occurred 
alongside a general increase in group-level IOS scores; Pearce et al., 2016b).  
 
100 See also how it is used by e.g. Pearce et al. (2016b) as an indicator of ‘collective bonding to the class as a 
single, non-individuated entity.’ (Pearce et al., 2016b: 506) 
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While these uses of ‘connectedness’ concern specific relationships, Pearce et al., (2016a) combine 
general scores of connectedness with the IOS ratings to form an overall index of ‘closeness’ - this 
time directed to the group of four as a whole, not towards other individuals. Weinstein et al. (2016) 
also show higher levels of ‘connectedness’ felt towards all others in a large group of a couple of 
hundred people. Pearce (2014) also relates this same concept to larger-scale group structures, 
discussing how the overall, wider social network of weaker ties might be maintained through 
occasional social gatherings or encounters (like large-scale music-making).  
Both of these levels are present in a definition of the term given by Lee and Robbins (1995). They 
speak of a general ‘sense of connectedness’ amongst all others, being “human among humans” (Lee 
& Robbins, 1995: 233), the feeling that one can participate in, belongs, and feels related to others in 
society; ratings on this scale also seem to predict the ability to identify with specific others, such as 
partners or friends.  
Similarity 
The feeling of being similar to another is semantically related to the idea of closeness or self-other 
overlap; however, this dimension is specifically directed towards other individuals, concerning 
specific interpersonal relationships rather than a sense of collective belonging. The question I used in 
experiment 3 (considering participants’ relationship with their single interaction partner) was a 7-
point Likert scale - ‘How similar do you feel to your partner?’ - taken from Rabinowitch & Knafo-
Noam (2015). They discuss how similarity is strongly linked to the mechanisms supporting smooth 
interaction - the tendency to mimic others, for example (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) - and enhancing 
affiliation between participants. In their design, the general question about similarity is presented 
alongside other questions about one’s perception of the other person (similarity in appearance, 
character, hobbies etc.) - it is the overall sense that the other is “Like Me”.101  Moreover, Valdesolo 
and DeSteno (2011) found that similarity is an important mediating factor between synchrony and 
affiliation, compassion or prosocial behaviour.  
Likeability 
Liking is another measure concerned with one’s direct relationship with another - an indicator of 
individual affiliation. I have used the 9-point Likert scale ‘How likeable is your partner?’, taken from 
Hove and Risen (2009), for measuring interpersonal bonding in experiment 3. Hove and Risen linked 
the concept of liking, or affiliation, to social cohesion and self-other closeness, perhaps reinforced by 
mechanisms such as action-perception resonances and mirroring, towards their specific tapping 
partner in the study.  
 
101 Compare this with the discussion of imitation in Chapter 1. 
161 
 
Memory for group members 
Memory for others is another measure of attention or bonding towards specific individuals. 
Woolhouse et al. (2016), in their ‘silent disco’ study, used memory of a certain feature (whether 
other participants had a cat logo on their sash) as an indicator of social bonding. In their literature 
review, they draw attention to the role of memory in forming attachment relationships - individuals 
need both the motivation to approach another and engage with them, and then the formation of 
social memories - specifically for that individual - so they can recognise the other when they 
encounter them again. 
I incorporated memory tests about particular features of others in experiment 1, but with the 
purpose of assessing what participants can remember about all others in their interaction group. This 
accommodates the idea of individual bonding, but within a broader context of group interaction and 
cohesion. Specifically, I ask participants how many members of their group (a) were wearing glasses, 
(b) have blonde hair, and (c) were wearing a pink wristband.102 
Entitativity 
One final measure, used in assessing participants’ perceptions of the whole-group interaction 
context in both experiments 1 and 2, was the index of ‘entitativity’. Rutchick and colleagues (2008) 
define this as ‘the extent to which a set of people is perceived as a meaningful group’, or an ‘entity’. 
This measure comprises three separate pictorial scales, one assessing overall ‘entitativity’ (a set of 
circles which are more or less overlapping), and then the others each testing the importance of 
certain cues, or antecedents, for this entitativity; namely - similarity (to what extent the group 
members share something, perhaps appearance or traits, in common, have a ‘common essence’ or 
homogeneity); and action and interaction (a sense of interdependence, working together towards a 
common goal, perhaps with some sort of group organisation). I included all three of these scales in 
my questionnaire. 
This item spans both the idea that groups are formed through interdependence (the suggestion is 
that entitativity which emerges from a higher rating of action and interaction indicates an 
interdependent group), but also categorisation (entitativity instead relating to higher perceptions of 
homogeneity or similarity; see Rutchick et al., 2008). I shall next go on to discuss this process of 
categorisation in more depth - first, the way in which I used the experiment set-up to create possible 
 
102 Certain limitations of (a) and (b) should be noted: pictures of the other group individuals had been included 
earlier in the questionnaire (in the forced-choice trust measure, for example) - some participants might have 
used this rather than their memory to inform their answers; also, it is difficult to assess what ‘blonde’ hair is 
(how dark can it be to still be considered blonde). 
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social identities, and second the way I measured how they were established in participants’ self-
concept following goal-focussed interaction.  
Summary of measures 
I summarise the items measuring group formation in Table 8 below. I split them up according to 
whether they measure interpersonal bonding (towards specific individuals within the group), or a 
broader sense of whole-group cohesion. 
 
Team formation: creating and measuring identities 
The line between forming a group through interdependence and face-to-face personal bonding, and 
a sense of team, collective identity, is somewhat blurred - of course, face-to-face bonding can lead to 
collective identity, and a prior sense of team membership makes individual affiliation easier 
(compared to relations with others in the out-group). I alluded to this by including a measure of 
entitativity which encompassed both the similarity and the action-interaction criteria as possible 
antecedents of each group ‘type’ (as either ‘categorically-’ or ‘dynamically-construed’ - see Rutchick 
et al., 2008). In my first experiment, I also decided to include an extra 7-point Likert item taken from 
Wiltermuth and Heath (2009) - ‘How far did you feel you were on the same team with other 
participants in the task?’ - despite not including any reference to ‘teams’ in the experiment set-up. In 
these ways, I acknowledged the fluidity of these processes; it is difficult to separate one from the 
other, as they feed into each other, and are deeply associated within the mind of each individual 
participant. 
Studies often merge these two concepts together. For example, Good and Russo (2016) measured 
the impact of various group activities (singing, art, or competitive games) on co-operation with that 
group (through a prisoner’s dilemma game); but, the singing and art conditions involved making up, 
and using, words describing positive things about living in their home city - this could well comprise 
and reinforce a collective identity that the participants shared. I wanted to measure a sense of 
collective identity separately from the more local sort of group bonding, as far as was possible. This is 
important for the aims of my project: it seems that music-making can establish group category 
Whole-group bonding Interpersonal bonding 
General trustworthiness of the group 
Inclusion of the other (group) in the self 
Connectedness 
Entitativity (through similarity or interaction) 
Specific interpersonal trust 
Similarity 
Likeability 
Memory for individual attributes 
Table 8  Summary of group bonding measures 
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divides, as well as forming group bonds, in slightly different ways - I attempted to devise experiments 
which clearly enacted and tested this distinction.  
In this section, I shall outline how I introduced the idea of opposing team identities at the outset of 
my experimental procedure; and then, how I investigated the role of musical goals in reinforcing that 
sense of identity amongst the participants.  
Team competition: experiment set-up 
In both experiments 2 and 3 (and also in the conditions for my video analysis), I divided participants 
into two teams. I aimed to create the basis from which a sense of team identification might then 
emerge as a result of certain properties of the interaction. All participants within a given 
experimental session (ten for experiment two, and four in experiment three) were divided into two 
equal, opposing teams - creating a clear sense of “us and them”, an in-group against one out-group 
(Hartstone & Augoustinos, 1995).  
Experiments conducted elsewhere have used all sorts of criteria to distinguish two groups in this 
way: existing membership of a university (Levine et al., 2002) or a social club (Pearce et al., 2016a), or 
assignment at the start of the experiment to phis or gammas (Locksley et al., 1980), or reds or blues 
(Miles et al., 2011 - supposedly on the basis of ‘art preference’). Participants’ team identity is often 
then displayed through some colour or symbol, or other distinguishing, perceptual, characteristic: an 
outward sign (e.g. a Crucifix or ‘Got God’ bracelet) of being a Christian (Yabar et al., 2006), the 
presence of a university logo (Reddish et al., 2016), or wearing a coloured sticker or t-shirt (Miles et 
al., 2011; Good et al., 2017, and others). My procedure has been influenced by the “minimal” group 
formation stage of studies such as Gaertner et al. (1990), Good et al. (2017), and Tunçgenç & Cohen 
(2016).103 In these, participants are assigned to one of two colour identities, then go to a given team 
location, where they might complete an activity together (e.g. drawing a team ‘flag’, thinking of a 
group name, maybe together discussing the ‘winter survival problem’ or telling others something 
about themselves). Given that I aimed to test the effect of group interaction, my team formation 
stage just included establishing separate identities and creating the sense of a competition between 
the wider team memberships (beyond those present in the experiment) - before they engage in 
within- or across-team interaction (in experiments 3 and 2, respectively). 
First, I created separate team identities by instructing half of the participants that they were in the 
“elephant” team, and the other half the “bird” team. I established a perceptual distinction by giving 
each individual a badge to wear, clearly showing either a bird or an elephant team symbol. In 
experiment 2, participants started the experiment seated in a circle with other team members (with 
 
103 These groups are generally not very “minimal”. 
164 
 
the other team in another circle, elsewhere in the room). Similarly, in experiment 3, same-team pairs 
were seated next to each other, and then were sent to do their dyadic interaction in adjacent rooms. 
Thus, they were always aware of their own team membership, as well as the presence of an out-
group. 
Second, I instructed participants that they were part of a large-scale competition - involving elephant 
and bird team members from across the faculty. The experimental tasks (the interaction, and, in 
experiment 3, the memory test) were posed as opportunities to gain points for their team (video 
cameras were set up to reinforce this, supposedly recording their behaviour for this purpose). 
Brewer (1979) notes greater in-group preference in conditions of competition between the two 
teams; of course, Sherif’s (1967) study also highlighted this as one instrumental component in 
forming team or group identity. I used these procedures in my studies as ways of introducing a clear 
sense of team membership before I tested the effect of group interaction goals on the social 
categorisation process (see above on how these goals resembled this perceptual team distinction).  
Measuring team identification: in-group preference 
The most common way in which social identity, or team formation, has been measured in the past, is 
to establish whether there is a greater preference for in-group members, or a particular discrepancy 
between the treatment of those belonging to the in-group compared to others who are part of the 
out-group. This is an important difference, compared with indicators of group formation: whereas 
the latter measure bonding, or affiliation, inclusion within the group, the experience of team identity 
always necessarily includes a distinction between who is in and who is not.  
There is a whole range of indicators of this sort of preference, from facial recognition (Bernstein et 
al., 2007), amount of behavioural mimicry (Yabar et al., 2006), to distinct neural responses while 
viewing others (Ratner & Amodio, 2013) or more active prosocial behaviour (Stürmer et al., 2006). 
The original ‘minimal group’ studies, however, assess participants’ strategies in reward allocation: 
Tajfel et al. (1971) use a point allocation matrix, and find that participants award more points to in-
group members, maximising the difference in point allocation rather than making sure they award as 
many points as they can. Locksley et al. (1980) use a simpler reward or ‘chip’ allocation measure, 
where participants just have to decide how many of their 100 chips they can allot to in-group or out-
group members (phis or gammas); Hetherington et al. (2014) include a similar resource allocation 
element in their design. In general, these sorts of decisions are made individually - participants just 
see whether another is part of their team or not from a code number (e.g. in Hogg & Turner, 1985; or 
Turner et al., 1983), or a coloured background, and make the choice purely on this basis. With the 
exception of Hetherington et al.’s study, they do not see the identity of the target individual; 
165 
 
sometimes they just see unfamiliar faces, which are counterbalanced for team affiliation across 
participants. 
I incorporated a measure of this nature in my third experiment: I provided pictures of individuals who 
were unfamiliar to my participants, alongside a symbol which indicated their team affiliation.104 
These individuals were shown in pairs - one associated with the elephant, and the other with the bird 
team - and participants had to decide how much to reward each, from a limited resource for each 
pair. They were instructed: 
Below are pictures of other members of the bird and the elephant teams who have taken part in 
the experiment already. Their team is shown by the symbol. Imagine that you have 4 pots of £5 in 
£1 coins. ... Decide how many £1 coins to allocate to each participant and write a number in each 
box. This must total £5 on each line. 
This was thus a forced-choice task, where participants have to choose who to give more or less to, 
just on the basis of team identity.  
I did not use just a reward allocation paradigm to test team formation in this way. In experiment 2, I 
also adapted my interpersonal trust forced-choice measure (see above) to test how far team 
affiliation shapes individual evaluation or judgements of trustworthiness: participants had to choose 
between more unfamiliar individuals (this time, they were from their cohort, but not involved in their 
experimental session), who had been assigned a team identity, with the relevant symbol displayed 
next to their picture. Moreover, in experiment 2, I included several different self-report ratings of 
connectedness: participants had to rate, in turn, how connected they felt to members of their own 
team, and members of the other team, thinking only of those involved in their mixed-team group 
interaction activity. These three dimensions - reward allocation, trust, and connectedness - all 
provided potential indicators of in-group preference, individual or group-level bonding on the basis 
of team membership. 
Self-other overlap - with the collective 
The measure of self-other overlap described above also does not just extend to general group-level 
bonding; more commonly, in fact, it is applied to a much larger-scale category identity. Swann and 
colleagues’ concept of identity fusion is explicitly linked to ideas of Social Identity and Self-
Categorisation, as individuals ‘fuse’ their personal identity with that of their e.g. religious or national 
group, and therefore feel they - even as an individual - can act on behalf of this wider category 
(Swann et al., 2009). The same 5-point pictorial Likert scale can be directed towards the team as a 
 
104 This measure was actually limited in validity as some participants claimed to recognise the photographed 
individuals. 
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whole - not just the other individuals present in the experiment session (in my study, I make this 
clear e.g. by presenting the questionnaire item next to the particular team symbol). Other 
researchers have used the IOS scale to measure a sense of in-group identity. Tropp and Wright 
(2001) discuss the process of self-categorisation as follows: 
When individuals categorize themselves as group members, the ingroup becomes included in the 
self and individuals recognize the characteristics of the ingroup as representing part of 
themselves. (Tropp & Wright, 2001: 586) 
Also, Schubert and Otten (2002) further explored how the IOS scale could be adapted to capture 
inter-group relations more fully - measuring not only the overlap of self and one’s in-group, but also 
how we relate to our out-groups, and how overlapping we feel our whole in-group is to the relevant 
out-group.105 
Team-related memory: implicit identification? 
Finally, I devised a more exploratory measurement of individual identification with a team that did 
not involve rating other individuals (especially other individuals who were involved in the interaction 
task). Having an implicit measure of the salience of one’s social or team identity - that could not be 
confounded by having interacted with specific individuals more than others - was important in 
distinguishing group bonding from a sense of team identity.  
Implicit measures have been useful in various investigations of social cognition, uncovering attitudes 
or stereotypes which might not be so readily observable, especially through self-report. Tasks 
involving word completion or reaction times might demonstrate such ‘traces of past experience’, 
being affected by factors or memories of which a participant might not even be consciously aware 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). An individual’s memory is a key part of this process. Certain tests of 
racial prejudice (notably the Implicit Association Test) use a priming procedure, and measure how far 
certain concepts are more or less congruent with certain categories of individual (using reaction 
times) in the memory representations, expectations (or stereotypes) held by the participant (see 
Fazio & Olson, 2003, for a review). Therefore, it makes sense that establishing a certain team identity 
in the lab might shape just how one recalls semantically-related concepts or words in a subsequent 
memory test. 
Tests of recall or recognition memory are generally affected by the learning context (see e.g. Smith & 
Vela, 2001; or, earlier, Smith, 1986). In a perhaps similar way, I supposed that if the musical 
interaction task had instilled more of a sense of team identity in the participant, then they might be 
 
105 A ‘group’ in this context refers to what I generally call a ‘team’: a sense of social identity, beyond those 
present in an interdependent, face-to-face interaction.  
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more prone to remember words related to their team in a subsequent written recall test, perhaps 
through a process of priming, or a memory bias effect. 
Summary of measures 
Table 9 below lists the indices I used to measure different aspects of team-related affiliation or 
preference - relating to specific individuals with whom they had been directly involved, other 
individuals who shared a team membership, or a more general, wider sense of identification with the 
team. In general, these tap into one’s own affiliation with a team, but sometimes this also results in a 
distinction between those who are in, and who are out - a process of exclusion (as opposed to the 
bonding, or inclusion, measured in the section on group formation above). This is something that 
needs to be investigated further, beyond this initial project.  
 
Target > Known individuals Unfamiliar team 
members 
Team identity 
v Experiment 
2 Connectedness Trust IOS 
3  Reward allocation Memory & IOS 
 
Controls, feelings, and other considerations 
I shall conclude this chapter with a few other considerations which were important for this project. 
The first are the normal dimensions that should be controlled - degree of musical training, prior 
knowledge of others in the experiment, and mood or affect. As I discuss in depth above, my musical 
interaction tasks were designed to be accessible regardless of musical background or expertise, and 
so should “level out” any participant differences in this domain; however, I measured this in one 
experiment (and kept it roughly constant in the others), just to ensure this did not affect the results 
in any way. 
Positive mood or affect might well affect processes of bonding or team identification (although it is 
unclear whether this mediates the bonding effect, or just correlates with other mechanisms, such as 
endorphin release). Weinstein et al. (2016) found that positive affect correlated with other indicators 
of group formation (e.g. IOS). Moreover, affect contagion is one outcome of shared group interaction 
or experience (see e.g. Barsade, 2002). Therefore, I used the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS) - a short self-report measure (Kercher, 1992; reviewed by Mackinnon et al., 1999) - both 
Table 9  Summary of team-related affiliation or identification measures 
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before and after the experiment to control for any confounding effects of mood, or to measure 
where increased positive mood might occur in tandem with other group bonding effects.106 
Beyond these normal control variables, I expected that the motivation for a participant to identify 
with a social class or group, in other words, to adopt that team identity as part of their self-concept 
(and so feel affiliation towards others who share that attribute - see discussion of self-esteem and 
social groups in Chapter 3) would be shaped by other social emotions. These are not necessarily 
indicators of bonding, but are other feelings that arise from the experience of the interaction task. In 
particular, I expected that the experience of embarrassment would have a significant effect - perhaps 
making people less likely to want any sort of association as a result (see discussion of this, and the 
motivation to ‘save face’, in Chapter 2). In my experiments, I included self-report questions about 
participants’ perception of the joint or group successfulness of the task, how difficult they found it, 
and whether they think they individually performed well. These items give an indication of how well 
they felt they presented themselves, how well they worked together, but also whether they 
individually might have been responsible for the success of the task. This was exploratory, I expected 
that these might shape how far participants felt they could identify with - or needed to distance 
themselves from - the social context created through musical interaction. In experiment 3, I 
introduced a further item which measured more directly how embarrassed they felt during the task 
(from Sabini et al., 2000). I did not consider this a confounding variable. Rather, avoiding potential 
embarrassment, and the task of impression management, is a central part of managing social 
interactions, and a factor shaping our sense of group identity. Including this in our investigation into 
social, musical interaction is necessary to begin to understand how music-making functions in social 
bonding (and in creating social distance or category divides) in the light of these other interpersonal 
factors. 
In this way, I have developed a thorough research paradigm to explore the role of music-making in 
forming social groups, and in distinguishing social categories; and to differentiate particularly 
“musical” forms of interaction from others. I shall now report on each of my experiments in turn, and 
then present the results of my video analysis. 
  
 
106 This is a tricky issue of causality: I am measuring the effect of musical interaction on group bonding effects; 
however, this might be closely linked to the affective experience, especially given the rewarding nature of 
social interaction. Compare results and discussion of experiment 1 with those of experiment 3 for more 
discussion of this: musical interaction did not correspond to changes in self-reported mood (in experiment 1), 
however, baseline mood scores correlated with the subsequent success of the task (in experiment 3). 
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Chapter 6 - Experimental groups 
Here, I bring in my empirical work: new data to shed light on our central question, that is, the role of 
music-making in forming and demarcating group identity. I present the method, results, and brief 
discussion for each experiment in turn, followed by my video analysis. In my conclusions, I shall 
discuss in greater depth the insights offered by this work, and the possible direction of future 
research. 
Experiment 1 - music in group formation 
The aim of this first experiment was to investigate the conditions of group formation: contrasting a 
“musical” interaction (very simple, instrumental music-making) with a “non-musical” (visual) 
interaction mode; comparing the effect of shared with conflicting goals, and also the effect of having 
or not having an interaction goal at all - on subsequent group bonding. The following were the 
hypothesised effects:  
(a) A higher level of group bonding following “musical” interaction than after a “non-musical”, 
visual, interaction task  
(b) A higher level of group bonding following interaction with shared goals than after a task 
involving conflicting goals (see Chapter 3 for discussion of interdependence in group 
formation) 
(c) An interaction - the effect of sharing goals is more important in the non-musical condition 
than in the musical condition (where non-shared goals can co-exist in a context of floating 
intentionality) 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 40 undergraduate students (20 male and 20 female) took part in this experiment. They 
were aged 18-21 years (mean 18.58; two participants did not provide their age). All participants had 
a high level of musical training (they were recruited through the music faculty). They all gave 
informed consent to take part in the experiment, which was reviewed by the Faculty of Music 
Research Ethics committee. 
Design 
This comprised a between-groups two-way 2 x 2 design, varying the mode of interaction 
(music/visual), whether or not groups shared a goal (shared, not shared), with a no-goal control 
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condition (see Table 10 below). All participants interacted in same-sex groups of four. Participants 
were split equally between each condition, with one male and one female group in each. 
 
 
 
 
 
Each participant assigned to one of the goal conditions was given a task to complete with others in 
their interaction group - to depict either elephants or birds. In the shared goal condition, all group 
members were given the same animal to depict; in the non-shared goal condition, two were given 
the elephant, and two the bird goal.  Participants assigned to the no-goal condition were not given a 
depiction task; their only aim was to interact with one another. The distribution of tasks is shown in 
Table 11. 
 
Mode of interaction Shared goal? Task assigned No. participants 
Music Shared Bird 4 (1 group) 
Elephant 4 (1 group) 
Not shared Bird 4 
(2 groups) 
Elephant 4 
No goal No goal 8 (2 groups) 
Visual Shared Bird 4 (1 group) 
Elephant 4 (1 group) 
Not shared Bird 4 
(2 groups) 
Elephant 4 
 
In line with previous literature, a range of outcome measures were used to test the level of group 
formation; these were administered via a post-interaction questionnaire. These included in-group 
trust (towards specific others and the group in general), memory for group member attributes, 
ratings of connectedness, closeness to the group (in an IOS scale), and perception of being on the 
same team as other group members. Participants were given a free written response task to describe 
their experience of the interaction. (See details of the measures in Appendix 1.1.) The short form of 
the PANAS mood questionnaire was administered pre- and post- interaction task (Kercher, 1992; 
reviewed by Mackinnon et al., 1999). Participants were also asked to rate (and detail, if necessary) 
Music & shared goal Visual & shared goal 
Music & non-shared goal Visual & non-shared goal 
Music & no goal  
Table 10  Conditions in experiment 1  
Table 11  Number of participants assigned to each condition and to each specific goal type 
Note: n = 8 in each condition. 
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how much they knew the group members (7-point scale), and the designated out-group members 
(for the trust measure - see below) prior to the experiment. 
Procedure and apparatus 
Pictures of all participants were taken, with consent, the previous day. These were used in the 
specific trust measure.  
Participants began the experiment seated individually, where they signed the consent form, 
completed the pre-task PANAS and then read their individual instructions. Pink wristbands were 
distributed at this point to two members of each group.  
Participants were led to believe that this was an experiment in group memory and non-verbal 
communication, and thus should be completed in silence; where a depiction task was given, the 
instructions implied that all group members would share that goal. Participants were not sat near 
any other interaction group members, ensuring that they were unaware if goal tasks varied within 
the group (as was the case in the non-shared goal conditions). They did not know who was in their 
group before the interaction task began. All participants were then instructed to go to one of ten 
different locations (signposted, and marked by letters A-J), located in four different rooms. There was 
one group at each location.  
The groups assigned a musical task could interact using only a simple vocalising instrument (the 
kazoo); this was chosen as it is easy to play, not distracting from the interaction with other group 
members, and encourages face-to-face engagement. Groups with a musical goal were instructed to: 
interact with each other, and improvise together, using only these kazoos, to perform music 
inspired by a herd of elephants(/flock of birds), as shown in the following picture ... Work 
together to depict this scene as accurately as you can. 
Two groups were given a shared musical goal: all four members of one group were given the 
elephant task; all members of the other group were given the bird task. Two groups had non-shared 
goals: in each group, two individuals had the elephant, and the other two had the bird goal (they 
were not aware of their differing goals). Another two groups were assigned the no-goal condition; 
they were instructed: 
interact with each other, and improvise together, using only these kazoos 
Another four groups were assigned the non-musical, visual, task. Each group was given an identical 
set of cardboard shapes and instructed to: 
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arrange these to create an elephant(/bird), as shown in the following picture ... Work together to 
reproduce it as accurately as you can.  
The shared and non-shared goal conditions were operationalised as above (two groups with shared, 
and two groups with non-shared goal). (See pictures used in Appendix 1.1.) 
All groups interacted for 10 minutes, working only within (and not between) their assigned groups 
for the duration of this time. The musical and visual tasks were piloted to ensure that they were 
equally engaging for this duration, and that both afforded a high degree of interpersonal interaction 
in a group of four. 
After this task, participants were asked to return to their first location. Their seats were now 
arranged in new groups of four: the out-group to be compared with in-group members in the forced-
choice trust scenarios.107 After they completed the questionnaire, participants submitted their 
responses and were led to a separate area to be debriefed about the design and purpose of the 
experiment. 
Data analysis 
There were three predictor variables for the initial analysis: mode of interaction (music or visual), 
goal condition (no goal, shared or non-shared), and the individuals’ specific task type (no-goal, 
depicting elephants, or birds). 
The questionnaire data is mostly ordinal (Likert rating scales etc.) therefore quantitative statistical 
tests could be run, using a mixture of ordinal regression, and non-parametric independent-samples 
comparisons (Kruskal-Wallis), with t-tests run on the memory scores (treating these as interval 
data).108 All post-hoc comparisons were Bonferroni-corrected. The specific trust preference data 
were calculated as the total number of in-group members chosen in the forced-choice in-group/out-
group comparisons. Tests of memory accuracy (correct/incorrect for each) for attributes of other 
participants were combined, forming a mark correct out of three. All other rating scales were 
analysed in their raw form. Non-parametric correlations were run on the dependent measures to test 
how they were related.  
 
 
107 Participants were sat far enough apart to ensure that they completed the questionnaire individually, and 
without worrying that others might see their responses. 
108 It is unclear whether the memory scores are interval data, as the scores from all three questions were 
totalled for each participant. Therefore, the parametric tests run on this outcome should be interpreted with 
caution. 
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Results 
Baseline mood and prior knowledge of others 
Ordinal logistic regression, using mode, goal condition, and task type as predictors, was used to test 
whether there was significant difference in baseline mood between groups. There was no difference 
for negative or positive PANAS pre-task baseline scores. Similarly, there was no significant difference 
between the groups for prior knowledge of the interaction group (or for the trust measure out-
group). 
Ratings of connectedness 
The ordinal regression model (with mode, goal condition and task type as predictors) was significant 
for ratings of connectedness (Chi-square = 10.245, df 4, p = .037), with effect sizes of r2 = .226 or .235 
(according to Cox & Snell/Nagelkerke).109  
Within this model, the only component which had a significant contribution was mode (Wald = 5.611, 
df 1, p = .018).110  A 2-tailed Kruskal-Wallis test also showed a significant difference in connectedness 
ratings according to mode: participants in the music conditions rated connectedness higher 
compared to participants in the visual conditions: H(1) = 6.917, p = .009, Cohen’s d = .913, r = .415 
(see Figure 1).111  
The same ordinal regression model (inputting mode, goal condition and task type) did not predict 
specific in-group trust scores (nor general ratings of trustworthiness), IOS scores (although this was 
nearing significance: Chi-square = 8.627, df 4, p = .071), memory scores, or the other ratings of 
successfulness, performance, same team perception, entitativity, difficulty, reliance on or confidence 
in others. 
 
 
109 Observed power = .91 
110 Inputting the same predictor variables into a linear regression model (for connectedness) in stages (1 - 
mode, 2 - goal sharing & mode, 3 - goal sharing & mode & task type) revealed a significant change when mode 
was inputted, but not when goal sharing, or goal task type were added to the model (although all three models 
were significant). 
111 All effect sizes were computed from means and standard deviations for pairwise comparisons using an 
online calculator found here: https://www.uccs.edu/lbecker/  
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Memory for group member attributes 
Memory scores were treated as interval data in an independent-samples t-test. Memory scores were 
significantly higher following the visual interaction task than the music task: t(37.87) = -2.147, p = 
.038.112  
A different ordinal regression model was created, excluding the music no-goal condition, inputting 
only mode, goal sharing (shared/non-shared) and their interaction. This model was significant for the 
memory scores (Chi-Square = 9.805, df 3, p = .020) with effect sizes r2 = .264 or .297 (Cox & 
Snell/Nagelkerke). The interaction between mode and sharing was the only significant component: 
Wald = 2.315, df 1, p = .005.113  
 
112 These scores are normally distributed; however, Levene’s test was significant (p = .003), therefore results 
given are corrected as equal variance is not assumed. 
113 This same model was not significant for any other dependent measure, including connectedness. 
Figure 1  Boxplot showing median, interquartile range (blue shading), and top and bottom 25% of ratings 
(with outliers at the upper end of the music condition) of connectedness according to interaction mode. 
Participants in the music condition rated connectedness to their interaction group significantly higher 
than those in the non-music condition. 
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Similarly, an ANOVA with mode, goal sharing, and their interaction as predictors was significant: F(3) 
= 3.843, p = .020, power = .762, with mode and mode*sharing as significant components. Memory 
scores were significantly higher following the visual than after the music task – F(1) = 4.392, p = .045; 
and there was a significant interaction – F(1) = 6.863, p = .014; observed power .525 and .715 
respectively (see Figure 2 below). 
 
  
Figure 2  Interaction graph showing estimated marginal means and 95% confidence intervals (error 
bars). There is a significant main effect of interaction mode, and significant interaction between mode 
and goal sharing, on the total memory score.  
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Perceived closeness: IOS ratings 
A 2-tailed Kruskal-Wallis test showed a significant difference in IOS scores depending on goal 
condition: H(2) = 7.352, p = .025. Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni-corrected) revealed that IOS 
scores were higher when no-goal, compared with the non-shared goal condition - H = 12.594, p = 
.028, Cohen’s d = 1.251, r = .530 (and marginally significant between the no-goal and the shared goal 
conditions - H = 11.156, p = .064) - but with no significant difference as a result of sharing or not 
sharing the goal (see Figure 3 below). 
 
  
Figure 3  Boxplot showing median, interquartile range (blue shading), and top and bottom 25% of 
ratings of IOS ratings following different goal conditions. Ratings were significantly higher after the no-
goal condition than the non-shared goal condition. 
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Perception of being ‘on the same team’ 
A 2-tailed Kruskal-Wallis test showed a significant difference in ratings of same team perception 
depending on goal condition: H(2) = 6.770, p = .034. In this case, there were no significant pairwise 
comparisons after Bonferroni corrections. There was a trend towards higher ratings of team 
membership when participants shared than when they did not share a goal114  and when they had no 
goal, compared to non-shared goal (see Figure 4 below). 
 
 
 
Correlations between outcome measures 
The following tables show Spearman’s rho correlations for the dependent measures highlighted in 
the above analyses. Connectedness was related to other bonding measures, and also general indices 
of trust (especially IOS and confidence - Table 12). 
 
 
 
114 This was the pairwise comparison nearest to significance - H = 10.469, p = .074. 
Figure 4  Boxplot with median, interquartile range (blue shading), and top and bottom 25% of ratings, 
showing  effect of goal condition on the perception of being on the same team 
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 IOS Entitativity 
(interaction) 
Team 
perception 
Reliance Confidence General 
trust 
No. social 
words 
Connected-
ness 
.581 
(p<.001) 
.334  
(p=.040) 
.451 
(p=.003) 
.468 
(p=.002) 
.546 
(p<.001) 
.389 
(p=.013) 
.374 
(p=.017) 
 
 
Connectedness did not correlate significantly with specific in-group trust preference, memory scores, 
interaction difficulty, performance, successfulness, or the other entitativity measures 
(similarity/entitativity).  
IOS scores are related to several of the same measures as connectedness (including confidence and 
same team perception - Table 13). Perception of being on the same team also correlates with many 
of the same rating scales (Table 14). 
 
 Entitativity Entitativity 
(interaction) 
Team perception Reliance Confidence 
IOS .520 (p=.001) .436 (p=.006) .510 (p=.001) .316 (p=.047) .546 (p<.001) 
 
 
 
 IOS Success-
fulness 
Entitat-
ivity 
Entitativity 
(interaction) 
Reliance Perfor-
mance 
Confid-
ence 
General 
trust 
Same 
team 
perception 
.510 
(p=.001) 
.436 
(p=.005) 
.406 
(p=.009) 
.493  
(p=.002) 
.468 
(p=.002) 
.457 
(p=.003) 
.492 
(p=.001) 
.385 
(p=.014) 
 
 
Memory scores did not correlate with any other measure. Moreover, specific in-group trust 
preference scores correlated weakly with two components of the entitativity scale - similarity (rho = -
.330, p = .04) and interaction (rho = .350, p = .034) - but with no other ratings (not even the general 
rating of trustworthiness).  
There were no significant correlations between any of these scores and prior knowledge of 
participants in either the interaction group or the trust comparison out-group. 
 
Table 12  Significant non-parametric correlations with connectedness  
Table 13  Significant non-parametric correlations with IOS scores 
Table 14  Significant non-parametric correlations with same team perception 
Note: each box shows rho (p-value). 
Note: each box shows rho (p-value). 
Note: each box shows rho (p-value). 
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Changes in mood 
The change in positive and negative PANAS scores pre- and post-interaction task was calculated. 
Ordinal logistic regression using mode, goal condition and task type as predictors was not significant 
for any change in negative mood. However, this model did significantly predict change in positive 
mood (Chi square = 9.594, df 4, p = .048, r2 = .213 or .215) with goal condition (between no-goal and 
non-shared) as the significant component (Wald = 7.558, df 1, p = .006). This is also shown in Kruskal-
Wallis independent-samples test: H(2) = 6.337, p = .042. No individual pairwise comparisons were 
significant after Bonferroni corrections, but there were trends towards a larger decrease in positive 
mood for no-goal compared to non-shared goal condition (H = -11.719, p = .060), and for no-goal 
compared to shared goal (H = -11.406, p = .070); there seemed to be no net change in positive mood 
for the shared/non-shared goal conditions. 
Sex differences 
Kruskal-Wallis independent-samples comparisons were run for all dependent measures according to 
sex. No differences were found except for ratings of difficulty of the task (higher ratings for male 
than female: H(1) = 4.495, p = .034), confidence in others (higher for female than male: H(1) = 7.212, 
p = .007), and for general trust (higher for female than male: H(1) = 6.537, p = .011). When included 
as a covariate in ordinal regression models (with mode, goal condition and task as predictors), sex did 
not have any effect.  
Experience of the group interaction task - free responses 
Comments by participants in the musical, shared-goal groups were largely to report a ‘good 
experience’, they ‘worked well together’, it being ‘enjoyable’ and ‘fun’, feeling ‘comfortable’ with lots 
of ‘laughter’. Similarly, in the musical, non-shared groups, they reported lots of ‘laughter’, while 
‘sharing similar feelings’ and ‘communicating’, with it being a bit more ‘confusing’. 
The non-musical, shared-goal groups emphasised the role of ‘non-verbal communication’ and 
‘comedy’, ‘working well together’, completing the task easily and ‘quickly’, ‘from instinct’, but ‘didn’t 
find it enjoyable’ in the same way as the music participants seemed to. Not sharing a goal had a 
bigger impact on the visual task: they noted that they didn’t work well, it was ‘confusing’ as they 
‘worked against each other’, with ‘saboteurs’ in the group; they commented that the experience was 
‘very awkward’ and confusing until they realised they had different goals. These responses reveal 
that the effect of sharing or not sharing a goal was more important in the visual than in the music 
task. 
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The musical, no-goal groups reported an experience similar to the other music groups: ‘quite 
amusing’, with laughter, while not working very well together as they had no goal to focus on. 
However, they still seemed to bond as a group: becoming ‘less shy’ as the task progressed. 
Summary of results 
Table 15 gives a summary of the main quantitative findings from my statistical analysis. The free 
responses corroborated the effect of mode on enjoyment and sense of bonding, with more reported 
fun/laughter etc. in the music condition, regardless of goal condition. 
 
Dependent measure Mode condition comparison Goal condition comparison 
Connectedness Music > visual **  
Memory scores Visual > music ** Mode*goal sharing ** 
visual – shared > non-shared 
music – non-shared > shared 
IOS ratings  No goal > non-shared ** 
No goal > shared goal 
Same team perception  Shared > non-shared 
No goal > non-shared 
Decrease in positive mood  No goal > shared 
No goal > non-shared 
 
 
Discussion 
In this experiment, I manipulated interaction mode (music vs. visual) and goal conditions (shared vs. 
non-shared vs. no goal) and measured how far each of these affected group formation, using a 
variety of indices of bonding. In line with hypothesis (a), there was a clear effect of mode, with higher 
ratings of connectedness to other group members following the music interaction task, in 
comparison with the non-music, visual condition. Connectedness was correlated with other items 
pertaining to general bonding with the group, including closeness scores (IOS), reliance on and 
confidence in the others, general trustworthiness and the interaction pictorial scale (the predictor for 
dynamic entitativity - see Rutchick et al., 2008). Connectedness ratings have previously been found 
to increase following synchronous walking (Wiltermuth and Heath, 2009 - study 1); here, this 
measure is applied to a context of group music-making, providing an indication of group formation or 
bonding as a result.  
Note: asterisks (**) indicate statistical significance. 
Table 15  Summary of data analysis 
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This effect of mode on connectedness did not seem to be as a result of increased attentiveness 
towards others; the memory scores show that the opposite is the case i.e. higher memory recall for 
others under the visual than the musical condition. These findings contrast with the results of 
attentiveness and memory conducted in dyads (e.g. Woolhouse et al., 2016). It might be the case 
that, in the context of group musical interaction, attention is not directed towards specific others, 
but is a more general awareness of the collective (compare the idea of a central ‘ear’ of a quartet, 
operationalised in Glowinski et al., 2013). The effect of mode on connectedness also does not seem 
to be related to any increase in positive mood as a result of the musical interaction task, measured 
using self-report PANAS pre-/post-interaction ratings. This contrasts with previous work linking 
collective effervescence or arousal to group bonding (see work on emotion contagion work by Spoor 
& Kelly, 2002, and Barsade, 2002; however, they use video coding of emotional behaviour as well as 
the PANAS).  
Neither hypotheses (b) nor (c) were supported by this experiment. There were no effects of the goal 
conditions on connectedness ratings, nor on any of the main bonding measures. In fact, the IOS 
scores indicated that the highest ratings of self-group overlap (or closeness) occurred following the 
musical, no-goal condition, with no apparent difference between shared and non-shared goal 
conditions for either modality. The ratings of ‘same team’ perception showed a marginally significant 
effect of goal conditions, with a trend towards higher ratings following shared than non-shared goal, 
but no pairwise comparisons were significant. There were also no effects of these conditions on 
mood, apart from a trend towards a decrease in positive mood following the no-goal condition. 
Limitations 
The main limitations of this experiment concerned the sensitivity of the measures we used. There 
was no effect of the presence of shared (or any) goals with the self-report, quantitative measures; 
however, the free responses (see above) indicate something that might not have been detected in 
these ratings. A more subtle effect might have been revealed through closer analysis of the nature of 
the interaction itself - for example, measuring moment-by-moment alignment in video analysis.115 
This has been studied in conversational contexts, with different degrees of multimodal alignment 
depending on whether partners agree or conflict on certain issues (Paxton & Dale, 2013). 
Similarly, music-making might have had an effect on mood if we used more sensitive (but time-
consuming) measures. Other studies showing the emotional or affective significance of music 
listening or performance use indirect methods such as pain threshold (as a proxy for endorphin levels 
 
115 See an example of this measurement in my video analysis (reported later), where I analyse the effect of 
presence or absence of an interaction goal. I could use a similar methodology in future research to compare 
interaction involving shared or non-shared goals. 
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- see Dunbar et al., 2012), or activation of reward centres in the brain (e.g. Blood & Zatorre, 2001). 
These might tap into more general reward or arousal processes, rather than sensations which can be 
self-reported more explicitly (as in the PANAS measure we used here).  
Our interpretations about participants’ attention might not be reliable, given a couple of problems 
with the accuracy of the memory scores.116 First, higher memory scores under the non-music 
condition could have been due to more focus on group members’ hands during the visual activity 
(which involved moving shapes on a table), leading to more accurate recall of wristbands. Second, 
the other interpersonal memory items were problematic: it is difficult to assess what counts as 
blonde hair, and pictures of group members had been displayed already in the trust measure (so 
participants might not have been completing these questions from memory of the interaction, but 
rather from earlier in the questionnaire; see footnote 102, p. 161). 
There are a number of possible reasons for the lack of any effect (of either mode or goal condition) 
on the specific in-group trust measure. The forced-choice task involved choosing between specific 
individuals; however, any sense of group formation might have been related to more of a collective 
focus, a more general bonding to the group as a whole (see suggestion above). Moreover, trust might 
be an inappropriate outcome for this reason: deciding whether or not to trust someone relies on 
knowledge and perception of another individual, rather than any affiliation to a group.117 Alternative 
explanations include reputation effects - choosing between specific others is a potentially costly task; 
subsequent investigation of this might emphasise more the anonymity of responses. 
Finally, the free responses highlighted a greater incidence of general group laughter in the musical 
compared to the visual condition; this behaviour might have contributed to social bonding (see 
Gervais & Wilson, 2005). A follow-up experiment (see Appendix 2) was conducted to ensure that the 
effect of mode on connectedness was not just as a result of the humorous nature of the musical task.  
Experiment 2 - music in team formation 
This experiment is an investigation of how team affiliation might be affected by properties of the 
interaction. In particular, I tested the efficacy of musical goals in contributing to team identity (or 
affiliation on the basis of team membership). I compared two goal types, corresponding to two team 
names, with a no-goal condition. I hypothesised higher levels of in-group preference (on the basis of 
team membership) following musical interaction with a goal than a no-goal task. 
 
116 Moreover, the main effect of mode emerged only in the more powerful parametric test, treating the 
memory scores as interval data. 
117 Group membership can contribute to person perception in this way, but probably not in the short time-span 
involved in this experiment. 
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Method 
Participants 
A total of 20 undergraduate students (16 male and 4 female) took part in this experiment. All 
participants had a high level of musical training (they were recruited through the music faculty). They 
were aged 17-26 years (mean 18.7).118 They all gave informed consent to take part in the experiment, 
which was reviewed by the Faculty of Music Research Ethics committee. 
Design 
This comprised a between-groups one-way design, varying the interaction goal (goal or no-goal). Ten 
participants were assigned to the no-goal condition; they were split into two teams (elephant and 
bird), but then interacted in a no-goal music task. Another ten participants were assigned to the goal 
condition; they were also split into the elephant and the bird team, but then interacted with the goal 
to depict a herd of elephants or a flock of birds (corresponding to their team identity).  The 
distribution of these goal conditions is shown in Table 16 below.  
 
Team identity (badge) Interaction goal No. participants 
Elephant No goal 5 
Bird 5 
Elephant Elephant 5 
Bird Bird 5 
 
All participants in the no-goal condition were male; interaction conditions with a goal (bird or 
elephant) comprised mixed-sex groups.119 All interaction groups comprised members of both teams 
(see Table 17).   
 
 
 
 
 
118 Although all participants were undergraduates, one was slightly younger (aged 17 years). They gave their 
informed consent in the same way as all the other participants. 
119 This difference in sex composition was a potential confound - any differences caused as a result of goal 
presence might have been attributable to sex differences. However, as there were no significant effects of sex 
in experiment 1, this was not likely to be problematic. 
Table 16  Number of participants assigned to each team, and to each interaction goal condition 
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Interaction group Interaction goal Team affiliations No. participants 
1 No goal Elephant 2 
Bird 3 
2 No goal Elephant 3 
Bird 2 
3 Elephant Elephant 2 
Bird Bird 3 
4 Elephant Elephant 3 
Bird Bird 2 
 
 
 
This experiment had two dependent variables - group bonding (within the interaction group i.e. 
mixed teams) and team identification (preference for team members, both from within and outside 
the interaction group). These were administered via a post-interaction questionnaire. Group bonding 
measures included ratings of connectedness for members of the interaction group (especially other-
team members), ratings of interaction success and entitativity. Team identification measures 
included specific trust preference, the difference in connectedness (between ratings for own-team 
versus other-team members), and an IOS scale of overlap with the team as a whole (see Appendix 
1.2 for full details of measures used). The short form of the PANAS mood questionnaire was 
administered pre- and post- interaction task (Kercher, 1992; reviewed by Mackinnon et al., 1999). 
Participants were also asked to rate (and detail, if necessary) how much they knew other members of 
their own and the other team prior to the experiment (7-point scales). 
Procedure and apparatus 
Photographs for the trust questionnaire had been taken, with consent, the previous day. Participants 
were tested in groups of ten - one session for the goal condition, and the other the no-goal 
condition.  
1) Minimal team formation 
Participants were first divided into two separate teams (five participants in the bird team, and five in 
the elephant team). These teams were sat separately (in two circles, both teams in the same room). 
Note: there were two groups in the no-goal session (comprising members of both teams). There were two 
groups with a goal condition; participants in each group had goals corresponding to their team identity (thus 
each group involved non-shared goals).  
Table 17  Tasks assigned to each interaction group 
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Participants were each given a badge to signify their bird or elephant team identity with the team 
symbol (see Figure 5 below). 
                 
 
Here, they signed the consent form, completed the pre-task PANAS and then read their individual 
instructions. Participants were told that they were part of ‘an improvisation competition at the music 
faculty’; each of them was a member of one of two teams in this competition. 
2) Interaction conditions 
Participants were instructed to move to one of two locations in the room, where they were each 
given a kazoo and told to:  
interact with each other, and improvise together, using only these kazoos.   
They were asked to complete the task without talking to one another, interacting and improvising 
only within (and not between) their assigned group.  
Participants in the no-goal condition were given no additional instructions. Those in the goal 
condition given a depiction task, corresponding to their team identity: 
interact with each other...to perform music inspired by a herd of elephants/a flock of birds 
Each interaction group involved members of both teams (see above) therefore the groups with a goal 
condition had non-shared interaction goals. All groups interacted for 10 minutes. 
Participants were told that they could earn points for their own team, being ‘assessed on how well 
you listen and co-ordinate with the others.’ Video cameras were set up for each group to reinforce 
the sense of competition. 
After this task, participants were seated individually to complete the questionnaire. After this, they 
were led to a separate area to be debriefed about the design and purpose of the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 5  Elephant and bird team symbols 
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Data analysis 
Goal was the main predictor variable. Comparisons were run between goal and no-goal conditions; 
also the goal conditions were separated to form three levels - the bird goal, elephant goal, and the 
no-goal condition.  
Items on the questionnaire measured either team formation (bonding to individuals on the basis of 
shared team membership, from within or outside the interaction group) or group formation (bonding 
to individuals within the interaction group regardless of team membership). Trust scores were 
formed by totalling the number of own-team choices for all scenarios (for familiar team members 
from the interaction task, for unfamiliar team members, and a combined score). Connectedness 
ratings comprised three different scores: towards own-team members, other-team members, and 
the difference (how much more connected participants felt towards own-team members within their 
interaction group).  
Kruskal-Wallis independent-samples non-parametric tests were run on all dependent measures. All 
post-hoc tests include Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons. Non-parametric correlations 
were run to test the relationship between team-focussed (e.g. IOS) and group-focussed (e.g. group 
success) items.  
Results 
Baseline differences 
1) Prior knowledge of others 
Kruskal-Wallis comparisons for prior knowledge of other participants (own-team and other-team 
members) were run. These revealed significant differences between goal conditions. The difference 
in prior knowledge of own-team members was significant: H(2) = 6.984, p = .030; participants in the 
bird goal condition knew their own team better than those in the no-goal condition (H = -7.650, p = 
.036). There were also significant differences in prior knowledge of other-team members: H(2) = 
8.933, p = .011; again, those in the bird goal condition gave higher ratings than those in the no-goal 
condition (H = -8.350, p = .010). 
One participant (in the bird goal condition) reported much higher ratings of prior knowledge for 
members of their own and other-team members. Kruskal-Wallis comparisons were re-run, excluding 
this participant. There was still a significant difference in prior knowledge of members of the other 
team: H(2) = 7.286, p = .026 (again, higher ratings in bird goal than no-goal condition: H = -7.275, p = 
.032). However, there was no longer a significant difference between the goal conditions for prior 
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knowledge of members of participants’ own team.120 The following statistics reported were run on 
this smaller dataset (n = 19). 
2) PANAS mood scores 
Kruskal-Wallis comparisons showed no difference between the groups according to goal type for 
baseline positive and negative mood, measured by the PANAS.  Moreover, there was no effect of 
goal type on changes in negative or in positive mood pre- and post-interaction task. 
3) Sex differences 
As noted earlier, there were 10 male participants in the no-goal condition, and a mix in the goal 
conditions (2 female, 2 male in bird condition, and 2 female, 3 male in elephant condition). 
Therefore, there were baseline differences between these conditions. 
Ratings of connectedness (towards others within interaction group) 
1) Towards own-team members 
Kruskal-Wallis independent-samples comparisons showed no significant effect of goal presence, or 
goal type, on ratings of connectedness with participants’ own team members. 
2) Towards other-team members 
However, there was a significant effect of goal presence on connectedness towards members of the 
other team: there were higher ratings following the no-goal than the goal conditions: H(1) = 9.444, p 
= .002, Cohen’s d = 1.961, r = .700.121  
 
 
120 This rating, and not the prior knowledge of members of the other team, might confound the team 
identification results if significant. On the contrary, if there is a higher rating of prior knowledge of members of 
the other team, this is actually likely to act in the opposite direction i.e. to reduce any potential own-team 
preference (unless, of course, their previous encounter with the out-group was a very negative experience). 
121 Observed power = .975 
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Separating goals into bird and elephant depiction tasks, there was again a significant effect of goal 
type: H(2) = 9.506, p = .009. In particular, this was higher following the no-goal than the elephant 
goal (H = 8.000, p = .020) and nearing significance when compared to the bird goal (H = 7.100, p = 
.077) (see Figure 6 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6  Boxplot (with median, interquartile range - blue shading - and top and bottom 25% of ratings) 
showing effect of interaction goal on connectedness towards members of the other team. Ratings of 
connectedness were significantly higher following the no-goal than the goal conditions (specifically, the 
elephant depiction task) 
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3) Towards own-team members more (difference between own and other-team ratings) 
A Kruskal-Wallis test revealed that participants felt significantly more connected to their own-team 
members (than the other-team members, all within the interaction group) following the goal 
conditions than the no-goal condition: H(1) = 5.507, p = .019, Cohen’s d = .737, r  = .346.122  Again, 
splitting up the goal condition revealed a significant main effect of goal type: H(2) = 7.683, p = .021. 
There was a larger difference in the bird condition than in the no-goal condition (H = -8.925, p = .018) 
(see Figure 7). 
 
 
 
In line with this, there were marginally significant effects of sex. Specifically, there were higher 
ratings of connectedness towards other-team members amongst male than female participants (H = 
3.946, p = .047) and towards own-team members amongst female than male members (nearing 
significance: H = 3.804, p = .051). This corresponds with the sex imbalance between the goal and no-
goal conditions (see above). 
  
 
122 Observed power = .314 
Figure 7  Boxplot showing effect of interaction goal on how much more connected participants felt towards 
members of their own team than members of the other team (within their interaction group). This is 
significantly higher following the bird task than the no-goal interaction (plot shows median, interquartile 
range, and top and bottom 25% of ratings). 
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IOS ratings (towards the team as a whole) 
Kruskal-Wallis comparisons revealed a significant effect of goal type on IOS ratings towards their 
team identity: H(2) = 6.788, p = .034. As above, post-hoc comparisons showed a significantly higher 
team IOS following the bird goal compared to no-goal condition (H = -8.300, p=.031, Cohen’s d = 
1.933, r = .695) (see Figure 8). There were no effects of sex on IOS scores.  
 
 
  
Figure 8  Boxplot showing effect of interaction goal on rating of IOS towards team as a whole. 
Participants rated closeness to team (IOS) significantly higher following the bird goal condition than the 
no-goal task (plot shows median, interquartile range, top and bottom 25% of ratings, and outliers).  
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Group success 
There was a marginal effect of goal type on success shown in a Kruskal-Wallis test: H(2) = 5.270, p = 
.072. This indicated a trend for higher success ratings in the bird than the elephant condition (but 
those in the no-goal condition spanned the whole range of scores) (see Figure 9). 
 
 
 
 
Ratings of group interaction success were correlated with ratings of connectedness towards own-
team members: Spearman’s rho = .648, p = .003 (see Figure 10 below).123 Group success was also 
correlated with the pictorial scale of entitativity (rho = .502, p = .029), and with the baseline measure 
of positive mood (rho = .509, p = .031), but with no other measure. 
 
 
123 This correlation was found only for connectedness to own-team members, not other-team members, or the 
difference. 
Figure 9  Boxplot showing effect of interaction goal on ratings of group interaction success (plot shows 
median, interquartile range, and top and bottom 25% of ratings). 
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Other ratings 
Kruskal-Wallis comparisons revealed no effect of goal type on the specific trust questionnaire 
(whether just familiar or unfamiliar individuals, or for the combined score). There were also no 
effects of goal type on any of the pictorial entitativity measures. 
Baseline positive mood correlated with trust towards unfamiliar others (rho = .631, p = .005), the 
total trust score (rho = .595, p = .009), as well as with group success ratings (see above). 
As in experiment 1, ratings of connectedness124 were correlated with general trust (towards 
unfamiliar others) and closeness to the team (see Table 18). 
 
Measure Specific trust (unfamiliar 
others on same team) 
IOS (towards team as a whole) 
Connectedness (to own-team 
members) 
.503 
(p = .028) 
.484 
(p = .036) 
 
 
 
124 Again, this refers to the ratings for own-team members (not connectedness to other-team members, or the 
difference). 
Figure 10  Significant non-parametric correlation between connectedness towards own-team 
members (who were also members of the interaction group) and ratings of group interaction success. 
Table 18  Non-parametric correlations between own-team connectedness, trust and IOS ratings 
Note: each box shows rho (p-value). 
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Experience of the group interaction task - free responses 
Participants in the no-goal condition largely seemed to focus on the group interaction and 
communication between group members; a few commented that they didn’t notice the team 
differentiation, but interacted equally. 
Participants in the goal conditions focussed less on group communication, but instead highlighted 
the difficulty of the task (especially participants given the elephant goal condition). 
Responses from some participants (across goal conditions) did not make a clear distinction between 
group and team identities, using ‘teamwork’ to describe the group interaction. 
Summary of results 
Table 19 provides a summary of the results of experiment 2. 
 
Dependent measure Goal condition comparison Goal type comparison 
Connectedness (other-team) No goal > goal ** No goal > elephant ** 
No goal > bird 
Connectedness (own-team more) Goal > no goal ** Bird > no goal ** 
IOS  Bird > no goal ** 
Success  Bird > elephant 
 
 
Discussion 
In this experiment, I distinguished between group bonding and team identification. The latter was 
established by perceptual differences in bird and elephant identities (using badges). I then measured 
the effect of having an interaction goal - comparing the bird and elephant depiction conditions with a 
no-goal music-making task. The group interaction tasks (in all conditions) deliberately crossed teams, 
forming a group membership that was somewhat distinct from team identity.  
In line with the hypothesis, participants with an interaction goal that corresponded to their team 
membership felt more connected to other members of their own team than those on the other team 
(within their interaction group), compared to participants without such a goal. This effect was carried 
by those who had the bird goal task (ratings of connectedness following the elephant goal lay in 
between those from the bird and no-goal conditions). Similarly, those in the bird goal condition felt 
more self-other overlap with the wider team membership (higher IOS scores) than participants in the 
Table 19  Summary of data analysis 
Note: asterisks (**) indicate statistical significance. The relative difficulty of the elephant condition was 
corroborated by the free responses. 
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no-goal task (again, the elephant scores lay somewhere in between). Therefore, an interaction goal - 
an external form of common ground, an element of a more extrinsically-oriented encounter - 
supports team identification i.e. affiliation with on the basis of team membership, which can go 
beyond the face-to-face group context. 
However, this effect was only shown by participants in the bird goal condition, not those with the 
elephant goal. This might be related to the trend towards higher perceived success for the bird goal, 
and the difficulty of the elephant goal task as reported via the free responses: only the goal which 
the participants felt was more successful contributed to team identity. In line with this, ratings of the 
group interaction success were correlated with one index of team affiliation. These findings provide 
evidence for the direct role of interpersonal interaction on the formation of team-based affiliation. In 
particular, the correlation between team identity and perceived group success aligns with the idea 
(part of Social Identity Theory) that our self-esteem is tied to our social (as well as personal) 
identities.  
On the other hand, participants who interacted in a no-goal, music-making task felt significantly 
more connected to members of the opposing team (in their interaction group) than participants who 
had an interaction goal which corresponded to their team identity. This highlights the potential for 
music-making (especially of a more intrinsic orientation - emphasising its phatic, relational attributes) 
to provide a context for social bonding which overrides team (or other category) divides (replicating 
e.g. Gaertner et al., 1993: see Shifting Goals section, Chapter 3, on processes of de- and re-
categorisation).  
Again, a sense of connectedness was correlated with more general social affiliation - in this case, 
trust towards unfamiliar individuals, and sense of overlap with team identity as a whole; this is 
similar to the correlations found in experiment 1 between connectedness and general 
trustworthiness. Thus, connectedness seems to be an important index of relationships, but one that 
is not directed towards specific individuals on the basis of knowledge or prior experience of that 
person. Rather, it seems to be related to general affiliation towards the group or team membership 
as a whole. 
Limitations  
One limitation of the present experiment is the gender imbalance between the goal and the no-goal 
conditions, which might confound the effect on connectedness. However, this is not likely to be 
problematic, given previous findings. In general, male participants are likely to have a stronger in-
group preference (see e.g. Van Vugt et al., 2007). However, here, male participants rated higher 
connectedness towards other-team members than did female participants, whereas female 
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participants rated higher bonding for the own-team members. This is more likely to be an effect of 
the goal conditions. Moreover, differences between the effects of the two depiction goals would not 
be confounded by sex (as both of these goal conditions had a gender mix). 
Prior knowledge of other participants might also limit the validity of these findings. This should not 
affect the results too dramatically: the participant with the highest ratings was removed from the 
dataset, leaving only a significant difference in prior knowledge of other-team members. However, 
the experiment should be replicated, with a larger sample, to ensure that this did not confound 
findings relating to team affiliation. 
Finally, the participants might have experienced some confusion regarding the group/team 
distinction within the experimental design - some of the free responses conflate the terms ‘group’ 
and ‘team’. However, this is not likely to be important for the present findings. Often, the 
connectedness ratings were calculated as an explicit comparison between those who shared and did 
not share team membership (within the interaction groups); the IOS scores were also clearly 
associated with the team symbol (and the use of the terms ‘group’ and ‘team’ might have been used 
loosely in the free responses).  
Experiment 3 - music in team identity 
This experiment built upon previous findings to investigate further whether different attributes of 
the musical interaction - presence of a depiction goal, and perceived interaction success - contribute 
selectively to interpersonal bonding or a sense of team identity. Based on earlier results, I 
hypothesised the following:  
(a) Higher interpersonal bonding following the no-goal (when the interaction is more 
intrinsically-focussed, privileging the phatic) than the goal conditions (where participants are 
focussed on an external depiction goal)  
(b) Higher team identification (higher recall of team-related words) following interaction with a 
team-related goal that was found to be more successful, in comparison with a less successful 
goal (or a no-goal task) i.e. higher following the bird goal than after the elephant or no-goal 
conditions.  
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Method 
Participants 
A total of 36 participants took part in the experiment.125 They were aged between 17 and 25 years 
(mean = 20.89).126 There was a mixture of male and female participants in each condition (7 female 
in the bird goal, 8 in elephant, and 9 in no-goal condition). Participants interacted in same- or mixed-
sex pairs (bird goal: 2 female, 1 male, 3 mixed; elephant goal: 2 female, 4 mixed; no-goal: 3 female, 3 
mixed). They were recruited from across the University. They all gave informed consent to take part 
in the experiment, which was reviewed by the Faculty of Music Research Ethics committee. 
Design 
This experiment comprised a between-groups design, varying interaction goal: no goal, bird goal 
(easy goal) and elephant goal (more difficult goal). Where participants were assigned to a goal 
condition, these corresponded to their team identity (see Table 20).  
 
Team identity Interaction goal No. participants 
Elephant 
No goal 
6 
Bird 6 
Elephant Elephant 12 
Bird Bird 12 
 
There were two dependent variables: team identification (measured using both implicit and explicit 
indices) and bonding with interaction partner (self-reported affiliation; partners shared team 
membership).  
Procedure 
1) Minimal team formation 
Participants were tested in groups of 4. They were first split into two teams (2 in the “bird” team, and 
2 in the “elephant” team). The experiment was introduced as a competition between these teams; 
they were told that they were going to do a couple of activities to earn points for their team. They 
were asked to put on a badge, showing their team symbol. This was similar to the ‘minimal’ team 
 
125 This was based on a pilot study. A priori calculations predicted power = .95 for n = 36. 
126 As in experiment 2, all were students at the University. 
Table 20  Team identity and interaction goal assigned to participants 
Note: n = 12 in each goal condition. 
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formation phase conducted by e.g. Good et al. (2017) and Tunçgenç & Cohen (2016). Participants 
were never in a group where there was a gender divide between teams. 
2) Interaction conditions 
Participants first completed an interaction task, supposedly to earn points for their team (video 
cameras were set up - not recording - to reinforce this). This task was completed with their partner 
(who shared the same team identity). Both pairs of participants completed this task simultaneously, 
in neighbouring rooms (the rooms were counterbalanced across conditions). They could not see the 
other pair, but they could hear what they were doing.  
All participants were each given a simple musical instrument (a kazoo) and told that they could 
interact with their partner using only this kazoo (without talking or otherwise communicating). It was 
expected, from pilot experiments, that the bird condition would be easier than the elephant 
condition. Participants engaged in the interaction task for five minutes. 
Easy goal condition – participants allocated to the bird condition were given the following task: 
make music inspired by a flock of birds, using only the kazoos. Improvise together, listening and 
co-ordinating with each other. In your joint improvisation, you could allude to e.g. a variety of 
bird calls, their manner and/or speed of movement, interaction with potential mates, wings 
flapping and their protection of territory, amongst other things. 
Hard goal condition – participants allocated to the elephant condition were given the following task: 
make music inspired by a herd of elephants, using only the kazoos. Improvise together, listening 
and co-ordinating with each other. In your joint improvisation, you could allude to e.g. 
trumpeting sounds, their manner and/or speed of walking, interactions with their calves, ears 
flapping, and the sound of drinking/spraying water, amongst other things. 
No-goal condition – participants allocated to the no-goal condition (half in the bird team, and the 
other half in the elephant team) were given the following task: 
make music, using only the kazoos. Improvise together, listening and co-ordinating with each 
other. 
3) Implicit measure of team identification 
Immediately after completing the interaction task, each participant was seated individually and given 
a word recall task (again allegedly to earn points for their team). Participants were presented with a 
written list of 22 words. Half were related to elephants (bull, herd, tusk, calf, trunk, ivory, mammal, 
leather, trumpet, mammoth and stampede) and half to birds (beak, eggs, wing, song, flock, chick, 
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aviary, feather, plumage, nesting and migratory). These were presented alternately, and in 
counterbalanced order; the bird and elephant lists were matched as far as possible in word length 
and familiarity. Participants were given 20 seconds to study the words, and then two minutes for 
free, written recall.  
4) Explicit self-report measures 
Participants were then asked to complete a questionnaire.  This contained measures of team 
identification (IOS towards team as a whole, reward allocation to unfamiliar individuals associated 
with the team) and interpersonal bonding (trust, connectedness, similarity and likeability) towards 
their partner. Participants were asked to rate their need to belong (using the single-item test – see 
Nichols & Webster, 2013). They were also asked about their perceived performance on the task 
(difficulty ratings, and how well they think they performed individually), how successful they thought 
they and their partner were at the interaction task, and how embarrassed they felt. (See Appendix 
1.3 for full details.) The short form of the PANAS mood questionnaire was administered pre- and 
post-interaction task (Kercher, 1992; reviewed by Mackinnon et al., 1999). Participants were also 
asked to rate (and detail, if necessary) how much they knew their team partner prior to the study (7-
point scale), and whether they recognised any individuals pictured in the reward allocation task. They 
were asked to specify how many years of musical training they have had in the past, whether they 
are practising musicians of any sort now, and - if so - how regularly (on a 5-point scale: monthly, 
fortnightly, weekly, more than once a week, every day). After they completed this questionnaire, 
participants were thanked, debriefed and paid for their participation. 
Data analysis 
To test the effect of interaction goal on partner affiliation, independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis 
comparisons were run on the self-report affiliation ratings (ordinal data including connectedness, 
IOS, trust, likeability) according to interaction condition (no-goal, elephant goal, bird goal).  
Before investigating the effect of perceived interaction success, Kruskal-Wallis comparisons were first 
run as a manipulation check, to test whether the bird and elephant goal conditions varied 
systematically in difficulty (using ratings of interaction success, difficulty, performance, and 
embarrassment). However, there were no significant differences according to interaction goal. 
Therefore, the effect of perceived interaction success on implicit team affiliation was tested across all 
goal conditions using linear regression (or ordinal regression for the IOS scores). Word recall was 
measured as a percentage of own-team related words out of total recall (including some words that 
were remembered correctly but with minor mistakes e.g. wrongly pluralised, ‘sing’ instead of ‘song’). 
Own-team reward allocations were totalled and calculated as a percentage of total reward (excluding 
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any comparisons where participants claimed to recognise individuals in the photographs). 
Correlational analyses were run on the dependent measures to test the distinction between 
affiliation-related and team-related ratings. 
Results 
Baseline measures 
Kruskal-Wallis comparisons were run to check whether there was any difference in baseline 
measures across interaction conditions. There was no difference in Need to Belong, the number of 
years of musical training, the frequency of musical activities, or in prior negative mood. However, 
there was a significant difference in positive mood (from the PANAS self-report test prior to 
interaction): H(2) = 8.123, p = .017; pairwise comparisons no goal > bird goal condition (H = 11.167, p 
= .027). 
Kruskal-Wallis comparisons were run after excluding four participants (two with the lowest mood in 
the bird goal condition, and two with the highest mood in the no-goal condition). There was no 
longer a significant difference in baseline positive mood according to interaction condition. The rest 
of this analysis was run using this smaller dataset (n = 32). 
Effect of interaction condition 
Partner affiliation and trust 
Kruskal-Wallis comparisons according to interaction condition (bird goal, elephant goal and no goal) 
showed significant effects on ratings of partner trustworthiness, connectedness, and similarity to 
partner. The statistics are reported in Table 21 (all pairwise comparisons are Bonferroni corrected). 
There were no effects on reliance, likeability or confidence in partner. (See Figures 11-13 below.) 
 
 
Measure Main effect Pairwise comparison Effect size 
Trustworthiness H(2) = 7.055 
p = .029 
No goal > Bird goal H = 10.350 
p = .024 
Cohen’s d = 1.157 
r = .501 
Connectedness H(2) = 7.970 
p = .019 
No goal > Bird goal H = 10.750 
p = .023 
Cohen’s d = 1.200 
r = .515 
Similarity H(2) = 6.273 
p = .043 
Elephant > Bird goal H = 9.717 
p = .038 
Cohen’s d = 1.325 
r = .552 
Table 21  Significant main effects, pairwise comparisons, and effect sizes of goal type on measures 
of partner affiliation 
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Figure 11  Boxplot showing effect of interaction goal on ratings of connectedness towards interaction partner. 
Ratings were significantly higher following the no-goal than the bird goal condition (plot shows median, 
interquartile range, and top and bottom 25% of ratings). 
Figure 12  Boxplot showing effect of interaction goal on ratings of partner trustworthiness. Ratings were 
significantly higher following the no-goal than the bird goal condition (plot shows median, interquartile 
range, top and bottom 25% of ratings, and outliers). 
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Task success 
There were no effects of interaction condition on ratings of difficulty, performance or task success. 
However, there was a significant effect on ratings of embarrassment: H(2) = 6.224, p = .045. There 
were no significant pairwise effects, except a marginal contrast between the bird and no-goal 
condition - bird > no goal, H = -9.700, p = .052.  
Team identification 
There were no significant effects of interaction condition on explicit team identification (IOS ratings). 
There were also no main effects of condition on reward allocation, or on team-related word recall (% 
own-team words, including and not including small errors).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 13  Boxplot showing effect of interaction goal on ratings of similarity to partner. Ratings were 
significantly higher following the elephant goal than the bird goal condition (plot shows median, interquartile 
range, top and bottom 25% of ratings, and one outlier). 
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Predicting social identification: ratings of success 
A multiple linear regression model for own-team word recall (an implicit measure of team 
identification), using measures of interaction success as predictors (difficulty, individual performance, 
success, and embarrassment) was significant: F(4) = 3.231, p = .027, adjusted r2 = .224. The effects of 
individual predictors within this model are shown in Table 22. Ratings of individual performance are 
negatively correlated with social identification, but joint success is positively correlated (nearing 
significance as an individual predictor). Embarrassment is negatively correlated with social 
identification. 
 
Predictor Beta coefficient T P 
Individual performance -.627 -2.944 .007 
Embarrassment -.406 -2.451 .021 
Joint success .385 1.943 .063 
 
 
Using non-parametric correlations, own-team word recall is correlated only with ratings of 
embarrassment (Spearman’s rho = -.357, p = .045). In turn, embarrassment does not correlate with 
any other ratings (apart from another negative correlation with ratings of interpersonal 
connectedness: rho = -.443, p = .011). 
This linear regression model did not predict reward allocation. Moreover, linear regression using the 
above measures of partner affiliation as predictors (similarity, trustworthiness, and connectedness) 
was not significant in predicting own-team word recall (or point allocation). 
Predicting IOS ratings: both partner affiliation and success 
An IOS scale was used as an explicit measure of team identification. However, the results of this 
seem to be (weakly) predicted by both interaction success and ratings of partner affiliation and 
closeness. The results of non-parametric Spearman’s ranked correlations are shown in Table 23. 
 
Measures Connectedness Similarity Likeability Confidence Success 
IOS rating .593 
(p < .001) 
.568 
(p = .001) 
.503 
(p = .003) 
.378 
(p = .033) 
.359 
(p = .044) 
Table 22  Performance, success and embarrassment as predictors of team identification 
Table 23  Significant non-parametric correlations with rating of IOS with team 
Note: each box shows rho (p-value). 
Note: team identification is as shown implicitly in own-team word recall. 
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An ordinal regression model of IOS ratings using those significant measures as predictors 
(connectedness, similarity, likeability, confidence and success) was significant: Chi-square = 68.591 df 
25, p > .001, r2 = .883 (Cox & Snell). 
Affiliation and performance: are they separate factors? 
A factor analysis was run on the following variables: IOS, own-team word recall, confidence, 
trustworthiness, connectedness, success, similarity, likeability, difficulty, performance and 
embarrassment (reliance was excluded as it correlated strongly with confidence).127 
Principal Component Analysis extracted three component factors (above Eigenvalue of 1), and then 
orthogonal Varimax rotation was run.128 The resulting factor loadings of each variable are shown in 
Table 24. 
 
1 - affiliation 2 - confidence 3 - identification 
IOS Confidence Word recall (negative) 
Connectedness Trustworthiness Embarrassment 
Similarity Joint success  
Likeability Difficulty (negative)  
 Individual performance  
 
 
Most of the partner affiliation measures load onto component 1, alongside IOS team identification. 
However, own-team word recall loads onto a different component (with ratings of embarrassment), 
as do ratings of success, confidence, trustworthiness, difficulty and performance.  
Mood changes, musical training and sex differences 
Spearman’s rho correlations indicated statistically significant relationships between baseline mood, 
mood changes and a number of rating scales (see Table 25). 
 
 
127 This dataset met the usual assumptions for factor analysis: KMO > .5, and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was 
significant at p < .001. However, these results should be taken as a guide only due to a smaller than usual 
sample size for this type of test. 
128 Orthogonal rotation was used as these variables are not strongly correlated. However, there is reason to 
believe that e.g. connectedness and trustworthiness are related (and IOS and confidence - see above), thus a 
different sort of rotation might be used if this experiment is repeated with a larger sample size. 
Table 24  Factor loadings on affiliation, confidence and identification  
Note: only factor loadings above .5 are shown. 
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 Difficulty Perfor-
mance 
Success Trustwor-
thiness 
Reliance Confidence Connected-
ness 
Likeable 
Baseline 
+ 
-.482* .436 .439 .352     
Baseline 
- 
 .360 .512* .551* .617* .485* .470* .397 
-ve 
change 
 -.403* -.505* -.489* -.546* -.450* -.500* -.533* 
 
 
Baseline positive mood correlated with ratings of interaction success; baseline negative mood 
correlated with ratings of confidence in or reliance on the partner, and also partner affiliation 
measures. An increase in negative mood from pre- to post-interaction had a negative correlation 
with those indicators of partner trustworthiness and affiliation, as well as success of the interaction. 
Kruskal-Wallis comparisons indicated a significant effect of musical training on ratings of 
connectedness. Those who indicated that they were not practising musicians rated partner 
connectedness as higher than those who were practising musicians: H(1) = 5.036, p = .025. Similarly, 
degree of musical training and connectedness were negatively correlated (rho = -.431, p = .014), as 
were connectedness and frequency of musical activities (rho = .-380, p = .032). This seems to indicate 
that those who were musically trained were less likely to feel connected to their partner. 
Kruskal-Wallis comparisons showed no effect of sex, or of the sex composition of the pairs, on any 
indicators of partner affiliation or team identification. 
Discussion 
This experiment tested the relationship between different modes or goals of interaction, and 
measured (perhaps) dissociable effects on interpersonal bonding and team identification. In line with 
hypothesis (a), I found higher ratings of partner connectedness, similarity and trustworthiness 
following the no-goal than the bird goal condition. Contrary to expectations, the bird and the 
elephant goal conditions did not vary systematically in difficulty or perceived success (see below for 
potential reasons for this). Therefore, there was no relationship between goal type and team 
identification. However, there was a relationship between team-related word recall (implicit 
measure of category formation or identification) and interaction success (specifically, how 
embarrassing it was, across all interaction conditions). In line with hypothesis (b), word recall was 
predicted by perceptions of interaction success (marginally significant), and by lower levels of 
embarrassment. Interestingly, it had a negative relationship with perceptions of individual 
performance. These findings are discussed in more detail below. 
Table 25  Non-parametric correlations with baseline and change in mood 
Note: all are significant at p < .05 level; those marked * are significant at p < .01. 
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The no-goal musical interaction task led to significantly higher partner affiliation than the musical 
interaction with an added bird depiction task. This seems to provide evidence that the mode of the 
interaction - the amount of freedom in the improvisatory task, and whether or not it involves an 
explicit external goal (or extrinsic orientation) - affects its efficacy in forming social bonds within a 
dyad (or, by extension, a group). In contrast, team identification, as measured using word recall, was 
related to interaction success - specifically, degree of embarrassment. This is evidence for the role of 
self-esteem and ‘face’ in team identification: if the interaction is more embarrassing, the participant 
is less likely to identify with that team (and is also less likely to feel connected to their partner). 
However, lower ratings of individual performance predicted higher word recall. This seems to 
contradict these findings; however, individual performance is different to any form of perceived joint 
success. If an individual feels that they personally “did well”, then they are less likely to associate 
with the others on their team than if they feel it was a more joint effort, or that their association was 
a more successful one (see e.g. Kokal et al., 2011). 
Mood might have been important in shaping perceived interaction success: baseline positive mood 
correlated with interaction success, while baseline negative mood correlated with higher ratings of 
confidence in and affiliation with the partner. These did not correlate with ratings of social 
identification. Feeling more negative over the course of the interaction, however, had a negative 
relationship with these ratings of partner affiliation and interaction success. 
The respective roles of interaction mode on partner affiliation, and the joint success of the 
interaction on team identification, seem to point to a conceptual distinction between interpersonal, 
group-like bonding, and social identification with a category or team. This is supported to some 
extent by the factor analysis, with connectedness, similarity and likeability loading onto a different 
component to confidence, success, difficulty and performance.  
Limitations 
The previous relationship between perceived success and interaction goal (bird and elephant tasks) 
was not found here, perhaps due to musical training (in the previous experiment, it is likely that a 
higher proportion of participants were musically trained than in the present study), or due to 
differing interaction contexts (here, they were in dyads who shared a goal, whereas previously 
participants were in groups of five, where the goal was not shared amongst all participants). 
Furthermore, there was no apparent effect of goal presence on team identification, in contrast with 
findings from Experiment 2; this might well also relate to the fact that, previously, teams were mixed 
in the interaction task (so goal difference between teams was more apparent), whereas, in this 
experiment, participants interacted in same-team pairs. 
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Another possible limitation is the potential confound with baseline positive mood, which was higher 
amongst participants in the no-goal than those in the bird goal condition. This should not affect the 
results reported here, as participants were selectively removed on this basis; however, this 
experiment should be replicated with a larger sample size. With a higher N, we could also run the 
factor analysis more reliably, to explore further a potential dissociation between indicators of group 
bonding and team identification. 
The explicit rating of team identification - the IOS scale - was predicted by a larger range of factors, 
spanning both interaction success ratings as well as various indicators of partner affiliation. This is 
perhaps due to the nature of the scale, which asks participants to depict their felt association with 
the team identity visually, in terms of degree of overlap between two circles. This more explicit 
representation might relate more to their interaction experience with their team partner (rather 
than with the more abstract concept of the team itself). 
Finally, the relationship between interaction difficulty, success, embarrassment and individual 
performance is still unclear from the present analysis. Although embarrassment and individual 
performance are related to team identification, joint success shows only a marginal relationship. 
Moreover, embarrassment correlates more strongly with interpersonal connectedness than with 
joint success. While it is apparent that team identification emerges from the social success of the 
encounter in some sense, embarrassment has more far-reaching implications (as one might expect) 
for the personal affiliations within the interaction, as well as the identities one develops as a result. 
Video analysis - experimental interaction 
In this section, I present the findings from a case study video analysis, in which I compared the 
behaviour involved in a no-goal condition (a more relational interaction) with the goal-focussed 
(extrinsically-oriented) musical tasks. I expected that these interaction conditions would have 
different goal orientations, and thus might necessitate different types of common ground - one more 
internal, or relational, and other more external, transactional, its focus outside of the interaction. 
I observed the gaze behaviour of each participant, anticipating that their looking patterns might offer 
insights about the interaction focus (see Chapter 2 on the role of gaze in grounding). I also measured 
the duration of interaction behaviour in each condition, and the amount of this time spent in joint 
synchrony (of note onsets). Synchrony has previously been linked to social bonding and fluency in 
dialogue (see Chapters 4 and 2, respectively). I expected that higher levels of synchrony (and an 
intrinsically-focussed interaction) might lie behind higher levels of interpersonal affiliation (no-
goal/elephant goal > bird goal - see experiment 3). 
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This was an exploratory case study. Prior work investigating gaze behaviour and musical interaction 
has investigated the role of looking patterns within a performance informed and regulated by 
specific conventions (see work by Nikki Moran, 2010, 2013, on gaze and gesture in North Indian 
classical music). The present analysis complements this by comparing two more basic interaction 
tasks, activities which model an overall distinction between more musical and speech-like modes of 
relating (compare also e.g. Vandermoortele et al., 2018); no comparison of this sort has been made 
before. I shall now report my method, before presenting my main findings; then, I shall discuss my 
results in the context of the literature and my other experimental results.  
Method 
In what follows, I shall detail how I set up my interaction conditions, and my procedure for the video 
analysis.  
Participants 
A total of 12 participants (aged 19-22, mean = 19.75 years) took part in the study, forming six 
interaction dyads. Three dyads (age 19-22, mean = 19.5) were selected for video analysis. These were 
chosen as none of the six participants had prior knowledge of their partner (all rated prior knowledge 
as 1). All participants had a high level of musical training (they were recruited through the music 
faculty or local choirs). Two dyads were mixed sex, and one was female only. All participants 
provided informed consent to take part in the study, and for their interaction to be filmed. 
Design 
This comprised a between-groups design, varying interaction goal - no goal, bird goal (an easy goal), 
or elephant goal (a difficult goal).129 The dyads chosen for video analysis each represented one of 
these different interaction tasks (see Table 26).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129 The tasks had been piloted to ensure that the bird condition was considerably easier than the elephant 
condition. However, I found in experiment 3 that these goal conditions did not vary in self-report ratings of 
success or difficulty. 
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Interaction goal Participant Sex 
Bird LC Female 
BK Female 
Elephant PC  Male 
SPC  Female 
No goal CL  Male 
AB  Female 
 
Procedure 
Participants were given a simple vocalising instrument (a kazoo) and told that they could interact 
with their partner using only this kazoo (without talking or otherwise communicating). The 
interaction task lasted for five minutes. The instructions given for each condition were similar to 
those used in previous experiments (and detailed in Appendix 3.1).  
Afterwards, participants were asked to rate different aspects of their experience of the task in a self-
report questionnaire, including their affiliation to their partner, how difficult they found the task, and 
how well they think they performed.130 Participants were also asked to rate (and detail, if necessary) 
how much they knew their partner (7-point scale). After they completed this questionnaire, 
participants were thanked and debriefed. 
Video and audio recording 
Participants were filmed during their interaction, and their individual contributions recorded using 
personal microphones. This took place in a sound-proof recording studio. Participants were sat down 
for the duration of the task, and thus their proximity to one another was the same in each interaction 
condition. Video cameras were positioned so that the facial expressions (including eye movements) 
of each participant could be recorded head-on. The video footage allowed discrimination between 
whether participants were looking towards the face region of the other participant, or whether they 
were looking away; when both participants looked towards the other, this was defined as a period of 
mutual gaze (compare similar approach, for looking patterns rather than gaze, in Moran, 2013). The 
audio tracks were analysed to locate note onsets; this data was integrated with the gaze data for the 
behavioural analysis. (See Appendix 3.2 for details of the recording set-up and of how the audio 
tracks and video footage were processed.) 
 
130 This data was not analysed for the whole sample (n = 12), as some dyads knew each other well before the 
experiment. The data provided for the case study sample (n = 6) was not large enough to run statistical tests. 
Table 26  Participants assigned to each interaction condition 
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Behavioural analysis 
Note onsets were used to show bouts of joint synchrony and any turn-taking behaviour. These were 
analysed alongside gaze onsets (looking towards the other), to investigate any patterns in the 
relationship between these variables. 
Bouts of joint synchrony 
Joint synchrony was defined in terms of the inter-onset intervals (IOI) of note onsets (using audio 
data). Bouts of joint synchrony were to have the following characteristics: 
1) A clear beat, maintained at approximately the same rate throughout  
2) This beat rate or tempo is shared between both participants 
3) Both participants contribute at least once during that period 
I calculated the beat rate or IOI for each participant using the inter-onset measurements between 
notes. Where the notes fit into a beat structure, but comprised a different rhythm, then the beat was 
calculated using the relative proportions of those inter-onset times e.g. adding together shorter 
notes which comprised a beat, or halving a longer note which lasted for two beats. In all cases, beat 
IOIs were around a second in length.131   
To give an overall IOI for each bout of joint synchrony, I combined the data from both participants. 
This was calculated as the mean of local beat onsets (this allowed for some flexibility of beat rate 
within each bout). A new bout of joint synchrony was marked when there was a significant change in 
perceived beat IOI. A bout of joint synchrony ended when the beat IOI changed or ceased to be 
shared, e.g. when one participant introduced a new tempo that was not continued by their partner.  
Two independent coders also indicated the start and end of bouts of joint synchrony, and whether 
they considered those bouts to be successful or unsuccessful.132  
Gaze onsets in bouts of synchrony 
I investigated the relationship between gaze onsets and beat IOI for each participant. This was 
calculated by measuring the time between gaze onset and the nearest beat onset (either before or 
after). Gaze onsets were considered “in time” when they occurred within the standard deviation for 
the beat IOI for the whole bout of joint synchrony.  
 
131 This is slightly slower than the spontaneous tapping tempo, but is well within the limits of ‘subjective 
rhythmization’ (see London, 2002). 
132 The experimenter used the note onsets (extracted using Praat). However, the independent coders used only 
the raw video material (with audio). They could start, stop and rewind as much as they needed to. They each 
viewed the goal conditions in a different order to counterbalance the effects e.g. of boredom. This was a 
quicker measurement, which complemented the more precise analysis of IOIs. 
210 
 
I also explored the relationship between gaze onsets and other features of the interaction (outside 
these bouts of joint synchrony). In the no-goal condition, I detected points of convergence; these had 
the following characteristics: 
1) Both participants’ note onsets occurred in synchrony i.e. within 250 ms133 
2) At a structurally important moments in the phrase i.e. at its beginning or ending 
3) With a harmonic relationship between the pitch height of each participants’ note  
The relationship between gaze onsets and endings (looking to their partner and away, respectively), 
and these points of convergence was measured. 
In the elephant goal condition, there were both points of convergence and more general periods of 
convergence. Periods of convergence were times of interaction in which there was more than usual 
sustained synchrony between the interaction partners. Approximate points of convergence occurred 
both within these periods and as isolated points, and were moments when there was particular 
synchrony (250ms deviance or less) and/or harmonic consonance between the individuals’ pitches. 
Turn-taking and gaze behaviour 
A pattern of turn-taking between the participants was detected in the two goal conditions. A new 
turn was defined according to the following rules: 
1) A turn switch between the two participants OR 
2) If the same individual started a new phrase, after a pause, and with a substantially different 
idea to their previous phrase. 
I investigated the relationship between participants’ turns, including, (a) who took each turn, (b) 
whether it was matched in pitch to the previous turn (i.e. whether any of the notes matched any of 
the notes of the previous turn), (c) whether it was in time with the previous turn (i.e. did the first 
note of the turn occur within the beat pattern established, within one standard deviation of the 
previous beat structure, if this was present), and (d) the relationship of the participant’s gaze onsets 
and endings to the start of their turn. 
The patterns observed through this analysis are reported in the next section. 
Results 
As in experiment 3, participants reported similar levels of difficulty and performance success across 
the different interaction conditions (see Table 27). 
 
 
133 250ms is the 20% deviation in metronome beat detected by all participants in Stephan et al. (2002). 
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Interaction goal Difficulty (/5) Performance (/5) Success (/7) 
Bird 4 2 4 
2 3 5 
Elephant 4 2 5 
2 4 5 
No goal 4 3 6 
2 4 4 
 
Bouts of joint synchrony 
For each bout of joint synchrony, a mean IOI and standard deviation were calculated. For all bouts of 
joint synchrony (identified by the experimenter), the overall mean IOI was approximately one 
second, and the mean standard deviation for all bouts was about 10% of that total.  
Graphs in Figure 14 show (a) the overall mean IOI for all bouts of joint synchrony, and the standard 
deviation about that mean, and (b) the mean variability, or an average of all the standard deviations 
for each period of joint synchrony. These are all roughly the same, across all conditions (although the 
beat IOI was perhaps slightly quicker for the no-goal than the bird condition). (See Appendix 3.3.1 for 
the raw data - the mean and standard deviation IOI calculated for each bout of joint synchrony, in 
each condition.) 
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Table 27  Ratings of difficulty, performance and perceived success for 
participants in each goal condition 
Figure 14  Overall IOI statistics for all bouts of joint synchrony, for each interaction condition. Figure 
14(a) shows the mean IOI across all bouts (with standard deviation). Figure 14(b) shows the mean 
standard deviation in IOI for all bouts (with standard deviation). 
Figure 14a Figure 14b 
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However, there were clear differences between interaction conditions regarding the duration of 
those bouts of joint synchrony. Table 28 reports the total interaction duration, the total duration of 
bouts of joint synchrony, and the percentage of total interaction time spent in joint synchrony, for 
each interaction condition. 
 
 
Interaction goal Interaction duration (sec) Joint synchrony (sec) % joint synchrony 
Bird 284.4 100 35.2 
Elephant 309.8 164 52.9 
No goal 293.6 258 87.9 
 
Although the amount of interaction time is roughly the same across conditions, the duration of this 
spent in joint synchrony is very different. Taking into account the ratings by the two independent 
coders gave a more conservative estimate of the number of bouts. (See Appendix 3.3.2 for the 
durations of joint synchrony identified by the experimenter, and by the two coders.) 
Table 29 shows the bouts of synchrony for which there was complete agreement (between the 
experimenter and both coders) and whether they were considered successful or unsuccessful - (1) a 
successful bout has SD IOI < 10% of the mean IOI, and (2) and (3) whether they were classed Y or N 
(successful or unsuccessful) by the two independent coders. 
  
 
Bird interaction condition 
Start of bout End of bout Length of bout Successful? 
02:19 02:25 00:06 N Y N 
05:09 05:14 00:05 Y Y Y 
Elephant interaction condition 
00:30 00:33 00:03 Y Y Y 
04:42 04:45 00:03 Y Y Y 
No-goal interaction condition 
00:34 01:42 01:08 N Y Y 
01:54 02:07 00:13 N N Y 
02:16 04:24 02:08 N Y Y 
05:12 05:32 00:20 N Y Y 
 
Table 28  Length of overall interaction and, of that, the time spent in joint synchrony, for each 
interaction goal condition 
Table 29  Bouts of joint synchrony as identified by the experimenter and two independent coders, and 
whether they were considered successful 
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The length of time spent in joint synchrony (identified by experimenter and validated by both coders) 
is shown in Table 30 (and presented in Figure 15). 
 
 
 
Gaze behaviour 
Table 31 shows the total incidence of individual gaze by each participant in each condition, and how 
much of this was mutual gaze. 
 
Interaction 
condition 
Participant Individual gaze Mutual gaze 
Number Length (sec) Number Length (sec) 
Bird BK 71 99.872 52 37.744 
LC 57 121.124 
Elephant PC 29 81.688 31 39.192 
SPC 48 99.368 
No-goal AB 55 124.829 13 9.674 
CL 14 14.046 
 
 
The no-goal condition had the least mutual gaze, but also the largest imbalance of gaze (as AB looks 
to CL more than vice versa).  
There was no striking difference in the number of gaze onsets which corresponded to the beat, 
within bouts of joint synchrony (defined according to the experimenter’s ratings). Table 32 gives a 
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Bird 11 3.9 
Elephant 6 1.9 
No goal 229 78.0 
Table 30  Time spent in joint synchrony 
for each interaction goal condition. 
Figure 15  Percentage of interaction time spent in joint 
synchrony for each goal condition 
Table 31  Gaze behaviour of each participant 
Note: this shows joint synchrony as 
validated by both coders, also expressed as 
percentage of total interaction time. 
Note: this shows total incidence and length of individual gaze, and incidence and length of mutual gaze (when 
both participants look to each other i.e. individual gaze overlaps). 
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percentage of gaze onsets which occurred within one standard deviation of the mean beat IOI, out of 
the total number of gaze onsets which occur within those bouts of joint synchrony (across both 
participants). 
 
Interaction goal No. gaze No. gaze within 1 s.d. % gaze within 1 s.d. 
Bird 43 12 27.9 
Elephant 39 12 30.8 
No goal 56 15 26.8 
 
 
Analysing the interaction as a whole, not just the bouts of joint synchrony, revealed some interesting 
patterns and some differences - especially between two of the interaction conditions: the no-goal 
task, and the bird goal condition. The elephant goal condition seemed to fall between these two 
extremes. These observations will be reported next. 
No-goal condition - observations 
The no-goal condition comprised more simultaneous playing, involving both participants throughout. 
There was no detected turn-taking behaviour. Their interaction was divided into clear phrases, and 
they would breathe between the phrases together. This phrase structure displayed general 
adherence to Western tonal harmony, in which they were both highly trained.  
As a result of this structure, there were clear points of convergence, where both participants played 
in synchrony, and with pitches that had a harmonic relationship to each other. These occurred at 
structurally-important moments - at the start or at the end of phrases. Gaze towards the other 
occurred before and/or during this point of convergence. (See Appendix 3.4 for all of these points of 
convergence, and the gaze behaviour which occurred within one second before and after this point.) 
Most (18 out of 26) points of convergence are preceded by gaze by one or both of the participants, 
within a second of the point of convergence; gaze then does not need to occur after this point. These 
points account for around 40% of all gaze onsets during the interaction.134 
Mutual gaze also occurs around these moments, generally before or at a phrase transition (including 
some of the points of convergence documented above). Table 33 shows all the points of mutual gaze 
 
134 This figure includes an aggregate of both participants, and includes some gaze onsets in the phrase 
immediately leading up to the point of convergence (sometimes more than one second before). The 
percentage is out of the total incidence of gaze towards the other. 
Note: this shows the total incidence of gaze in bouts of joint synchrony, and the number of gaze onsets 
occurring “in time” with the beat (i.e. within one SD of the bout IOI), also expressed as a percentage. 
Table 32  Relationship between gaze and interaction beat 
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throughout the interaction. All occur at phrase boundaries, with a possible point of convergence (of 
varying synchrony and harmonic consonance) occurring afterwards. All of these points are in this 
case signalled and preceded by a breath together.  
 
Mutual gaze (Possible) 
P.O.C. 
Synchrony 
(ms) 
Pitch relationship Other 
behaviour Start Finish 
00:50.6 00:52.8 00:56.7* 181 Octave  
01:11.2 01:11.6 01:12.0* 14 Fourth  
01:46.2 01:46.6 01:48.4 96 Fourth  
02:06.3 02:07.7 02:09.2 523 Non-consonant Laughter 
02:20.2 02:21.3 02:24.7* 134 Third  
02:47.0 02:48.4 02:48.3 305 Third (Laughter) 
02:50.6 02:50.9 02:52.1 84 Non-consonant Laughter 
03:00.0 03:00.3 03:01.6 42 Sixth  
03:46.2 03:47.1 03:45.9 16 Non-consonant  
04:06.3 04:06.8 04:05.6 88 Non-consonant Laughter 
04:23.7 04:24.2 04:24.0 107 Non-consonant Laughter 
 
 
 
 
The rows highlighted in grey do not follow the standard pattern: the points of convergence occur 
before rather than after the period of mutual gaze. In general, however, the same pattern emerges - 
gaze behaviour occurs before moments when the participants play together, co-ordinating those 
points where they coincide - in some sort of harmonic or temporal synchrony. 
The following picture sequence (Table 34) shows the first of these moments of mutual gaze 
unfolding.  
 
 
 
Note: the points denoted with an * are points of convergence also documented above (see Table 48). 
The others do not fall into that category because they (a) have synchrony of > 250, (b) are not 
consonant, due to breaking into laughter shortly after, or (c) are at less structurally-important phrase 
boundaries. (Laughter) denotes behaviour which signals the start of a frame break, which then occurs 
at 02:52. 
Table 33  Mutual gaze during interaction, and co-occurrence with other interaction behaviour 
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Time point AB CL Observations 
00:47.1 
  
Continuing 
phrase, both are 
looking away 
00:48.3 
  
AB looks 
towards CL 
00:50.9 
  
CL reciprocates, 
establishing a 
period of mutual 
gaze 
Table 34  Sequence of events during and after a moment of mutual gaze in no-goal condition 
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00:52.8 
  
CL ceases to 
gaze towards AB 
00:56.6 
 
 
AB looks away 
just before the 
point of 
convergence 
(which forms the 
start of the next 
phrase) 
 
 
There are several points when the interaction is disrupted by laughter. These sometimes lead to a 
complete breakdown in the interaction. The points of laughter occur immediately (or a short time) 
after mutual gaze (an estimation of eye contact). See Table 35 for details of what happens when 
these points occur. 
 
 
 
 
Note:  left: AB; right: CL. 
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Mutual gaze Mutual laughter onset (est.) Frame break? 
Start End 
00:50.6 00:52.8 00:51.98 No 
02:06.3 02:07.7 02:07.17 Yes 
02:50.6 02:50.9 02:52.20 
(cont.) 
Yes 
03:00.0 03:00.3 No 
03:46.2 03:47.1 03:55.11 No 
04:06.3 04:06.8 04:07.14 No 
04:23.7 04:24.2 04.24.13 Yes 
 
 
Bird goal condition - observations 
The bird goal condition displayed another consistent pattern of gaze behaviour - but one which 
contrasted to that shown in the no-goal task. In the bird goal condition, the dyad kept to a turn-
taking structure, with less simultaneous playing. Participants BK and LC took it in turns to play. Each 
looked away before their onset (or were already looking away), and then checked back after their 
onset. They looked away between 5 seconds and 41 ms before the onset of their turn (mean: 
1770ms before; or, in six cases, were not looking at all), and then checked back between 68 ms and 5 
seconds after the turn onset (mean: 1649ms after; all gaze after is included when it is within a second 
after turn onset, or occurs at some point during the turn). This pattern held for 66 out of a total of 80 
turns (including both participants) - i.e. 82.5% of turns. Of the turns that conformed to this pattern:  
- 51 (77.3%) were matched in pitch to the previous turn 
- 28 (42.4%) were in time with the previous turn 
- 21 (31.8%) were both matched in pitch and timing 
There were no significant differences between participants within the dyad.   
The following picture sequence (Table 36) shows one example of this pattern unfolding: 
 
 
 
Table 35  Co-occurrence of mutual gaze and mutual laughter in no-goal condition 
Note: a frame break is when the interaction completely breaks down, and they resume together a short time 
afterwards. 
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Time point BK LC Observations 
01:08.8 
  
BK starts her turn, with 
averted gaze 
01:09.9 
  
BK checks back at LC 
shortly after her turn 
starts 
01:12.3 
  
LC starts her turn, with 
averted gaze 
Table 36  Sequence of events during a turn transition in bird goal condition 
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01:14.3 
  
LC checks back, again 
during her turn 
01:14.9 
  
BK starts her next turn, 
with averted gaze 
 
In this case, instances of mutual gaze often occurred in the cross-over between turns, and were not 
related either to particular points of convergence, or to moments of breakdown or laughter. Of the 
remaining 14 turns that did not conform to the look away/check back pattern described above: 
- 9 had either (a) no gaze before or (b) looked away beforehand (as expected) but then did not 
check back after the turn onset 
- 1 where the participant looked away at the onset of the turn (rather than before) and 
checked back shortly after 
- 4 had gaze before and during the turn onset (they did not look away) 
On other occasions, the participants played simultaneously, and so a different pattern of gaze 
behaviour emerged. This occurred on several occasions, but especially from 03:14.8 to 03:30.5 and 
Note: left: BK: right: LC. 
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03:45.1 to around 03:54.8. During these periods, the participants gazed at the other both before and 
during their turn onset, rather than averting their gaze. The first incidence of this (from 03:14.8) 
displays an interesting asymmetry between the participants: each time, LC joins simultaneously, 
looking towards BK during her turn onset. However, each time BK enters, she starts a new turn as 
normal, gazing away from LC beforehand. During the second period of simultaneity (from 03:45.1), 
both participants gaze towards each other at their turn onsets, either imitating the other, or 
continuing their own previous turn material, while the other continues to play. This same gaze 
pattern then later occurs only for LC, when she joins simultaneously, sometimes imitating BK (this 
occurs at 03:57.4, 04:02.6, 04:14.4, and at 04:26.1). 
Thus, with a bird goal, the interaction assumes a turn-taking structure for the majority of the 
interaction time. However, there are short periods of the interaction which deviate from this pattern 
- participants can play simultaneously, and so gaze towards each during (rather than after) their turn 
onsets, rather like the points of convergence in the no-goal condition. This mixture of patterns is 
more obvious in the elephant goal condition, as will be reported next. 
Elephant goal condition - observations 
The elephant depiction goal was chosen as it was expected to be a harder goal to achieve in this 
context (especially with the musical instrument selected for the interaction). Although this was not 
reflected in the self-report ratings of success and performance (see above), the difficulty of the goal 
might be reflected in other patterns of behaviour. In this case, the turn-taking structure of the bird 
goal occurs for some of the time, but also there is more recourse to simultaneous, synchronous 
playing. This might be because the goal itself was harder to maintain, so it was a less important part 
of the interaction (in comparison with the bird goal condition). 
First, the pattern of gaze aversion for turn onset and checking back afterwards occurs for both 
participants, for a total of 23 times. (See Appendix 3.5.1 for details of each of these.) On each of 
these occasions, the participants are often playing simultaneously, but at each turn they introduce 
their own independent material. Second, a similar pattern of convergence to what is displayed in the 
no-goal condition occurs, and more regularly than the occasions in the bird goal condition. In this 
case, instead of particular points of convergence, there are periods of more sustained synchrony. 
These periods always begin with either sustained gaze from one or both participants before and/or 
during onset, or the establishment of synchrony very early on (meaning that gaze is not essential to 
co-ordinate their interaction). Often, there is a point of convergence in the middle of this period, 
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facilitated by a period of mutual gaze. On other occasions, there are isolated points of convergence. 
(See Appendix 3.5.2 for more precise details.)135 
In this way, the elephant goal involves both patterns of gaze behaviour - with gaze aversion before 
and checking back after each turn onset; and gaze behaviour which occurs before or during particular 
points (or periods) of convergence. Most (all but two) of the instances of mutual gaze occur during 
these points of convergence. Similar to the no-goal condition, the interaction breaks down with 
laughter on a number of occasions - all after periods of mutual gaze. See Table 37 for a summary of 
these points. 
 
 
Mutual gaze Mutual laughter onset (est.) Frame break? 
Start End 
00:55.27 00:57.62 00:56.99 Yes 
01:31.94 01:33.29 01:32.46 No 
04:01.00 04:03.32 04:02.69 No 
05:00.95 05:02.50 05:02.17 Yes 
 
The mixture between two distinct patterns might demonstrate that the goal in this case is less salient 
or important in the interaction, perhaps as a result of it being harder or less effective in this context. 
Therefore, the form of interaction is more towards the ‘musical’ end of the spectrum - it is more 
intrinsically-oriented (this is exhibited even more so, of course, in the no-goal condition) - maybe as a 
result of the difficulty of the goal task.  
Summary of findings 
Table 38 summarises the main features for each interaction condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 Sometimes, it is difficult to categorise their behaviour as either turn-taking (where an individual takes their 
turn, to exchange with the other) or periods of convergence (where there is more simultaneous, synchronous 
playing). There is inevitably a degree of overlap between the two. 
Table 37  Co-occurrence of mutual gaze, mutual laughter, and interaction breakdown in the 
elephant goal condition 
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Condition Duration of joint 
synchrony 
Turn-taking 
behaviour 
Simultaneous 
behaviour 
Frame breaks? 
No goal High None Gaze (incl. mutual 
gaze) occurs 
before points of 
convergence 
After mutual gaze 
Bird goal Medium Gaze aversion 
before turn 
onset; check back 
after onset 
Short periods: 
gaze before onset 
None 
Elephant goal Low Gaze aversion 
before turn 
onset; check back 
after onset 
Periods of 
synchrony: gaze 
at/before onset; 
mutual gaze at 
points of 
convergence 
After mutual gaze 
 
These results reveal interesting patterns in the gaze behaviour. There are two distinct patterns which 
emerge depending on the prominence of the goal task. This might indicate different types of 
common ground, depending on whether the interaction is extrinsically-or intrinsically-focussed (with 
or without a feasible depiction goal). The role of mutual gaze is of particular interest in this respect. 
In addition, the incidence of frame breaks (i.e. breaking into mutual laughter) provides insights into 
common ground (as signalled by mutual gaze) from a different perspective. The findings relating to 
the duration of joint synchrony are also of interest. These interpretations will be discussed (alongside 
findings from my other experimental work) in my discussion.  
Discussion 
This video analysis reveals differences between forms of interaction which vary only in the presence 
(and type) of goals. As discussed in Chapter 2, interaction which has no external goal beyond that just 
to maintain the affiliative, interactive context, is more intrinsically-oriented. Whereas, adding an 
external, here depiction, goal creates more of an extrinsic focus. Both of these interaction types 
necessitate common ground - but the nature of this might differ. We expected that any differences 
would be revealed through patterns of both individual and mutual gaze (see role of gaze in 
conversation, detailed in Chapter 2). 
On one hand, in the no-goal interaction condition, participants did not exhibit any turn-taking 
behaviour, but instead played simultaneously throughout, with long periods of joint synchrony. By 
looking towards each other just before moments at which they converged, in synchrony, with 
Table 38  Duration of joint synchrony, turn-taking, points or periods of convergence, and incidence 
of interaction breakdown in each interaction goal condition 
224 
 
harmonic relationships, perhaps also breathing together as they start a new phrase, it appears that 
our participants focussed primarily on co-ordinating these moments, aligning their sounds and 
intentions in time.136 Thus, the process of grounding in this context seems to concern synchrony, co-
ordination, and a convergence of intentions within the interaction itself - rather than sharing 
understanding about anything outside.  
On the other hand, where the interaction involves a clear goal (in this case, to depict birds), it 
resembles more closely the turn-taking structure characteristic of speech (Sacks et al., 1974). Even 
more precisely, the pattern of gaze aversion-gaze checking, before and after turn onset, which we 
see here is also common in spoken exchanges (Kendon, 1967). Mutual gaze occurs in the cross-over 
between turns (as also shown in e.g. Bavelas et al., 2002). This might indicate that the grounding 
which occurs here is analogous to what happens in speech - even though the only form of reference 
we have in this experiment is to depict a very general scene, sharing just the broad focus on birds. 
Even here, just with this vague external focus, we have primed a more extrinsically-oriented form of 
interaction - something more speech-like rather than musical. Previous work has found that gaze 
aversion might occur in this turn-taking context in order to reduce cognitive load - in order to re-
direct attentional resources away from observing the other to forming the next utterance (Doherty-
Sneddon & Phelps, 2005). Checking back is then important to ensure that the other is attending, and 
to register their back-channelling responses - which indicate that they have understood (Bavelas et 
al., 2002). In this musical context, it is unclear what specific meaning could be part of this shared 
understanding. Perhaps, we see this gaze pattern here because it is the expected or automatic form 
which structures our interaction - a structure we would usually need when external goals and 
references are introduced.  
The patterns exhibited in the elephant-goal condition were a mixture of these two types - perhaps 
because the goal was less successful in its own right, leaving the participants to pursue more 
relational goals for a larger part of the interaction (which was, as a result, more intrinsically-
focussed). Some of the same turn-taking pattern of gaze aversion and checking was displayed; this 
differed to the bird task, as participants generally played simultaneously (although I still considered 
these turn-taking bouts, given that each participant “came in” with a contribution that was 
distinctive, introducing new melodic material each time). At other points, there were more periods of 
synchrony: participants did not contribute separate, or even overlapping, turns, but rather kept time 
together, often in iconic “marching” behaviour. Even though this was presumably designed to 
resemble our external elephant goal, the gaze patterning was similar to our no-goal case - gaze 
 
136 Compare an observation made by Moran (2013) in her video analysis of duo improvisation in a North Indian 
classical tradition: moments of eye contact occurred at the sam - the point of coherence at the first beat of the 
metric cycle. 
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(including mutual gaze) occurred before or at broad points of convergence, again perhaps to co-
ordinate their synchronisation. (In the bird condition, there were a couple of shorter periods of 
simultaneous playing where a similar pattern was displayed.) 
If the nature of the common ground is indicated by gaze patterns, then it seems that the no-goal 
condition (or the elephant-goal condition, where the goal was harder to achieve) involved shared 
focus on co-ordination, i.e., a relational focus. In the bird-goal condition, the gaze pattern is 
analogous to what occurs in speech - behaviour usually oriented towards mutual understanding of 
something external. This provides initial evidence that there is a real, behavioural difference between 
interaction modes according to their goal - namely, whether the exchange is more intrinsically- or 
extrinsically-focussed, and thus involves common ground which is oriented internally or external to 
the interaction.  
Mutual gaze also signals a moment of grounding even where the interaction frame breaks down - as 
in instances of mutual laughter, disrupting the flow of the interaction. On these occasions, 
participants look towards each other (as expected), achieve eye contact, but then the interaction 
rapidly deteriorates. This laughter again seems to be a point of grounding - a moment of mutual 
recognition reached at that moment of eye contact. Laughter might index positive affect, perhaps as 
participants appreciate the humour in the incongruence of playing a kazoo in the University Faculty 
of Music. However, laughter is also generally a response to embarrassment, as a way of saving face in 
those contexts. The task to make music, playing a slightly silly musical instrument, with strangers - 
usually a situation in which one tries to make a good first impression - might well have contributed to 
a feeling of self-consciousness and embarrassment. Laughing together might have been a joint effort 
to protect the face of the other, jointly acknowledging the situation while working together to diffuse 
or mask any negative feelings (see discussion in Chapter 2). Interestingly, this joint laughter occurred 
only in the elephant- and no-goal conditions. These were the more intrinsically-oriented of the three 
tasks; also, however, they were the cases in which there was a mix of genders (whereas both 
participants were female in the bird condition). The presence of someone of the opposite sex might 
well have increased the social pressure, perhaps making such frame-breaks, and moments of mutual 
embarrassment, more likely. Together with my experimental findings, this suggests an important role 
of embarrassment (or of motivations to protect, perhaps enhance, self-esteem) in managing or 
evaluating these social relationships.  
I also found a strong disparity in the amount of joint synchrony displayed. In particular, the no-goal 
condition exhibited much more synchronous playing - perhaps a factor in the higher social 
connectedness emerging following this condition (compared with the goal conditions) in experiment 
3. This is unlikely to explain completely the differences in interpersonal affiliation shown in our 
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previous experiment: while the video analysis revealed very few bouts of joint synchrony in the 
elephant goal condition, the degree of affiliation following this task (in experiment 3) fell somewhere 
in the middle (between the no-goal and bird-goal tasks). It seems more likely that the effects of 
interaction on social bonding relate both to the degree of synchrony and to the differences in mode 
or goal focus. Of course, a more relational goal itself involves a greater emphasis on joint synchrony; 
this is clearest in the no-goal condition. These findings also correspond to the effect of musical 
interaction on group bonding (compared with a non-musical task, in experiment 1), and the effect of 
the no-goal condition on connectedness to members of the other team (in experiment 2). 
The work of this chapter has made some substantial, if exploratory, contributions to our 
understanding of interaction mode, of the nature of musical interaction, and the effect of interaction 
goal focus on the way we relate to others. This also sheds light on the types of social relationships we 
establish - whether a sense of interpersonal or group affiliation, or a new team identity (which might 
even exclude others who do not belong). My conclusion will bring all of this work together, providing 
a summary of what I have shown so far, and our next steps in this new, wider project. 
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Conclusions  
Making music is an activity that we do together. For the duration of that performance, we focus our 
efforts at co-ordinating with each other, losing ourselves in the task to become more aligned with 
those around us, sometimes striving to perform something well, or correctly. It is a powerful way in 
which we assert a group identity - whether as believers in a church congregation or supporters of a 
football team. We do not just reflect that group identity, but we enhance, perhaps even enact it, in 
that performance. 
Belonging to a social group and forming meaningful relationships with those around us is crucial for 
our wellbeing. We interact with people time and time again, building social networks and 
relationships of trust. Our group identity comes from our affiliation with others, through 
interdependent relationships - working on something together, making music, or holding a 
conversation. This process, however, is not without its limits: our new group identity does not 
include everyone. For an in-group to exist, it must have a boundary, dividing those who belong from 
those who do not.  
This thesis has been about the intersection of these spheres - how we interact through music, and 
how this structures our social relationships. I have pulled together many different fields of study, 
constructing a theory and proposing some specific hypotheses about the role of interaction in group 
formation. 
Instrumental music, speech, song, and even dance all stem from our capacity to relate to and 
understand others, and meet our need to belong and secure lasting connections. I have explored the 
nature of these everyday interactions: we might interact to get something done, to communicate 
some information about something outside our relationship; at other times, our primary goal is to 
relate to each other, to share a sense of intentionality and affiliation that does not require external 
knowledge of a common ground. I have also explored the nature of our group identities: we bond 
with others through face-to-face engagement, or interdependent relationships; however, these 
occasions are often shaped by judgements we have made about others before we are even 
introduced. Their appearance - looking or sounding different to us, perhaps with a different skin 
colour, strange clothes, or a strong accent - can lead us to categorise them as “other”, making us less 
inclined to engage with them; however, if we see them regularly, or find that we need to work 
together, we can break down these barriers. 
The way that we interact is crucial in managing, reinforcing, and enacting these group bonds and 
boundaries - building relationships with some, but excluding others who do not belong. I have 
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proposed that it is the goal of our interactions, and the prerequisite common ground, which predict 
whether our encounter brings people together and encourages them to participate, or whether it 
constructs boundaries between who can and who cannot be involved. More musical forms of 
engagement, which have an intrinsic orientation, being more about our shared participation than 
anything beyond this, are powerful in bonding us together through relationships of interdependence. 
However, where we speak different languages (whether in speech or in other, more prescribed forms 
of music-making), we find it much harder to engage: interaction with an extrinsic focus, where the 
goal is to talk about something, relies on a common code, shared access or understanding, and is 
thus limited to a few, select others. This reinforces the boundaries we construct through 
categorisation of ourselves and others. 
I have described many examples of this in action, from playing games, singing football chants, to 
everyday camp-fire songs and discussion groups. However, I also adopted the task of attempting to 
provide empirical data for this framework. Substantiating my theory calls for many experiments - 
many more than what is possible in a thesis of this length; I devised a methodological paradigm and 
used this to conduct an initial exploration. 
In my first experiment, I explored how musical interaction contributes to group formation, as 
measured by ratings of interpersonal connectedness. Improvised, simple music-making was more 
effective than an interactive, visual task. There were no effects of group members sharing, not 
sharing, or even not having an external goal: group formation does not rely on the presence of an 
explicit shared goal - in fact, having a goal sometimes seemed to distract from the self-other bonding 
process. In my second experiment, I corroborated and extended these findings. In this case, I 
compared musical interaction with and without external goals. Where my participants had no 
additional goal beyond the task to interact, they subsequently felt more connected to those assigned 
to an opposing team (where their different team identities were reinforced by corresponding musical 
goals, they instead felt a stronger affinity to their team-mates). Again, in experiment three, the no-
goal interaction task resulted in higher feelings of affiliation towards one’s partner than when the 
interaction involved some external, shared goal. Thus, musical interaction, and especially music-
making in which the performers are focussed upon each other rather than on something else, can 
bring and bond people together more easily than other tasks. Music foregrounds the phatic, the 
relational components of interaction, whereby individuals can co-ordinate their actions within a 
framework of floating intentionality without relying on shared meaning or external common ground. 
Forms of interaction with more salient, external goals might instead contribute to processes of 
categorisation. I introduced this question in my second experiment, assigning participants to 
different teams and then measuring how far the interaction task enhanced their identification with 
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that team, specifically. Musical interaction with a corresponding depiction goal enhanced 
connectedness towards others who shared that team affiliation, promoting intergroup bias between 
the “birds” and the “elephants”. This effect emerged only as a function of the success of that 
interaction task. In experiment three, I clarified this relationship. Using an implicit measure, I showed 
that participants felt stronger team identification when they thought the interaction was a joint 
success - or rather, was less embarrassing. When they were more embarrassed, or when they felt 
they were more personally responsible for the success of the task, they were less likely to 
incorporate this team identity into their self-concept. This has parallels with Social Identity Theory, 
specifically the role of self-esteem. In defining oneself in relation to a particular category, we seek 
enhanced self-evaluation through the positive distinctiveness of our group or category (see Turner et 
al., 1987). Moreover, Goffman’s work on maintaining ‘face’ in interaction is relevant here. He 
emphasises the importance of maintaining ‘positive social value’, through regulating the flow of 
interaction, i.e. ‘face-work’ (Goffman, 1967: 5). A social situation which is unsuccessful, or 
embarrassing, causes the individuals to distance themselves from the associated category or team as 
a face-saving strategy. And perhaps this is the case vice versa: positive interaction that is associated 
with a particular team identity is likely to result in adoption of that social identity, driven by 
motivation to enhance self-esteem. 
The results of these three preliminary experiments are presented in Tables 39 and 40. Overall, they 
make a start at identifying the components of musical (and other forms of) interaction which 
structure our social relationships - bonding us together (via affiliative interdependence), and dividing 
us from others who are different (through our sense of team identity). 
 
 
Experiment Variable Measure 
1 Music > Visual Ratings of connectedness 
No goal > (Non-shared) goal IOS ratings 
2 No goal  > Goal Connectedness to other-team members 
3 Elephant/no goal > Bird goal Partner trust, connectedness, similarity 
 
 
 
 
Table 39  Experimental results showing factors which might contribute to group or 
interpersonal bonding 
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Experiment Variable Measure 
2 (Bird) goal > No goal Connectedness to own-team members more 
(Bird) goal > No goal IOS ratings for team 
Goal success Connectedness to own-team members 
3 Embarrassment (-ve) Team-related word recall 
 
My video analysis explored in more depth the behavioural correlates of interaction with different 
goal orientations - again, with or without an external depiction goal. This case study offers some 
insight into the possible roots of what I measured elsewhere using scales of connectedness and other 
indicators of team identity. The no-goal interaction task, i.e. our more intrinsically-oriented condition 
which had resulted previously in higher levels of affiliation, involved much more synchronous playing 
than either of the two goal conditions. Furthermore, different patterns of individual and mutual gaze 
suggested distinct grounding processes. On one hand, participants given the no-goal task focussed on 
mutual co-ordination, achieving alignment at important moments in the musical phrase. On the 
other hand, the pair with the bird goal (perhaps the more achievable of the two goals) engaged in a 
speech-like manner, looking away to process the “information” conveyed, and to form a turn, and 
then checking to see if the other had “understood” something. Furthermore, mutual gaze enacted 
alignment in a different sense - this was often the moment of breakdown, when the exchange 
disintegrated into laughter. Goffman described this very situation in his discussion of 
embarrassment; I argue here that this emotion, and our motivation to save face in the light of this, is 
yet another form of grounding. It concerns our immediate relationship with another, but also affects 
how we feel about the social identity we might represent together. 
Future directions 
This work has implications not only for our understanding of social group formation, and the complex 
role of music-making in establishing our communities, but also for our understanding of interaction 
more generally. The crucial difference between interaction which is more “speech-like” and forms 
which are more “musical” might be one of goal orientation, a different type of shared focus - or 
perhaps a different type of common ground. I have demonstrated here a novel, but simple, way of 
modelling those interaction types, so we can use the controlled setting of a psychology laboratory to 
understand more those processes which we see every day in “real life”. 
Further research should not only attempt to replicate the results reported here, perhaps with larger 
and more diverse samples (to tackle the problem identified by e.g. Henrich et al., 2010), but could 
Table 40  Experimental results showing factors which might enhance team-related affiliation, or 
a sense of team identification 
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also use different, perhaps more sensitive or reliable measurement techniques. Eye tracking and 
motion sensor technology could be used to analyse a larger corpus of behavioural data; physiological 
measures could detect smaller changes in affect or mood over the course of the interaction task; a 
more reliable interpersonal memory test (similar perhaps to Woolhouse et al., 2016) could assess 
more accurately whether attention towards others varies as a result of shared or conflicting goals (a 
condition which seemed to have no effect in experiment one, but which appears to be significant 
from my other results). Further research could ascertain whether the results of my implicit team 
identification measure (memory for team-related words) are reliable - and whether they do indeed 
tap into a sense of identity, rather than mere concept salience. Moreover, more data collection could 
clarify the relationship between joint success and embarrassment, and demonstrate how these are 
related to a sense of team identity (and also to interpersonal connectedness, more generally). 
Research could employ the same experimental paradigm to investigate other factors which might 
shape group formation, or the nature of the interaction: for example, the number of people in a 
group, its gender composition, and the relationship between gender and other social or team 
divisions. Does gender identity overshadow any alternative social categorisation? Furthermore, how 
does goal orientation shape the nature of the interaction when it includes three rather than two 
participants? What happens if they have conflicting depiction goals? Further work is needed to clarify 
the nature of embarrassment in this context - what other behavioural correlates are there, beyond 
mutual gaze and laughter? Is it more likely where there is a mix of genders? Do friends show a 
different response, compared to the unacquainted individuals recruited here? Furthermore, more 
clarity is needed regarding how embarrassment and interaction goals each relate to the formation of 
social identity, and a cohesive social group. Can the interaction itself build a team identity without it 
being established at the start of the experiment? And are there other types or components of 
interaction, beyond a depiction goal, which might create common ground in an experimental 
context? Finally, beyond the role of embarrassment, my work has not seriously probed the role of 
emotion, or affect. We know that music is a rewarding activity - but how exactly does its effect on 
our mood shape the personal relationships it enacts? We know that interaction varies in goal 
orientation - but our emotions (including embarrassment) supersede this divide: they affect our 
relationships, but in ways tied to our joint experience of the world, our successes and failures as an 
individual and as a group. 
This thesis has answered some important questions - and it has raised many more. It has presented a 
theoretical framework, and a research methodology, which makes it possible to explore this area 
with new impetus. This is a time of new and rising social divisions. We need to understand better 
how we relate to others, and how we can overcome those barriers which divide us.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 - Experiment outcome measures 
1.1 Experiment 1 
The outcome measures of group bonding are listed in Table 41 below, in order of presentation: 
 
Outcome Measure Reference 
In-group trust Forced-choice responses to various scenarios 
(half reverse-scored); choice between specific 
individuals who belong to the in-group, or the 
out-group (photographs shown; randomised 
order of presentation). 
Scenarios adapted from the 
Specific Interpersonal Trust 
scale (Johnson-George & 
Swap, 1982; taken from 
Wrightsman, 1991) 
Experience of 
the group 
interaction task 
Free written response; participants asked to 
describe their experience, level of enjoyment, 
and how successful they felt they were at 
working together. 
N/A 
Memory for 
group member 
attributes 
Asked how many members (a) were wearing 
glasses, (b) have blonde hair, and (c) were 
wearing a pink wristband 
Similar to the test 
administered in Woolhouse 
et al. (2016) 
Connectedness 7-point Likert scale, ‘How connected did you feel 
with the other participants in your group during 
the activity?’ 
Wiltermuth & Heath (2009)  
IOS scale of 
bonding of the 
individual to 
the group 
5-point pictorial likert scale Swann et al. (2009) 
Successfulness 7-point Likert scale: ‘How successful do you think 
your group were at the task?’ 
5-point Likert scale: ‘I found this task difficult’ 
5-point Likert scale: ‘I think I performed well on 
this task’ 
N/A 
Entitativity  Three 5-point pictorial scales of entitativity, 
similarity, and interaction 
Rutchick et al. (2008) 
Table 41  Outcome measures of group formation used in experiment 1 
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Team 
perception 
7-point likert scale, ‘How far did you feel you 
were on the same team with other participants in 
the task?’ 
Wiltermuth & Heath (2009) 
General trust in 
group 
5-point Likert scale: ‘I could rely on the people in 
my group.’ 
5-point Likert scale: ‘I had confidence in the 
others in the group’ 
5-point Likert scale: ‘Overall, I think the people in 
my group are generally very trustworthy’ 
N/A 
 
 
Other filler items were included: rankings of interaction with other individual group members (rank 
1-3 if interacted with them most to least); a social word completion game was also included (taken 
from Knowles & Gardner, 2008). 
Pictures used in depiction goal instructions 
Figure 16 shows the pictures used for the depiction tasks in the musical and non-musical goal 
conditions. 
(a)             (b)        (c)   (d) 
 
 
 
1.2 Experiment 2 
Two different types of dependent variable were used in this experiment – some measuring group 
formation (towards the interaction group, i.e. mixed teams - see blue text), and others measuring 
category or team formation (towards specific team members both from within and outside the 
interaction group - see red text). These were administered in a post-interaction questionnaire. The 
main items are shown in Table 42 below, in order of presentation: 
 
 
Figure 16  Pictures used for depiction goal tasks (a) the elephant goal in the musical condition, (b) the bird 
goal in the musical condition, (c) the elephant goal in the non-musical condition, and (d) the bird goal in 
the non-musical condition. Pictures (a) and (b) were also used in the goal conditions of Experiment 2. 
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Dependent variable Measure Reference 
Specific trust preference 
(own-team members vs. 
other-team members) 
Forced-choice questions for a number of 
different scenarios. Participants chose 
between photographs of own-team and 
other-team members (some familiar from 
the interaction, and others unfamiliar i.e. not 
involved in the experiment). Each 
photograph was associated with own or 
other team symbols (randomised order of 
presentation; half items reverse-scored).   
Scenarios adapted from 
the Specific 
Interpersonal Trust scale 
(Johnson-George & 
Swap, 1982; taken from 
Wrightsman, 1991) 
Experience of the group 
interaction task 
Free written response: describe experience, 
level of enjoyment, success at working 
together across the two teams. 
N/A 
Connectedness for own 
and other team members 
(in interaction group) 
Two 7-point Likert scales, ‘How connected 
did you feel with members of your team/the 
other team during the activity?’ 
Wiltermuth & Heath 
(2009) 
Rating of successfulness 
(of the group interaction) 
7-point Likert scale, ‘How successful do you 
think your group were (as a whole) at the 
task?’ 
N/A 
Entitativity  (ratings of 
the group as a whole) 
Three 5-point pictorial scales of entitativity, 
similarity, and interaction 
Rutchick et al. (2008) 
IOS scale of bonding of 
the individual to their 
team as a whole 
5-point pictorial Likert scale, associated with 
their team symbol 
Swann et al. (2009) 
 
 
1.3 Experiment 3 
Measures in the questionnaire, in order of presentation (measures relating to team identification are 
shown in red and to partner affiliation in blue), are detailed in Table 43. 
 
 
 
Table 42  Outcome measures of group formation and team-related affiliation or identification in 
experiment 2 
Note: measures of group formation are in blue text and team-related affiliation or identification in red. 
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Dependent variable Measure Reference 
Participants were shown a picture of their team symbol, and asked to ‘think about your team – the 
bird/elephant team – as a whole’ 
IOS scale of bonding 
of the individual to 
their team 
‘Please select the picture which best represents your 
relationship with your team.’ 
5-point pictorial likert scale 
Swann et al. 
(2009) 
Reward allocation to 
unfamiliar team 
members 
‘Below are pictures of other members of the bird and 
the elephant teams who have taken part in the 
experiment already. Their team is shown by the 
symbol. Imagine that you have 4 pots of £5 in £1 
coins. ... Decide how many £1 coins to allocate to each 
participant and write a number in each box. This must 
total £5 on each line.’ 
Forced-choice decision to allocate unequal rewards to 
unfamiliar individuals associated with their own and 
other team symbols. Photographs and team 
membership were counterbalanced.  
Similar to 
Hetherington et 
al. (2014) and 
Locksley et al. 
(1980) 
Participants were asked to ‘think back to the musical task you did with your partner.’ 
Experience of the 
interaction task 
Free written response: ‘describe your experience of 
the task, how much you enjoyed it, and how 
successful you think you were as a pair.’ 
N/A 
Trust in/reliance on 
partner 
5-point Likert scales:  
‘I think I could rely on my partner’ 
‘I had confidence in my partner’ 
I think my partner is generally very trustworthy’ 
N/A 
Connectedness to 
partner 
7-point Likert scale: ‘How connected did you feel with 
your partner during the activity?’ 
Wiltermuth & 
Heath (2009) 
Similarity to partner 7-point Likert scale: ‘How similar do you feel to your 
partner?’ 
Rabinowitch & 
Knafo-Noam 
(2015) 
Partner likeability 9-point Likert scale: ‘How likeable is your partner’ Hove & Risen 
(2009) 
 
Table 43  Outcome measures of partner affiliation and team identification in experiment 3 
Note: measures of partner affiliation are in blue text and team identification in red. 
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Amongst the measures above, they were also asked about their perceived performance on the task 
(5-point Likert scales: ‘I found this task difficult’ and ‘I think I performed well on this task’), how 
successful they thought their interaction was (7-point Likert scale: ‘How successful do you think your 
pair was at the task?’) and how embarrassed they were (7-point Likert scale: ‘How embarrassed were 
you during the task?’; see e.g. Sabini et al., 2000).  
Appendix 2 - Experiment 1 follow-up  
A short follow-up experiment after experiment 1 tested further whether there were any 
experimental artefacts arising as a result of the particular nature of the music task. The musical 
interaction might have caused greater connectedness (in comparison to the non-musical, visual 
interaction task) for several different reasons.   
First, musical interaction might foreground phatic, interpersonal dimensions more than when there is 
a more explicit focus on a visual goal. Both forms of interaction relied upon non-verbal interaction of 
some sort, but the music condition, with its affordance for sounded gestures and melodic contour, 
made the interaction itself (rather than something external) the central focus.  
Second, the musical task was much more flexible: there were no real constraints on the notes, or on 
how the interaction was to proceed. The visual task enabled some freedom, but moving shapes 
afforded much less improvisation and had a possible “finish” point. This freedom might have helped 
or hindered the relationship between participants - in the former by enhancing moment-by-moment 
attention, or by making the interaction more risky and potentially embarrassing in the latter.  
Third is the possible role of positive affect. While music generally results in positive affect (Dunbar et 
al., 2012), some elements of the music condition particular to this experiment (and not more 
generalizable as effects of music-making) might have prompted positive behavioural responses (e.g. 
laughing together) resulting in enhanced connectedness (see Gervais & Wilson, 2005). For instance, 
the musical instruments produced a buzzy and humorous timbre; also, the depiction tasks were 
unusual and perhaps more light-hearted than other forms of participatory, improvisatory music. 
In order to investigate which attributes of music-making might have contributed to group 
connectedness, I ran a smaller-scale case study experiment, manipulating certain aspects of the 
music interaction task. By restricting the melodic content (making the interaction more scripted), or 
by using an instrument limited to the pentatonic scale, I investigated the potential effect of 
interaction freedom. These are compared to a free improvisation task, using the same simple 
vocalising musical instrument (kazoo) as was used in the original experiment.  This set-up also tests 
238 
 
whether bonding only occurs as a result of the peculiar characteristics and sounds of the kazoo (via 
group laughter), or whether it might be a result of other aspects of the music-making.  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 9 participants took part in this case study (8 female, 1 n-b), all aged between 20 and 24 
years (mean = 20.89). All were musically trained (recruited from the music faculty). They all provided 
informed consent to take part in the study, which was reviewed by the Faculty of Music Research 
Ethics committee. 
Design 
This was an exploratory, between-groups design, varying the limitations and modality of the 
interaction condition on three levels: (1) free improvisation using simple vocalising instrument 
(kazoo), (2) improvisation around a melodic ‘anchor’, the well-known tune of ‘Happy Birthday’, using 
the same instrument and (3) free improvisation using a pentatonic percussion instrument (balafon). 
This simultaneously measured any specific effect of the kazoo (being an instrument which might 
enable social bonding merely through laughing together), while testing the effect of limiting the 
freedom of interaction, either on the basis of a melodic structure, or limiting the notes available in a 
consonant, pentatonic framework.  
The number of participants was split equally, with three assigned to each condition. Participants 
interacted in groups of three (all group members assigned to the same condition) 
The dependent variables included various measures of social bonding to the interaction group as a 
whole, and towards specific members of the group. These were administered in a questionnaire. 
Table 44 below summarises the items used, in order of presentation. 
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Dependent variable Measure Reference 
Experience of the 
interaction task 
Free written response: ‘describe your experience 
of the task, how much you enjoyed it, how 
comfortable you were, and how well you think 
you all worked together’ 
N/A 
Connectedness to 
group/group members 
7-point likert scale: ‘How connected did you feel 
with the other participants in your group during 
the activity?’ They were also asked how 
connected they felt to the others individually 
(identified using letter A, B or C on badge) 
Wiltermuth & Heath 
(2009) 
IOS scale of bonding of 
the individual to their 
group 
‘Tick the diagram which best represents your 
relationship with the group.’ 
5-point pictorial likert scale 
Swann et al. (2009) 
Entitativity  Three 5-point pictorial scales of entitativity, 
similarity, and interaction 
Rutchick et al. (2008) 
 
 
Participants were also given 5-point Likert scales to report how far they could rely on the people in 
their group, how difficult they found the task, how well they think they performed, their confidence 
in the others, and how generally trustworthy their group is. They were also asked about their need to 
belong (using the single-item Need to Belong test – see Nichols & Webster, 2013). A social word 
completion game was also included (taken from Knowles & Gardner, 2008). There were 7-point Likert 
scales on how successful they thought the group as at the task, how embarrassed they felt (see e.g. 
Sabini et al., 2000) and whether they felt they were on the same team as the others (Wiltermuth & 
Heath, 2009), as well as 9-point scales on how likeable the other members are (as a group, and 
individually – see Hove & Risen, 2009). They were given a simple memory test (eye colour of each 
other group member, and whether they were wearing glasses during the task). The short form of the 
PANAS mood questionnaire was administered pre- and post- interaction task (Kercher, 1992; 
reviewed by Mackinnon et al., 1999). Participants were also asked to rate (and detail, if necessary) 
how much they knew the two other group members (two 7-point scales). 
 
 
 
Table 44  Outcome measures of individual and group bonding 
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Procedure 
Participants took part in groups of three. They were each given a badge (A, B, or C) to identify 
themselves (for the questionnaire administered later). They were given the following instructions, 
according to their assigned condition. 
Free improvisation – ‘Your task is to make music together, using only the kazoos. Improvise together, 
listening and co-ordinating with each other.’ 
Improvisation around melodic anchor – ‘Your task is to make music together, using only the kazoos. 
Improvise on and around the tune of Happy Birthday. Work together, listening and co-ordinating 
with each other.’ 
Improvisation in pentatonic framework – ‘Your task is to make music together, using only the 
balafons. Improvise together, listening and co-ordinating with each other.’ 
All groups were told not to talk or otherwise communicate, and were given five minutes for this 
interaction task. They were filmed during this interaction task, and their individual contributions 
recorded using microphones. 
Immediately after the interaction task, participants were seated individually and asked to complete 
the questionnaire. They were then thanked and debriefed. 
Results 
Non-parametric independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis tests were run according to interaction 
condition. The only main effect was on ratings of connectedness towards the group as a whole: H(2) 
= 6.095, p = .047. There were significantly higher ratings of connectedness in the free improvisation 
condition compared to the melodic anchor condition: H(2.160) = 5.333, p = .041 (see Figure 17 
below). Ratings of connectedness were not correlated with any other measure. 
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Baseline mood and prior knowledge 
There were no significant differences between the three conditions for baseline mood (using PANAS 
self-report scale before interaction), nor were there significant differences in level of prior 
knowledge amongst the participants in each group. 
Similarly, the ratings of connectedness were not correlated with ratings of prior knowledge of the 
individual group members. Ratings of connectedness towards individuals were also not correlated 
with prior knowledge; nor were they correlated with change in mood pre- and post-interaction. 
Discussion 
This outcome enables us to exclude the possibility that increased connectedness resulted only from 
specific task characteristics (the humorous nature of the kazoos): this instrument was used in both 
free improvisation and the melodic anchor condition. In contrast, higher connectedness resulted 
following the conditions with a greater degree of melodic flexibility, supporting the suggestion that it 
is the freedom of the improvisatory musical task which contributes to group bonding. (Instead of the 
possibility of having to overcome embarrassment in this condition, there was actually a trend 
towards higher embarrassment for the melodic anchor condition, although this did not reach 
significance.) 
Figure 17  Boxplot showing the effect of interaction condition on ratings of connectedness with the 
group. Connectedness was significantly higher in the free improvisation compared the melodic anchor 
condition (plot shows median, interquartile range, and top and bottom 25% of ratings). 
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In summary, this empirical work demonstrates that five or ten minutes of very simple music-making 
results in a sense of group connectedness amongst adults, in comparison to a non-musical depiction 
task. This could be due to the multimodal, phatic nature of the musical task, or due to the greater 
freedom enabled by an improvisatory context.  
Appendix 3 - Video analysis supplementary materials 
Videos can be made available on request.  
3.1 Task instructions 
The instructions given for each task are detailed in Table 45. 
 
Interaction goal Instructions 
Easy goal - bird task ‘make music inspired by a flock of birds, using only the kazoos. 
Improvise together, listening and co-ordinating with each other. In your 
joint improvisation, you could allude to e.g. a variety of bird calls, their 
manner and/or speed of movement, interaction with potential mates, 
wings flapping and their protection of territory, amongst other things.’ 
Hard goal - elephant task ‘make music inspired by a herd of elephants, using only the kazoos. 
Improvise together, listening and co-ordinating with each other. In your 
joint improvisation, you could allude to e.g. trumpeting sounds, their 
manner and/or speed of walking, interactions with their calves, ears 
flapping, and the sound of drinking/spraying water, amongst other 
things.’ 
No goal ‘make music, using only the kazoos. Improvise together, listening and 
co-ordinating with each other.’ 
 
3.2 Interaction set-up and data processing 
The configuration for video recording the interaction condition is shown in Figure 18. Participants 
(and the direction they were facing) are shown by the grey squares. Cameras are denoted by the 
large black arrows. Participants were also filmed from above using a GoPro camera. The microphones 
used were AKG 414 ULS microphones set to cardioid (picking up sound from one direction, and 
attenuating it from other directions), held in position using stands, near to each participant, but not 
obstructing their interaction with each other. 
Table 45  Task instructions for different interaction conditions in video analysis study 
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The audio tracks and video footage were synchronised 
using Final Cut Pro X. From this, a multi-cam clip, 
including the footage of direct gaze for each 
participant, was created for each dyad. Annotations of 
gaze behaviour were completed using ELAN.137 
Annotations were created frame-by-frame to show 
the start and end of gaze towards the face region of 
the other, within a precision corresponding to the 
frame-rate of 25 frames per second. The overlaps 
between the gaze annotations for each individual in a 
dyad were defined as periods of mutual gaze. 
Analysis of the audio track was completed using Praat.138 Audio tracks were recorded separately for 
each participant. Note onsets were defined as the beginning of an amplitude increase. Note changes 
within a continuous phrase were also marked as separate onsets, corresponding to detected changes 
in frequency. These markers were imported into ELAN to be compared to the video annotations. 
Inter-onset intervals for each note were calculated automatically as the distance between each 
marker. 
3.3 Bouts of joint synchrony 
3.3.1 IOIs - means and standard deviations 
Table 46 documents the mean IOI for each period of joint synchrony, with the standard deviation 
about that mean, in each interaction condition. Bouts of joint synchrony are not necessarily the same 
length. The mean of each of these (plotted in the graphs in Figure 14) is found at the bottom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
137 A linguistics software developed at the Max Planck Institute, retrieved February 2019 from 
https://archive.mpi.nl/tla/elan. 
138 This was developed by Boersma and Weenick, and retrieved from http://www.praat.org in March 2019. 
Figure 18  Diagram representing room layout 
for video recording (not to scale) 
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Bird Elephant No goal 
Mean IOI (s) SD IOI (s) Mean IOI (s) SD IOI (s) Mean IOI (s) SD IOI (s) 
1240.7 
1694.5 
1221.9 
882.4 
1092.7 
1201.6 
1331.2 
984.5 
1203.4 
883.3 
1294.7 
955.8 
153.3 
211.0 
73.4 
114.7 
169.3 
124.8 
201.1 
98.7 
140.0 
74.7 
98.6 
149.6 
808.2 
1271 
1021.4 
1233.3 
1044.5 
1050.1 
1115.2 
603.5 
970.5 
1418.8 
843.5 
1431 
821.8 
1229.4 
1000.5 
967.7 
1113.2 
864.3 
80.1 
116.3 
96.3 
77.6 
75.9 
104.8 
165.8 
61.4 
162.6 
124.8 
172.3 
185.7 
61.3 
146.1 
76.5 
108.5 
48.1 
63.4 
854.6 
921.6 
921.2 
997.8 
905.9 
898.2 
68.0 
124.0 
182.8 
102.0 
79.7 
116.1 
1165.6 134.1 1044.9 107.1 916.5 112.1 
 
3.3.2 Bouts of synchrony - coder agreement 
Table 47 shows the bouts of joint synchrony extracted in each interaction condition - when they 
occurred, the average beat IOI and standard deviation of the beat IOIs (in ms), and how long the bout 
lasted. This also shows the bouts of joint synchrony coded (in one sitting) by two independent 
coders. Boxes highlighted in red show a bout which was identified by two coders, or by the 
experimenter and one coder; rows in yellow show bouts for which there was agreement by all three. 
 
 
 
Table 46  Mean and standard deviation IOI for each period of joint synchrony, in each interaction 
condition, with overall mean (and mean SD) at bottom of each column 
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Note: red shading: this period of joint synchrony was identified by the experimenter and one coder, or by both 
coders; yellow shading: this period of joint synchrony was identified by all three. 
Table 47  Bouts of joint synchrony in each interaction condition 
 
 
Bird interaction condition Coder 1 Coder 2 
Start of 
bout 
End of 
bout 
Mean 
IOI 
SD 
IOI 
Bout 
length 
Start End Success? Start End Success? 
00:48 00:53 1241 153 00:05    00:49 00:55 N 
00:59 01:06 1695 211 00:07       
01:06 01:21 1222 73 00:15 
01:08 01:32 Y 
   
01:22 01:28 882 115 00:06    
01:32 01:40 1093 169 00:08 01:32 01:48 N    
01:51 02:06 1202 125 00:15 01:48 02:08 Y    
     02:08 02:19 N    
02:19 02:27 1331 201 00:08 02:19 02:30 Y 02:19 02:25 N 
02:31 02:38 985 99 00:07 02:31 02:41 Y    
     02:41 02:52 N    
     02:52 03:14 N    
     03:31 03:45 Y    
     04:01 04:04 Y    
04:04 04:14 1203 140 00:10 
04:04 04:25 Y 
   
     04:17 04:24 Y 
     04:36 04:41 N    
     04:51 04:57 Y 04:51 04:57 Y 
     04:57 05:04 N    
05:08 05:16 883 75 00:08 05:09 05:14 Y 05:08 05:16 Y 
05:21 05:25 1295 99 00:04       
05:27 05:34 956 150 00:07       
Elephant interaction condition   
00:05 00:15 808 80 00:10       
00:23 00:30 1271 116 00:07       
00:30 00:34 1021 96 00:04 00:29 00:34 Y 00:30 00:33 Y 
00:37 00:42 1233 78 00:05 00:39 00:43 Y    
00:46 00:50 1045 76 00:04       
00:51 00:55 1050 105 00:04       
01:08 01:24 1115 166 00:16       
01:39 01:46 604 61 00:07       
01:50 02:10 971 163 00:20       
02:11 02:26 1419 125 00:15       
02:26 02:30 844 172 00:04       
02:46 02:57 1431 186 00:11       
03:12 03:16 822 61 00:04       
03:18 03:30 1229 146 00:12       
03:31 03:35 1001 76 00:04       
03:51 04:07 968 109 00:16       
04:16 04:25 1113 48 00:09       
04:40 04:52 864 63 00:12 04:42 04:58 Y 04:41 04:45 Y 
No-goal interaction condition   
00:11 00:18 855 68 00:07 00:12 00:26 N    
00:34 01:42 922 124 01:08 00:26 01:47 Y 00:32 02:08 Y 
01:54 02:07 921 183 00:13 01:47 02:07 N 
02:16 04:27 998 102 02:11 02:10 04:26 Y 02:10 04:24 Y 
04:46 04:54 906 80 00:08 04:46 05:12 N    
05:01 05:32 898 116 00:31 05:12 05:34 Y 05:00 05:32 Y 
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3.4 Gaze behaviour - no-goal condition 
Table 48 shows all of the points of convergence, and the gaze behaviour which occurred within one 
second before and after this point. Here, synchrony is the deviation between the note onsets of each 
participant; gaze before shows the onset of a gaze which either continues or finishes within one 
second before the point of convergence, and gaze after includes the onset of gaze which occurs 
within one second after the point of convergence. Both participants are included in the gaze analysis 
(black = AB and blue = CL). Most points of convergence are preceded by gaze by one or both 
participants; the rows highlighted in grey are points of convergence which don’t adhere to the 
pattern. 
 
Time Synchrony 
(ms) 
Pitch 
relationship 
Phrase 
location 
Gaze 
before? 
Gaze 
during? 
Gaze 
after? 
00:16.8 14 Octave End 00:15.7 Y N 
00:37.8 8 Octave End N N N 
00:41.6 77 Octave Start N N N 
00:52.8 157 Major 4-3 End 00:50.5 Y N 
00:51.9 Y N 
00:56.7 181 Octave Start N N 
01:08.7 234 Fifth End 00:59.1 Y N 
01:12.0 14 Fourth Start 01:11.2 Y N 
01:10.9 N N 
01:23.8 20 Third End 01:22.1 N N 
01:25.5 61 Third Start 01:24.9 N N 
01:39.5 120 Third End 01:33.5 Y139 N 
02:14.8 127 Fifth End 02:11.6 N N 
02:16.7 4 Unison Start N N N 
02:24.7 134 Third Start 02:24.4 Y N 
02:36.3 23 Third Start 02:35.5 Y N 
02:40.1 194 Octave Start 02:40.0 Y N 
03:09.9 140 Octave Start 03:03.5 N N 
03:25.6 170 Octave Start N N N 
03:37.8 37 Third End N N 03:37.9 
03:41.8 160 Minor third Start N N N 
 
139 With slight deviation, but still towards CL 
Table 48  Points of convergence and associated gaze behaviour in no-goal condition 
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03:52.0 65 Third End 03:51.8 Y N 
03:53.9 94 Octave Start 03:53.7 Y N 
04:17.7 35 Octave End 04:16.8 Y N 
04:21.8 203 Octave Start 04:21.7 Y N 
05:04.8 99 Octave Start N N N 
05:16.4 152 Octave End N N N 
05:19.9 47 Third Start 05:18.9 N N 
 
3.5 Gaze behaviour - elephant goal condition 
3.5.1 Turn-taking 
Table 49 displays the patterns of gaze aversion for turn onset and checking back afterwards. The time 
shown is the onset of the turn, gaze aversion documents the length of time after the end of the 
preceding gaze (if there is one), and checking back shows the length of time before the start of the 
checking gaze, if it occurs within 5 seconds of the turn onset. Again, the rows highlighted in grey 
display deviations from the usual pattern for turn-taking behaviour (gaze aversion beforehand, and 
checking afterwards) - always because they do not check back within five seconds of turn onset. 
 
Time Participant Gaze aversion (ms) Checking back (ms) 
00:05.4 PC 1930 3541 
00:11.3 PC 192 1796 
00:16.0 PC 221 2663 
00:20.1 SPC 674 1797 
00:22.1 PC 1198 4151 
00:24.9 SPC 372 18 
00:27.7 SPC 20 189 
00:28.9 PC 898 2588 
00:36.2 PC 3489 4608 
00:37.2 SPC 160 2163 
00:43.6 PC 1413 (none) 
00:44.1 SPC (at onset) 0 242 
01:03.3 PC 4404 4655 
01:04.3 SPC 159 3750 
01:28.4 PC 2494 3608 
Table 49  Turn-taking and associated gaze behaviour in elephant goal condition 
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01:29.1 SPC 2186 2317 
01:33.2 PC 61 (none) 
01:34.8 SPC 1100 1446 
02:32.0 PC 3309 3994 
02:32.3 SPC (none) (none) 
02:42.0 PC 583 2452 
02:42.4 SPC 423 213 
03:12.0 SPC 3779 2787 
03:12.7 PC 3533 (none) 
03:18.6 SPC 55 254 
03:30.8 PC 3919 1965 
03:31.6 SPC (none) (none) 
04:14.1 PC (none) 4517 
04:26.8 PC 233 (none) 
04:28.5 SPC (none) (none) 
04:45.3 SPC 1831 (none) 
04:45.4 PC 1029 (none) 
 
3.5.2 Periods of convergence 
Table 50 shows periods of convergence in the elephant-goal condition. Occasions marked * are 
characterised by synchrony very early on (removing the necessity for gaze to co-ordinate the 
moment) (PC gaze = black, SPC gaze = blue). Some of these overlap slightly with the turn-taking 
behaviour above (e.g. when one continues a turn, but the other joins in before they have finished). 
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Period of convergence Gaze Point of convergence? 
Start End Start End Time Synchrony 
(ms) 
Pitch 
relationship 
Mutual 
gaze? 
00:02.8 00:19.0 00:01.8 00:19.4 00:15.0 134 NC Y 
00:13.1 00:15.8 
00:24.9 00:27.7 00:24.9 00:26.8 00:26.4 270 Octave Y 
00:26.2 00:27.9 
00:30.0 00:33.2 00:28.5 00:32.3 00:32.0 63 Octave Y 
00:31.4 00:32.7 
00:38.7* 00:42.3 00:39.3 00:47.4     
00:40.7 00:42.2     
00:46.7* 00:57.4 00:55.2 00:57.6 00:56.5 183 NC Y 
00:55.1 00:58.9 
01:03.2* 01:06.6 01:03.5 01:04.2 01:04.8 146 Third N 
01:39.1 01:54.4 01:46.3 01:48.1 01:46.5 87 Fifth Y 
01:44.0 01:51.2 
01:56.3* 02:06.3       
02:07.2 02:30.0 02:11.5 02:14.2     
02:06.6 02:07.0     
  02:38.5 02:42.0 02:40.7 182 NC Y 
  02:36.0 02:41.3 
03:00.0 03:11.9 02:59.0 03:01.6 03:03.8 150 NC Y 
03:03.3 03:04.9 
03:06.5 03:08.3 03:08.5 51 Octave Y (before) 
03:00.5 03:09.2 
  03:23.9 03:25.4 03:25.3 39 NC Y 
  03:25.1 03:26.9 03:29.1 44 Fifth N 
  04:00.7 04:03.6 04:02.1 203 NC Y 
  04:01.0 04:03.3 
04:16.5* 04:25.6 04:18.6 04:23.5 04:23.1 70 Octave N 
04:37.1* 04:44.6 04:41.9 04:43.5     
04:40.3 04:44.4     
Table 50  Periods of convergence (with possible point of convergence) and associated gaze 
behaviour in the elephant goal condition 
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Appendix 4 - A note on group selection 
Human sociality depends on the capacities of individuals - we need to possess certain traits or 
predispositions to be able to engage with others. However, these social capacities or preferences 
only come to light in a group context (see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, who model the effects of 
individual co-operation on the whole population). This is especially pertinent for social preferences 
which are in fact potentially costly for individuals, but which benefit the group as a whole - as is often 
the case with prosocial or co-operative behaviour. It follows that, perhaps, in understanding the 
evolution of sociality or of co-operative behaviour, we should adapt our theory of selection to 
operate at a group level - considering the selective advantage or fitness of one group over another, 
rather than between competing individuals (and their traits, or genes). This theory is called group 
selection; in brief, it posits that social groups with norms of co-operation are likely to function more 
successfully than other groups, leading to the proliferation of more co-operative tendencies in 
subsequent generations (see original theory presented by Wynne-Edwards, 1962). 
This has been the subject of much scrutiny and debate. Something like group selection emerges from 
models of kin selection and reciprocity; others have argued that within-group differences are far 
more significant, and outweigh any effect of between-group selection (see e.g. Leigh, 2010; and West 
et al., 2007a, and the subsequent exchange - West et al., 2007b, and Wilson, 2007). This controversy 
is ongoing; however, there are some new avenues which offer a productive way forward. For 
example, multilevel selection theory acknowledges that selective processes can operate both on a 
within-group and a between-group level, and that both of these offer useful insights (Wilson & 
Sober, 1994; see also Wade et al., 2010 - in answer to Wild et al., 2009). In conditions of high within-
group conformity, for example, selection on a whole-group level might become more salient, 
perhaps then effecting overall shifts in altruistic behaviour on a population level (although the fitness 
benefits remain exclusively individual; see Wilson et al., 2008; see a computational model of this 
level in action in Gardner & Grafen, 2009). Another perspective is offered by niche construction 
theory: the group is not the unit of selection, but rather the selective environment, which itself 
selects or reinforces certain individual prosocial traits which are advantageous to the group as a 
whole. Finally, we could even consider group-level traits as the units of selection (rather than 
selecting groups, individuals, or genes).   
Group-level traits are not expressed by any single individual in the group, but emerge only from 
the structured organization of differentiated individuals. (Smaldino, 2014: 244) 
Social behaviour - whether it is a preference for co-operation, or the display of some sort of 
‘collaborative interdependence’ - is beneficial for groups and their individual members; this emerges 
only in a group context. 
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Traits at the level of individuals are the bedrock of human behavior and encompass the 
phenomenological experience of being human. But organization matters. Emergent group-level 
traits allow one group to outperform another, and they alter the physical and social environment, 
providing additional selection pressures and opportunities for new behaviors. (Smaldino, 2014: 
254) 
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